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Abstract
This  thesis aims to understand processes of innovation in digital media production. 
Traditional discourses  on digital media have tended to foreground the role of 
technology, its  effects  and its influences.  This thesis argues that a more rounded 
understanding of digital media can be obtained through considering the social, cultural, 
political and economic factors that also influence production.  Furthermore, traditional 
discourses of innovation - based on studies  of the manufacturing, industrial and 
knowledge-intensive business sectors - do not represent the types of innovation pertinent 
to production of  cultural artefacts in the digital media sector.
Whilst some recent studies have greatly rectified this deficit by foregrounding the specific 
qualities  of innovation in commercial digital media content production, this  thesis 
suggests that these studies can be complemented with qualitative research on production 
within the artistic sector, where processes  of creativity and innovation are combined 
with a non-commercial intentionality in producing digital media artefacts.
This  thesis takes a critical approach to traditional discourses on the role of technology 
and innovation.  Influenced by the Frankfurt School of critical theory, it sets out a 
theoretical framework where a socially, culturally and politically grounded aesthetic 
theory is  combined with a consideration to temporal situatedness  in Ireland’s current 
‘crisis’.  It situates Ireland as  a postcolonial state and explores how this postcoloniality 
has influenced artistic production and art critique.
This  framework forms the basis for an empirical study which explores  digital art 
production in Ireland from the micro-individual level, through to the meso-institutional 
and macro-political economic levels.  It does this using a combination of methods, from 
an ethnography of the digital art sector, qualitative interviews with artists and members 
of  art institutions, and case studies of  art works and events in the digital art sector.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Research
1.1 Introduction: Why Digital Art?
The aim of this research thesis is to explore innovation in digital media, specifically in 
the realm of the artistic sector.  There are a number of reasons for this choice of 
research theme.  
First, the ‘culture industries’ have been recognised at a government level as potentially 
important sites  of innovation and job creation in Ireland, as  in many other countries 
(Preston, 2001) - a potential role that has received increasing attention over the years. 
Forfás  (2006a) cited the creative arts along with digital media as important areas  through 
which economic growth could be fostered.  In 2009, the Western Development 
Commission published its  report on the importance of the creative sector in the West of 
Ireland.  They cited the importance of the sector, noting its  strong growth potential, the 
high quality of employment that it generates, and also its contribution to innovation in 
other sectors.  The report also noted how the sector plays an important social role, along 
with stimulating regional development (WDC, 2009). 
Second, particular economic attention has been drawn to the cultural and artistic sector 
following the financial and banking crisis  that emerged in Ireland in 2008.  During this 
time, the government convened the Global Irish Economic Forum, held through the 
department of Foreign Affairs  in September 2009.  This forum encouraged members of 
the Irish diaspora to contribute their thoughts  to a quasi ‘think-tank’ on economic 
recovery.  The forum included prominent business  professionals, but significantly, 
cultural producers were also invited to take part, with one of the eleven working groups 
focused on ‘what role can Ireland’s cultural and artistic capital play in developing our 
economy?’ (Global Irish Economic Forum report, September 2009, Dept of Foreign 
Affairs).  One major theme that emerged from the forum was  the ‘recognition of the 
importance of culture in promoting Ireland abroad and developing a unique brand for 
the country in new markets’ (ibid.).  This was on the backdrop of a report that the Irish 
government had asked the economist, Colm McCarthy to produce on massive public 
spending cuts, published in July 2009.  This  report had recommended the abolition of 
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several arts  institutions, including the Irish Film Board and Culture Ireland, along with 
the removal of the department of the arts  (which would leave Ireland as  the only 
member of  the EU without such a senior department).
Third, it has  been established that knowledge-intensive industries innovate differently 
from technical, pharmaceutical and manufacturing industries (Boden & Miles 2000, 
Howells  & Tether 2004, Cawley & Preston 2004).  There is  more reliance on tacit 
knowledge in these industries than is traditionally understood within the 
pharmaceutical, manufacturing, and industrial sectors.  Script/content, authoring and 
design are cited as crucial knowledge functions of the media industries, and equivalent 
to traditionally understood R&D functions.  Within these knowledge-intensive service 
industries are a subset of industries  that include the media and cultural sector.  In this 
sector, specific types  of creative, imaginative and intuitive forms of knowledge 
production play an especially important role.  The innovation process in the media 
services  draws on very distinct forms of knowledge, including creative, aesthetic, 
authoring and design capabilities or competencies, as well as tacit skills and experience-
based knowledge.  
Fourth, the arts  sector is a specific segment of these creative industries, and provides a 
source of research into those distinct forms of knowledge production that shape, 
enhance and grow innovative practices.   The cultural industries are largely driven by 
producing content for mass-consumption.  In contrast to this, the artistic sector - while 
of course needing to function in capitalist societies  - provides  content that is often less 
driven by mass-consumption, or industrial modes of production, and where questions of 
artistic autonomy, social critique and even political comment are pertinent to the 
content producers.  This sub-sector can be seen as complementary to the mass-media 
segments  of the creative industries.  Within the artistic sector is  a cohort of artists  who 
engage with digital technologies to varying degrees  in their practices - both as tools and 
as  an aesthetic medium in its own right.  Therefore, this sector provides  a rich field of 
insight into the specific skills, innovative practices, technological competencies and 
content production that have already been established as being crucial to innovation in 
knowledge-intensive sectors.   
15
Thus, there exists a complex nexus of individual, social, cultural, political and economic 
factors linking the production of cultural artefacts in Ireland.  This  is particularly so 
within the artistic sector, where issues of intentionality, expression and critique converge 
with traditional discourses  of innovation.  It is  therefore important that when 
considering broader implications  for government policy regarding the ‘smart economy’ - 
and its close association with an encouragement of creativity and innovation - to have a 
rounded, thorough understanding of how the factors  named above, shape, foster or 
hinder innovative and creative practices.
In this  thesis then, the overall scope of the research is to investigate innovation in digital 
media through an analysis of the digital art sector in Ireland.  It queries how artists 
appropriate digital tools for the production of digital art works.  It explores what the 
potential sites  of innovation are in the digital art sector and maps  where that ‘R&D’ 
function exists for digital artists.  The thesis also addresses innovation in digital media 
artistic production from the perspective of gatekeeping, enablement and support of 
digital practices.  It problematises  issues of support and representation of digital art and 
suggests conceptual, theoretical and visceral ‘specificities’ of digital art that potentially 
hinder its  production in Ireland.  It also examines  the broader cultural, social and 
political situatedness of the sector and includes an analysis of policy-level discourses 
around ‘crisis’ and how in Ireland, art has  become situated as  a ‘rescuer’ for the 
country’s  fiscal issues.  It problematises this  ‘turn to culture’ in the context of previous 
discourses about art, culture and the ‘role’ of  art. 
This  thesis comprises  several strands  that methodologically provide a holistic mapping of 
the digital art sector.  Along with the qualitative method of in-depth interviews with key 
actors  in the sector, from artists  to gatekeepers and cultural theorists, the sector is 
mapped through an ethnography of selected galleries, workshops and talks.  This 
ethnography allows for an account of the sector that also enables the inclusion of a 
number of case-studies  of specific artworks and arts  organisations that serve as a 
complement to the interview data.  
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1.2 A Process-Based Depth Model of  Enquiry
During the initial review of prior research, it became clear that this research project 
could potentially focus on the technological innovations that diffuse within digital art in 
Ireland; for example software imaging programs, digital video, digital signal processing, 
high-definition film formats  etc.  Such a focus  could adopt a technology-centric 
framework to justify this  approach.  There are many such justifications available, 
attesting to the autonomy of technology and its effects, and whilst the sector or object of 
study does  not pre-determine the theoretical perspective (i.e. ‘technological determinist’ 
studies of media content and culture are also in evidence, not just tech-centric studies of 
software and hardware technologies), nonetheless  such an approach was  deemed 
inappropriate for this research.
The relationship between new technologies, their adoption and their use is  highly 
complex (Rogers 1966/1995).  Their diffusion and appropriation cannot be explained 
through traditional determinist approaches which suggest the technology is  autonomous 
and outside the bounds of societal influences.  Instead, the review of the literature has 
elucidated that the diffusion of innovations and technologies is  governed by complex 
societal, cultural, political and even personal factors.
With this in mind, the focus  of this research will centre on the innovative processes within 
the digital art sector, as  opposed to a concentration on the technological innovations. 
This  approach is  being taken in order to provide an understanding of the digital art 
sector that does  not prioritise technology over individual volition, or societal factors or 
political ones.  Instead this approach aims to consider the interrelationships between the 
technology, the artist, and the complex political, cultural and social domains in which 
they are situated.
The research tracks the interplay of (1) individual, (2) social, (3) cultural, (4) political and 
(5) economic factors  from the micro level of analysis, to how the meso, institutional level 
shapes  and influences the micro level, while it is  itself also shaped by social and cultural 
factors.  I also follow the interplay of factors  through to the macro level, where political 
and economic factors shape policy decisions  on innovation, the creative industries and 
ultimately the ‘smart economy’.
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In adopting this three-level approach (micro, meso and macro), my aim is  to provide a 
depth-model to help understand the innovative and creative processes  that policy drivers 
wish to encourage, whilst also taking into account the many-layered aspects  to cultural 
production.  The intention of this  depth-model is  to avoid a ‘flat’ understanding of 
cultural production.  
This  model works as follows: prioritising intentionality, creativity and situatedness  at a 
micro-level provides  an understanding that places the individual ‘cultural creator’ as an 
innovator in their own right, whilst also acknowledging that the individual is also 
situated in a broader cultural and societal domain.  
Then, at this second, meso level, the model reveals  how questions of cultural 
gatekeeping and programming arise.  Thus, a meso-level institutional analysis can be 
applied in order to understand the social and cultural dimensions to innovation.  
Just as the individual cultural creator is  situated however, so are the meso-level 
institutions themselves situated within a larger, macro-level system.  The depth model 
allows for an investigation into this  macro level, which helps to situate the individual 
processes of the cultural creator, the cultural and social processes  at play at the meso-
level institutional level, within a macro-level layer that takes  account of broader political 
and economic forces that also shape innovative practices.
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1.3 Goals, Questions and Themes
As outlined in sections 1.1 and 1.2, the primary goal of this research is to adopt a 
process-based depth model to investigate innovation in the production of culture, 
specifically through a study of the digital art sector in Ireland.  This  broad goal is 
achieved by setting out a number of questions, explorations of which will break apart 
and elucidate the individual, social, cultural, political and economic factors that pertain 
to this  study of digital art in Ireland.  I propose to explore these thematic questions by a 
combination of  methods that I describe in section 1.6 and further analyse in chapter 6.
1.3.1 The Key Question
The research centres around the major question: how do artists innovate by interacting with 
(using, appropriating) digital technologies to produce artistic works in contemporary Ireland?  This 
major question raises  some sub-questions, broadly themed under the five areas  of (1) 
socio-cultural situatedness, (2) art, (3) technology, (4) innovation and (5) the political-
economic dimension.  It is  difficult to separate these themes  in the body of this  research 
thesis.  For example, art and technology are often understandably discussed alongside 
each other during interviews  with digital art practitioners.  Thus, the key themes are 
treated in the main thesis  as  interrelated, dialoguing strands of enquiry.  However, my 
attempt in this section is to cluster the the sub-questions in a thematic way, in order to 
clarify the broad parameters of  what is an interdisciplinary approach to the research.
1.3.2 The Sub-Questions
The first set of questions are centred around the theme of cultural or socio-cultural 
situatedness.  This theme underpins  much of the thesis  - how the artist is  situated within 
a broader cultural and societal domain, how gatekeepers  are situated within institutional 
contexts, and how institutions  themselves are situated within political and economic 
contexts.  To interrogate this further, I propose to explore the specificities  of cultural and 
historical situatedness, the specificities of cultural and historical situatedness of artistic 
practices and appropriations of digital technologies in the contemporary Irish setting. 
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Irish cultural identity is  complex, having moved from a colony of the British empire to a 
post-colonial and late-developing society.  What is  striking and specific about this 
identity is that Ireland became a post-colonial entity during a historical period of rapid 
technological, cultural and social change comparable to that of the digital era - that of 
high modernism.  Thus, the questions that I wish to engage with concerning this theme 
are: how can we understand being culturally situated in contemporary Ireland?  How is the 
contemporary digital age comparable with high modernism?  How is Irish post-coloniality reflected in the 
Irish art world?
On the second theme of art, existing critiques of art by scholars such as Adorno, 
Benjamin, Bourdieu and Lovejoy discuss art within broader social, cultural, political and 
even digital contexts.  However, providing a conceptualisation of art itself is  complex, 
being at once introspective, historically situated and also necessarily intellectually 
grounded, in this  case, for the context of digital media production and a deep political-
economic ‘crisis’.  Thus, my themed questions about art are: what is my conceptualisation of 
art - including digital art - for the purposes of this research?  What is the role of art, especially 
contemporary and/or digital art?  What is the function of art? How is art produced and represented in 
Ireland, and, in particular, the role and place of  the digital in contemporary art practices?
On the third theme of technology, I wish to engage with the role and influence of the 
ICTs in artistic practice.  In studies of innovation within services, it is  acknowledged that 
technology, whilst necessary in some contexts, is not sufficient to produce innovations, 
and that the ‘soft’ skills such as tacit, design and authoring knowledge are important 
factors.  Yet, digital media ICTs also comprise materially distinct and novel vehicles  for 
expression, just as  canvas is for the traditional media artist.  Walter Benjamin advised 
the artist not to be dazzled by the spectacular effects  the new technologies  could afford, 
and instead advised the artist to make the technology a vehicle for their own 
autonomous voice.  However, the ‘spectacular effects’ potentially offer both 
opportunities  and challenges  to artistic autonomy, with the artist being challenged to 
adopt and embrace the new technologies whilst at once not succumbing to some of the 
‘hype’ and rhetoric that often accompanies  discourse around technology, but instead, 
mounting a critique of the means of production of their day.  Thus, I posit these 
questions  in relation to technology: are the ICTs a tool only, a medium only, or both a tool and a 
medium?  What is the digital artists’ relationship with technology in contemporary Ireland?  Can and do 
artists critique cultural and socio-political trends and issues using the technological means of  their day?
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Theme four is  concerned with ideas of innovation.  Considering the artist within 
culture, society and technology situates the artist as an innovator with various 
knowledges and competencies.  However, the artist at the micro level, and the arts 
institutions at the meso level are themselves situated within a political structure, 
consisting of policies and frameworks that can either support or hinder innovative 
practices from the top down macro level of analysis.  Thus, I wish to explore questions 
of policy discourse on innovation.  Specifically, I ask: how does existing policy discourse on 
innovation apply to the the art domain of the cultural sector, and especially to the digital media artist? 
How are digital artists represented at meso and macro levels?  How are they supported through state 
funding?  How is digital art critiqued, and its status or role valued or evaluated, by cultural gatekeepers 
at meso and macro levels?
 
The fifth theme centres around art practices  and how they are viewed in the political 
realm.  I investigate how artistic production is viewed within a wider political structure, 
whilst also exploring how artists interact with political structures.  This theme is also on 
the backdrop of economic, social and cultural crisis.  The questions around this theme 
are: what role do the arts have during the time of crisis in Ireland?  How do artists see their role, 
politically?  
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1.4 The Overall Theoretical Framework
Having introduced the broad parameters and key questions of the research, I now turn 
to map more fully the theoretical framework that underpins the research.  As  outlined in 
section 1.2, my approach is  process-based, and it incorporates a framework whereby (a) 
the micro-level individual, (b) the meso-level social and cultural, and (c) the macro-level 
political and economic systems are considered.  This  approach enables  a mapping of 
the contextual setting of the sector, even if it is challenging for its  unknowns, rather than 
to utilise existing frameworks in situ as it were.
The framework can be thought of as  comprising three ‘segments’, corresponding to the 
major considerations  of the individual or ‘I’, the cultural/social or ‘We’, and the systems 
or ‘It’ realms  of research, as described above1.  There are a number of ways in which 
these three segments  can be considered.  Each individual segment can be considered in 
its own idiom, research on which would garner a thorough but contextual grounding in 
the area of choice.  For example, applying systems theories to innovation would give an 
overview of the complexities at a macro, ‘It’ level.  This  suggests  that conducting 
research into the psychology of innovation could give an insight into the micro ‘I’ level, 
and conducting research into cultural production and social shaping would garner 
insights into the meso ‘We’ level.
The framework can be mapped to the research on digital art in Ireland, by engaging 
with theories and scholars who have considered the micro, meso and macro levels  of 
research on the main themes of the research - art, situatedness, technology, innovation 
and the political.
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2 Influenced by the work of  Ken Wilber (2001)
1.5 Applying the Framework to Relevant Literature
I believe that the tripartite framework proposed above provides  a robust basis by which 
the literature and concepts  relevant to the current study can be categorised, understood 
and evaluated.  This  framework also structures the research and guides it with due 
consideration to the complex production nexus of the digital media realm from (a) 
ground-level individual factors, through to (b) the broader social and cultural domains, 
and onwards to (c) the political and economic realms.
To summarise how the framework can guide appropriate research into the specific 
subject of innovation in digital media art in Ireland, I now introduce an application of 
the framework to the themes and subjects with which I have engaged in the review of 
existing literature.  Some theorists and theories  will be artificially divided between micro, 
meso and macro for the sake of clarity.  However, in the body of the research, the key 
themes of  the research, and the three levels of  enquiry are much more interlinked.  
1.5.1 Situatedness and Agency at the Micro Level
The main research concerns at this level are how the artist interacts  with technology, 
how they see their broader role in society, and how they interact with arts institutions.
An enquiry into the macro-level factors of artistic production could potentially start by 
investigating psychological theories  of creativity and innovation.  There is  much work on 
this  subject, the work of Tanja Sophie Schweizer being a good example of this2.  So too 
is the work of Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi (1996) who has  researched extensively on the 
subject of creativity and the creative process individuals, analysing distinguishing 
characteristics and personality traits of  creative people.
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2 Schweizer (2006) has proposed a neurocognitive model for innovation, creativity and novelty-seeking. 
She reveals that from a neuropsychological perspective,  individuals with high levels of novelty-seeking 
behaviour have certain personality traits  requiring deliberate consideration in the workplace (Schweizer 
2006). What is interesting about this postulation is that Schweizer not only considers the psychological 
consequences for the individual who has  these personality traits, but she also considers  the economic 
consequences for the companies who employ such individuals. This work is therefore valuable for offering 
an insight and potentially a management resource for the creative and cultural industries, who seek to 
employ and retain innovative, creative individuals in order to grow their business.
However, an in-depth study of psychological traits and neurocognitive tendencies  was 
deemed at an early stage of the research to potentially lead the work down a complex, 
medical route.  It was thus decided that in exploring the ‘I’, it is  a social, situated, 
networked ‘I’ that is considered.  This is  partly influenced by the work of Carl Jung. 
Jung is  best known as  a psychologist, but particularly in works such as The Undiscovered 
Self (1958) he situated the psychological self, and the self ’s associations  with autonomy 
and agency, within a social world, associated with structure.  Of course, this  agency 
versus structure debate has a long history in analyses of cultural and social phenomena. 
One recent manifestation arises in debates on the role of digital technology and its 
relation to cultural change.  The Actor-Network Theory of Bruno Latour, during a 
review of literature of technology and society was shown to have implications for the 
micro level, despite being more broadly operational on a meso level.  Thus, agency with 
respect to technology is  also of concern here, and broad theories  of the technology/
society relationship have influenced the research with respect to individual artists.
In terms of the artist as  a situated producer of cultural texts, the work of Theodor 
Adorno has  been highly influential for this  particular study in framing the macro-level 
enquiry to a situated ‘I’, even though, again, his work and that of the Frankfurt School 
straddled the various  levels  of enquiry.  Adorno posited a Marxist-influenced approach 
to cultural production in the modern setting, which had as a concern, the social, cultural 
and political influences on the situated individual.
1.5.2 Production and Gatekeeping at the Meso Level
The main research concerns at the meso level are how institutions approach digital art, 
how they conceptualise, define and serve to shape and inform the practices of digital 
artists, and how they see the state in terms  of funding and policy-making for the arts. 
The concerns  also centre around the institutions’ relationships with artists, and the 
gatekeeping and taste making ‘currencies’ of the art world.  This level of enquiry also 
focuses on a socially grounded view of  technology.
Technological determinism promotes the idea that agency lies  primarily with 
technologies; that the technologies  are somehow autonomous and outside the influence 
of societal factors.  It suggests that the technology acts upon society whilst standing 
24
outside society (McLuhan, 1962, 1964, 1967; Castells, 1999).  Such approaches imply 
that technology operates  at a macro level, outside of societal and cultural domains.  Yet 
this  standpoint has proven to be problematic.  By placing agency primarily with the 
technologies, it homogenises society and ignores influences on the origins and uses of 
new technologies.  It can promote a form of hype around new technologies, and thus 
can lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy, where society appears powerless  to act upon it, 
thereby relinquishing power to the technology itself.  
The social construction of technology approach attempted to delve further into the 
nuanced relationship between technology and society.  Raymond Williams was a major 
innovator in this field, positing the view that there is a cause-and-effect relationship 
between technology and society which is  usually ignored by the technological 
determinists  (Williams, 1974).  MacKenzie and Wajcman (1985) explored this 
relationship further in their work entitled The Social Shaping of Technology.  They proposed 
a more nuanced relationship between technology and society, noting that technology 
can be shaped by many different social factors, for example, cultural prejudice, science, 
existing technologies, context within a system, and path dependence.       
While the social construction of technology approach (SCOT) considered the 
complexities  and nuances involved in the relationship between society and technology, it 
can be critiqued for undervaluing the role that technology may play in shaping society. 
This  critique applies to social shaping of technology in its ‘hardest’ form.  However, a 
further approach to the technology/society relationship, known as actor-network theory 
(ANT) has  been advanced, which synthesises  the view of both theoretical approaches. 
Bruno Latour, a major proponent of the ANT approach, suggests that technology and 
society are mutually constitutive.  A key tenet of ANT is  that society is intrinsically 
networked in nature, thus  allowing for the standpoint that a technology can effect a 
societal network, but importantly that the technology is not outside the network and can 
itself be affected through being part of the hybrid network (Law, 1992; Lister, Dovey, 
Giddings, Grant, and Kelly, 2003, 2009).
A second aspect of enquiry at the meso level of analysis  is that of cultural production 
and art.  Within the cultural studies  canon, there has  been a movement to conceptually 
group cultural artefacts that are produced for commercial reasons with cultural artefacts 
whose primary function is not for mass-consumption in a commercial way.  The 
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movement regards  all of these artefacts  as  cultural texts, and, also homogenises original 
creative works  with interpretations or reworkings of existing texts (Hesmondhalgh 2007). 
Some cultural studies theorists, in asserting that there should not be a distinction 
between the validity of high art and popular culture have attested to the power of the 
consumer to interpret texts, thereby downgrading the status of the creator of such texts 
(Fiske 1989a).  This  ‘active audience/viewer‘ trope of cultural studies has also been 
emphasised as a particularly prominent feature of modern art, according to many art-
world theorists.  However, this  has gone as far as to suggest that the consumer can 
subvert the capitalist ideologies  marked by popular culture, but this  is a highly contested 
stance.  For example, David Morley (2006) has called for the field of cultural studies  to 
also consider high culture as an important area of  research.
In contrast to this stance, critical theory can provide an alternate model of cultural 
production which considers not just cultural tastes  of consumers, but how the consumers 
are culturally situated.  Theodor Adorno has critiqued popular culture and challenged 
the view that the individual consumer has power within that meso level dynamic 
(Adorno, 1991).  He notes that the primary aim of the ‘culture industries’ is  not to 
inform, or even entertain its consumers, but to make a profit.  In a sense, the consumer 
is being used as  a money-making tool within a broader institutional domain.  This  calls 
into question the content being produced by the culture industries, as  it is being created 
for profit and not primarily for pure expression or with consideration to aesthetics or 
truth.  Far from being elitist, as  has often been suggested of Adorno (Adorno, 1991), his 
concern is  that by homogenising the study of high art with popular culture, the specific 
features of both fields  are not fully respected.  Walter Benjamin, a contemporary of 
Adorno, also warned of the dangers of commodification of culture.  Whilst attesting to 
the emancipatory possibilities  that emerge with mechanical reproduction, Benjamin also 
warns that the resulting loss  of the genuine artistic ‘aura’ can lead to a loss  of meaning, 
thereby commodifying the cultural text (Benjamin et al, 2008).
The third area of enquiry at this meso level is  that of gatekeeping and taste making in 
the arts.  Here, the work of Pierre Bourdieu also firmly situates the question of cultural 
production and cultural appropriation at the meso and also macro levels  of analysis.  He 
has questioned the notion of a ‘pure’ micro level aesthetic experience, instead positing 
that aesthetic taste is appropriated in a complex nexus of social, cultural and economic 
factors.  He has provided, in his works  Distinction (1984) and The Rules of Art (1996), an 
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exegesis  on the concept of cultural capital, whereby economic and financial capital can 
be exchanged for cultural goods, thus increasing symbolic capital, or status.  Bourdieu 
treats cultural production ‘as  “position taking” in a field of possibilities, a market in 
which symbolic capital or cultural distinction are product, reward and resource: both 
means and end’ (Jenkins 2002: xii).  Whilst this is  a stance that is  easily critiqued for its 
reductionism, nonetheless it provides a further model around which discussions  about 
cultural gatekeeping and taste making by the art institutions and art critics, can be 
opened up.  
An alternate institutionalist approach to cultural production emerged in the US in the 
1970s, and is  appropriate to this  research for its unpacking of a production nexus with 
regard to the different sub-fields of culture.  This  school of thought attempted a 
practical and systematic meso-level analysis  of the interconnected factors  involved in the 
production of culture,addressing culture within social and economic contexts.  Central 
figures  in this approach include Richard Peterson, Narasimhan Anand, Paul Hirsch, 
Howard Becker and Diana Crane.
Applying this  to Ireland reveals tensions at the meso level.  The postcolonial theories of 
Spivak and Bhabha help to contextualise the Irish cultural identity, and in keeping with 
the theme of ‘situatedness’, this provides  a historical, political and cultural relevance to 
artistic production in Ireland.  Luke Gibbons and Terence Brown help to examine Irish 
identity more granularly.  Finally, the work of Cyril Barrett, Tom Duddy and Declan 
McGonagle further contextualise Irish postcolonial identity to art critique in Ireland.
Refining the subject matter further, the survey of existing literature has also given 
consideration to theories  of digital art.  The work of Margot Lovejoy is  considered for 
her wide-ranging overview of digital art, whilst also acknowledging the work of Walter 
Benjamin, and applying it to the digital age.  Lovejoy’s work thus provides a continuity 
within a theoretical frame that employs a history-friendly approach.  Along with 
Lovejoy, Lev Manovich has  attempted a survey of the specificities of digital art and new 
media.   Domenico Quaranta has problematised how new media and contemporary 
discourses on art both relate to digital media, and Martin Lister has provided an 
overview of key debates  in the recent literature on new media.  Finally, Nicolas 
Bourriaud addresses  the debate between modernist and postmodernist concepts in art 
through positing a conceptual frame called ‘altermodernity’.  Through these more 
27
contemporary works, the literature review explores  how the specificities of digital art - 
the aesthetics, the concerns, the possibilities - can be better understood.
1.5.3 Innovation, the Crisis and the State at the Macro Level
At the macro level enquiry, the main research concerns are of the state and the arts, the 
crisis  (a crisis  that is not just economic and financial, but social and cultural), the state’s 
foregrounding of the arts  since the Global Irish Forum at Farmleigh, and how these 
discourses map to policy.  First though, this level of enquiry is  concerned with systems  of 
innovation.
Traditional frameworks of innovation tend to priorities  the macro level, focusing on 
national and regional systems, to explain modalities of innovation, with the 
manufacturing sector as  the default site of analysis.  Recent decades have seen 
complementary systems theories of innovation, posited by Lundvall (1992) and Nelson 
(1993), including some focused on sectoral specificities.  Nelson explained the 
importance of empirical research on a country-by-country approach, whereas Lundvall 
suggested approaching the subject in a more thematic way.  Mjoset applied an approach 
similar to Nelson in his 1992 study, including Ireland in a six-country study of national 
systems of innovation (Mjoset, 1992).  Evolutionary theory has also influenced the 
systems of innovation approach, suggesting that innovators  produce artefacts  that are 
progressively superior to previous  artefacts  currently in existence (Edquist, 1997).  This 
literature also yields the concept of ‘path dependence’ which can be fruitfully adapted to 
understand the parameters shaping innovation in the domain of  digital art.
However, prior studies also identify certain flaws  and gaps these frameworks.  The social 
shaping of technology poses challenges to the evolutionary framework of what 
constitutes  ‘better’ in technological development.  It points out that what might be 
considered a ‘better’ technology in some areas  might not be considered ‘better’ in 
others.  It also reveals that sometimes the ‘best’ technology does  not necessarily become 
widely adopted (MacKenzie & Wajcman, 1999).  Therefore, what could hold on a 
macro, supra-national context may, like technological determinism, not take into 
account some nuances  in the innovation process, such as the meso level social factors 
that might cause an innovation to be either adopted or rejected (Rogers, 1966/1995).
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Early studies of systems of innovation approaches  focused on national systems.  They 
were also critiqued for being too particular to specific industries (Nelson & Rosenberg, 
1993), the authors thus calling for a sectoral approach to innovation.  Works such as 
Pavitt and Patel (1991) attempted this, but only attempted to categorise more traditional 
or ‘high-tech’ industrial sectors.  However, more recent work on services  innovation 
yields evidence on how services innovation is very different to innovation processes in 
manufacturing, ‘high tech’, or technology supplying sectors.  This points  to an argument 
that the services sector warrants its  own field of study.  Boden & Miles (2000) noted that 
in traditional frameworks of innovation, the services sector has been largely ignored. 
Howells  & Tether (2004) also explained the importance of researching innovation in the 
services  sector by noting how the services  sector accounts for a majority of employment 
and GDP in developed countries.
Within the recent research on innovation in the services sector, much attention falls  on 
the knowledge-intensive services (K-IBS).  However, most of the research engaging with 
K-IBS has focused on innovation in computer services  and related managerial systems 
or business  services.  These may be viewed as equivalents  to ‘high tech’ services, but 
which are very distinct and different to the media and cultural services sectors  on several 
counts.  In terms of innovative practices, there can be a ‘special case’ made for content 
production within the digital media sector, where traditional concepts  of ‘research and 
development’ have their equivalents in the form of tacit knowledge, creative, authoring 
and design skills and content creation abilities (Cawley and Preston, 2004).  The authors 
note that the software/technical knowledge is  just one factor in this  sector, observing 
that the most crucial supports  or enablers  of innovation in the sector also comprise 
novelty, entrepreneurship and idea-generation.  This  strand is further analysed and 
contextualised to digital media production in Ireland by Preston, Kerr and Cawley 
(2009).  Their work provides an interdisciplinary conceptual and empirical frame in 
which to situate processes and practices in the area of digital media content production, 
and provides a contextualisation for digital media artistic production in Ireland. 
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1.6  Methodology 
1.6.1. A post-positivist methodological framework
This  research thesis  employs  methodologies  that are essentially post-positivist.  Whilst 
positivist approach has links with the ‘scientific method’, is  associated with ‘objectivity’ 
and ‘verifiability’, it has limitations when applied to studies  of culture.  A post-positivist 
framework however, takes  account of a multiplicity of potential knowledges, attests  to a 
relative, not absolute, relativity and thus considers ‘situatedness’ in its approaches. 
1.6.2 Qualitative Methods
In keeping with a three-segment theoretical framework, I have employed 
methodological techniques  of interviewing participants related to both the micro-level 
and meso-level influences.  These interviews  also provide an insight into macro-level 
discourses on funding, policy and the crisis, through engaging with participants  who are 
practicing digital artists and representatives of  arts organisations and institutions.
The methodological practice of ethnography has also been employed throughout the 
duration of the research project.  This has included becoming involved with a digital 
arts  and technology group in Dublin, regular gallery visits, and attending workshops on 
the artistic application of technologies.  This  is further complemented by the third 
methodological approach of case studies  of artistic works and events  in the digital art 
sector.
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1.7  Thesis Guide and Chapter Outline
1.7.1 Thesis Guide
Following on from this introduction, this  thesis will first analyse existing literature in the 
fields  of technology and society, innovation, theories  of art, cultural production, 
postcolonialism and Irish cultural identity.  This is followed by a chapter outlining the 
methodologies  employed (chapter 6), a brief overview of empirical findings (chapter 7), 
three chapters  devoted to primary research findings  (chapters  8-10) and a concluding 
chapter (chapter 11).  
Chapters 2-5 explore the various  subsets of existing literature that are relevant to this 
research approach to digital art in Ireland.  This is to introduce the reader to the various 
sets  of knowledge that have informed this  thesis.  As  this introductory chapter has 
outlined, the thesis encompasses five major themes  across three levels  of enquiry.  Thus, 
chapters 2-5 aim to provide a theoretical grounding that may be discussed across the 
themes and through the levels.  For example, whilst chapter 2 discusses  technology and 
its relationship with society, those theoretical perspectives are then applied in chapters 
8-10 in specific ways according to the three level approach.  Thus, in chapter 8, I discuss 
individual, or micro level opinions  and concerns of artists working with technology, in 
chapter 9 I investigate technology at the meso level through a problematisation of 
technology at the level of gatekeepers  at art museums, and in chapter 10 I interrogate 
how state institutions for the arts perceive a technology-focused artistic practice at a 
macro level.  This general principle applies for all five themes across all three levels.
To guide the reader through this thesis, I suggest that the key themes be borne in mind, 
along with the overall aim of the thesis which is  to explore, problematise and understand 
digital media cultural production in Ireland at three levels.  Nonetheless, there is an 
attempt to focus  in chapter 8 on the micro level of enquiry, in chapter 9 on the meso level, 
and in chapter 10 on the macro level.  Thus, the reader will see that in chapter 8, 
formulations of the ‘digital aesthetic’ first introduced in chapter 4 will be discussed with 
individual artists at the micro level of enquiry.  Chapter 8 also includes  micro-level 
accounts of the role of technology in arts  practice, along with a formulation of how 
artists innovate through three ‘features’ or characteristics of  digital art.
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The meso level of enquiry is foregrounded in chapter 9 where the opinions and 
concerns of the individual artists are taken as  being ‘in discussion’ with the meso-level 
gatekeepers in arts  institutions.  This  is to mirror the assertion in this introductory 
chapter that the three levels overlap, interact and dialogue with each other.  Thus, whilst 
in chapter 9 I do include a problematisation of digital art practices  from the micro level, 
where artists  consider digital art to be under represented in Ireland, the chapter also 
introduces perspectives from the meso level, where gatekeepers at arts institutions reveal 
issues of  collection, acquisition, exhibition, display and archival of  digital works. 
Again, whilst it is in practical terms  nigh on impossible to separate the three, dialoguing 
levels of enquiry, an attempt is made in chapter 10 to foreground the macro level of 
enquiry, through analyses  of the ‘role’ of art at a state level, an investigation of state-
sponsored cultural funding bodies  in Ireland and a case study of the state broadcaster 
with respect to art and culture.  The methodology of case study is  used again in this 
chapter with an analysis  of funding for digital art through the case of a digital arts 
group.
In the next section below, I describe more granularly, chapter by chapter, what is 
included in this  thesis, in an attempt to provide a ‘roadmap’ through the themes and 
levels of  the thesis.
1.7.2 Thesis Chapter Outline
Chapter 2 starts by analysing theories  of technology, including that of technological 
determinism.  This determinist perspective is then critiqued through theories of society 
in which technology is  situated and contextualised.  The work of McLuhan and 
Williams are discussed, and a third theory - actor-network theory - is  then introduced as 
a ‘third way’ to interpret the place of technology in society.  The chapter then moves on 
to a discourse on innovation - the processes  and the systems  involved in innovation.  It 
then looks at diffusion of  innovations, and how new innovations are adopted.
Chapter 3 moves  on to look at the production of culture.  It starts  by providing an 
analysis of the Frankfurt School of critical theory through the work of Walter Benjamin 
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and Theodor Adorno, along with some personal correspondence between them, where 
they debated the role of art and the potential of new media.  It also introduces the 
concept of the ‘culture industry’ through the writings of Adorno.  The chapter then 
provides an alternate view to the production of culture through the work of Richard 
Peterson and others.  This  perspective is  then critiqued through the critical theory of the 
Frankfurt School.  Finally, the chapter introduces the cultural theories of Pierre 
Bourdieu.
Chapter 4 moves into the subject area of art, looking at perspectives on art through 
cultural studies scholars such as Hesmondhalgh and Fiske.  It critiques the cultural 
studies perspectives on art by introducing the work of Simon O’Sullivan and his theory 
of art as an encounter.  The chapter then moves  on to consider specifically digital art 
and aesthetics through the work of Lovejoy, Wood, Lister et al., Manovich, Quaranta 
and Bourriaud.
Chapter 5 is  concerned with situating the research to Ireland.  It explores postcolonial 
theory and Irish cultural identity since 1922.  Concepts such as  the social shaping of 
culture are explored with respect to Irish identity.  The nexus of nationhood, identity 
and culture are explored, as is  globalisation.  The chapter also includes a critique of 
postcoloniality in Irish art criticism by an analysis of works by Irish cultural theorists  as 
Tom Duddy, Luke Gibbons, Declan McGonagle and Ian Kilroy.
Chapter 6 centres on an outline of the methodological approaches.  The justification for 
the methodology is expanded, as  is  the implementation of the methodologies  of 
interviewing, case study and ethnography.
Chapter 7 introduces  the empirical research on a themed basis and posits a ‘spectrum’ 
hypothesis  of attitudes, practices  and acceptances.  It outlines the main themes that 
emerged during the research including innovation and the digital aesthetic, support and 
enablement of  digital art practices, and the arts and digital art at a time of  crisis.
Chapter 8 opens with the theme of technology - its use as a tool and/or medium, and its 
role in digital art.  It explores the digital aesthetic which pays attention to a mode of 
production that incorporates  technology, whilst being critical of it.  It examines 
collaborative practices  in terms of sites  of innovation.  It considers  the use of open 
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source software in what is considered to be a political move on the part of artists, and it 
explores  the practice of ‘repurposing’ materials  in digital art practice as an act of either 
incremental or radical innovation.
Chapter 9 addresses the theme of support and enablement of digital art practices.  It 
engages with issues of representation of digital art in galleries, problematises  as to why 
cultural gatekeepers can be conceptually and ideologically opposed to foregrounding 
digital art practices, and it explores attitudes  adopted and strategies employed by artists 
in the face of representational challenges, concluding by suggesting an opportunity for 
digital art to foreground itself  in Ireland.
Chapter 10 analyses macro-level issues, including funding at the state level for the arts. 
The chapter also analyses media and political discourse in the arts  and cultural sector. 
Here, the ‘role’ of the arts is  foregrounded, as  the economic and financial crisis  spread, 
with attention turning to discourses of  art as ‘rescuer’ to the economic difficulties.
Chapter 11 provides  a summary review of the main findings  of the research, and 
concludes the research thesis  by identifying limitations within the research, whilst also 
suggesting possibilities for further research. 
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Chapter 2 
Technology, Society and Innovation
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Chapter 2: Technology, Society and Innovation
2.1  Introduction
In this chapter I review the literature on theories  of technology, society and innovation 
and seek to identify certain concepts and ideas which inform the theoretical framework 
for this  study of digital art in Ireland.  This  chapter thus interrogates issues  pertaining to 
themes three and four, technology and innovation, as introduced in section 1.3.2, and 
addresses  the key questions therein.  Whilst technological means  have historically been 
available to artists, ranging from animal hair brushes and gouache of the Renaissance to 
the use of gyroscopes and electricity in the works of Moholy-Nagy and Duchamp, I 
suggest that in the current mode of production, significant attention is  given in media 
and political discourses to the subject of technology and its  role in our lives.  The digital 
artist, situated in this  zeitgeist is  thus  not immune to changes in the material means  for 
creative expression nor to various discourses surrounding the potentials of technology. 
This  chapter thus explores  theories of society and technology with a view to situating 
technology as  an important component in digital art production, whilst also recognising 
its place as merely one factor in the innovative process.
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2.2  Technological Determinism
2.2.1 Introduction: Of  Galaxies and Villages
Manuel Castells, a prominent professor of sociology, and champion of the information 
age has  described Canadian communications theorist Marshall McLuhan as ‘the great 
visionary who revolutionised thinking in communications’ (Castells  1999: 357).  Castells 
has also (metaphorically) named a galaxy after McLuhan, explaining that he did this ‘in 
homage to the revolutionary thinker’ who formulated the mass media electronic 
communication system ‘as  a distinctive mode of cognitive expression’ (ibid.).  Given this 
and other examples of the ongoing influence of McLuhan’s  theories on contemporary 
discourse on technology and society, I will proceed to review his  theories of media. In a 
wide-ranging overview of the features of new media, Lister, Dovey, Giddings, Grant, 
and Kelly (2003/2009) provide a comprehensive analysis of McLuhan, his works and 
key concepts. Indeed, Lister et al. (2009) demonstrate that McLuhan’s views on the then 
‘mass media’ of the 1960s have still powerful relevance, more than forty years  after first 
publication. In reviewing the work of McLuhan, I will argue against its determinist 
stance around technology and its presumed relation to cultural and societal change.
2.2.2 Technology, The Extensions of  Man, Media Cold and Hot
In Understanding Media (1964), McLuhan proposes one of his most famous aphorisms, 
that ‘the medium is the message’ (McLuhan 1964: 7), the tenet of this  aphorism is that 
the content of the medium is  unimportant, but that the medium itself actively shapes 
communication.  This determinist viewpoint is underlined - quite literally - by the 
“Extensions of Man” subtitle of Understanding Media, underpinning how in McLuhan’s 
view, a medium, media or technology (he conflates the terms frequently) is  ‘any 
extension of ourselves’ (ibid.: 7)3.  McLuhan asserted that technological developments 
extended the human body outside the bounds  of its  bare corporeal reality, both spatially 
and temporally.  He observed how historically, ‘during the mechanical ages we had 
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3 In his 1967 work The Medium is the Massage: An Inventory of Effects, McLuhan furthers this point by noting 
how ‘societies have always  been shaped more by the nature of the media by which men communicate 
than by the content of  the communication’ (McLuhan 1967, in Lister et al, 2003 – emphasis added).
extended our bodies in space’ (ibid.), whilst in the current technological age ‘we have 
extended our central nervous system itself in a global embrace, abolishing both space 
and time’ (ibid.).  
For McLuhan, these media and technology-based ‘extensions’ have societal effects, 
regardless  of the content of the mediums.  ‘The personal and social consequences of 
any medium – that is, of any extension of ourselves – result from the new scale that is 
introduced into our affairs by each extension of ourselves, or by any new technology’ 
argued McLuhan (McLuhan 1964: 9).   Thus, media and technology are producers of 
societal effects, acting upon society regardless of the content therein.  To elucidate this 
point, McLuhan suggested a consideration of the light bulb as  ‘pure information’.  He 
positioned the electric light as  ‘a medium without a message’, and regardless of what the 
purpose of the use of the light is, the light has  effects.  He cites  this  example to reinforce 
his conviction that ‘the medium is the message’, positing that the content-empty 
medium of electric light ‘shapes  and controls  the scale and form of human association 
and action’, causing both ‘psychic and social’ effects.  For McLuhan, the ‘content’ or 
uses  of the light are redundant, a distraction to understanding the ‘character’ of the 
medium under consideration, and even ‘ineffectual in shaping the form of human 
association’. 
In Understanding Media, McLuhan posited the concepts of ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ media, based 
on degrees  of ‘definition’ provided by such media channels (McLuhan 1964: 37).  For 
McLuhan, ‘a hot medium is one that extends one single sense in “high definition”’. 
This  ‘high definition’ is  not that kind which we currently know to be part of emergent 
TV broadcasting and DVD media.  In McLuhan’s world, ‘high definition’ is ‘the state of 
being well filled with data’, such as a photograph which fills the sense of sight with rich 
data.  In contrast, a cartoon image is ‘low definition’ as ‘very little visual information is 
provided’4.    Extending these concepts  to include issues of participation, McLuhan 
suggests a correlation between the ‘definition’ of a medium and the level of 
participation which it requires.  For McLuhan, hot media forms  do not ‘leave so much 
to be filled in or completed by the audience’ and are therefore ‘low in participation’ or 
‘completion’ of sensory information by the audience.  Thus  for McLuhan, the effects of 
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4 Likewise, for auditory perception telephone is a ‘cool’ or ‘low definition’ medium, as ‘the ear is  given a 
meager amount of information’, presumably by the compression of the audio signal itself, but also for 
McLuhan like speech where ‘so little is given and so much has to be filled in by the listener’.
hot and cool mediums vary, again clearly placing the medium at the centre of  influence.
McLuhan also associates  art with its format as  medium, rather than with any deference 
to the content of artistic works.  This is  specifically revealed during his  contemplation of 
the artistic movement of Cubism, describing it as setting up ‘an interplay of planes and 
contradiction or dramatic conflict of patterns, light, textures that “drives home the 
message” by involvement’ (ibid.: 11).  Thus, posits  McLuhan, the ‘illusion of 
perspective’ in traditional art is  dropped by the Cubist movement, ‘in favor of instant 
sensory awareness  of the whole’.  ‘Cubism’, opined McLuhan, ‘by seizing on instant 
total awareness, suddenly announced that the medium is  the message’.  He suggested 
that other disciplines can also be considered in this  way, where ‘specialized segments  of 
attention’ in the fields  of science and the arts such as physics  and poetry ‘have shifted to 
total field’.  This shift for McLuhan is indeed total - and totalising - as  resulting from this 
shift ‘we can now say, “The medium is the message” quite naturally’.
I posit that McLuhan’s reduction of art and society itself to passive receivers of 
technology or media is a technological determinist viewpoint, whose argument posits 
that technology drives  social change.  This view implies that technology stands outside of 
society as an autonomous  entity, acts upon it but in itself is  exogenous  to society or 
culture.  Determinism implies  an uncritical inevitability about technological progress 
and change.  I suggest that such determinism in, for example, the media and political 
institutions, is  potentially detrimental to critiques  of technology and its role in society. 
Evidence exists  that such institutions do take this  approach.  Preston (2001) notes  that 
the theory of technological determinism ‘is one that most frequently informs  popular 
and journalistic accounts of the effects  of impacts of new ICT’ (Preston 2001: 111). 
Lister et al, (2003) observe how McLuhan’s  theories appeal to big business, stating that 
they serve ‘for corporate business’ as ‘a source of propaganda’ (Lister et al,. 2003: 73), 
and how in a more general societal setting, it appeals  to those who ‘see new media as 
bringing about radical cultural change or have some special interest in celebrating its 
potential’ (ibid.).  MacKenzie and Wajcman also draw attention to the determinist 
tendency in the media, noting that ‘(w)hen this intertwining (between society and 
technology) is  discussed in newspapers or other mass  media, the dominant account of it 
can be summed up as technological determinism’ (MacKenzie and Wajcman 1999: xiv).
I suggest that in these determinist propositions, McLuhan reduces  the humanistic and 
39
societal implications  of media down to the scale of the technologies  and media involved, 
irrespective of the content produced.  This has implications for the cultural producer, 
and the producer of digital artefacts  which are often heavily technology-based, but often 
utilise technology as  content to critique technology.  Thus, a reductionist view of 
technology as determining our communication stands at odds with the cultural producer 
who utilises  digital technologies  with a sensitivity to the medium as  deliverer of content, 
conscious of its  affordances and its limitations.  In the chapter 2 addenda in appendix A 
I further develop my critique of technological determinism by means of two determinist 
stances on technology by Neil Postman and Manuel Castels that posit highly variant 
world views, yet similarly position technology as the driver of  such worlds.
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2.3 Technology as Determined: Social Shaping Theories
2.3.1 Introduction
Whilst technological determinist approaches to technology foregrounded the 
technological means  as  primary actors, critiques  of such ideology sought a repositioning 
of the role of technology, arguing that the technology/society relationship was much 
more than a one-directional one.  In this  section I explore an early critique of 
McLuhanite determinism by Raymond Williams, and introduce theories  of the social 
shaping of technology, which suggest that social factors often play a role in shaping 
technological artefacts in a way unacknowledged by the determinist stance.
2.3.2 Raymond Williams Challenges Determinism
The cultural theorist Raymond Williams was an early critic of the McLuhanite stance 
on technology and society.  In his  1974 work Television: Technology and Cultural Form, 
Williams posited that statements about the ‘effects’, or what was ‘brought about’ by 
various  technologies brought up concerns.  For Williams, the act of making such 
statements  where ‘effects’ were already an a priori component to the debate, served to 
hide more complex philosophical questions.  Such uncritically adopted tropes such as 
that of the effects of technology masked such questions as  ‘whether it is  reasonable to 
describe any technology as a cause, or, if we think of it as a cause, as what kind of cause, 
and in what relations with other kinds of causes’ (Williams 1974: 2).  Williams therefore 
observed that if there is  an implication of ‘effect’, there is also the implication of 
‘cause’5.  Therefore, according to Williams, once philosophical questions  about 
technology are centred on effect, it is to the detriment of  the exploration of  cause.  
Williams posited that whilst it is  often difficult to engage in arguments  of cause and 
effect when ‘we know how to do’ more practical empirical research such as  surveys in 
the discipline of cultural studies, he nonetheless sees these more philosophical questions, 
those often regarded as  ‘merely theoretical and abstract’, as  fundamental to the 
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5  For example, the ideology of a cause and effect relationship between television, society, culture and 
personhood
discipline (ibid.).  He argued that the questions about the relationship between a 
technology and a society are, rather than difficult or abstract, hugely practical.  Williams 
also observed that if debates centring around technology (Williams  uses  the example of 
television) are limited to issues of ‘cause’, or a phenomenon that ‘leads to’ another 
societal and cultural outcome, then, as passive receivers  ‘we can at best modify or seek to 
control its  effects’ (ibid.).  Williams  also considers the corollary; if we do concede that 
technology as an effect, what are the causes that has resulted in its particular use?  
Thus, such questions undermine the simplistic determinism that centres around the 
causes and effects  of technology, that positions technology as the major actor.  Williams’ 
enquiries  on the social and cultural determinants of technology are now seen to ‘have 
been a major, shaping contribution to the constitution of an academic discipline’ (Lister 
et al., 2003: 73).  The questions bring the role of society as an influence on technological 
change to the foreground.  Whilst McLuhan set apart technology and humankind, 
Williams worked to find out the underlying social dimension to technology, asking 
cultural critics to contemplate why the technology may have been developed, why it was 
adopted, why it was successful or why it failed.  This enquiry led to the emergence of 
studies about human agency, path determinism, the relationship between technology 
and politics, and that between technology and science.  Where McLuhan saw ‘mankind’ 
as  a homogeneous entity – glorified users of tools  – Williams’ enquiry demanded that 
we include ‘mankind’ in its  myriad, complex social, cultural, political and scientific 
dimensions once again at the hub of discourses around technology.  For Williams, just as 
with old technologies and media, new ICTs such as television can be the basis of good 
or poor cultural productions.
2.3.3 MacKenzie and Wajcman: Social Shaping of  Technology
Following on from the work of Williams, Donald MacKenzie and Judy Wajcman 
developed the study of technology within the context of social dynamics  further in their 
1985 work The Social Shaping of Technology.  In this  work, they collated essays together to 
explore the social shaping model of the technology/society relationship6.  The authors 
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6 In this chapter, I refer to the second edition of the work from 1999, where the editors explain that in the 
time between editions it has become more accepted that there exists  a two-way relationship between 
technology and society.
observe how the social sciences are behind disciplines  such as  engineering in their 
discourses of technology, in so far as engineers have long accepted that the technological 
superiority of an object cannot alone counter more ‘social’ issues  of expense, aesthetic 
unattractiveness, the object being unfit for purpose, or politically problematic 
dimensions, which can all cause a technologically superior object to nonetheless fail7. 
Thus, for the authors, existing discourses of technology within the discipline of 
sociology amounted to ‘a naive technological determinism’ (ibid.) that was  simplistic, 
both politically and intellectually.  This position encouraged political passivity and 
reduced critical discourse to positions that adopted an uncritical embracing of 
technology, a defensive adaptation to it, or a rejection of it.  The authors, echoing the 
sentiments  of Raymond Williams posited how determinist accounts of technology 
reduce the complex relationship between technology and society ‘to a simple cause and 
effect sequence’ (ibid.) in which no consideration is given to how social actors and the 
interrelationships between them affect the things they make.  
2.3.4 The Multiple Shapings of  Technology
MacKenzie and Wajcman explored the debate on the society and technology 
relationship through case studies, in an exercise that acknowledges the surface-level 
‘common sense’ ideology of technological determinism, whilst undermining it with 
analyses that uncover the social dimension to the cases.  One such case study by 
Langdon Winner tells  the story of Robert Moses, who was involved in the construction 
of New York infrastructure from about the 1920s  to 1970s.  Moses had overpasses and 
bridges  built  with nine feet of clearance, an insignificant detail in construction to the 
technological determinist.  
However, from evidence cited in Moses’ biography, the height of the overpasses was 
more sinister in its  intent, designed to discourage the passage of public transport 
through certain wealthy areas, thus reflecting Moses’ ‘social-class bias  and racial 
prejudice’ (Winner, in MacKenzie and Wajcman, 1999) by confining the poorer classes 
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7  It was a social scientist named John Law who coined the phrase ‘heterogeneous engineering’ to be 
understood as  the engineering of social relations as well as of physical objects, whereas on a practical level 
engineers  had been aware of this much earlier.   The authors  also referred to the work of Misa (1988) who 
observed that technology is  ‘both socially shaped and society-shaping’ (MacKenzie and Wajcman 1999). 
It was therefore on that backdrop that they collated their second edition
to the poorer areas8.  Thus, the technology of Moses’ bridges  alone did not determine 
the passage of people, rather the technology was shaped by the social biases of Moses. 
In a technological determinist lens, this  example explains how specific designs or 
applications  of technology can literally shape society through bridge construction. 
However, the further analysis revealed how complex social concerns  of prejudice and 
politics determined how the technology was manifested.  
For MacKenzie and Wajcman, technological systems too are constrained by other 
‘social’ factors outside technology.  They argue that amongst the ‘goals’ of a system are 
the economic goals of cutting costs  and increasing profit, thus suggesting that ‘typically, 
technological decisions are also economic decisions’ (ibid.) and thus can not be 
considered outside that economic sphere.  In this way, technology is  embedded within 
market competition, which forces  change on the technological systems, making any 
discourse around the ‘autonomy’ or ‘separateness’ of technology from societal influences 
naïve indeed.  Whilst Mackenzie and Wajcman cited Edison’s consideration of ‘profit 
and loss’ in the design of his  light bulb, another source of electric light – the fluorescent 
light – was  the subject of some economic controversy, cited in Bijker’s  study of the 
technology and society relationship.  When General Electric wished to introduce the 
fluorescent light into circulation in 1938, the electricity companies objected, protesting 
that its  efficiency would damage their profits.  After much struggle, the design of the 
light was changed, but that change attracted the attention of government antitrust 
investigators who sued GE.  However, in another twist to the story, GE were able to 
defend against the suit with the help of the war department by claiming that such 
interference would hinder the war effort.  So in this  case, politics, big business and 
economics  all converged to result in a highly complex technology and society 
relationship (Bijker 1995).   
For MacKenzie and Wajcman, the determinist stance regarding the ‘best’ technology is 
also under question.    A determinist stance suggests that regardless of economic, social 
or political challenges, the ‘best’ technology will be the successful technology.  In 
response to this, MacKenzie and Wajcman suggest that the notion of the best 
technology is complex, and what is ‘best’ from one point of view might not be ‘best’ 
from another.  Therefore, the subjective perception of ‘best’ makes  inherent in the 
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8 In a double confinement, Moses later vetoed a proposal to extend the rail network from Long Island to 
Jones Beach.
argument of the technological determinist the implication that human nature is also 
involved.  The authors further observe how technologies ‘often manifest increasing 
returns to adoption’ (ibid.), with performance of a technology often improving as  it is 
used, where user experience is related to the object designers  in an iterative process. 
These incremental improvements can further strengthen and fine-tune the technology. 
Likewise, vulnerabilities (known as ‘reverse salients’) in the technology are also 
potentially discovered and then eliminated or reduced as the technology is  utilised.  The 
benefits  of early adoption can also affect what becomes  regarded as  the ‘best’ 
technology9.
2.3.5 Social Construction of  Technology
Moving on from the social shaping approaches  outlined above, the concept of the social 
construction of technology (or SCOT) was  developed by Wiebe Bijker and Trevor Pinch. 
SCOT takes into account ‘relevant social groups’, observing how ‘those groups who 
share a meaning of the artefact’ can affect the development of a technology (Kline & 
Pinch, in MacKenzie & Wajcman, 1999).  Such groups include advertisers, engineers 
and consumers as obvious agents of influence, but they also point out that other groups 
can all attach different meanings to a technology.  The ‘meaning’ that these disparate 
groups attach to the technology can explain potential development paths  of the 
technology.  They term this the ‘interpretative flexibility’ of an artefact (ibid.).  Kline 
and Pinch also suggest that interpretative flexibility has an end point where ‘closure’ and 
‘stabilisation’ of the technology occurs.  The mechanisms of closure and stabilisation 
thus cause certain technologies  to achieve some dominance10.  However, it is also 
possible for new problems to emerge in an established, stable technology and for another 
spate of interpretative flexibility to occur in once again, an iterative process.  Thus, for 
Kline and Pinch, the interpretative flexibility of a technological artefact renders it 
subject to different interpretations depending on use by variant social groups.  Thus, one 
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9 The QWERTY computer keyboard serves  as  an illustration.  This  design of computer keyboard lays in 
its historical genesis in the typewriter, where it was  important to separate keys in such a way as to 
minimise the likelihood of them being hit together and jamming the typewriter.  Thus, the design had a 
historically early adoption in the mechanical typewriter, and even though the electronic keyboard negated 
the need to have such a keyboard layout,  the keyboard design did not change, despite it now having been 
shown to be less effective and productive as the DVORAK layout.
10  Although in the case of aircraft technology, the authors  observe how jet engine and the propeller 
engine co-exist, both having reached closure and stability in their own, disparate ways.
cannot assume that a technology will have the same meaning ‘for all spaces, times  and 
communities’ (ibid.), where one social group may adopt a technology readily yet another 
one may reject it outright, for reasons other than technological ones.
Thus, the ‘social shaping of technology’ work of Williams, Bijker, MacKenzie, 
Wajcman, Kline and Pinch has  largely aimed to counter the determinist stance - 
whether utopian or dystopian - asking the researcher to consider complex interactions  of 
technological development, adoption, use and success within a broader societal, political 
and economic domain.  I suggest that such a standpoint regarding technology is highly 
pertinent to the study of digital art, where technology and aesthetics  are often 
intertwined.  I suggest that to adopt a determinist stance in the survey of digital art 
would fetishise the technological component to the detriment of the aesthetic, cultural, 
political and economic factors involved in art-making.  However, the social shaping 
approach itself has not been without its  own critique, through the negating of the effects 
of technology and an excessive foregrounding of the social dimension in its  ‘hard’ form 
in social construction of technology (SCOT) theories.  In the next section, I outline a 
‘third way’ of actor-network theory and suggest that for the study of digital art - where 
technology plays  an important role - it is  a viable model through which to examine the 
complex connections  between technology and art, where technology holds a significant 
place, but is also significantly examined and critiqued.
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2.4 The Third Way of  Actor-Network Theory
2.4.1 Introduction: Agency Vs Structure
The work of Bruno Latour and his various collaborators  including Shirley Strum has 
also proved an important influence on how the relationship with technology and society 
is currently conceptualised in the social sciences11.  From studies in primatology, Latour 
and Strum concluded that technology is  constitutive of human society, positing the 
erroneousness of overly socially determinist stances  to theorise social relations 
independently of technology12.  Thus any theory of society which disregards societal 
relationship with technology amounts  to ‘baboon theory’ due to its  focus  on primitive 
behaviour patterns that disregard the embedded technological dimensions inherent in 
modern human societal interactions (MacKenzie and Wajcman 1999).  Rather for 
Latour, both humans  and technology posses agency within a broader sociological web of 
influence.
The sociological debate around agency and structure has centred on the ability of the 
individual human to act with free will whilst also situated within conflicting social 
structures, where individuals  act according to social norms, minimising their 
individuality in favour of group acceptance.  Pierre Bourdieu13  attempted to dismantle 
the dualistic nature of the debate around agency and structure, instead maintaining that 
the subjective and objective parts  of social interaction are interlinked into a more 
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11 Latour and Strum investigated into the field of primatology,  and found that within baboon societies, 
there are not just fixed social structures that the individual baboons fit into.   Rather, the individuals are 
constantly renegotiating their roles and the social structure results from this individual organisation rather 
than the other way around.  Their point is  that primatologists  view baboons similarly to the way 
sociologists view human structure - that humans are actors, creating their structure in and through 
interaction.  However,  primate societies  are limited temporally and spatially but human societies have 
histories  and geographies  beyond the immediate time span so are infinitely more complex.  Latour and 
Strum also cite the use of 'material resources  and symbols' (Latour and Strum in MacKenzie, 1999) as a 
difference between the societies.  They say that it is  particularly the use of material resources  that make 
human society as we know viable.  This  therefore makes the technological sphere part of what makes 
society possible, instead of  being a sphere separate from society.
12 See the chapter 2 addenda in appendix A for an account of Latour’s case study which analyses the 
complex factors which led to the failure of  the Paris transport system Aramis
13 whose cultural theories I discuss further in chapter 4
symbiotic relationship (Marshall & Scott: 2005)14.
Actor Network Theory explores  concepts of mutual agency between human and 
technological ‘actors’.  Therefore I suggest that the work of Bruno Latour attempts to 
transcend the dualistic approach to agency and structure, technology and society, in a 
framework applicable to a survey of digital art, where technology is integral to the 
practice, yet is often explored, shaped and reworked by the practitioner. 
2.4.2 Actor-Network Theory
Actor-network theory suggests that the concept of ‘agency’ usually attributed to humans 
in sociological studies  also extends to non-humans.  Key to Latour’s theory is  the 
inclusion of a networked dimension, where agency occurs  within a network of other 
agents, both human and non-human.  Here, Latour’s theory becomes controversial, as it 
breaks down the relationship between society and individual, or between culture and 
nature.  As Lister et al (2003) observe, the case of Hubert Dreyfus  who challenged a 
computer to beat him at chess (and lost) showed the lengths to which certain parties 
would go to guard their ‘specialness’ as humans.  However, in an actor-network context, 
the machine invented to meet Dreyfus’ challenge would not have existed without human 
motivation for it to exist.  Nor would the human interaction with the machine happen 
without the machine existing.  Third, the game itself was dependent on the human and 
machine both existing and having motivation to interact.  Therefore, the Dreyfus 
example serves to elucidate the combined agency between human, machine and game. 
All agents ‘acted’ in an interdependent sphere to arrive at a complex outcome.  Whilst 
this  is just one example of how actor-network theory can be applied to debates on ‘man 
vs  machine’ Latour posits  that similar consideration be given to major institutions  and 
organisations.  Thus, according to actor-network theory, humans  do not just create the 
networks  of organisations in a socially determinist way; nor are they acted upon by 
them in a technologically determinist stance, but both ‘agents’ are in an interdependent 
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14 As a brief aside, I also note that CG Jung described this  conflict between human agency and structure, 
positing the view that researchers need to take into account the individuality of social agents when 
conceptualising human interactions with society.   He elucidated the struggle between human agency and 
social structure, observing how, in the act of negation of individuality, ‘(t)he individual is  increasingly 
deprived of the moral decision as to how he should live his  own life, and instead is ruled, fed, clothed and 
educated as  a social unit,  accommodated in the appropriate housing unit, and amused in accordance with 
the standards that give pleasure and satisfaction to the masses’ (Jung 1958).
relationship15.  
2.4.3 Society and Network
Latour’s work is  important for our discussion around technology and its relative position 
in society.  One important premise of actor-network theory is that society is  intrinsically 
networked.  On initial reflection, this premise appears logical – we can imagine our 
personal and professional lives  as built around groups  of people who in turn engage 
other groups  of people in a broad social web of interconnections.  However it is not as 
intuitive to think of society not just as social networks of people, but of people and 
corresponding materials.  John Law helps  to contextualise this  viewpoint.  He suggests that 
knowledge in itself is  social, it is a product of a network, but it is also material.  For Law, 
knowledge is  a combination of the non-human (computers, microscopes and such), but 
also of the human, in the form of researchers, scientists and the skills  they possess. 
Therefore, science, or the gathering of knowledge can be termed ‘heterogeneous 
engineering’ because it brings together discrete entities of social, technical and textual 
spheres into heterogeneous networks  of people and objects.  Actor-network theory 
extends this  to the social dimension, including family, suggesting social society is  also 
organised into a network of these heterogeneous  materials  (Law: 1992).  Therefore, in 
discussing the social, actor-network theory suggests that we include humans, texts, 
literature, but also machines and any other material that acts  as an agent.  Law posits 
how ‘almost all of our interactions  with other people are mediated through objects of 
one kind or another’, offering the example of he himself ‘speaking’ to the audience 
through a text which he has  created on a computer.  The text could be in printed format 
or could have travelled through another network of the postal system.  However, myriad 
actor-networks of humans and non-humans have resulted in his being able to 
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15 John Law (1992) further expands on this, observing how ‘Napoleons  are no different in kind to small-
time hustlers, and IBMs to whelk-stalls’ (Law 1992) when viewed through the framework of actor-network 
theory.  For Law, this is explained by positing that actor-network theory does not presuppose a hierarchical 
view of society;  rather that it looks at the interactions  between agents,  why some are more stable and thus, 
why some gain in size and power.  Law argues further into his paper that resonances exist between actor-
network theory and Foucauldian thought, and certainly power relationships are common to both. 
However, Law points out that ‘a relatively stable network is one embodied in and performed by a range of 
durable materials’ (ibid.), thus critiquing the Foucauldian perspective where only human actors introduce 
instability into networks.  Those materials, crucially to this theory, can take the form of both human and 
non-human parts,  rendering power relationships more complex and yet more fluid than traditional power 
discourses allow for. 
communicate with his audience, in an intrinsically social, mutual communication16.  
 
In the next section, I move on to issues pertaining to theme four of the key questions, 
that of  innovation.
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16 This  stance is  also controversial, raising ethical questions in that it denies any of the ‘specialness’ about 
humans  in its denial of a hierarchy between humans and objects.  However, Law addresses  this critique by 
suggesting the need to distinguish between the fields of ethics and sociology.  He posits  how a 
consideration of these areas as separate fields of enquiry could yield benefits by them informing each 
other.  For Law, whilst on a point of analysis or understanding within the actor-network framework there 
is  not a difference between people and objects, it certainly does not follow that human rights  should not be 
afforded, or that human actors are reduced to machine status in a real-life situation.  Law posits  how 
actor-network theory could inform ethics  by shedding a deeper light on situations  of people who are being 
kept alive by machines, precisely because of actor-network theory allowing for a richer conceptualisation 
of  human-technology relationships than the traditional dualistic and hierarchical model (Law: 1992.).
2.5 Theories of  Innovation
2.5.1 Introduction: Defining Innovation
Innovation must be distinguished from invention, as Schumpeter (1939) amongst others 
observed during the inter-war depression - whilst at the same time identifying ‘multiple’ 
types  of innovations other than the technological which have economic or social 
implications.  Innovation thus implies the existence of an invention, coupled with the 
successful ‘birthing’ of that idea into the arena where it can be adopted for use. 
However, the term ‘innovation’ has many different contextual meanings depending on 
which academic discipline one is viewing innovation from.  I therefore investigate 
theories  of innovation and how innovations diffuse, with the view to analysing 
implications for innovation within the sphere of  cultural production of  digital media.  
Within an Irish context, the term ‘innovation’ has  been recently defined in a report from 
the government policy advisory board for enterprise and science, Forfás, as ‘the creative 
process  of exploiting new ideas’ (Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment 
2008: 2)17.  Everett M. Rogers  describes  innovation as  ‘an idea, practice, or object that is 
perceived as new by an individual or other unit of adoption’ (Rogers  1966: 11) .  This 
expands on the Forfás definition, as Rogers stipulates  how an innovation can take the 
form of a practice or an object, and not only an idea for such.  Furthermore, an 
important component of innovation is  the perception of that idea, practice or object as 
new.  This provides  an important contrast with Forfás’ process-based definition in that 
Rogers  incorporates the social processes  involved in an individual or an adopting group 
who perceives the entity as an innovation.  For Rogers, the perception of ‘newness’ 
therefore, is not an absolute and objective concept, the implication suggesting that what 
may be innovative in some circles or amongst some individuals may not be considered 
innovative amongst others.  
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17  This definition is quite illuminating,  in so far as it describes what Forfás considers to constitute an 
innovation: new ideas.  The definition then describes an act of mediation of these ideas, a mediation that 
they term ‘exploitation’.  It then proceeds  to describe how this mediation occurs,  which is  through a 
‘creative process’.  In this definition is  a highly dynamic model of innovation, consisting of the idea, the 
mediation of the idea through its exploitation, and the process through which the idea is mediated, all 
resulting in the genesis of an innovation.  This model is potentially useful for cultural production of digital 
media as it describes the initial idea, in this case an artistic one, its ‘mediation’ by the cultural producer, 
whilst acknowledging the process through which the idea matures.
Garcia and Calantone observe how the OECD considers  innovation to be ‘an iterative 
process  initiated by the perception of a new market and / or new service opportunity for 
a technology-based invention which leads to development, production, and marketing 
tasks  striving for the commercial success of the invention’ (Garcia, Rosanna and 
Clinton, Roger 2002: 112).  They suggest two implications  for this definition; first that 
technological innovation is  invention combined with market development, and second 
the process  is  iterative, implying scope for new innovations and re-introductions  of 
existing innovations.  Charles Edquist suggests a similarly economistic account of 
innovation, positing that ‘innovations  are new creations of economic 
significance’ (Edquist 1997: 1).  This  definition implies  that there are two aspects to 
innovation; the creative entity combined with the successful transfer of the creative 
entity into the marketplace.  
Whilst these economistic perspectives on innovation broadly support Garcia and 
Calantone’s  observation that innovations  are a two-forked entity comprising the idea/
invention and the adoption of the invention, I suggest that within this  definition, no 
scope is left for innovation in the cultural production of digital media, due to the 
coupling of invention and market development.  In a sector where intentionality and 
expression operate to the foreground of the market, definitions which couple invention 
with the market suggest that these cultural artefacts  are not innovative18.  Also, whilst 
digital media artefacts  produced with an artistic or cultural intention often utilise 
technology to an extensive degree, the artefacts are not ‘technology-based’ but 
‘conceptual’ or ‘contemporary’ art objects.  Thus, a granular definition of innovation 
which includes the foregrounding of market and technological dimensions is inadequate 
in describing artistic and/or cultural innovations.
From this  short analysis of these descriptions of innovation, it is  evident that the concept 
of innovation is  multidimensional and potentially concerns many different academic 
disciplines, including economics (Schumpeter19; OECD, Edquist), communication 
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18  A brief account of the psychological dimensions  to innovation, such as personality traits and 
neurocognitive processes,  which may be applicable to a discussion of creativity and innovation in the arts, 
can be found in the chapter 2 addenda of  appendix A
19  Schumpeter is the best known [but not only] early exponent of the perspective that innovation is 
multidimensional.   His work serves to underline the extent of the long/big “lag” between that insight and 
actual policy practices  - even today (Schumpeter (1939). Also see Preston (2001) for an account of the 
Schumpeterian approach.
studies (Rogers), science (OECD), politics  (Forfás) and psychology (Forfás, Rogers), 
management and marketing (Garcia, and Calantone, 2002) as well as the 
interdisciplinary field of ‘innovation studies’.  Garcia and Calantone (2002) posit that 
the myriad nature of the studies  of innovation has led to a confusion, rather than 
elucidation of innovation studies.  They observe that ‘fifteen constructs  and at least 51 
distinct scale items’ have been used in 21 studies dealing with product innovativeness in 
the field of new product development (NPD) (Garcia, Rosanna and Roger Calantone 
2002: 111), leading to a confusion of what dimensions of innovation are actually 
measured.  Combined with the cross-disciplinary approach of many of the studies, a 
lack of consensus  on terminologies  also ensues.  The authors therefore suggest a need 
for consensus  on defining ‘innovativeness’, noting how researchers  class their own work 
as  ‘new’ when it may be  a ‘re-labelling’ of existing concepts  that had been defined and 
researched in another discipline.  Thus, research from a different field to the researchers 
own may be ignored even though the research may be pertinent20.
Thus, a framework of innovation that allows  for a more matrix-like application of 
interdisciplinary literature broadens the discourse of innovation to include innovative 
practices and processes  in a sector such as  digital media cultural production, where a 
conscious decoupling of  production from market concerns is to the fore.
2.5.2 Systems of  Innovation
The main theoretical origins of systems of innovation approaches  were interactive 
learning theory and evolutionary theory, suggesting that the process of innovation is a 
process  of interactive learning (Edquist 1997: 5).  This, Edquist notes, is complimentary 
to systems of innovation as ‘interactivity paves  the way for a systemic approach’ (ibid.: 
5).  Lundvall also concurs with this  suggestion as ‘it is assumed that all learning is 
predominantly an interactive and, therefore, a socially embedded process  which cannot 
be understood without taking into consideration its  institutional and cultural 
context’ (Lundvall 1992: 1).  However, in a somewhat determinist stance, Edquist also 
uncovers the origins of innovation studies  in evolutionary theory, suggesting that 
innovation (and technical change) can be seen as an evolutionary process.  According to 
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20 Please see the chapter 2 addenda in appendix A for a further account of  Garcia and Calantone’s work
this  process, the innovator creates an object that is superior to existing objects. 
‘Technical change clearly is  an evolutionary process’ suggests  Nelson, ‘the innovation 
generator keeps  on producing entities  superior to those earlier in existence, and 
adjustment forces work slowly’ (Nelson, 1987: 16, quoted in Edquist, 1997).  However, as 
seen earlier, the social shaping approach to technology challenges traditional notions of 
what constitutes ‘better’ or superior in technological development (MacKenzie and 
Wajcman 1999), and thus stands at odds with the evolutionary theory origins of systems 
of  innovation theories.
However, notwithstanding the theoretical origins  of the approach, Edquist in his  1997 
work elucidates the basic tenets of a framework for systematically analysing innovation, 
observing that innovation processes  occur ‘in interaction between institutional and 
organizational elements which together may be called “systems  of innovation”’ (Edquist 
1997: preface). The approach, Edquist claims, provides a framework for the empirical 
study of innovations, and helps  with a better understanding of the innovation process. 
For Edquist, a strength of the systems  of innovation framework is  in the systematic study 
of the interaction between companies and a broader social and political context. ‘Firms 
almost never innovate in isolation’, observed Edquist (ibid.: 1), rather they interact with 
other firms, universities, research institutes and government ministries, and influenced 
by institutions that impose restrictions on or incentives to innovation.  e.g. imposing 
cultural norms, laws, social rules, technical standards.  Thus, these firms in their 
interactions with each other and with the institutions are elements of a system, within 
which innovations  emerge.  However, the concept of an ‘institution’ or ‘organisation’ is 
inherently vague (ibid.: 41).  Edquist along with Johnson note how the concept of an 
institution and its effect on innovation ‘is  not at all clear in the literature and various 
scholars mean very different things when they use the term “institution”’ (ibid.: 41).
Nonetheless, despite these observations  and reservations, the systems of innovation 
approach - including the concepts of national, regional and sectoral innovation - 
provides a useful conceptual backdrop to a study of innovation in digital media.  I thus 
outline the national, regional and sectoral approaches  to the study of innovation in the 
chapter 2 addenda of  appendix A.
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2.5.3 Clusters of  Innovation in the Cultural Industries
Whilst a sectoral approach to innovation has relevance for describing innovation in the 
cultural sphere, it is also worthwhile to consider the role of clusters in the systems of 
innovation approach.  Clusters  include aspects of the national, regional and sectoral 
systems in a hybrid of these frameworks21.  This  approach to innovation could prove 
particularly beneficial to encouraging discourse on innovation in the cultural and media 
industries.  The ‘creative clusters’ approach has  been much favoured by consultants such 
as  the Richard Florida and the Comedia consultancy group as well as  urban policy and 
related policy advisers. However, it has  also be subject of much criticism by critical 
geographers, not least for its neglect of grounded studies of the growth trends in the 
media and cultural services sectors, lack of attention to the low levels  of income of 
much cultural workers  and for a tendency to be harnessed to economic boosterism and 
property-centred development strategies (e.g. in the work of  Anne Markusen).
David Hesmondhalgh supplements the general literature on clusters  of innovation with 
an account of innovation in the cultural and creative industries  (Hesmondhalgh: 2007). 
He outlines  how the concept of creative clusters emerged in the 1990s22, and analyses  a 
study by Landry and Bianchini of how ‘the industries  of the twenty-first century will 
depend increasingly on the generation of knowledge through creativity and innovation 
matched with rigorous systems of control’ (Landry and Bianchini, 1995: 12 in 
Hesmondhalgh, 2007: 142).  The concept of the creative city was also mooted at this 
time, whilst policy in the UK saw a merging of the project of urban regeneration with 
creativity, leading to the ‘creative city’ trope.  Landry and Bianchini offered ‘creative’ 
solutions to urban planning issues and posited a symbiotic relationship between the 
cultural industries and creative cities, in that the cities  needed creativity, and creativity 
needed creative cities within which to thrive (Hesmondhalgh 2007: 142).
Mommaas  suggested that the clustering of the creative industries  to promote urban 
regeneration was  a strategic move, observing that ‘cultural clustering strategies represent 
a next stage in the ongoing use of culture and the arts as  urban regeneration 
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21 For details of  an EU report on innovation clusters, please see the chapter 2 addenda of  appendix A
22 with some influence from the Comedia consultancy group who were consulted for policy-making in the 
UK.
resources’ (Mommaas, 2004: 508 in Hesmondhalgh 2007: 143).  Thus, an ongoing 
‘trope’ in innovation policy has centred on the clustering of creative industries, of which 
the digital media industries  are a subset.  I suggest therefore that in this  survey of digital 
art in Ireland, a mindful awareness of these tropes can help explain the foregrounding of 
the digital media industry, and artistic sector.  However, the digital media industry is also 
a service which innovates differently to industries  traditionally surveyed by systems of 
innovation frameworks (pharmaceutical, industrial etc).  I therefore suggest that a brief 
outline of innovation in the services sector will also yield results for the consideration of 
the digital media sector.
2.5.4 Innovation and Services 
The services sector has been described, somewhat comically, as being involved with 
‘things that could be bought or sold but not dropped on one’s  foot’ (Boden and Miles 
2000.: 7).  In the traditional studies  of systems of innovation, the services sector has 
been ignored in favour of manufacturing.  However, with predominant growth in the 
services  sector, Boden and Miles have called for a careful examination of innovation in 
the services.  They outlined how (1) traditional indicators of innovation have not 
included innovation in services, (2) when studies of innovation in services  have been 
carried out, there emerge more complex dynamics than previously considered, (3) 
services  are among the leading active users23 of ICTs, and (4) services  aid innovation in 
other firms (ibid.: 9).  Howells  and Tether also stress the importance of services, noting 
that ‘the service sector has a dominant role in the developed economies, accounting for 
about two thirds  of employment and GDP’ (Howells  and Tether 2004: 11), and thus 
represent potential for economic growth.  Howells  and Tether observe how traditional 
discourses situated services as  technologically backward, and as passive adopters  of 
technologies that originated in the manufacturing sector (ibid).  However, this  is often 
not the case, with services not only adopting technology, but adapting it creatively, thus 
reflecting back to other sectors a challenge for further innovations.   
Also within the services sector are a subset of knowledge-intensive business services (K-
IBS), also analysed in discourses  of innovation.  As  Howells  and Tether have observed, 
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23 i.e. are not using ICTs solely for consumption puropses.
‘the service sector is  becoming an ever more important focus for innovative activity 
within the emerging “knowledge economy”’.  For the authors, ‘“knowledge-intensive 
business  services” (KIBS), such as those involved in market research, design, engineering 
and technical services, are particularly important economic actors’ (ibid.: 12).  As 
Cawley and Preston note through Manuel Castells’ observation, ‘the media industries 
may be defined as  typical of the “intangible”, information-intensive growth sectors 
deemed to characterise the contemporary “knowledge” or “network” society’ (Cawley 
and Preston 2004: 119). 
Thus, for Cawley and Preston, the functions  involved in the innovation process  in the 
media sector is of significance importance, noting how for the media industries, 
differences in the research and development (R&D) and knowledge functions  exist, 
compared with other sectors.  For Cawley and Preston, script/content, authoring, 
design, and direction of the object are crucial knowledge and innovation functions of 
the media industries, the authors  positing how these functions are equivalent to 
traditionally understood R&D functions (ibid.: 127).  Thus, an innovation in this sector 
can involve the ‘packaging’ of information into new products and services, in an 
innovation process ‘based on novel publishing entrepreneurial ideas/knowledge rather 
than purely technical knowledge’ (ibid.: 127).  This  suggests that the traditional 
understanding of innovation as  facilitated by technical tools must also be expanded to 
include creative tools, with technical tools and skills being ‘necessary but not sufficient’ for 
successful innovation strategies in the digital media sector (ibid.: 128)24.  
These findings, along with those from Preston and Kerr (2003 - see footnote 25) 
underpin how, in the digital media sector, major sources of innovation are in the area of 
authoring and design skills, with a strong design or authoring portfolio valued more than 
years  of experience.  Preston and Kerr’s study also found that software competency is  a 
straightforward process  of learning, whereas achieving creative competency is not as 
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24  Further research by Preston and Kerr suggested that within digital media companies, ‘occupations 
whose core function involved media production and design were more numerous than programming, IT 
and management’ occupations in the companies, thus further highlighting the ‘creative’ tools and skills 
fostering innovation in digital media.
Cawley and Preston provide further information from the Preston and Kerr analysis which found that 
there was  a large input of non-technological knowledge in the digital media sector.  The findings included 
how (1) media content authoring and design posts accounted for 34% of total jobs  in the firms, (2) 
management, sales, marketing accounted for 20%, (3)  software development, IT and system support were 
15% and (4) quality control and testing were 19%
(Preston and Kerr, 2003 in Cawley and Preston 2004: 128-129)
linear a process.  Thus, within discourses  of K-IBS services, I suggest that digital media 
industries innovate with a less reliance on ICTs  than traditionally discussed in theories  of 
innovation.  Whilst the digital media industries  are ‘knowledge-intensive’, the added 
complexities  pertaining to innovation in the digital media industries be considered in 
discourses of  innovation.
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2.6 Diffusion of  Innovations
2.6.1 Introduction
Whilst systems of innovation frameworks  foreground the processes, contexts and sites of 
innovation, the adoption or diffusion of those innovations  is  also of importance.  Rogers 
posits  that diffusion is  ‘the process by which an innovation is  communicated through 
certain channels over time among the members  of a social system’ (Rogers  1966: 5)25. 
Thus, diffusion is  a process of information and ideas  sharing in a ‘special type’ of 
communication, the content of which pertains to the ‘newness’ of the idea.  For Rogers, 
‘newness’ implies  uncertainty in that ‘new’ is  untested, unchartered and unexplored. 
Uncertainty, according to Rogers, is  the degree to which alternates  are possible, thus also 
implying unpredictability.  However, for Rogers, this unpredictability can be mitigated 
by the provision of information, also suggesting that technological innovations embody 
information, therefore reducing uncertainty.  He suggests how the adoption solar panels 
for water heating reduces uncertainty about fuel prices.  This  leads  Rogers to consider 
how diffusion acts  as ‘a kind of social change’, as when new ideas  are invented, diffused, 
and are adopted or rejected, consequences exist, which can lead to social change (ibid.: 
6).  Finally for Rogers, diffusion can be spontaneous and unplanned or managed and 
planned26.
2.6.2 Rogers’ Diffusion Model
For Rogers, innovations  diffuse through four major aspects; (1) the innovation, (2) the 
communication channels, (3) time and (4) the social system.  These are outlined below.
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25  Rogers observes that ‘communication’ implies an exchange between two or more people, thus 
foregrounding the social dimension to the diffusion of  innovations
26 Rogers  provided case studies  in diffusion as part of his work.  See an account of these in the chapter 2 
addenda of  appendix A
1.  The innovation
For Rogers, it matters  little about the objective newness  of an innovation, but rather that it 
is  perceived as being new.  Therefore, the ‘newness’ of the innovation lies in the changing 
perception of the adopting group.  Rogers thus suggests that it is  worthwhile to study the 
mechanisms of  early and late adopters of  innovations.
2.  Communication channels
Rogers  posits that channels of communication are important for the effective diffusion 
of an innovation, observing how ‘mass  media channels are often the most rapid and 
efficient means to inform an audience of potential adopters  about the existence of an 
innovation’ (Rogers 1966: 18)27.  However, mass media is  not the only effective 
communication channel for the diffusion of innovations.  For Rogers, interpersonal 
communication can prove more effective at diffusing an innovation to an individual, 
especially if education or socioeconomic standing are similar between the sender and 
receiver of the communication28.  Thus, Rogers notes, the diffusion process is  highly 
social in nature, with a social preference amongst adopting groups for a peer-evaluation 
of the innovation rather than relying on disinterested observations alone.  This homophily, 
which is  ‘the degree to which two or more individuals who interact are similar in certain 
attributes, such as  beliefs, education, social status, and the like’ (ibid.: 18), suggests  how 
communication is more effective when there is a greater degree of homophily between 
individuals.
3.  Time
Rogers  includes  time as  a factor in the innovation process, as  in between an individual 
hearing about an innovation, and deciding whether to adopt it or not, is the medium of 
time.  This process is five-fold, through which an individual ‘passes  from first knowledge 
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27 This has implications for the cultural industries, who at once are involved in innovating, and are also 
shaped by innovations. 
28 This suggests  a parallel with the work of Pierre Bourdieu on social and cultural capital.   See chapter 4 
for an account of  Bourdieu’s research on capital.
of an innovation to forming an attitude toward the innovation, to a decision to adopt or 
reject, to implementation and use of the new idea, and to confirmation of this 
decision’ (ibid.: 20), or in summary; knowledge, persuasion, decision, implementation 
and confirmation.  However, akin to the reverse salience concept in social shaping of 
technology models, Rogers  observes how in an act of what he terms discontinuance, a user 
who has previously ‘confirmed’ the adoption of an innovation can then become 
unhappy with it and subsequently reject it (ibid.: 21).
4. The Social System  
Rogers  considers the diffusion of innovations to be a social process.  A social group 
possesses  a commonality of goals, and shares  the construction of joint problem-solving 
processes to achieve these common goals.  Thus, innovations  occur in social structures, 
the boundaries of  which can affect the diffusion of  the innovation29.  
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29 While noting the dearth of research on how the social structures affects diffusion, he recounts  a study 
by Katz to show how an adoption of innovations are affected by social factors.  Katz studied the adoption 
of family planning amongst two women, each in one of two villages  in Korea, finding that despite other 
similarities (age, family background, socioeconomic and educational areas) adoption of family planning 
depended on how the social group perceived family planning.  The study found that with the adoption of 
family planning in one village at less than half that in the other, the observed woman in that village 
showed less likelihood to adopt the innovation herself than the woman in the other observed village with 
the higher rate of  adoption.
2.7 Conclusion
In this chapter I have reviewed certain key schools and theories of the complex 
relationship between technology, society and innovation.  This  review has  identified 
certain concepts that directly relate to specific sub-questions related to themes three and 
four of the key research questions  (i.e.. those pertaining to technology and innovation) as 
listed in the previous chapter.  Sections 2.2-2.4 expanded on themes  which relate to the 
key questions  in theme three, which centres  around technology, its  place in digital 
media, its contested status as a tool for creation, or a McLuhanite ‘medium’ in its  own 
right.  Whilst a determinist stance around digital technologies was shown to be 
problematic, likewise was  a ‘hard’ social shaping approach.  I argued that a framework 
such as actor-network theory that accounted for mutual agency between human and 
non-human actors better situated technology without fetishising it.  This is  particularly 
relevant to research on digital media art, where technology resides as  both a tool and a 
medium, yet is used to critique itself, revealing a complex relationship between the 
artistic ‘actors’ and the means at their disposal.
Sections  2.5 and 2.6 analysed the existent literature on innovation that link up with the 
key questions within theme four.  These questions  pertained to how we may understand 
innovation for the artistic sector in terms  of how the channels or means of innovation, 
along with what constitutes innovation itself, are viewed through a lens  of innovation 
studies.  Garcia and Calantone, Edquist, Boden and Miles and Lundvall were reviewed 
for their conceptualisations  of innovation, its sites and how it can be formulated in 
‘systems’ approaches.  Rogers’ study of diffusion of innovations revealed a complex 
nexus  of factors in the diffusion process.  However, the work is not without a critique of 
idealism and universalism.  Flynn and Preston have suggested that the work made 
simplistic assumptions that ‘innovations  diffuse within a context marked by an 
autonomous  or free market and that diffusion is  driven by the demands of individual 
consumers freely exercising their market power’ (Preston and Flynn 1999: 439)30. 
Clearly some of Rogers (1966) ideas are now very dated given the huge expansion of the 
innovation studies field in subsequent 45 years.  Some of his  ideas  on ‘diffusion’ would 
also be incompatible with much subsequent social shaping and SCOT perspectives 
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30  They do observe that Rogers  somewhat adapted his  work in later editions, yet there still existed 
criticisms about the theoretical underpinning.
highlighting the flexibility and mutability/changeability (e.g. across  social groups  or 
settings)  of  what constitutes - even technological - ‘innovations’.
Likewise, definitions of innovation were critiqued for foregrounding a simplistic ‘market’ 
stance which implied that for a product or service to be innovative, it needed to show 
commercial success.  In the context of non-commercial production of digital media, 
such as artistic production, a sector-based or cluster-based approach is robust, yet can be 
supplemented with the macro-level accounts  of innovation that emerge from theories of 
innovation that pertain to national and regional accounts.  Thus, existing theories of 
innovation do not rest easy when applied to non-commercial production of digital 
media, revealing gaps in the understanding of traditional theories of innovation to 
account for the skills required to innovate in the artistic or cultural sector, along with an 
account of the motivation for such creations, as they stand outside market-based 
motivations.
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Chapter 3
The Production of  Culture
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Chapter 3: The Production of  Culture
3.1 Introduction
In this  chapter I explore theories  of cultural and artistic production.  This is  in order to 
inform my frameworks concerning the key theme (number two) of art as  identified in 
chapter 1 whilst situating artistic and cultural production within cultural, social, 
economic and political spheres.  Thus, this  chapter focusses  on meso and macro levels, 
addressing how artistic production is  a civic and social endeavour, according to the 
Frankfurt School, to how it is economically situated, in the case of the production of 
culture perspective, to a political and class-based dimension, as argued by Bourdieu.  
This  chapter follows up the initial argument expressed in chapter 1 that issues  of 
cultural production cannot be analysed in isolation from other macro-level influences, 
and presents  these three main cultural theories to reveal the multiple facets that interact 
and intervene in a ‘nexus’ of cultural production.  I suggest that this  ‘nexus’ of factors 
has particular relevant to a survey of digital media art.  The artist is situated, as argued 
in chapter 1, and so is the cultural artefact produced.  This  chapter, in revealing aspects 
of a production ‘chain’, accounts for the specificities  of production in contemporary 
late-capitalism, whilst also following through on discussions of technology from the 
previous chapter, as  in the case of the analysis of Benjamin’s  exegesis on the then ‘new 
media’ technology of  film.
I suggest that this  chapter is  a ‘sister’ of chapter 4, as in this thesis, ‘cultural production’ 
and ‘art’ are linked by the overall theoretical framework that examines production in a 
situated, embedded context.  Thus, whilst I could have furthered the discussion of 
Adorno’s ‘culture industry’ by following up with an account of postmodern aesthetics by 
Jameson, that discussion is  left until chapter 4, where ‘art’ is threaded through a 
modernist, postmodernist, digital and finally ‘altermodernist’ lens.
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3.2 The Frankfurt School of  Critical Theory
The Marxist-influenced Institut fur Sozialforschung (Institute of Social Research), 
otherwise known as the Frankfurt School31, produced many novel and influential 
analyses of media and cultural production, including a critical aesthetic theory and a 
dialectical critique of mass  culture. Central figures in this  school were Theodor Adorno 
and Walter Benjamin. Although both authors  were members of the Institut pre-WWII, 
their work continues to have significant relevance to current discourses on media, 
popular culture and the culture industries.
Walter Benjamin’s  essay, The Work of Art in the Age of its Technological Reproducibility32 
documents some of the significant issues  that he considered to exist within traditional 
concepts  of high art, cultural expression and the social functions of art and culture.  In 
accord with the overall ethos  of the School itself, he situated these issues  in the context 
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31  The Frankfurt School was influenced by philosophers  and theorists  such as George Steiner and 
György Lukács, who discussed issues of ‘reification’ (Jay 1996: 173).   Such influences were to mark the 
aesthetic philosophy of the Frankfurt School as  different from orthodox Marxist expositions of aesthetic 
theory, associated with the international communist movement. As  Jay notes, ‘if ... the Institut refused to 
fetishize economics or politics, it was also equally reluctant to treat culture as a realm apart in 
society’ (ibid.: 176).  Thus, the Frankfurt School is of particular interest in that it explored the complex 
nexus  between cultural production and the embeddedness  of a collective culture within society.  They 
embedded their aesthetic and cultural theories  within the political and economic zeitgeist of modernity, 
and were sensitive to capitalist modes  of production.  In fact, Fredric Jameson considers the work of 
Theodor Adorno to be unique in his understanding of late capitalism, observing Adorno’s ‘unique 
emphasis on the presence of late capitalism as a totality within the very forms  of our concepts or of the 
works of art themselves’ (Jameson 2007:  9).  Jameson also maintains that ‘no other Marxist theoretician 
has ever staged this relationship between the universal and the particular, the system and the detail, with 
this kind of  single-minded yet wide-ranging attention’ (ibid.).
The Institut’s critical aesthetic theory went beyond orthodox Marxist aesthetic theory; they rejected the 
orthodox Marxist position on art as only having legitimacy when it is mobilised in a political context. 
However, they also challenged the belief that art was  an expression of only individual or subjective 
experience. As Jay reminds us, Horkheimer wrote his doctoral thesis on Kant’s Critique of Judgement, 
thus influencing his views on common human experience,  where ‘an element of common humanity, of 
shared hope for the potential of mankind, informed every aesthetic act’ (ibid.). Thus, in situating the 
artist, the Frankfurt School considered the complex relationships between the individual artist, the artwork 
itself, the culture in which it is  embedded, whilst also stressing the interconnectedness of all of these facets 
within the societal and political frameworks and ideologies of  the time.
32 I have chosen to use the alternately titled, second, extended version of Benjamin’s  essay,  translated and 
cited in a recent collection of his work (Benjamin et al. 2008).  As the editors  note, it is ‘a revision and 
expansion (by seven manuscript pages) of the first version of the essay ...  the second version represents the 
form in which Benjamin originally wished to see the work published’ (ibid.:  42).  Hansen notes  that 
Benjamin considered it his  ‘Ur-text’ (Hansen 2004: 4).  It contains the original ending to the text; ‘Such is 
the aestheticizing of politics, as practiced by fascism.  Communism replies  by politicizing art’ (Ibid.).  As 
Jay notes however, ‘the printed version replaced “Fascism” with “the totalitarian doctrine” and 
“Communism” with “the constructive forces of mankind” ... on the same page, the original “imperialistic 
warfare” was changed to “modern warfare”’  (Jay 1996: 205).  Bloch et al note how ‘its preface, which 
directly invoked Marx, was omitted altogether’ (Bloch 1980: 106).
of the political moment in which he lived. The essay also provides an exegesis  on the 
potential of the then new media of film, to change the dominant political ideologies of 
the day and to liberate society from traditional hierarchical structures. I suggest that this 
essay has  valuable resonances today, in a parallel time of economic, political and 
cultural crisis33.
Theodor Adorno offered a critique of Benjamin’s essay, positing his own critical 
observations  on the workings and influence of the culture industries and their 
relationship with society.  While Adorno’s works  have been branded ‘elitist’ in some 
cultural studies discourses, Bernstein (1991), Jameson (2007) and Slater & Tonkiss (2001) 
testify to the complexity, richness  and continuing validity of his work as a critical theory 
of aesthetics  and culture - especially valid in today’s moment of crisis in late capitalism - 
and worth revisiting for its complex and considered insights into art, culture and politics.
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33 A view paralleled by Margot Lovejoy, whose work is analysed in chapter 4.
3.3 Walter Benjamin’s Aesthetic and Cultural Theory
3.3.1 The Aura
In his essay The Work of Art in the Age of its Technological Reproducibility, Benjamin developed 
his concept of the artistic ‘aura’ 34, the concept of which I briefly investigate to situate 
Benjamin’s  views on artistic autonomy and the function of artistic works. Benjamin 
conceptualised the aura as ‘a highly sensitive core’ of an artwork, a core ‘more 
vulnerable than that of any natural object’ (Benjamin et al. 2008: 22). That core, for 
Benjamin, was the artwork’s  ‘authenticity’ (ibid.), which Benjamin saw as ‘the 
quintessence of all that is  transmissible in it from its origin on, ranging from its physical 
duration to the historical testimony relating to it’ (ibid.).  Thus, for Benjamin, the artistic 
aura corresponded to its  essence as  an ‘authentic’ object, combined with a sense of the 
physical and historical narrative accompanying it.
For Benjamin, reproduction invalidated the ‘physical duration’ of the artistic object and 
thereby challenged the history associated with the object.  ‘Since the historical testimony 
is founded on the physical duration’, posited Benjamin, ‘the former, too is  jeopardized 
by reproduction, in which the physical duration plays  no part’ (Benjamin et al. 2008: 
22).  Thus, the historical narrative, so important for the existence of an artwork, is 
greatly diminished, if not obliterated.  For Benjamin, ‘what is really jeopardized when 
the historical testimony is affected is  the authority of the object, the weight it derives 
from tradition’ (ibid.).  This process of technological reproduction ultimately caused, for 
Benjamin a ‘withering’ of the aura.  Thus, I suggest that the aura can be conceptualised 
as  a metanarrative, or a rhetoric surrounding an object - a mythology or even a certain 
Jungian archetypal significance that accompanies a work of art.  Therefore, the loss  of 
aura through reproduction throws into doubt the authenticity of the work, with the 
reproduction mounting a challenge to the historical testimony that accompanies a work 
of  art.
However, the concept of the aura has been somewhat contested by commentators, with 
some scholars  equating the aura with a corrupt, capitalist, hegemonic elitism that 
surrounded certain art (Jennings  in Benjamin et al. 2008, Kul-Want & Piero 2007). A 
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34 First discussed briefly in Benjamin’s 1931 work, Little History of  Photography
further presentation on the letters between Adorno and Benjamin talks  of ‘Benjamin’s 
attack on aesthetic “aura” as a vestige of bourgeois culture’ (Bloch 1980: 106). 
Certainly Benjamin himself critiqued the manipulation of the aura. In the introduction to 
his essay, for example, he distanced himself from the notion that his  own work could be 
manipulated by Fascism by claiming that ‘in what follows, the concepts which are 
introduced into the theory of art differ from those now current in that they are 
completely useless for the purposes of fascism. On the other hand, they are useful for 
the formulation of revolutionary demands  in the politics  of art’ (Benjamin et al. 2008: 
20).
Despite the reticence on Benjamin’s part to have his hypothesis of the aura appropriated 
by corrupt ideologies, I posit that Benjamin did not wish to ‘attack’ and deconstruct the 
aura, as commentators  have suggested (e.g. Bolter et al: 2006). Rather, Benjamin 
witnessed what he believed was the inappropriate manipulation of the powerful 
properties of the aura.  Thus, Benjamin wished to redress  that manipulation by 
providing an exegesis on how new media forms had the potential to distribute the positive 
power of the aura - its authenticity - and thereby illuminate society.  This relationship 
between the cultural product, the producers, the culture industries  and the aura of a 
cultural object is still ongoing today.  I thus  posit that similar consideration is still 
required today, in order to define and critique the ‘auratic’ properties  of cultural objects, 
and to understand the place of culture and art at a time of great technological change 
that is also marked at a time of  crisis.
3.3.2 New Media, Old Cults of  Beauty
According to Benjamin, ‘the first truly revolutionary means  of reproduction’, that of 
photography, became increasingly evident during his lifetime, and precipitated a change 
for the aura, and also for modes of artistic production.  Benjamin argued that since 
prehistoric times, the work of art was  based in ‘ritual’35, a basis that continued into 
Renaissance times and beyond, noting that although this ritualistic fascination with the 
object may have become secularised in modern times, the ritualistic element exists up to 
modern times in the form of the “cult of beauty”.  Due to this fundamental basis in 
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35 insofar as ‘the elk depicted by Stone Age man on the walls of his cave is an instrument of magic, and is 
exhibited to others only coincidentally; what matters is that the spirits see it’ (Benjamin et al. 2008: 25)
mythical thinking, the aura - that is the authenticity and testimony of the work - became 
vulnerable to any means by which its ritual status  could be diminished.  Of course, 
photographic reproduction, with its  ability to disseminate a work of art, threatened the 
physical presence - the ‘here and now’ - of an original work of art.  Reproduction closed 
the gap between the artwork and the audience by allowing the artwork to be 
disseminated by various means, previously unavailable. The result of this is that ‘insofar 
as  the age of technological reproducibility separated art from its  basis  in cult, all 
semblance of  art’s autonomy disappeared forever’ (ibid.: 28).
Benjamin argued that due to the threat to ritual-based artistic production, the art world 
reacted to the threat to its aura ‘with the doctrine of l’art pour l’art - that is, with a 
theology of art’ that ‘in turn gave rise to a negative theology, in the form of an idea of 
“pure” art, which rejects not only any social function but any definition in terms of a 
representational content’ (ibid.: 24). Therefore, art reacted to the threat to authenticity 
with an extreme attempt at artistic autonomy. 
Therefore, for Benjamin, the aura was to be preserved and valued, yet liberated from its 
exploitation at the hands  of extreme artistic autonomy in the form of l’art pour l’art. 
While Benjamin attested to the power of the artistic message, he could not attest to 
manipulation of the aura that denied the social and cultural spheres  in which the artist 
and the artistic message were embedded.  This reveals  a complexity pertinent to cultural 
production, insofar as  the ethereal and economically unquantifiable quality of ‘aura’ of 
a cultural product is  nonetheless a powerful force that can be mobilised by the artist, by 
political hierarchies and by the culture industry - each with different and complex 
motivations.  This  complexity of ‘aura’ persists  in today’s knowledge-based mode of 
cultural production, and therefore its  potential mobilisation needs to be considered in 
academic analyses of  cultural production in the digital age.
3.3.3 New Media and Cultural Romanticism
Despite Benjamin’s  lucidity in relation to the auratic qualities of cultural artefacts, he 
exhibited a certain romanticism about the ability of culture to liberate ‘the masses’. 
Benjamin’s  convictions  reveal complexities pertaining to cultural production that are 
also pertinent in today’s  moment of crisis.  Benjamin stressed the social function of art, 
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specifically explaining that ‘the primary social function of art today is  to rehearse that 
interplay’ between nature and humanity.  He argued how this  social function has been 
particularly applicable in film, noting that ‘the function of film is to train human beings 
in the apperceptions and reactions  needed to deal with a vast apparatus whose role in 
their lives  is expanding almost daily’ (Benjamin et al. 2008: 26).  Thus, Benjamin 
attested to the liberating power of the then new media of film in its ability to reveal 
realities  about the ‘apparatus’ in which human society is enmeshed, and also to afford, 
through a new means of perception in the ‘apparatus’ of the film camera, the ability to 
human beings to negotiate and react to that apparatus.  He was concerned with how 
city-dwellers were required ‘to relinquish their humanity in the face of an 
apparatus’ (ibid.: 31). Film however, came to the liberation of these individuals  as  in the 
act of visiting a cinema, these workers  ‘witness the film actor taking revenge on their 
behalf not only by asserting his humanity (or what appears to them as such) against the 
apparatus, but by placing that apparatus in the service of his  triumph’ (ibid.).  He 
observed that in doing so, the technology offered a certain, if temporary psychic 
liberation to such oppressed workers, illustrating that ‘dealing with this apparatus also 
teaches them that technology will release them from their enslavement to the powers of 
the apparatus’ 36  in what could be argued is a technological determinist perspective 
typical of  radical moderns.  
Benjamin continued his  acclaim of this new media of film, listing qualities  such as  ‘a 
capacity for improvement’ (ibid.: 28) that renounced rigid eternal values, and proposing 
that just as newspaper letters to the editor, letters of complaint, and reviews afforded 
literary expression to the masses, ‘all this can readily be applied to film, where shifts  that 
in literature took place over centuries  have occurred in a decade’ (ibid.: 34).  According 
to Benjamin, it was the mechanism of capitalism that obstructed this  process, declaring 
that ‘in western Europe today, the capitalist exploitation of film obstructs the human 
being’s legitimate claim to being reproduced’ (ibid.). The benefit of this  legitimate right 
to technological reproduction was, for Benjamin ‘understanding themselves and 
therefore their class’ (ibid.).  Benjamin thus saw film as a means by which society could 
understand itself  more, and thus self-illuminate.
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36  However, this liberation from enslavement to the apparatus did come with a caveat,  Benjamin 
specifying that this  would happen ‘only when humanity’s  whole constitution has  adapted itself to the new 
productive forces’ (ibid.: 26).
For Benjamin, this process of self-illumination by means of film technology was 
facilitated by the material characteristics of the technology, positing that reality could 
not be hidden from a camera, and that no illusion could be hidden behind a camera 
lens.   For Benjamin, ‘the illusory nature of film is  of the second degree; it  is the result of 
editing’ (ibid.: 35), but that the primary technique of film-making could provide deeper 
insights  into the fabric of reality.  ‘In the film studio the apparatus has penetrated so 
deeply into reality that a pure view of that reality, free of the foreign body of 
equipment, is the result of a special procedure - namely, the shooting by the specially 
adjusted photographic device and the assembly of that shot with others  of the same 
kind’ (ibid.) posited Benjamin.  While it could be posited that film is  a highly mediated 
form of reality, Benjamin attested to transcendence of that mediation due to the 
profound ways in which the camera technology could penetrate reality and offer 
multiple views of it, or as Benjamin termed it ‘the most intensive interpenetration of 
reality with equipment’ (ibid.).
Just as  the camera lens  could provide insights  into reality, for Benjamin it could also 
provide insights  into alternate realities, observing that ‘thanks  to the camera, the 
individual perceptions  of the psychotic or the dreamer can be appropriated by collective 
perception’ (ibid.: 38). While this  appropriation through technology may not be wholly 
desired, Benjamin used this  negative application to suggest that ‘this  same 
technologization has created the possibility of psychic immunization against such mass 
psychoses’.  He posited that cinema can mitigate this ‘by means of certain films  in which 
the forced development of sadistic fantasies or masochistic delusions  can prevent their 
natural and dangerous maturation in the masses’ (ibid.). Here, Benjamin is  referring to 
slapstick comedies and Disney films, claiming that such films ‘trigger a therapeutic 
release of unconscious  energies’, and that ‘collective laughter is one such preemptive 
and healing outbreak of  mass psychosis’ (ibid.).
Thus, with these features of expressive liberation of the working class, the technical 
abilities  of film to provide an enhanced view of reality, and its  abilities to make alternate 
realities  conscious, Benjamin displayed a romanticism, and even a determinism about 
the new film technology.  As much as  he critiqued the narcissism of the content of l’art 
pour l’art, we see a failure on Benjamin’s  part to critique the content of film - presuming 
that the nature of the technology would produce a cause-and-effect scenario whereby 
the proletariat would be liberated by these deeper views of the world around it.  As 
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much as  he provided caveats in his work pertaining to the misuse of the aura, he did not 
significantly critique the auratic properties that potentially pertained to the film industry. 
This  has ramifications for the romanticism that can surround the properties of today’s 
new media technologies  and cultural objects.  Thus, this analysis  of Benjamin’s  work 
reveals both his  intuition, shrewdness of vision about the potential of the auratic 
qualities  of an object, and also the shortcomings of his  critique of the new media 
technology of  the day.
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3.4 Art and Politics - Adorno’s Critique of  Benjamin
3.4.1  Adorno on the Aura
Benjamin’s  friend and colleague Theodor Adorno mounted his critique of Benjamin’s 
essay, in both personal letters and more formally and polemically in his essay On the Fetish 
Character in Music and the Regression of Listening.  Whilst there was  accord with Benjamin 
regarding the aura, Adorno noting that ‘I need not assure you that I am fully aware of 
the magical element in the bourgeois  work of art’ (Bloch 1980: 121), Adorno challenged 
Benjamin on his belief that use-value of this  powerful aura can be employed in what he 
saw as a utilitarian fashion.  Adorno made this point clear in correspondence, flatly 
remarking that ‘I now find it disquieting … that you now casually transfer the concept of 
magical aura to the “autonomous work of art” and flatly assign to the latter a counter-
revolutionary function’ (ibid.).  For Adorno, the ‘autonomous work of art’ was art which 
was  not produced for commercial purposes, and thus  did not have the constraints  or 
pressures  of the ‘culture industry’ attached, leaving it relatively more ‘autonomous’ than 
those cultural goods produced with a profit motive.
For Adorno, the ‘autonomous work of art’ was  more complex.  Just as he congratulated 
Benjamin on his  treatment of the concepts, he criticised him for his one-sided view of 
autonomous  art, noting that ‘dialectical though your essay may be, it is not so in the case 
of the autonomous  work of art itself ’ (ibid.).  Adorno acknowledged how Benjamin’s 
analysis of the aura over-emphasised the mythic and ritual aspects  to the work of art to 
the detriment of a more rounded exploration of the aura, positing that ‘it seems to me 
that the centre of the autonomous work of art does not itself belong on the side of 
myth ... but is  inherently dialectical; within itself it juxtaposes the magical and the mark 
of freedom’ (ibid.).  Whereas  as  for Benjamin, the centre of the work of art - its auratic 
core - was rooted in myth, Adorno here reminded Benjamin that the nature and 
function of the work of art is more complex - founded both in a historical myth but also 
a forward-looking sense of potential - and thus  the artist’s role is also complex within 
this nexus of  production and reception of  art and culture.  
While Benjamin strongly attested to the liberating qualities  of new media technology in 
the form of film, Adorno observed that far from having been freed from a bourgeois 
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type of aura, the film lent itself just as much to having ‘an aural character’ as  traditional 
‘high’ art.  Polemically, Adorno quipped that ‘the idea that a reactionary is  turned into a 
member of the avant-garde by expert knowledge of Chaplin’s films strikes me as out-
and-out romanticization’ (ibid.: 123).  Thus, Adorno revealed his  disbelief of how the 
negative manifestation of the aura could be deconstructed by the mass-culture 
phenomenon of the film, rather observing how film dissemination has lent itself to the 
construction of a different, and potentially equally insidious type of aura.  The aura 
which Adorno saw in the culture industry was  one which he could not equate with the 
freedom and liberation that could transcend what he considers  the ‘spurious harmony’ 
of an ‘affirmative culture’.  This stance thus  stands  as a direct response to Benjamin’s 
uncritical view that the (then) new media of film could have a therapeutic effect on the 
audience through slapstick comedy and ridicule.  
3.4.2  Artistic Function and Artistic Autonomy
Adorno was  concerned with dialectical relationships - between myth and history, and 
between subjectivity and objectivity.  Thus, when considering a work of cultural 
production, he could not consider any work to be purely subjective, but influenced by 
the culture, society and political structures  around it.  In his  Aesthetic Theory, Adorno 
argued how ‘the emancipation of the artwork from the artist is no l’art pour l’art delusion 
of grandeur but the simplest expression of the work’s constitution as the expression of a 
social relation that bears  in itself the law of its own reification’ (Adorno 1997: 220). 
Adorno thus stressed the importance of the situatedness of the individual artist within the 
collective of society, demystifying the notion of the sole autonomous creator, set apart 
from societal influences.  Like Benjamin, he refuted the validity of l’art pour l’art, insisting 
that the artwork was  not just an individual expression, but also existed as  a social entity 
with a civic function.  He observed how ‘correspondingly, and this  is  key to art, even out 
of so-called individual works  it is  a We that speaks and not an I - indeed all the more so 
the less the artworks adapts externally to a We and its idiom’ (ibid.).  Thus, artists  and 
artistic works were situated as  expressions  of the civic, political and cultural dimensions 
to society in which they are embedded.  It also situated artistic function, in that artists 
act as  a mirror to that society, reflecting back the gaps and incompleteness in the ‘We-
ness’.   Therefore, for Adorno, the less congruity between the artwork and the ‘We’ of 
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the society in which it is  produced, the more the potential of ‘We’ is expressed through 
the negative space of  that incongruity.  
Whilst this may at first seem obtuse and contradictory, Adorno’s  argument suggests  that 
when there is  a ‘gap’ between the artistic work and the civic and political structures  in 
which it is  produced, the artwork becomes a vehicle for exploration of the key features, 
and even the inadequacies  and failings of that civic society.   Through that dialectical 
relationship of autonomous artist and artistic function exists  the possibility that civic, 
political and societal transformation can occur.  As he observed in Prisms, ‘a successful 
work ... is  not one which resolves objective contradictions in a spurious  harmony, but 
one which expresses the idea of harmony negatively by embodying the contradictions, 
pure and uncompromised, in its innermost structure’ (Adorno, 1981: 32).  Therefore, for 
Adorno, the function of art was to interrogate the social and moral order, and in doing 
so, art potentially provided expression to the contradictions and inadequacies of civic 
society.
I also suggest a deeper implication in term ‘spurious harmony’.  This  loaded term 
implies that just like the suggestion that l’art pour l’art was a delusion of autonomous 
grandeur, an attempt at l’harmonie pour l’harmonie or ‘harmony for harmony’s sake’ is  to be 
thought of, similarly, as  delusion.  A better approach, according to Adorno, is  to reify the 
contradictions and inadequacies through the ability of the autonomous artist to imply a 
negative harmony, thus exposing the possibility of a transcendental ideal harmony, and 
providing a motivation towards it.
Adorno also posited the potential in autonomous  art to achieve a conscious expression 
of freedom, a point he saw as neglected by Benjamin.  He suggested that ‘precisely the 
uttermost consistency in the pursuit of the technical laws  of autonomous art changes 
this  art and instead of rendering it  into a taboo or fetish, brings it close to the state of 
freedom, of something that can be consciously produced and made’ (Bloch 1980: 122). 
Thus, in the refinement of techniques and modes of expression, the autonomous artist 
can become increasingly conscious in their expression, thus  becoming increasingly 
capable of bringing about the illumination that Benjamin himself was  hoping for. 
Whereas Benjamin saw the potential of that illumination with the new medium of film, 
Adorno could also see that potential within autonomous  art - a point of renewed 
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relevance within this survey of digital art, where affordances  of new media technologies 
and artistic autonomy are intertwined.
Thus, the function of art for Adorno was, as for Benjamin, one of interrogation, 
illumination and transformation on a societal level.  However, Adorno linked the 
function of art with artistic autonomy.  Like Benjamin, he critiqued extreme artistic 
autonomy.  Nevertheless  he situated the importance of the autonomous but societally-
embedded artist in terms of art having the potential to provide a space or a gap in not 
only the societal, but also the cultural and ethical order.  He warned against the 
smoothing over of societal issues by the ‘spurious harmony’ of the culture industry, and 
positions ‘autonomous’ art as having if not the actualisation, at least the potential to 
offer a space in which transformation, and insights  into deeper reality - for the purposes 
of  improving the lot of  society - can occur.  
3.4.3  Technology mis-applied - the culture industry
Adorno observed how Benjamin’s romanticism about the aura somewhat ironically led 
to him taking up a politicised position on art that Adorno could not help but bring to his 
colleague’s attention.   In a personal letter, he polemically stated to Benjamin that ‘I 
must accuse your essay of ... romanticism.  You have swept art out of the corners of its 
taboos - but it is as though you feared a consequent inrush of barbarism and protected 
yourself by raising what you fear to a kind of inverse taboo.  The laughter of the 
audience at a cinema … is  anything but good and revolutionary; instead it is  full of the 
worst bourgeois sadism’ (Bloch 1980: 123). 
The consequence to this for Adorno was that human beings  were no longer valued in a 
model of cultural production where the profit motive became primary to expression, as 
Adorno witnessed at the hands of what he termed the ‘culture industry’.  He explained 
how ‘culture, in the true sense, did not simply accommodate itself to human beings; but 
it always  simultaneously raised a protest against the petrified relations  under which they 
lived, thereby honouring them’ (Adorno and Bernstein 1991: 100).  However, because 
the culture industry conflates the previously separated domains of art and popular 
culture, ‘products  which are tailored for consumption by masses, and which to a great 
extent determine the nature of that consumption, are manufactured more or less 
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according to plan’ (ibid.: 98).  The result of this profit-based intent of the culture 
industry is  an undermining of the ‘true sense’ of culture that Adorno previously 
explained.  According to Adorno, ‘in so far as culture becomes wholly assimilated to and 
integrated in those petrified relations, human beings are once more debased’ (ibid.: 100). 
Thus the potential liberation that was afforded by the ‘true sense’ of culture is eroded by 
production of  culture where profit is primary.
In his essay On the Fetish Character in Music and the Regression of Listening Adorno suggested, 
contrary to Benjamin, that the culture industry has  brought about not a technologically-
inspired enhancement, but a regression in listening perception.  He observed how the 
regressed listener’s  ‘primitivism is  not that of the undeveloped, but that of the forcibly 
retarded’ (ibid.: 47).  The result of this was the ‘well-hidden doubt’ that the audience 
vaguely perceived about the culture industry’s ‘blessings’, Adorno continuing that 
‘whenever they [the regressed listener] have a chance, they display the pinched hatred of 
those who really sense the other but exclude it in order to live in peace, and who 
therefore would like best to root out the nagging possibility’ (ibid.).
Therefore, for Adorno, the culture industry smoothes over the negative dialectic that 
exists between society as it stands, and the potential of human society as  Adorno and 
Benjamin both strived for.  Rather than seeing the audience as senseless  beings happy to 
play along with the illusion, he saw how they sense the ‘other’ but that it is  so removed 
from them, such an impossibility to actualise, that they regress  and try to wholly deny 
the possibility of the ‘other’.  In his essay Culture Industry Reconsidered, Adorno paralleled 
this  view, explaining how ‘the concepts of order which it [the culture industry] hammers 
into human beings are always those of the status  quo’ and that these concepts  ‘remain 
unquestioned, unanalysed and undialectically presupposed, even if they no longer have 
any substance for those who accept them’ (ibid.: 104).  He believed that the culture 
industry was not concerned with freedom or choice, rather that it ‘impedes  the 
development of autonomous, independent individuals who judge and decide 
consciously for themselves’ (ibid.: 106), and ‘it proclaims: you shall conform, without 
instruction as  to what; conform to that which exists anyway, and to that which everyone 
thinks anyway as a reflex of  its power and omnipresence’ (ibid.).
Thus for Adorno, the danger of producing culture for profit was manifest in the cultural 
artefacts produced.  For Adorno, these artefacts would not challenge the existing social 
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order, as they are designed not to expose a dialectic between what is and what can be, 
but rather to make a profit for the industry.  Therefore, such cultural artefacts  are non-
innovative, regressive and mimetic in character, hiding and smoothing over the ‘gaps’ in 
civic society while they reinforce the capitalist order.
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3.5 Beyond Frankfurt
Whilst this thesis  considers  the critical theory of the Frankfurt School to be especially 
relevant to the survey of cultural production in Ireland at this  time, given that they 
operated at a time of crisis and were attempting to understand the role of art, culture, 
politics, economics and society at a similar time, nonetheless  attention must be drawn to 
others  who similarly, rejected the legitimacy of l’art pour l’art and also foregrounded the 
social and political connectedness of art and society.  In the following sections (3.6 and 
3.7), I look at both the production of culture perspective and the work of Pierre 
Bourdieu, both perspectives  which stress  the interconnectedness of artistic production 
with other factors  of production, distribution and reception channels.  However, in this 
section I briefly draw attention to some other writers who also took this approach, 
signalling a broad tradition in how the art/society relationship is considered.
For example, John Berger in his work Ways of Seeing (Berger, 1972/2008) critiques 
ideologies of how we view artistic works.  In a series of seven essays  (four written and 
three visual), Berger mounts a challenge to, for example, how we may understand 
artistic production, to images  as means for consumption to how women are positioned 
in the art world.  For example, Berger critiques the oil painting, not for the techniques it 
can employ, but for its  role as status symbol for the collector, positing that the ‘things’ 
that oil paintings  often depict are ‘things which in reality are buyable’ (Berger, 2008: 83). 
Thus, for Berger, there is a link between the possession of the real-life object and 
possession of the art object depicting it.  Thus, the tradition of oil painting is loaded 
with aspirations of wealth and status, or as  Berger argues, it ‘still forms many of our 
cultural assumptions’ (ibid.: 84).  Why this  is, Berger suggests is  because ‘the art of any 
period tends  to serve the ideological interests of the ruling class’ (ibid.: 86).  Oil painting 
in part achieved this due to its  ability to depict ‘real’ objects.  As  Berger observes, ‘what 
distinguishes  oil painting from any other form of painting is  its  special ability to render 
the tangibility, the texture, the lustre, the solidity of what it depicts‘ (ibid.: 88).  Thus, the 
oil painting ‘defines the real as  that which you can put your hands on’ and therefore can 
suggest an exchangeability or commodification of  these objects in the real world.
Berger follows this  thread to the present day where, in his final essay argues  how we are 
presently surrounded by ‘hundreds of publicity images’ (Berger, 2008: 129).  Whilst we 
may only see these images fleetingly, nonetheless for Berger, they ‘stimulate the 
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imagination by way of either memory or expectation’ (ibid.).  He describes the 
prevalence of the images as  a ‘total system’ (ibid.: 130), and whilst they give the illusion 
that the beholder can pass  by the image by, for example looking away, turning down the 
sound or making some coffee (ibid.), nonetheless, ‘despite this, one has the impression 
that publicity images  are continually passing us, like express trains on their way to some 
distant terminus’ (ibid.).  For Berger, the reality of this state is that ‘we are static; they are 
dynamic’ (ibid.).  Berger then introduces the political-economic dimension to this 
argument, observing that the competitiveness  of these ‘public images’ is of benefit and 
service to the public, or the consumer as Berger suggests, as  such competitiveness  is 
coupled with notions  of efficiency of manufacturing and thus a streamlined, consumer, 
economy.  Thus the mechanism of the public image forms an illusory construct where, 
‘it proposes  to each of us that we transform ourselves, or our lives, by buying something 
more’ (ibid.: 131), and juxtaposes  inner wealth for surface wealth as ‘it proposes  [that it] 
will make us in some way richer - even though we will be poorer by having spent our 
money’ (ibid.).  Thus, Berger engages  with the nexus between the image, culture, 
politics, consumerism and society.
Berger also provides  a treatment of how women are depicted in art, and how that differs 
from depictions of men.  He addresses  the ‘function’ as  it were, of the female nude in 
art, arguing that ‘the social presence of a woman is different in kind from that of a 
man’ (Berger, 2008: 45).  For Berger, the social presence of a man constitutes ‘the 
promise of power which he embodies’, or ‘suggests  what he is  capable of doing to you 
or for you’ (ibid.: 46).  However, Berger argues that this  is  significantly different in 
representations of women in art, positing that ‘by contrast, a woman’s presence 
expresses  her own attitude to herself, and defines what can and cannot be done to 
her’ (ibid.).  Thus, the woman learns to ‘continually watch herself ’, as  she becomes 
aware that she is  an object of surveillance, ‘and so she comes to consider the surveyor and 
the surveyed within her as  the two constituent yet always distinct elements of her identity 
of a woman’ (ibid.).  Berger suggests that the surveyor in a woman’s psyche is itself male, 
as  she imagines herself, or rehearses, being surveyed by males.  Thus, ‘she turns  herself 
into an object - and most particularly an object of  vision: a sight’ (ibid.: 47).
Berger then moves  on to analyse the tradition of the nude in European painting, 
arguing that women have been depicted as objects  of blame, punishment, shame and 
vanity.  Thus, in this act of observing the artworks depicting female nudes in this way, an 
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element of judgment is added (Berger, 2008: 52).  There has  arisen a situation presently 
where women are now judged for their beauty.  Thus, according to Berger, ‘beauty 
becomes  competitive’ (ibid.), leading to a condition where ‘those who are not judged 
beautiful are not beautiful’.  The corollary to this  is that ‘those who are, are given the 
prize’ (ibid.).  Berger asks  the consequence to this, which is  for him that ‘the nude also 
relates  to lived sexuality’ (ibid.: 53).  However, as the gaze is subjected ‘onto’ a woman; 
she is  the object ‘on display’ (ibid.: 54).  Thus, ‘the principal protagonist is never painted’ 
as  ‘he is the spectator in front of the picture and he is presumed to be a man’ (ibid.).  For 
Berger, this  has never changed, concluding that ‘the essential way of seeing women’ is 
still the same to the present day (ibid.: 64).  Berger argues that ‘the “ideal” spectator is 
always  assumed to be male and the image of the woman is designed to flatter 
him’ (ibid.).  Thus, in this essay Berger addresses culture from the political perspective of 
feminist studies, arguing that the production of the image is politically loaded with 
ideology of  gender.
A year earlier than this  work was  published, Linda Nochlin posited the question ‘Why 
Have There Been no Great Women Artists?’ in an article of the same name, published for 
ArtNews magazine (Nochlin, 197137).  Nochlin in this work seeks to problematise not only 
the marginalisation of female artists from the canon of art, but also the naive position-
taking adopted by feminists, whereby their ‘first reaction is  to swallow the bait, hook, 
line and sinker’ (ibid.) by attempting to answer the question as-is.  This is  an attempt to 
counter the most obvious and ‘insidious’ answer to Nochlin’s question that implies  there 
are no great women artists because women are incapable of greatness.  However, the 
traditional feminist response is  to enumerate examples  of female artists, to ‘rediscover’ 
them or, as Nochlin observes, ‘to engage in the normal activity of the specialist scholar 
who makes  a case for the importance of his very own neglected or minor master’ (ibid.). 
Another position according to Nochlin, is to ‘shift’ the parameters of what constitutes 
‘greatness’, and thus engage in an attempt to find the existence of ‘a distinctive and 
recognisable feminine style, different both in its  formal and its expressive qualities and 
based on the special character of  women’s situation and experience’.  
For Nochlin, these positions  obscure the hidden ideologies and assumptions the lie 
beneath the typical arguments that rail against masculine hegemony.  Rather, the arts is 
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37 Article reproduced at Baker University and accessible at http://www.bakeru.edu/faculty/adaugherty/
wc/module5/artists.html
not alone in how it is ‘stultifying, oppressive, and discouraging’ to not only women but 
all those ‘who did not have the good fortune to be born white, preferably middle class, 
and above all, male’.  Thus, for Nochlin, attention needs to turn not to blaming ‘our 
empty internal spaces’ and bemoaning the unchangeable fact of having been born a 
woman, but by turning to a problematisation of ‘our institutions and our education’. 
Thus, the question would be far better answered by interrogating how these questions 
are posed in the first place, for example as  ‘the woman problem, or the ‘black problem’ 
or the ‘American ‘problem’, all of which can be turned on their corollary as  ‘the man 
problem’, the ‘white problem’ and the ‘Asian problem’ for example (ibid.).  Thus, instead 
of addressing the ‘problem’ within the institutions as they are currently formulated, 
Nochlin suggests that it is up to women themselves  to ‘conceive of themselves as 
potentially, if not actually, equal subjects’ rather than adopting a stance of self-pity. 
Nochlin also suggests  that feminist scholars  challenge ideas of normativity, of what 
constitutes  ‘natural’ thought.  Therefore, Nochlin challenges how art is perceived not 
just from a feminist standpoint, but by critiquing the institutions, value systems and 
education systems  under which art is produced, and ‘normative’ art is  that produced by 
a white, middle-class male.
Likewise art historian and critic Griselda Pollock has similarly critiqued the institutions 
under which art is evaluated, assessed and positioned as ‘valid’ or worthy of exhibition 
and review.  As Pollock observed in a publication for New York’s MoMA38, collecting 
and exhibiting art historically existed as ‘social strategies and cultural mechanisms for 
legitimating the very visible forms of social difference and privilege created by both old 
and new wealth in the modern industrial era’ (ibid.).  This  wealth was  largely controlled 
by men, and thus, ‘for a masculine establishment in control of the discourse and 
evaluation of art, which then shapes the whole discipline and practice in its  own image, 
the artist cannot be a woman and perform this  function’ (ibid.).  This  set the scene for 
the double exclusion of women institutionally - both from being part of the institution 
and from being included in the canon of  art produced by the institution.  
Thus, Pollock suggests that what is required of historical analysis  of the canon is ‘not a 
belated recognition of hitherto-neglected women modernists as a second tier in the 
great modernist pantheon’.  Rather, Pollock argues that ‘different modes of seeing’ and 
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38 An online report, available at http://www.moma.org/explore/publications/
ModernWomen_Pollock.pdf
understanding art are required.  For Pollock, modernism was not simply a ‘one-sided 
project’ that ‘(white) men simply did better’ (ibid.).  However, modernist thought failed 
to incorporate ‘whatever it was that modernist women were introducing into culture 
through their newly emancipated and active embrace of the modernist revolutions in 
aesthetics’.  Why this was, Pollock posits, is  because this  active embrace was so new as to 
appear as ‘other’ to ‘early masculinist curators’ (ibid.), thus warranting a neglect.  
Therefore, like Nochlin and Berger, Pollock has  called for a critique in understanding 
how we ‘read’ art, and how at an institutional level, art does  not exist purely for art’s 
sake, rather that there are institutional, political and gendered interests involved in the 
production of  art that require consideration.
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3.6 The Production of  Culture Perspective
3.6.1 Introduction, or Prolegomenon
I now turn my attention to exploring an alternate model of cultural production, which 
originated in the US in the 1970s  and is known as  the ‘production of culture 
perspective’ (Hesmondhalgh 2007: 37).  This  school of thought attempted a practical 
and systematic analysis of the interconnected factors involved in the production of 
culture, addressing culture within social and economic contexts, whilst focusing on the 
meso-level rather than the macro (Preston, 2009).  Central figures in this approach 
include Richard Peterson, Narasimhan Anand, Paul Hirsch and Diana Crane.
Whilst the ‘important contributions’ of this  school, have been noted by cultural theorist 
David Hesmondhalgh, suggesting that ‘one of the most useful contributions of the 
production of culture perspective has  been to enrich our notions of symbolic 
creativity’ (Hesmondhalgh 2007: 37)39, and indeed whilst the perspective does 
schematise the production nexus, this was  a topic that the Frankfurt school were also 
concerned with much earlier in the century.  I thus suggest that the production of 
culture perspective cannot be considered without some deference to their earlier 
influences 40.  
In his Prolegomenon to the production of culture perspective, Richard Peterson outlined 
his views on what a sociology of culture should consider for the advancement of the 
subject of cultural production (Peterson 1976).  This, along with the more retrospective 
account in Peterson & Anand’s  2004 review provide an exegesis  on the more 
institutional perspectives pertaining to the production of  culture.
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39   Hesmondhalgh also testifies to the context that the perspective provides, stating that ‘instead of 
understanding culture as the product of supremely talented individuals, writers such as Howard Becker 
(1982) and Richard Peterson (1976) have helped to make it clear that creative cultural and artistic work is 
the product of  collaboration and a complex division of  labour’ (ibid.).  
40 In fact,  in a retrospective account of cultural production,  Paul Hirsch acknowledges that a previous 
article of his was a ‘depoliticized exploration of what Adorno (1991) had earlier characterized as the 
industrialization of  high culture’ (Hirsch 2000: 356).
For Peterson, no existing sociological perspective has  successfully explained the society/
culture relationship41 , not least because they concentrate on debates  between 
materialism and idealism, instead of focusing on shared characteristics.  The term 
production is  understood in the context of the production of culture perspective was  also 
delineated by Peterson, observing that ‘as used here, the term “production” is  meant in 
its generic sense to refer to the processes  of creation, manufacture, marketing, 
distribution, exhibiting, inculcation, evaluation, and consumption’ (ibid.: 672).  Thus, 
the production of culture perspective focuses on the systematic processes involved in 
cultural production.
Specifically, Peterson suggests that the production of culture perspective ‘chooses  the 
alternate tack of turning attention from the global corpus of habitual culture and 
focusing instead on the processes by which elements of culture are fabricated in those 
milieux where symbol-system production is most self-consciously the center of 
activity’ (ibid.: 672).  He acknowledges one shortcoming to the production perspective 
however, stating that ‘while it is  made to order for explicating the common mechanisms 
for making “normal culture” … it is  ill-equipped to predict or even identify “cultural 
revolutions” in the making’ (ibid.: 673).
3.6.2 Strengths and Weaknesses of  a Production Perspective
One strength of focusing on the production mechanisms, according to Peterson, is a 
‘levelling’ effect in the face of a ‘high-low’ divide, in sociological perspectives, that 
prioritise ‘the elite academic end of a continuum which also includes, near the 
commercial end, engineering and popular science of diverse sorts which received scant 
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41 The earlier prolegomenon proceeds by identifying perceived gaps in the canon of sociological texts 
relating to culture.  Peterson thus calls  for a grouping of those studies into a sociological perspective 
grouped around that subject of cultural production (Peterson 1976: 670), whilst also justifying the need for 
such a grouping by suggesting three existing perspectives on the culture/society relationship.  The first 
grouping, which he terms the ‘autonomous culture cycle’, postulates  that culture and society are two 
distinct and separate spheres.  The second grouping,  which he describes as ‘materialist’, is summed up by 
stating that ‘social structure creates culture’.  The final grouping,  described as ‘idealist’, posits that ‘culture 
creates social structure’.   It is  in this  final grouping, incidentally, that Peterson includes Adorno (ibid.: 671). 
I believe that while this  grouping is useful, it is misguided on Peterson’s part in relation to how he has 
situated Adorno.  Drawing on my analysis of Adorno and Benjamin in the context of cultural production, 
culture, art and society are situated in a mutually constitutive way by the Frankfurt School.  Certainly, 
both Adorno and Benjamin could testify to the potential of cultural forms to influence society.  However, 
they were also very much aware of how culture could be inhibited by social structures.  This  is particularly 
the case for Adorno, whose reticence regarding the culture industry and its  profit motives is  a case in 
point.
scholarly attention of the sort advocated here’ (ibid.).  Thus, in effect, this perspective 
offers a liberation for all forms of cultural production in terms  of scholarly legitimacy. 
Another strength lies in the nature of cultural production, where ‘the scope of research 
is circumscribed enough in time and subject matter that small research projects can be 
cumulative’ (ibid.: 673).  A third strength lies  in the easy adaptation of research practices 
from other sociological perspectives for research on the production of culture.  Finally, 
this  perspective can highlight communal practices  across  varying areas of cultural 
production.  
Along with these strengths, Peterson critiques the production perspective, remarking in a 
footnote that ‘the focus on production should not obscure the fact that there is a 
difference between producing a refrigerator on the one hand, and a president, a play, a 
law, a god, or a scientific formula on the other.  In common these latter are invested with 
symbolic meaning well beyond their utility, and their creators  are vested, in some degree 
with “sacred” powers’ (ibid.: 679).  This acknowledgement of symbolic meaning alludes 
to gradations of values and meaning in cultural production in comparison to the 
production of other objects, although Peterson does not go as far as  to delineate 
between ‘high’ and ‘low’ culture, rather suggesting that cultural products  can have more 
symbolic meaning than industrial products.  
A limitation of the production perspective according to Peterson is that while it provides 
an exemplary exposition of processes in the making of what he terms ‘normal culture’, 
it fails to account for ‘cultural revolutions’ (ibid.: 673).  Peterson argues  that ‘academic 
practitioners often elevate their own activity by denigrating commercial culture as 
brutalizing, inauthentic, or mere entertainment’.  For Peterson, ‘the impact of 
commercial forms  on their consumers  is a vital question, but too often a dehumanizing 
effect is  assumed, and the study of popular culture itself is  denigrated or dismissed as 
slumming’ (ibid.: 676).  Peterson claims that these habits of thinking ‘lead to a 
glorification of the creator and foster the simplistic view that the unique creative genius 
is always and everywhere threatened by the debasing demands of culture 
consumers’ (ibid.).  The result of this, for Peterson, is  that this  ‘systematically blinds the 
researcher to the complex mediating infrastructure between the two’ (ibid.), i.e. the 
meso-level factors which, incidentally, he largely ignores.  For Peterson, however, ‘it is 
perhaps the distinctive characteristic of the production-of-culture perspective that it 
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focuses  attention on this  infrastructure’ (ibid.), thereby eliminating the risk of an 
academic research ideology grounded incorrectly in elitism.  
3.6.3 Applications and Schemas of  Production of  Culture Models
A later work by Peterson and Anand provides a retrospective exegesis  of the production 
of culture perspective, whilst also offering some criticisms.  They note how the 
production nexus  can be organised into six facets (Peterson and Anand 2004: 311).  The 
document provides an explication of the six facets  of the production nexus and also 
provides an in-depth case study of the cassette tape in India as a model for how the 
production of culture perspective can be applied.  It contextualises this  perspective for 
organisational research, and also for research on informal relations.  
By schematising the production nexus into six facets, the authors  suggest that it is 
possible to see patterns in how the nexus operates.  According to Peterson and Anand, 
the six facets are (a) technology; (b) law and regulation; (c) industry structure; (d) 
organisational structure; (e) occupational careers; and (f) market42.  They observe that 
the facets are significantly linked to the extent that a change in one of the facets can 
have a knock-on destabilising and reorganising effect on the whole nexus (ibid.).  They 
explain that this  approach ‘views  both culture and social structure as  elements  in an 
ever-changing patchwork’, claiming that it offers more than the traditional approaches 
which had seen culture and society as mutually constitutive.  
In citing several studies, the authors explain that the studies ‘(a) focus on the expressive 
aspects  of culture rather than values; (b) explore the processes of symbol production; (c) 
use the tools of analysis  developed in the study of organizations, occupations, networks, 
and communities; and (d) make possible comparisons across  the diverse sites  of culture 
creation’ (ibid.: 312)43.
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42 Please see chapter 3 addenda of  appendix A for a thorough outline of  the six production facets
43 David Hesmondhalgh also carried out research into the facets of cultural production, considering the 
role of the culture industries, marketisation of culture, organisational structure, technological advances 
and the political framework in which the culture industries  operate (Hesmondhalgh 2007). Please see the 
chapter 3 addenda of  appendix A for a further elucidation of  Hesmondhalgh’s model
3.6.4 Critiquing the Perspective
Whilst the contribution of the six-facet model provides researchers  with an insight into 
the complex relationships underpinning cultural and creative production, as Peterson 
and Anand themselves have observed, the production of culture perspective has been 
critiqued for ignoring ‘what is special about art, what distinguishes  it from the 
production of automobiles  or shoes’ (Alexander 2003 in Peterson and Anand 2004: 
326).  The authors accept this  charge without attempting to self-critique it, arguing that 
‘in practice, the production perspective denies that there is something essentially unique 
about fine art … rather it emphasizes  that these high-status  fields  can be studied like 
other symbol-producing institutions’ (Peterson and Anand 2004: 327).
Diana Crane also observed a distinction between the culture industry and autonomous 
art in her study of reward systems  (Crane 1976).  Her work provides  a further insight 
into the complexities involved in artistic production that casts  doubt on the production 
of culture perspective’s assertion that there was nothing unique about fine art, and that 
such fields can be homogenised along with mass culture.  In her work, Crane posited 
four broad types  of reward systems, which may be considered as incentives to 
innovation; (a) independent reward systems, (b) semi-independent reward systems, (c) 
subcultural reward systems and (d) heterocultural reward systems44.  
Whilst Crane concedes that studies of independent reward systems have not been 
applied to avant-garde art, she nonetheless acknowledges that avant-garde art operates 
with an independent and/or semi-independent reward system.  She then posits that 
mass media cultural production falls  into the category of the heterocultural reward 
system, significantly noting that ‘this  type of cultural form is parasitic, borrowing from 
the other types if the gatekeepers think that these innovations will be of interest to a 
larger audience’ (ibid.).  She furthers this point, noting that ‘typical of the heterocultural 
reward system is the supremacy of economic rewards  over symbolic rewards and the 
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44 Crane defines  the independent reward system as that ‘in which cultural innovations are produced for 
an audience of fellow innovators’, and posits that it is the innovators themselves who decide upon 
symbolic and material rewards.  A semi-independent reward system differs from the independent one 
insofar as the innovators  set the norms and decide upon the symbolic rewards, but ‘material rewards are 
allocated by consumers, entrepreneurs or bureaucrats’.   The subcultural reward system rewards 
innovations  that are produced for a particular subculture, e.g. ethnic or generational.  In this reward 
system, the innovators set the norms, much like in the first two systems, but the subculture of consumers 
decide upon both the symbolic and material rewards.  Finally, the heterocultural reward system 
‘represents  a situation in which entrepreneurs or bureaucrats  set norms for innovative work, consumers 
allocate symbolic rewards, and entrepreneurs or bureaucrats allocate material rewards’ (ibid.: 721-722).
fact that the innovator himself becomes relatively unimportant and powerless.  He is 
easily replaceable by other innovators with whom he has little contact or 
exchange’ (ibid.).
In this regard, Crane’s work can be considered as one that augments the production of 
culture perspective.  Where the production of culture perspective appears  lacking in its 
critique of the culture industries  and their primary profit motives, Crane considers  this. 
Where the perspective fails to strongly distinguish between works in terms of their 
quality, Crane suggests  that the functional meaning of cultural products  is 
distinguishable.  Therefore I believe that when considering the production of culture 
perspective in terms of a six-faceted nexus, Crane’s  work provides  an adjunct, and 
possibly a seventh facet, that takes into account the concerns of cultural theorists  such as 
Adorno45.
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45 Adorno argues that ‘the culture industry intentionally integrates its consumers from above’ and ‘forces 
together the spheres of high and low art, separated for thousands of years’ (Adorno 1991: 98).   The intent 
with which this  industry operates  is  also explained, Adorno observing that the culture industry 
‘undeniably speculates on the conscious and unconscious state of the millions  towards which it is 
directed’ (ibid.).  Yet, according to Adorno, ‘the masses are not primary, but secondary, they are an object 
of calculation, an appendage of the machinery’ (ibid.: 99).  This clearly echoes Crane’s assertion of the 
parasitic nature of the heterocultural reward system, its use of innovations for economic gain, and the 
unimportance of  the innovator and the audience.  
Adorno also describes  a remarkably similar set of processes in the culture industry as Crane does  for the 
heterocultural reward system, observing that autonomous works of art are all but eliminated by the 
culture industry.  His sentiments are similar to Crane’s, who posits that the bureaucrats and entrepreneurs 
allocate the material and symbolic rewards in the heterocultural system.  In Adorno’s critique, he 
identifies ‘both those who carry out directives  (bureaucrats) as well as those who hold the power 
(entrepreneurs)’  (ibid., my observations in parenthesis), blaming those two groups for the demise of the 
autonomy of  art in the culture industry.
As to why this is, again we find congruences between Crane and Adorno.  Crane cites the ‘parasitic’ 
nature of the reward system, and observes how it favours economic rewards.   Adorno’s critique is  in 
accord with this, baldly stating that ‘they are or were in search of new opportunities for the realization of 
capital in the most economically developed countries’ (ibid.).
3.7 The Cultural Theories of  Pierre Bourdieu
3.7.1 Introduction
Pierre Bourdieu investigated the role of culture in society, whilst also advocating a 
broader sociological epistemology that invited a combination of relative objectivity and 
also reflexivity on the part of the sociologist.  Bourdieu termed this  epistemology 
‘participant objectivation’ (Bourdieu 2003).  Thus, he is  of importance to a study of 
cultural production on two counts; first from his specific works on culture, and also his 
broader epistemological outlook46.    
Richard Jenkins  stressed the importance of Bourdieu’s  work for the contemporary 
intellectual and their engagement with the global zeitgeist, positing that ‘he asserted the 
right, the duty indeed, of the public intellectual to engage with politics and the issues of 
the day, whether they be poverty, immigration, or globalisation’ (Jenkins 2002: x).  Thus, 
for Bourdieu, any sociological survey, including a study of cultural or artistic production, 
was  situated in a political and economic domain that was  local, national and supra-
national47.  Jenkins posits  that ‘Bourdieu's  main contribution was, perhaps, to 
demonstrate, by example in his own work and by exhortation, the necessary and mutual 
implication in each other of theory and research’ (ibid.).  Jenkins  observes that 
importantly, this  standpoint has ‘consistently been framed by and engagement between 
systematic empirical work’ (ibid.: 10), with Jenkins quoting from Bourdieu that ‘theory 
without empirical research is empty, empirical research without theory is blind’ (ibid.).
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46  Whilst I aim to focus  mainly on his writings on cultural production, it is  also relevant to explore 
Bourdieu’s perspective on the practice of sociological research, which is  outlined in the chapter 3 addenda 
of appendix A in order to situate the specific works on culture within his broader perspective on the 
discipline of  sociological research.
47 This standpoint is  similar to that of the Frankfurt School, who stressed that the cultural producer was 
embedded culturally,  technologically, historically and politically.   For the Frankfurt School however, their 
aesthetic theory posited that it was the place of the producer to highlight the potential transformative 
opportunities for society, whereas for Bourdieu, this role lay with the public intellectual.  Another 
difference between the two standpoints is  that while the Frankfurt School are more widely regarded as 
critical theorists, Bourdieu conducted extensive empirical research to support his theories. 
In the following sections  I introduce some of Bourdieu’s  key concepts, those of habitus, 
field, capital and distinction.  This  provides  a complement to the production of culture 
and Frankfurt School theories, bringing together elements of class-based concerns  and a 
‘framework’ of  cultural production and reception.
3.7.2  Habitus, Field and Capital
3.7.2.1 Habitus
The habitus is  an important concept in Bourdieu’s  cultural theories, comprising ‘a 
system of lasting, transposable dispositions which, integrating past experiences, functions 
at every moment as a matrix of perceptions, appreciations  and actions and makes 
possible the achievement of infinitely diversified tasks, thanks to the analogical transfer 
of schemes  permitting the solution of similarly shaped problems‘  (Garnham & Williams 
in Collins 1986: 120).  It is  more easily understood as ‘a feel for the game’ or a ‘practical 
sense’ (Bourdieu 1993: 5), operating with an internal logic, in what Bourdieu terms ‘the 
logic of practice’ (ibid.).  The habitus is  formed in childhood, is  appropriated from the 
parents in an unconscious  way, and while it can be altered, it is  largely built upon simple 
logical distinctions in childhood (such as high/low, black/white) which are then 
subsequently applied in more complex and broad ways.  The habitus, although 
internalised, is  not an individual concept, it is rooted in the family, and in a larger class 
context, and is thus unified at a social level.  While the individual performs  actions, 
‘individual practice as regulated by the logic of practice is always a structural variant of 
group and especially class  practice’ (Garnham & Williams  in Collins 1986: 120). 
Bourdieu suggests that the unified practice of a class group is  in part determined by the 
habitus, positing the formula [(habitus) (capital) ] + field = practice (Bourdieu 1984: 
101).  Thus, the habitus  can direct the actions of a class  group based on previous 
experience, and also based on the trajectory of  that group.
The habitus has  implications for the field of cultural production and appropriation. 
Garnham and Williams posit that certain consistencies  of taste observed by Bourdieu 
are indicators  of the habitus of a particular social group, or class fraction.  As Bourdieu 
observed, ‘the schemes of the habitus  ... owe their specific efficacy to the fact that they 
function below the level of consciousness  and language’ (Bourdieu 1984: 466).  As 
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Bourdieu argues, ‘taste is a practical mastery of distributions  which makes  it possible to 
sense or intuit what is likely (or unlikely) to befall - and therefore to benefit - an 
individual occupying a given position in social space’ (ibid.).  For Bourdieu, a system of 
cultural production or appropriation, is  a subset of a larger, unconscious class  dynamic 
which seeks to preserve, reinforce and reproduce the class relations  that have been 
appropriated in the habitus, for example with distinctions  such as rare/common and 
distinguished/vulgar etc (Garnham & Williams in Collins 1986: 122).
3.7.2.2  Field
The social groups of the habitus are also organised into ‘fields’ comprising ‘a social 
arena within which struggles of manoeuvres  take place over specific resources or stakes 
and access  to them’ (Jenkins 2002: 84).  This  organisation is a hierarchical and relational 
one ‘within which human agents  are engaged in specific struggles to maximize their 
control over the social resources specific to that field, the intellectual field, the 
educational field, the economic field etc’ (Garnham & Williams  in Collins 1986: 122). 
Bourdieu posits  that the field of class  struggle predominates over the other fields, and 
thus imbues each other field with the same features of class struggle.  Therefore, a 
particular field will struggle within the broader field of class struggle, develop skills  to 
cope or to advance, with the ultimate goal leading to an accumulation of  capital. 
The concept of the field has implications  for cultural production, gatekeeping and taste. 
Bourdieu is  quite precise as  to what a field is  or is  not, positing that an artistic or literary 
field ‘is  neither a vague social background nor even a milieu artistique like a universe of 
personal relations between artists  and writers.  It is a veritable social universe where, in 
accordance with its particular laws, there accumulates  a particular form of capital and 
where relations of force of a particular type are exerted’ (Bourdieu 1993: 164).  Taste 
and aesthetic judgement is  mitigated by the hierarchical struggles  at play within the field 
of cultural production, but also by the relationship of the field of cultural production to 
the broader field of power.  Therefore, within the hierarchy of a field, there can be a 
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dominant class and a dominated class, while the field itself can be relatively dominant or 
dominated when viewed relative to the field of  power48.  
3.7.2.3 Capital
The concept of capital is  central to Bourdieu’s work on cultural production.  Bourdieu 
posits  the existence of a class  struggle for domination over the modes  of production, and 
therefore over capital.  According to Bourdieu this is a historical struggle, with pre-
industrial societies characterised by a fusion of material and symbolic fields  of 
production (Garnham & Williams in Collins 1986: 122).  At the next stage of 
development there was a growth of an economic field, which began to separate the 
material from the symbolic fields.  It was  at this point, Bourdieu argues, that ‘a 
specialized group of symbolic producers’ emerged, ‘with an interest in securing a 
monopoly of the objectified instruments of symbolic struggle, especially written 
language’ (ibid.: 123).  This interest in dominating the means of expression in the 
symbolic realm ‘pits them against the dominant economic class in a struggle over what 
Bourdieu describes as  “the hierarchization of the principles  of hierarchization”’ (ibid.). 
However, this  group is somewhat conflicted as it  ‘shares a mutual interest with the 
dominant economic class in maintaining the overall set of material class  relations’.  This 
is  because they have an interest in transforming their symbolic capital in to economic 
capital, and therefore in a sense must ‘collude’ to articulate the symbols  of the dominant 
economic class in order to maintain the class structure that supports and facilitates  the 
field of  cultural production in the first place.  
However, at times  of great change this relationship can be subverted as material capital 
is  more overtly prioritised.  Bourdieu considers  the era since the nineteenth century to 
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48 Bourdieu elucidates  this by positing that the field of cultural production is itself dominated by the field 
of power.  This is  because this field ‘is the economic world reversed’ insofar as ‘cultural production 
distinguishes itself from the production of the most common objects  in that it must produce not only the 
object in its materiality, but also the value of this object, that is, the recognition of artistic 
legitimacy’ (ibid.).  Therefore, the agents  within the field of cultural production ‘occupy a dominated 
position in the dominant class, they are owners  of a dominated form of power at the interior of the 
sphere of power’ (ibid.).  Bourdieu stresses the importance of considering the field of cultural production 
in this manner, as it helps  explain certain strategies  employed by artists  and other members  of the field of 
cultural production.  Bourdieu even posits that members of this field possess  a double status as both an 
orator and a fool (ibid.: 165) because of their position as  a dominant agent in a dominated field. 
Therefore, members of this  field can be treated with ambivalence by the dominator field,  but the 
members of the field of cultural production can adopt an ambivalent stance to the dominator field, 
notably for Bourdieu in the contrasting examples of  l’art pour l’art and social art movements (ibid.).
be one such period of change.  He posits that agents in this late historical time enter 
fields  with their appropriations from the habitus, but also with a set of material goods. 
Bourdieu divides these assets into two forms of capital - cultural and economic (ibid.). 
He posits that an agent will enter a field with the intention of reproducing and if 
possible adding to the capital of that field.  This holds true even for so-called ‘cultural’ 
capital, because cultural capital functions  as a form of symbolic capital that has  the 
potential to be ultimately converted to economic capital.  The education system ‘as a 
system of certification, created a market in cultural capital within which certificates 
acted as money both in terms of a common, abstract socially guaranteed medium of 
exchange between cultural capitals and, crucially, between cultural capital and the 
labour market and thus access to economic capital’ (ibid.: 124).
The implications  of Bourdieu’s  treatment of capital and interest for cultural production 
are articulated by Jenkins.  He observes that ‘in general agreement with his  hostility to 
rational actor theories of any kind, what Bourdieu is offering here is in trenchant 
opposition to any view of art, whether traditional or radical, which places individual 
creativity, however conceived, at the heart of the enterprise’ (ibid.: xii).  Instead, 
Bourdieu treats cultural production ‘as “position taking” in a field of possibilities, a 
market in which symbolic capital or cultural distinction are product, reward and 
resource: both means  and end’ (Jenkins 2002: xii).  However, in accepting a stance that 
artistic cultural production is for recognition, he denies  the individual intentionality and 
consciousness  that Jenkins  highlighted.  Therefore, there appears to be a contradiction 
in Bourdieu’s rationale here - at once he advocates a conscious, considered reflexivity in 
social science research but somewhat minimises  it in the case of artistic production. 
Once again Jenkins critiques this, noting that ‘one does not have either to sign up to the 
“lone genius” model, or lapse into reductionist subjectivism, to suggest that in art as  in 
all other areas  of social practice something of some importance which can usefully be 
glossed as  creativity is sometimes  happening.  In this  sense, Bourdieu's analysis is open to 
criticism as  social reductionism: a baby may perhaps  be being thrown out with the bath 
water’ (ibid.: xiv)49.
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49 Please see the chapter 3 addenda of appendix A for an annotation of Bourdieu's social space and for 
an account of  how he situates cultural consumption as one aspect of  production
3.7.3 Distinction
For Bourdieu, the primary motive of the dominant class  is  to use these tropes of habitus 
and field, and forms of accumulated capital to distance themselves from the other 
classes  in an act of  judgement - of ‘distinction’.  Thus, there exist what Bourdieu terms 
‘hierarchies of legitimacy’ (Bourdieu 1993: 85).  According to these hierarchies, ‘the 
more legitimate a given area, the more necessary and “profitable” it is to be competent 
in it, and the more damaging and “costly” to be incompetent (ibid.).  
Garnham and Williams observe that in response to this, ‘at the deepest level of the class 
ethos the dominated class reject the dominant culture in a movement of pure 
negation’ (Garnham & Williams in Collins  1986: 126).  However, in doing so, they 
create their own aesthetic of negation, which rejects aesthetic form in favour of function 
and judges art and other cultural goods  not by an aesthetic, but by what they represent 
‘according to the social and ethical values of the class ethos, that values participation 
and immediate semi-sensual gratification at the expense of disinterested and distanced 
contemplation’ (ibid.).  As  Bourdieu explains, ‘it must never be forgotten that the 
working class “aesthetic” is a dominated “aesthetic” which is constantly obliged to define 
itself in terms  of the dominant aesthetics’ (Bourdieu 1993: 41).  Bourdieu posits that the 
working class therefore experiences  a conflicted relationship with aesthetics, positing that 
‘the members of the working class, who can neither ignore the high-art aesthetic, which 
denounces their own “aesthetic”, nor abandon their socially conditioned inclinations, 
but still less  proclaim them and legitimate them, often experience their relationship to 
the aesthetic norms in a twofold and contradictory way’ (ibid.).  This  manifests  in an 
aesthetic appreciation of the practical value of the work, Bourdieu observing that 
‘working-class people, who expect every image to fulfil a function, if only that of a sign, 
refer, often explicitly, to norms of morality or agreeableness in all their 
judgements’ (ibid.).
The petite bourgeoisie also make distinctions  - judgements of taste - based on strategy. 
Bourdieu explains the reason for this, positing that ‘the whole relationship of the petite 
bourgeoisie to culture can in a sense be deduced from the considerable gap between 
knowledge and recognition, the source of the cultural goodwill which takes different 
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forms  depending on the degree of familiarity with legitimate culture, that is, on social 
origin and the associated mode of cultural acquisition’ (Bourdieu 1993: 319).  Bourdieu 
suggests that this  cultural goodwill manifests in a complex juxtaposition of strategies, 
including ‘cultural docility … often combined with a sense of unworthiness … 
commensurate with the respect that it is accorded’ (ibid.: 321).
3.7.4 Critiques
Garnham and Williams (1986) suggest critiques of Bourdieu’s work, relevant to a 
discourse on the cultural industries, with Jenkins  also observing that ‘as  Garnham has 
pointed out, the institutions of cultural production - the “culture industry” - are more or 
less completely neglected by Bourdieu’ (Jenkins  2002: 147).  Garnham and Williams 
observe a research question not addressed by Bourdieu, namely ‘the effect on the 
operation of symbolic power of the increased intervention of economic capital directly 
into the field of the production of symbolic goods via the so-called culture 
industries’ (Garnham & Williams in Collins  1986: 129).  Thus, the field of cultural 
production, distinguished by its negation of economic capital in order to first exist, is 
now undergoing an investment of economic capital, thus blurring its  very raison d’etre. 
This  blurring causes a situation where, according to Garnham and Williams ‘the 
economic interests  of the dominant fraction directly threaten the cultural interests  of the 
dominated fraction’ (ibid.), an insight relevant to today’s  top-price art ‘market’ whether 
in London, New York or Beijing.
Garnham and Williams are also critical of Bourdieu’s analysis, deeming it to contain ‘a 
functionalist/determinist residue in [his] concept of reproduction’ (Garnham & 
Williams in Collins  1986: 129).  Jenkins, while agreeing that the notion of a ‘pure’ 
Kantian aesthetic is problematic, also suggests that Bourdieu’s  approach ‘is, in its own 
way, no less  reductionist.  Culture and taste are, for Bourdieu, wholly arbitrary; history 
and social construction are all’ (Jenkins 2002: 149), leading Bourdieu ‘to place less 
emphasis on the possibilities of real change and innovation’ (Garnham & Williams in 
Collins  1986: 129).  Jenkins also observes  this, questioning how Bourdieu could explain 
such upheavals as the rise of modernism, and positing that ‘there is little room for 
innovation of deviance except insofar as  they represent limited manoeuvres  within an 
overall framework of  stability’ (Jenkins 2002: 149).
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Garnham and Williams posit that Bourdieu needs  to make a further distinction, as  it were, 
of his own when considering cultural production - that between replication and 
reformation.  They explain that ‘reformation points  us towards  spaces  that are opened 
up in conjunctural situations  in which the dominant class  is objectively weakened and 
which thus offers opportunities for real innovation in the social structure’ (Garnham & 
Williams in Collins 1986: 130).  However, these spaces  are contested and fraught with 
their own power dynamics that, according to Bourdieu’s analysis, make change difficult.  
Jenkins also finds this problematic, attributing the issue to Bourdieu’s concept of the 
habitus.  Jenkins explains  that ‘once acquired it underlies  and conditions  all subsequent 
learning and social experience.  This raises the issue of the possibility of change, both at 
individual level and the collective (because, although the habitus  is  embodied in 
individual agents, it is a social phenomenon)’ (Jenkins 2002: 79).
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3.8  Conclusion
In this chapter I have analysed key theories of cultural production, with a view to 
situating cultural production in the digital age to these frameworks.  Both the Frankfurt 
School and the production of culture perspective have considerably illuminated the 
complexities  and ambivalences  involved in cultural and artistic production.  Where the 
two schools of thought complement each other is  in the synthesis of meaning and 
practicality, the Frankfurt School being concerned with meaning, freedom, and artistic 
autonomy, the production of culture perspective with the practicalities of deconstructing 
complex processes into a practicable schema for analysis.  In the context of this  research 
thesis, the Frankfurt School is of particular relevance as it engages  with concepts  of 
artistic production whilst also stressing the situatedness  of the producer.  Thus, this 
theoretical perspective is  relevant for informing the theoretical framework for a meso 
and macro-level analysis of cultural production.  It also adds a perspective in the two 
themed areas of  (1) socio-cultural situatedness and (2) art, as outlined in chapter 1.
The advantages of a production of culture perspective include a systematic empiricism 
and practicality.  However, a tendency for such systems  approaches is that they can 
underemphasise and even negate the subjective and intersubjective facets of research. 
As we have seen, despite the general practicalities that the production perspective 
affords, it has usually overlooked, with Crane and Wolff as exceptions, the complexities 
involved in analysing high art and popular culture.  In contrast to this, the Frankfurt 
School analysed the subjectivity and intersubjectivity of the artistic innovator, and the 
interdependent relationship of the individual, culture and society.  The advantage to this 
approach is  that tends  to be anti-reductionist and does not attempt to reduce immanent 
experience to an objective system.
The work of Bourdieu has contributed much to the understanding of how scholars 
approach their research.  His practical, empirical work supported by robust theory 
combines  two of the strengths  of academic research - reflexivity and (relative) 
objectivity.  In terms of explaining tensions of class dynamics, his concepts  of the field 
and habitus are useful, whilst situating these concepts  within a dynamic of cultural, 
social and economic capital.  Again, this is relevant for informing the key themed area of 
socio-cultural situatedness, with a strong emphasis on both the production and reception 
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of culture.  In terms of cultural production, Bourdieu's key concepts, while very 
powerful for revealing certain dynamics of power, capital, economics and hierarchy, fall 
short of explaining radical innovations in the cultural sector.  It would seem that in his 
desire to distance himself from any over-romantic belief in ‘innate’ taste, Bourdieu 
nonetheless distances himself from concepts  of individual intentionality, consciousness, 
creativity and innovation.  
In the next chapter I pick up these concepts of individuality, creativity and the artistic 
experience, whilst also situating the aesthetic encounter within periodising hypotheses of 
modernist, postmodernist, electronic, ‘altermodern’ and ‘postmedia’ conditions of 
artistic production.
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Chapter 4
Perspectives on Art
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Chapter 4: Perspectives on Art
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I analyse perspectives on art and aesthetics, to situate cultural and 
artistic production of digital media within the context of multiple academic domains. 
The chapter thus  aims  to provide an exegesis on the key questions  on the subject of art 
as  described in chapter 1, and complement the discussion of art as  production of 
culture in chapter 3.  I therefore explore how art is positioned through various 
theoretical lenses, with perspectives from cultural studies, aesthetic theory and the 
philosophy of art included.  I suggest that this interdisciplinary account of art may 
ameliorate the contested formulations of what art ‘is’, by considering facets  ranging 
from debates  on a ‘universal’, Kantian aesthetic to the subjective and immanent 
response to the work of art.  I suggest this approach, as an encounter with art is a 
contested, debated and problematic experience in terms  of description, analysis and 
categorisation, with further implications for digital art, where new forms of production 
and distribution often challenge traditional notions of  ‘art’ itself.
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4.2 Art as an Encounter
Simon O’Sullivan (2006) suggests that the experience of an art object may be examined 
by comparing an object of artistic encounter with an object of recognition (O’Sullivan, 2006: 
1).  This distinction is  significant.  O’Sullivan posits that in meeting with an object of 
recognition, ‘our knowledges, beliefs  and values are reconfirmed’ (ibid.).  On the other 
hand, O’Sullivan posits  that to have the experience of an encounter  however, is  to have an 
antithetical experience.  According to O’Sullivan, an encounter ‘produces a cut, a 
crack’ (ibid.), and in such an encounter, ‘our typical ways of being in the world are 
challenged, our systems of knowledge disrupted’ (ibid.), and ‘we are forced to 
thought’ (ibid.).  Thus, in an experience of recognition, the observer is  confronted with a 
familiar scene or event which reinforces that scene, reaffirms it  and strengthens prior 
perceptions of it.  However, in an experience of encounter, a rupture to the familiar 
occurs, where new knowledge and experience can seed itself.  For O’Sullivan, ‘the 
rupturing encounter also contains a moment of affirmation, the affirmation of a new 
world, in fact a way of seeing and thinking this world differently’ (ibid.)50.  Thus, in that 
rupture between the known and the unknown, a transformational space is possible.  
However, to uncritically consider this  trope of ‘art-as-encounter’ from this one author - 
however in tune with the ‘negative dialectics’ of critical theory - would amount to a 
mere article of faith.  Thus, whilst it is beyond the scope of this section to fully expound 
on the historical trajectory ‘art-as-encounter’ trope in art theory, I nonetheless wish to 
draw the reader’s attention to other influences on this  trope.  One such influence is the 
of Henri Bergsen, who in his  major work Matter and Memory (1896/1988) problematises 
perception, leading on to discussions of recognition and attention (Bergsen, 1988: 99). 
Bergsen suggests  that in the act of attention, the mind ‘gives up the pursuit of the useful 
effect of a present perception’ (ibid.: 101) and relinquishes  that pursuit in favour of 
allowing for ‘the projection, outside ourselves, of an actively created image’.  Thus, 
when the suspension of a recognised perceived object occurs, there is a moment of 
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50 I compare this process to the Vedic concept of mantra and brahmana.  To elucidate, mantra consists of 
sound vibrations (chants, for example), and brahmana consists of the gaps  between the sounds.  On the 
surface value, the mantra is supremely important,  as it is the manifest,  repeatable, knowable substance of 
the chant.   However, it is  only through the brahmana – those gaps and pauses that allow space for the sound 
to enter, while also giving it a syntax and meaning – that contextualisation, understanding and ultimately 
transformation of the chant can occur.  Likewise,  in the rupture that a genuine encounter with art can 
provide, there is a space created for a new understanding of  the matter at hand.
relinquishing that recognition in favour of allowing the mind to imagine, or construct a 
‘projection’ of a newly created image.  Thus in the relinquishment of the familiar, or 
‘present perception’, a space or ‘gap’ allowing for the construction of a new formulation 
is possible.  Bergsen’s  work has been influential on theorists of art and aesthetics such as 
Emmanuel Levinas and Bracha Ettinger.
For Levinas, the artwork allows for this  transformation between the present perception 
and the projection, or possibility of an other image. Thus Levinas argues that ‘the most 
elementary procedure of art consists  in substituting for the object its image. Its image, 
and not its  concept’ (Levinas, 1987: 3).   Levinas  expands on this, considering a ‘concept’ 
as  an ‘object grasped’ or ‘the intelligible object’.  Thus, in such an intelligible object, that 
which makes sense, ‘we maintain a living relationship with a real object; we grasp it, we 
conceive it’ (ibid.).  
However, in terms of art then, an image disrupts this procedure, or ‘neutralises this real 
relationship, this primary conceiving through action’ (Levinas, 1987: 3).  This disruptive 
or ‘monstrous’ property of art, for Levinas is the function of art, rhetorically asking 
‘does  not the function of art lie in not understanding?’ (ibid.).  In what I suggest is 
another parallel to the concept of the ‘gap’ in which the artistic ‘encounter’ may occur, 
Levinas describes  how art can open this ‘gap’.  ‘Art’ according to Levinas, ‘brings  about 
this  duration in the interval, in that sphere which a being is able to traverse, but in which 
its shadow is  immobilised’.  Again, clarifying between the concept and image of an 
object, Levinas  continues by noting how ‘he eternal duration of the interval in which a 
statue is immobilised differs  radically from the eternity of a concept; it is the meanwhile, 
never finished, still enduring - something inhuman and monstrous’ (ibid.: 11).  Thus the 
‘gap’ in which the artistic experience or encounter may occur is  not necessarily a positively 
transcendental moment, but can be more akin to Burke’s  formulation of the sublime, 
where an event - a terrible one - beyond our grasp precipitates  a sense of ‘astonishment’ 
that causes a suspension of  movement, thought and action.
Bracha Ettinger similarly discusses  the artistic encounter in terms  of ‘trauma’.  For 
Ettinger, ‘the place of art is  for me the transport-station of trauma: a transport-station 
that more than a place is rather a space, that allows for certain occasions  of occurrence 
and of encounter’ (Ettinger, 2000: 91).  This ‘transport-station’ works thus: ‘the 
transport is  expected in this station, and it is possible, but the transport-station does not 
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promise that passage of remnants  of trauma will actually take place in it; it only supplies 
the space for this occasion’ (ibid.).  Thus, in Ettinger’s formulation art can be 
conceptualised as a potential space, a holding space in which transported information 
may or may not appear.  However, the information that does  arrive through an 
experience of the artistic encounter may be traumatic, or it may not arrive at all.  As 
Ettinger, continues  ‘the passage is expected but uncertain, the transport does  not happen 
in each encounter and for every gazing subject’ (ibid.).  Thus, the trope of ‘art-as-
encounter’ is  not prescriptive.  Not every art object will evoke this encounter, and even if 
it does, it will not do so for every person that observes the art object.  Thus the trope of 
‘art-as-encounter’ is  a contested and problematic concept, with conflicting theories of 
art either bolstering the case for an ‘encounter’, or denying the possibility for such 
experience to exist.  
One such criticism comes from postmodern thought, which is often seen as ‘a break with 
the aesthetic field of modernism’ (Foster, 1998: ix).  Problematising postmodernism and 
its relationship to modernism Jurgen Habermas (1998) posited that the aesthetic of 
modernity was in part, characterised by the separation of ‘the substantive reason 
expressed in religion and metaphysics into three autonomous spheres’ of science, 
morality and art (ibid.: 8).  This separation led to the various subjects being handled by 
‘experts’ in their fields, for example, taste, art criticism, and ‘aesthetic-expressive 
rationality’, which could then be institutionalised and formalised further (ibid.). 
However, Habermas  posits  that the project of modernity had a lofty and overly-
ambitious ‘extravagant expectation that the arts and sciences  would promote not only 
the control of natural forces but also understanding of the world and self, moral 
progress, the justice of institutions  and even the happiness of human beings’.   (ibid.). 
Habermas observes how ‘the 20th century has  shattered this  optimism’, leading to 
‘efforts to “negate” the culture of  expertise’ in a postmodern gesture.
This  is evident in postmodern art practices such as primitivism and conceptualism, 
where technical expertise, skill and refinement of expression is not only deprioritised but 
relinquished in a deliberate anti-expertise gesture that is  more well-known in 
postmodernist thought as a turn to ‘populism’.  In particular, the Turner Prize has been 
regarded as an exponent of postmodern art and culture, with one commentator noting 
how ‘recent Turner prize winners testify to the degree to which the post-modern 
movement has extended notions of art’ (Harold: 2005, Beaumont: 2005, Boston: 2000). 
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However, the prize has  also attracted much criticism for what it considers as  ‘art’, 
revealing the postmodern anti-expertise gesture to turn art practice into a trajectory 
where theoretical validation appears necessary to bolster poorly executed work.  Once 
commentator revealed how this criticism has been mooted by several daily newspapers, 
observing that ‘the Independent yearned for something that wasn’t “about wearing your 
theory-stuffed brain on your sleeve”.  The Telegraph wrote off the entire 2008 show as 
“technically competent, bland, and ultimately empty”’ (Higgins, 2008). 
For Habermas (1998), the postmodern efforts of artistic and cultural negation are a 
mistake.  He suggests  that ‘the problem won’t go away’ by making a regressive, anti-
modern gesture (Foster, 1998: 9).  For Habermas, the postmodern gestures that remove 
‘the distinction between artefact and object of use’, its  efforts to ‘declare everything to 
be art and everyone to be an artist’ (ibid.: 10) and a practice that serves  to ‘retract all 
criteria and to equate aesthetic judgement with the expression of subjective experiences’ 
have failed, showing themselves ‘to be sort of nonsense experiments’.  Thus, rather than 
the negation of expert art, the postmodern gesture has ‘ended up ironically by giving 
due exactly to these categories through which Enlightenment aesthetics had 
circumscribed its  object domain’.  A second flaw in the postmodern gesture for 
Habermas is  in the ‘abstraction’ of meaning.  For Habermas, ‘in everyday 
communication, cognitive meanings, moral expectations, subjective expressions and 
evaluations  must relate to each other’.  The abstraction of these meanings, through a 
‘cultural impoverishment’ could not help ‘save’ a ‘rationalised everyday life’ (ibid.: 11). 
For Habermas, the aesthetic experience, whether by a ‘layman’ or a ‘professional critic’ 
is  a significant and meaningful one which ‘not only renews the interpretation of our 
needs in whose light we perceive the world’, in what is a comparable process to the 
recognition of O’Sullivan.  Rather, the aesthetic experience also ‘permeates as well our 
cognitive significations  and our normative expectations and changes the manner in 
which all these moments refer to one another’, in a process compatible with O’Sullivan’s 
formulation of  the transformative encounter with an art object.
Thus, the postmodern ‘pure immanence of art’ which ‘disputes that it has a utopian 
content’ negates the potential of the artistic encounter for Habermas.  However, this 
trope of ‘utopian’ potential of art is  also somewhat simplistic and problematic, bringing 
a prescriptive ontology of ‘sameness’ to the potential of art.  As  noted above, Levinas 
described this potential as  ‘inhuman and monstrous’ in its ability to be limitless, 
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suggesting that the ‘gap’ in which the artistic encounter may occur is  not necessarily in 
line with the modern ideal of a ‘utopian’ experience of art.  Likewise, Ettinger discussed 
the artistic encounter as  a ‘transport-station of trauma’.  Notwithstanding this 
problematic dimension to Habermas, I suggest that a practical stance is  to treat an art 
object as a potential site of encounter.  Whilst an extreme postmodern position negates  this 
potential, I also point out that the encounter must also only be considered in its  potential. 
It is  by no means a given that every art object will bring about an encounter, let alone a 
utopian one, nor can that potential be negated in a conceptual frame that does  not allow 
for its possibility.
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4.3  Cultural Studies and Art
4.3.1 Artists or ‘Symbol Creators’?
In this  section, I argue that the neglect of O’Sullivan’s  ‘encounter’ is evident in the field 
of cultural studies.  Enlightenment thinking posits  art as  a pinnacle of human 
achievement, or as David Hesmondhalgh observes, ‘since the Renaissance – and 
especially since the Romantic movement of the nineteenth century – there has been a 
widespread tendency to think of “art” as being one of the highest forms  of human 
creativity’ (Hesmondhalgh, 2007: 4).  Artists were thought of as special, gifted or 
different, with Hesmondhalgh suggesting that this mystery around ‘high’ art caused 
cultural studies  scholars to question just what ‘high’ art comprised.  He thus posits that 
this  creativity involves ‘the manipulation of symbols’ in a largely materialist stance, the 
symbols mostly created ‘for the purposes of entertainment, information’, albeit with an 
aside that they can be created for ‘perhaps even enlightenment’.  He also undermines 
the role of ‘creator’ or ‘artist’, preferring to use the terminology ‘symbol creators’ to 
describe such roles  (ibid.: 5).  Also significantly, Hesmondhalgh defines  these ‘symbol 
creators’ as people who ‘make up, interpret or rework stories, songs images  and so on’ (ibid. 
emphasis added). 
Considering the suggestion that art potentially exists as a site of encounter, the position 
that Hesmondhalgh adopts  is problematic, equating the creative processes  and the skills 
involved in executing an original work with the skills involved in the interpretation or the 
reworking of a text, thus conflating O’Sullivan’s recognition with encounter.  This  conflation 
is further confirmed in the discussion of cultural texts, (in the form of informational 
texts  but also films, TV series and video games), Hesmondhalgh suggesting that those 
forms  ‘provide us  with recurring representations  of the world and thus  act as a kind of 
reporting’, and how they ‘help to constitute our inner, private lives and our public 
selves’ (Hesmondhalgh, 2007: 3).  Here, Hesmondhalgh draws  equivalence between 
creation and interpretation, as  abstract ‘symbols’ or as  the ‘recurring representations’ 
that they provide, without making distinction between representation of existing work 
and newly created, original work.  Where this stance is  problematic is that, according to 
Hesmondhalgh, there is  no place, nor is  there any necessity to even discuss  the concept 
of rupture or encounter.  The function of ‘symbol creators’ is  merely to provide objects of 
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recognition that help ‘us’ constitute ourselves in a process of  reassurance and repetition. 
4.3.2 Cultural Studies and Art
Hesmondhalgh is  not alone in how his  interpretation of art and creative works  as 
cultural text and ‘symbol’.  Chris Barker provides a summary of debates  within cultural 
studies around the nature of ‘high’ and ‘low’ culture, analysing how scholars such as 
Arnold and Leavis delineated between high and low culture by a quality of aesthetics. 
According to Barker, this has been problematic for cultural studies  in that ‘the policing 
of the boundaries  of a canon of “good” works  led to the exclusion of popular 
culture’ (Barker, 2008: 63).  For Barker, this  policing was through a hierarchy whereby 
distinctions were made about the quality of works  from the cultural vantage point of the 
elite and privileged, which did not take into account the tastes of the masses, but of the 
select number of individuals  who belonged to that privileged class.  This  ‘class-based 
hierarchy’, as Barker terms  it, had been ‘employed by apologists as representative of a 
universal set of aesthetic criteria’, criteria that cultural studies scholars deemed to be no 
longer valid means by which to judge the cultural texts (ibid)51.  Thus, a reactionary 
stance positions artistic production as just another form of production, in ‘a human 
transformation of the material environment through labour’ (ibid.: 64).  Barker sums up 
this  debate within the cultural studies domain by observing that ‘there is little 
justification for excluding the soap opera from the artistic domain on the grounds that 
art, i.e. aesthetic quality, is a different kind of  activity’ (ibid).
Seen through the lens of of postmodernist thought, where hierarchical value 
judgements are discarded in favour of an ‘inner logic of a cultural domain’ (Foster, 
1998: 12), this argument is difficult to counter.  However, Barker critiques  this position, 
arguing that the issue of value judgement has  shown itself to be problematic within 
cultural studies, as it proves  contradictory in its application.  According to Barker, the 
conflict lies thus; the discipline aims  to foreground popular culture as a valid area of 
study, accepted into the academy in the context of the existing tradition of ‘high’ 
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51 Using the example of the soap opera, Barker analyses  how the traditional means employed to judge 
quality became no longer valid in later discussions of cultural studies.  He observes how Allen (1985: 11) 
argued how the crux of the issue surrounding discussion of the soap opera was related to its  form.  By 
judging the value or quality of the soap opera based on the traditional aesthetic forms, the soap opera was 
bound to be seen as ‘superficial and unsatisfying’ Barker, 2008: 63).
culture.  This  process  therefore requires a moratorium on the existing value judgements, 
or a suspension of disbelief, that has traditionally ostracised the study of popular culture 
in the academy, so that popular culture is  accepted in the academic context for analysis, 
critique and, ironically enough, value judgements.  Barker himself does not find this 
situation satisfying.  As he notes, ‘there is a reluctance to sanction a position in which we 
are disbarred from making judgements’ (Barker, 2008: 65).  For Barker, rather than 
attempting to legitimise the content or the aesthetics  of cultural texts, the critique can be 
shifted to the power dynamics, for example, by examining the culture industries  and the 
nexus  of power, production and distribution therein, while also noting that so-called 
high culture can be as much an industry as popular culture (ibid.: 64).  While this is  what 
I would term a ‘workaround’ to the problematic issue of value judgements, such a model 
of culture provides  a limited analysis  of the formation and production of cultural texts. 
It suggests that all cultural texts  are forms  of labour that can be evaluated in terms  of 
industry and profit, reducing art, creativity and innovative endeavour to the political and 
economic spheres.  While this debate has had influence in popular culture - and Barker 
himself alludes  to this in terms of domestic drama and its portrayal of the family, 
patriarchy and social issues (ibid.: 65) - I suggest that in the light of the work of the 
Frankfurt School, and particularly Theodor Adorno’s  work on the culture industry, it is 
reductionist to categorise all cultural artefacts  in that manner, confining the analysis to a 
material one.  Or to return to O’Sullivan’s  model, the analysis  is  reduced to that which 
can describe and annotate recognition, but not encounter52.
4.3.3 The Creative Consumer - John Fiske
For Barker, the cultural studies  critique suggests that the Frankfurt school ‘make the 
assumption that the meanings so identified are taken up by audiences  in an 
unproblematic fashion’ (Barker, 2008: 67), whereas in contrast, ‘consumption-oriented 
cultural studies  argues that meanings are produced, altered and managed at the level of 
use by people who are active producers  of meaning’ (ibid.).  A well-known proponent of 
this  ‘creative consumer’ or ‘active audience’ position within cultural studies is John Fiske. 
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52 Whilst the scrutiny of the Frankfurt school is seen as ‘pessimistic’ in certain cultural studies domains 
(Barker, 2008: 67), it is  difficult to conclude that the culture industry values the expression of the audience 
it purports  to represent,  when profit-making has become the primary reason for the existence of the 
industry in the first place.  Barker critiques the Frankfurt school in a number of ways, noting that the 
school has over-relied on textual analysis, and has  over-emphasised the inherent or immanent meaning of 
the texts (ibid.).  
Barker summarises Fiske’s  position thus: ‘Fiske argues  that popular culture is  constituted 
by the meanings that people make with it rather than those identifiable within 
texts’ (ibid.: 68), referring to works  where Fiske discusses ways in which the capitalist 
forces  ‘are coped with, are evaded or are resisted’ (Fiske, 1989a: 8, in Barker: 68).  For 
Fiske, ‘popular vitality and creativity’ testifies to the ability of popular to effect social 
change (ibid.), and ‘consumers  are not passive dopes  but discriminating active producers 
of  meaning’ (ibid.).  
While raising important debates  surrounding the subject, identity and the site of 
meaning, Fiske himself has  come under criticism.  Morley observes Fiske’s tendency 
towards  ‘romanticism’ (Morley, 2006: 31), an observation also noted by Simon During 
suggesting that in Fiske’s framework, the audience ‘will choose only those texts that offer 
opportunities  to resist, evade of scandalise hegemony’ (During, 1999: 91).  According to 
Gray (1998) ‘the critical literature on cultural studies is characterized by a repetitive 
figuration of “active audience theory” as the source of all evil, in so far as it has 
supposedly led cultural studies into a trajectory of work which is banal, naively 
celebratory and politically irresponsible’ (Morley, 2006: 31).  Whilst Morley lays 
responsibility for this  on Fiske (ibid.), he nonetheless argues that the study of popular 
culture in the cultural studies  discipline should not be foregrounded to the detriment of 
the study of ‘high’ art, Morley asserting that ‘it’s actually very important that the field of 
cultural studies also pays  proper and full attention to what is  understood as high 
culture’ (ibid.: 54).  Whilst Morley observes how the foregrounding of popular culture 
has been historically necessary, due to its  neglect in traditional academic studies, he 
warns of the dangers of a reactionary position where only popular culture is  considered 
as  ‘valid’ culture.  He advises  the discipline not to stay ‘stuck in that moment’ of that 
reactionary position, stressing the importance that ‘one doesn't imagine that only 
popular culture is important’ (ibid.).
Chris Barker summarises  McGuigan’s  examination of Fiske’s position by observing that, 
according to McGuigan, ‘the celebration of the productive and resistive capacities  of 
audiences has  gone too far’ (Barker, 2008: 418).  Barker also posits  a significant issue 
with the ‘postmodernization’ of culture by observing that the discipline of cultural 
studies ‘is unable to critique the products  of consumer culture because it has lost sight of 
any profound conception of cultural value from which to critique texts’ (ibid.).  This 
adoption of a postmodern perspective ‘over-endows audiences with the cultural 
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competencies  to deconstruct ideology’ (ibid.), where that endowment may not be 
justified.
The result of this, according to McGuigan, is  that cultural studies  has in effect, vitiated 
itself and made itself impotent to put forward ‘at the level of either analysis or policy, 
any transformative alternative to the market as  it stands’ (ibid.) due to its  refusal to treat 
‘high’ culture as in any way qualitatively different from popular culture.  This  stance has 
thus led to the discipline becoming in effect, if not intent, an apologist for the market, 
with its  uncritical stance on popular culture and its  mode of production serving to 
support the machines of the capitalist ideologies  - the very position that Adorno was 
concerned with.  Just as cultural studies contested the Frankfurt School’s supposition that 
the audience adopted cultural texts  uncritically, Adorno’s work challenges cultural 
studies discourse that sees the consumer as  critical thinker, instead providing a thought-
provoking reminder of the need to be conscious of the complex nature of the industry 
and its motives of  ‘symbol’ creation53.
Other writers  such as Fred Inglis  and Janet Wolff also critique the popular culture 
stance in cultural studies  literature.  Inglis  suggests in what he describes as  a ‘guerrilla 
attack’, works within the discipline of cultural studies ‘denounce the category of art as 
an instrument of class assertiveness, refuse the sacred status of art, and treat all symbolic 
expression as equally worthy of serious  interpretation’ (Inglis, 1993: 18).  Janet Wolff 
also situates the problem of art, aesthetics and their reconciliation in popular culture 
studies, observing how aesthetic theories  are ‘forcing us to recognise the impossibility of 
counter-posing “great art” to popular culture or mass culture in any simplistic 
manner’ (Wolff, 1983: 11). 
The cultural studies perspective on art, while valuable because it required the 
consideration of an expanded conceptualisation of ‘culture’, nevertheless is problematic. 
In suggesting that artistic endeavour is just another form of labour or ‘symbol creation’, 
and thereby attempting a pseudo-liberation of art to include popular opinions and 
world views, it  has  homogenised high art and popular culture in an oversimplified way. 
We have seen how the discipline of cultural studies, through scholars such as Fiske 
(although he is  only one example) adopted this  belief, but there are other philosophical 
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53 Please see the chapter 4 addenda in appendix A for comments on the continued relevance of Frankfurt 
School theories
positions that suggest that this uniformity can no longer hold true.  In the context of 
O’Sullivan’s distinctions  between recognition and encounter, the foregrounding of the 
audience as  creators of meaning is overstated, given that the modes of reception of 
popular culture tend to revolve around acts of  recognition54.  
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54 Roland Barthes in Camera Lucida (1980) also suggested a process of transformation, occurring through 
the medium of photography and its ability to preserve meaning and a sense of ‘timelessness’.  He posited 
the concept of the punctum which is described as ‘an effect of being moved and rendered speechless by the 
photographic image’ (Kul-Want, 2007:  147).  Thus, the punctum describes an encounter with the 
photographic image, equivalent of the rupture in experience and providing that gap in which a new 
experience can take place.  Barthes ruminated on a specific photographic image of his mother, and 
explored ways  in which looking at the photograph allowed him to transcend time and space, and connect 
with some of the qualities his  deceased mother possessed (ibid.).  The experience was  therefore not just of 
recognition of  his mother, but of  transformation of  his prior opinions of  his mother.  
Nietzsche also commented on the rupture that occurs  in art.  In The Will to Power as Art, Nietzsche 
explored the concepts  of beauty and truth in art, concluding that ‘beauty is  not just passive but 
transformative’ (Kul-Want, 2007: 171).  For Nietzsche, beauty, even what was traditionally seen as 
‘negative’ beauty in the form of destruction or failure,  could be seen as  ‘intrinsic to art, creativity and life-
affirming values’  (ibid.).  Just as the experience of beauty was transformative for Nietzsche, so could be the 
production of an artistic work.  For Nietzsche, ‘the “will to power” was the ability to embrace change - and 
what is new or different - and convert it into creative energy’ (ibid.: 60). 
I suggest that these examples reveal how the safe environs of representation, reaffirmation and repetition 
do not give full compliment to the range of human aesthetic experience.  Promoting a discourse that calls 
for cultural artefacts to be uniformly categorised does not do justice to the rupture that an artefact can 
provide.  It does not allow for a discourse of  real transformation.
4.4 Art, Postmodernism and the Cultural Turn
4.4.1  Introduction: The Cultural Turn
I suggest that the account of the cultural studies’ perspectives on art in the previous 
section signals a rise in the attention paid to ‘culture’ not only within the cultural studies 
discipline, but also within broader social thought and critical theory since the 1980s, a 
turn which implies new or different ways of conceptualising ‘art’.  This ‘cultural turn’ is 
evident across  a wide spectrum of academic disciplines, and argues  that economic 
processes are not autonomous, but embedded in cultural and social terms 55.  The turns 
to culture may be viewed as a counter to to ‘hard’ disciplines  such as economics and its 
increased influence connected to the rise of neo-liberalist thought.  In an ‘ironic’ mode 
favoured by contemporary cultural studies, this  turn to culture is read as a subversive 
response to Thatcher’s declaration that there is  no such thing as  society, or likewise that 
there is no such thing as ‘social science’ other than economics (Morgan and Preston, 
2010).  
This  postmodernist thought which is intertwined with the cultural turn discourse, is, as 
discussed in section 4.4.4, marked by an inattentiveness to historical considerations, and 
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55 There are a number of dimensions  of recent socio-cultural change which underpin this  recent cultural 
turn.  First, it is claimed that the economy is  now largely constituted through informational and symbolic 
processes.   Such advocates of the cultural turn point to a fusion of the economic and the cultural spheres, 
suggesting that any clear distinction between the two is no longer meaningful.  The most extreme version 
of this argument can be found in the work of postmodernist theorists  such Jean Baudrillard who 
emphasises the ‘simulation’ effects of the explosion of media images and the increasingly symbolic 
character of  all types of  commodities.
Second, the cultural turn has  been closely linked to the emergence of globalisation as a theme in current 
critical and social discourses.  Third, such cultural discourses also tend to emphasise the role of new ICTs 
in furthering the trends towards the globalisation and the fusion of  economic and cultural processes.  
Fourth, the cultural turn is  marked by increasing attention to - and celebration of - consumption processes 
and leisure activities.  In the contemporary economy, there is an increasing reliance on market-based 
commodities to deliver material,  social and cultural requirements.  This is  seen to require a major focus on 
consumption processes and a consequent marginalisation of  productive activities.  
Fifth, the cultural turn presumes that, in today’s materially affluent and multicultural societies,  economic 
or material inequality matters less  than in the past.  This theme is evident in discourses which highlight 
‘the politics of  representation’ rather than the politics of  distribution.
Finally, one major theme associated with the cultural turn centres around an emphasis on increasing 
individualisation and a consequent diminution of relatively fixed, socially-framed identities,  which 
characterised earlier stages of capitalist modernity.  One implication of this position is that both the 
production and consumption of culture have now become increasingly individualised and broken free of 
their moorings in social, cultural or political collectivities (Morgan and Preston, 2010).
a reductionist understanding of the early modern period and of the subsequent 
evolution of ‘the unfinished project of modernity’ such as that discussed by Habermas. 
However, the rise of modern concepts  of culture, including aspects of our relationship 
with art and culture, comprises aspects of the umbrella concept of ‘modernity’56.  Thus, 
the ahistoricity with which the cultural turn treats the development of culture is  an 
inadequate model which ignores  the significant historical context in which issues 
surrounding contemporary culture are embedded.  Therefore, any ‘cultural turn’ can 
only be conceptualised as  intrinsic to the rise of the capitalist system, rather than an 
adjunct feature peculiar to a ‘late’ or ‘post-modern’ capitalism (Preston: 2001, Jameson: 
1984).
4.4.2 The Neo-Liberal Turn
The rise of capitalism has also implied new relationships between the artistic producer 
and their audience, as noted by one of the key pioneers of what now passes as  the 
cultural studies field, Raymond Williams.  However, as  capitalist market society 
expanded and the market-based ‘public’ became the patron, artists themselves  became 
more critical of this relationship, seeing how their works can often become 
commodified.  Thus, for Preston, ‘ever since the industrial revolution, and long before 
the emergence of modern social and cultural theory - not to mention contemporary 
notions of an emerging new kind of ‘information society’ - many literary and artistic 
voices  as well as critics and intellectuals have pointed to diverse tensions  and 
antagonisms between the expanding hegemony of ‘the market’ and the idea of 
distinctive forms of  ‘culture’’ (Preston 2001: 238).  
Looking to recent trends, we see cultural policy over the last twenty years or so turn to a 
neo-liberal framework that promises  to usher in a new ‘information society’.  Such 
frameworks  privilege ICTs as  drivers of this new age, and firmly situate culture as just 
one aspect of this grand project.  For Preston (2001), the convergence of this neo-liberal 
turn with the cultural or postmodern turn has  implications  for critical discourse around 
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56 Please see the chapter 4 addenda in appendix A for further analysis on concepts of modernity and how 
they relate to artistic/cultural production
culture and art57.  
4.4.3 The Changing Role of  Culture in the ‘Cultural Turn’  
The contemporary cultural production system links  together cultural producers and 
their audiences. To an increasing extent, art is produced, distributed, and consumed via 
a complex technological, social, and economic infrastructure, by a growing number and 
range of actors, and their gatekeepers, using diverse networks.  This is made possible by 
deepening social divisions  of labour and technological infrastructures. These divisions in 
turn frame the lived experience, the expressive opportunities, and the material incentives 
confronting individual artists, and even serve to channel important aspects of their 
conscious and imaginative sensibilities.
However, far from cultural processes or institutions  asserting control over economic or 
bureaucratic rationality, as cultural turn discourses  might have us believe, we are merely 
confronting a shift in the division of labour.  Adam Smith suggested that in a 
commercial-based society the production of knowledge would become just like any 
other form of labour.  Smith was  both describing and prescribing that the function of 
the artist, no less than that of the intellectual, is to ‘prepare for the market’ his or her 
own particular ‘species of goods’, which will then be ‘purchased, in the same manner as 
shoes or stockings’58.
This  utilitarian view of the function of cultural production has  persisted to more 
contemporary discourses  that mark the ‘cultural turn’, such as the ‘production of culture 
perspective’ which I analysed in chapter 3.  As also seen in this  chapter, while such an 
approach to schematising culture has its  benefits, it is also critiqued for this utilitarian 
stance to the production of culture, suggesting that it is  in no way more ‘special’ than 
Smith’s shoes or stockings.
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57 In the chapter 4 addenda in appendix A, I look at these implications in terms of three of the major 
subjects in the area of cultural production - ownership, the role of the state, and advertising, based on 
Preston (2001).
58 However, Smith partly explains the high income of  opera singers in the late 18th century by reference 
to the ‘shame’ associated with attempts to sell their talents for money
4.4.4 Against the Cultural Turn: Fredric Jameson
Fredric Jameson is a cultural critic, noted for his account of postmodernism, and the 
implications for culture of the postmodern turn.  He was influenced by Marxist critique 
of society and aesthetics.  His  1984 essay Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late 
Capitalism, later expanded into his  1991 book of the same name, outlines  a critique of 
postmodern culture through several themes.  A full analysis  of all six themes can be 
found in the chapter 4 addenda of appendix A, but here I briefly outline parts  of this 
essay with particular relevance to art, aesthetics, culture and the nexus with capitalism.
Jameson argues  that postmodernism began as the certainties  of modernist thought came 
to an end in a ‘radical break’ with modernist thought, coinciding with movements  such 
as  abstract expressionism or existentialist philosophy in ‘the final, extraordinary 
flowering of a high modernist impulse which is  spent and exhausted with 
them’ (Jameson, 1984: 54).  For Jameson, this sense of finality foregrounds postmodern 
thought.  Jameson posits  that the reaction to modernism first came about, and is  most 
easily visible in the area of architecture, explaining that movements  such as  the 
International Style became perceived as authoritarian and elitist through a postmodern 
lens.  For Jameson, ‘high modernism is  thus  credited with the destruction of the fabric of 
the traditional city and of its older neighbourhood culture (by way of the radical 
disjunction of the new Utopian high modernist building from its  surrounding 
context)’ (ibid.).  This perception of elitism in high modernist art and architecture thus 
brought about a reaction, characterised by the postmodern expression of ‘aesthetic 
populism’.  As Jameson notes, this  populist discourse, has had the effect of ‘drawing our 
attention to one fundamental feature of all the postmodernisms […] namely, the 
effacement in them of the older (essentially high-modernist) frontier between high 
culture and so-called mass or commercial culture’, also noting the seeming fascination 
that ‘postmodernisms’ have with commercial culture.  
Jameson suggests a ‘periodizing hypothesis’ through which to contextualise 
postmodernism, noting that he is attempting this ‘at a moment in which the very 
conception of historical periodization has  come to seem most problematical indeed due 
to perceptions that a periodising hypothesis tends  to ‘obliterate difference’ and that such 
hypotheses ‘project an idea of the historical period as massive homogeneity’ (ibid.: 56). 
It is  in this context that Jameson posits  the importance of not just considering 
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postmodernism as a cultural style, but as  a ‘cultural dominant’, which although allows 
for different stances, nonetheless positions  them as  subordinate in face of the dominant 
a-historicism (ibid.).  This  cultural dominant has  however become institutionalised.  For 
Jameson, the ‘offensive features’ of postmodernism that include ‘obscurity and sexually 
explicit material to psychological squalor and overt expressions of social and political 
defiance’ have become normative, and are now met with not only ‘the greatest 
complacency but have themselves become institutionalized and are at one with the 
official culture of  Western society’ (ibid.).
Jameson argues that contemporary aesthetic production has fallen foul of this culture, 
observing that ‘aesthetic production today has  become integrated into commodity 
production generally: the frantic economic urgency of producing waves of ever more 
novel-seeming goods’ (Jameson, 1984: 56).  He explains this  mechanism by focusing on 
architecture, positing that of all the arts, architecture is closest to the economic, property 
and finance nexus, with a ‘postmodern architecture grounded in the patronage of 
multinational business’.  For Jameson ‘this  whole global, yet American, postmodern 
culture is  the internal and superstructural expression of a whole new wave of American 
military and economic domination throughout the world: in this sense, as throughout 
class  history, the underside of culture is  bloody, torture, death and horror’ (ibid.: 57). 
Thus, for Jameson, postmodern ideology and its  accompanying commodity culture is 
inherently bound to multinational capitalism.  This  relationship is also clearly 
problematic for Jameson, who considers  the nexus between postmodern culture and 
capitalism to be more than unwholesome - it is a nexus of  aberrations.
Thus, Jameson posits six characteristics  that define postmodernism.  His first, the 
deconstruction of expression deals with the perceived loss  of context in postmodern cultural 
objects.  He illustrates  this by comparing Van Gogh’s work Peasant Shoes which contains 
the context of hard physical labour, with Andy Warhol’s Diamond Dust Shoes, which for 
Jameson is  so visually processed as  to become devoid of meaning and context, in what 
amounts to ‘the inversion of Van Gogh’s  Utopian gesture’ (Jameson, 1984: 60).  This 
leads to what Jameson terms ‘the waning of affect’, where, removed of context and 
narrative the work becomes  devoid of meaning.  Jameson uses Edward Munch’s The 
Scream to elucidate this point, arguing that The Scream epitomised the modernist themes 
of alienation, disconnection and isolation of the embodied subject.  For Jameson then, 
this  ‘depth model’ or mode has been replaced by a superficial multiplicity of ‘surfaces’ in 
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postmodernist thought.
Jameson’s  second characteristic, termed postmodernism and the past compares  the devices of 
modernist parody with postmodernist pastiche.  Whereas for Jameson, parody had a 
sense of design or deliberation towards the object of the parody, pastiche becomes mere 
mimesis, and due to the ‘waning of affect’, it is a kind of castrated mimesis, without a 
caustic, intentional wit.  This leads the cultural producers of postmodern times to hark 
back nostalgically to the past, to find examples of pastiche that they can co-opt in the 
present.  This  appears to conflict with Jameson’s  convictions  earlier in the essay where 
he suggests  a tendency in postmodern thought to ahistoricism.  However, this apparent 
contradiction is resolved by Jameson’s hint at the unconsciousness  of this  nostalgia in the 
use of the word ‘libidinal’, suggesting a latent, repressed desire.  Thus, in the 
annihilation of history there is a loss, albeit a ‘forbidden’ loss, which must be expressed 
libidinally.  For Jameson, this  libidinal historicism can be seen in the aesthetic styles 
employed in postmodern film.  He cites the film Body Heat which is  a ‘remake’ of the 
film The Postman Always Rings Twice.  The purpose of the ‘remake’ is to situate the 
original work of fiction into the contemporary.  However, although set in contemporary 
times, Jameson notes  that the aesthetic ‘eschews most of the signals that normally 
convey the contemporaneity of the United States in its multinational era’ including 
skyscrapers, cars  and appliances (ibid.: 68).  Thus, the viewer reads the film as  if it were 
set in the thirties, in a libidinal nostalgic gesture on the part of  the cultural producers.
Jameson’s  third characteristic, the breakdown of the signifying chain, reprises the theme of 
ahistoricity, suggesting that subjectivity becomes fragmented when it is not temporally 
grounded, either regarding the past, present or future.  Again, referring to the 
production of culture in such circumstances, randomness and ‘heaps  of fragments’ 
become features  of cultural artefacts.  This ‘breakdown of the signifying chain’ is  akin to 
a schizophrenia, where the subject loses a sense of meaning, or even temporality in the 
face of an onslaught of an excess of information flooding their consciousness during an 
episode.  Thus, the postmodern subject is immanently present, disallowing any space for 
past, for context, and instead imbuing the present with an intensity that replaces the 
previous modernist themes of anxiety, alienation and isolation.  Thus the postmodern 
‘moment’ is always intense.
The fourth characteristic of postmodernism, the hysterical sublime, is  related to the 
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postmodern intensity described above.  The postmodern subject is  not just temporally in 
a state of intensity, but spatially also.  This ‘immediacy’ of time and space has therefore 
led to an ‘incompatibility’ with embodiment itself.  Thus, the body is  abstracted, leading 
to its fetishisation.  The very state of embodiment becomes  the ‘hysterical sublime’, as 
embodiment in the postmodern era is too intense, too great to linguistically or 
aesthetically structure or represent.  Whilst in Kantian philosophy, the sublime referred 
to the enormity of nature, in postmodern times the enormity of nature has required 
domination, by capitalism.
Jameson next moves  to his  fifth feature of postmodernism, post-modernism and the city. 
Here, Jameson argues that the turn to postmodernism was a reaction against the 
formalist structures of modernism, and this was most vehemently represented in the 
architectural break with modernism, as  characterised by the Bonaventura Hotel in Los 
Angeles.  Whilst one of postmodernism’s  ideologies has been a populist one, this hotel is 
incongruous  in terms of its navigation.  The exits and entrances are hidden, leading 
Jameson to argue that whilst the hotel is ‘popular’ it also acts more like a self-contained 
city, neither inviting entrance nor exit, but instead suggesting that one is  either inside the 
‘skin’ of the hotel, or outside it.  Likewise, the interior of the hotel is prescriptive in its 
navigation structures, with the positioning of the elevators and escalators leaving no 
choice for the resident to move about the space of their own will.  Thus the inhabitant is 
subjected to that fragmentation of their embodied experience as described earlier, in 
what Jameson terms a ‘postmodern hyperspace’, where the inability of the subject to 
orientate themselves within this built environment is  analogous to the lack of ability to 
negotiate late capitalism.  
Jameson’s  final characteristic of the postmodern turn is  the abolition of critical distance. 
This  is an ethical malaise, in which the ‘hyperaesthetic’ of postmodernism, with its 
fetishistic and nostalgic evoking of the past results  in a lack of coherent vision for the 
present or future.  Jameson observes  how ‘the logic of the simulacrum’ does  not only 
repeat the logic of late capitalism, but ‘reinforces  and intensifies  it’ (Jameson, 1984: 85). 
Thus, along with the affordances  of the late capitalist mode, there is  an ethical 
imperative to also critique it in a dialectical exercise that questions the normativity of 
the postmodern turn to pastiche, fetishisation, deconstruction of meaning and waning of 
affect.  However, the postmodern characteristics  that abstract temporality and spatiality 
disallow this ‘critical distance’ to emerge.  In the overwhelming of the body, 
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postmodernism does not allow a ‘space’ for an encounter with another possibility 
outside itself.  The nature of multinational capitalism has also caused commodification 
to penetrate into areas of our life that had been previously untouched - for Jameson this 
is  Nature and the Unconscious  (ibid.: 86), further eliminating a possibility of critical 
distance.
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4.5 A Digital Aesthetic
4.5.1 Introduction
In this section, I investigate the impact of the so-called knowledge society on art, where 
technology and cultural and creative knowledge have become increasingly intertwined. 
For Aylish Wood, the contributions of digital media to the gallery space are significant in 
how they add a temporal experience to an art installation, thus  challenging the 
traditionally understood modes of visual representation (Wood, 2007: 134).  For Wood, 
the addition of new media forms such as sound or moving image means that the purely 
spatial components of traditional gallery installations are transformed into spatio-
temporal sites of interaction59  60.  For Margot Lovejoy, there exists  ‘a need to explore the 
impact of electronic media on representation and on our culture as  a whole, and, in the 
process, to extend the theories  of Benjamin’ (Lovejoy, 2004: 4).  For Lovejoy, this need to 
explore is  precipitated by the development that ‘computers represent a challenge to 
conventional notions of  visual representation’ (ibid.: 152).  
Thus, theories of art now require a consideration to these digital media that have 
become so commonplace and ‘everyday’, that for one cultural critic, ‘the art of 
tomorrow is  the art of the media’ (Stocker: 2006).  For Stocker however, consideration to 
the technology alone provides an inadequate overview of digital media art, arguing that 
‘it is  no longer the technological possibilities’ but rather the socio-cultural structures  of 
the neo-liberal information society that ‘are decisive in the context of an art of 
tomorrow’ (ibid.).  Even the terminology describing this art - digital art, electronic art, 
media art, new media art, net art etc - is interchangeable, but as  Stocker observes, these 
‘ambiguous  labels’ reveal ‘the ways  artists deal with the constituent elements of the 
Information Society and its technological as well as social dimensions’ (ibid.).  Bringing 
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59 Of course, temporal elements in gallery installations can be traced back at least as far as  Man Ray and 
Marcel Duchamp.  However, digital media technologies can be employed in a sophisticated manner to 
distribute and demand the viewers attention.
60 An international example of this is Tony Oursler’s  2007 installation on the theme of war, entitled Dum-
Dum, Metalbreath, Wadcutter.  It contains  competing spatial and temporal elements, some traditional, such as 
furniture, but other elements  made possible by digital technology,  such as figures  on the floor that are in 
the form of projections on to spherical sculptures.  In this  installation, figures can be seen lying as if 
crushed beneath the furniture.  However, the digital technologies  facilitate the complex projection 
techniques that enable the artist to create projections  from the sculpted spheres that speak accusingly at 
the viewer (Oursler, 2008).
forth yet another concern of the digital art aesthetic, Stocker also argues  that digital 
artists not only use technology as a tool, but as  a subject, which involves  the artist ‘taking 
leave of familiar domains’ to ‘delve into the technological and sociocultural contexts  of 
the process  of reordering our society into a global information economy’.  For these 
artists, their ‘highest priority’ is not in the description of contemporary society, but in an 
‘analytical investigation’ that illuminates ‘the mechanisms  and functional principles of 
that society’s systemic foundations’ (ibid.).  Thus, for Stocker, in an echo of a 
technological determinist perspective, such an art practice in a society ‘in which the 
configurations of software and hardware act much more powerfully than laws  as 
determinants  of the freedom of movement within the new public domain of global 
networks’ is ‘endowed with an immediate political relevance’ (ibid.).
Thus, the topic of the digital in art, or the digital aesthetic requires a consideration that 
takes account not only of aesthetics as  understood by contemporary art theories61, but 
moves  beyond traditional aesthetic theory towards  one which can incorporate 
technology and the implications of technology use in artistic practice.  Such a theory 
requires  consideration of the sociocultural ramifications  of the digital age, where the 
mediatisation of society, culture and art, is becoming more pronounced.  In the 
following sections I thus  examine some of the key debates on art in the digital age, 
including Quaranta’s  postmedia and Bourriaud’s  altermodernity, along with calls  from new 
media critics to reject a-historical ‘vapor-theorising’ about the potentials  of new 
technologies (Lunenfeld, 2001), and look to the continuities from ‘old’ media that can 
inform the present.  First however, I proceed by means of an overview of ‘new’ media - 
positing some characteristics through which we can understand the ‘new’ digital means 
available to artists.
4.5.2 The ‘New’ Media in Historical Context
In considering a ‘digital’ aesthetic for the purposes of a survey of digital media art, I 
suggest that a turn to the more generalised discourses of new media can yield insights 
into the key debates surrounding new media generally, debates that flow into or dovetail 
with artistic debates on new media art.  Lister et al. suggest that the term ‘new’ with 
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61 Or the ‘isms of  the artistic discourse’ as Stocker refers to the contemporary art world
respect to media emerged to designate a seminal shift in the production, reception and 
distribution of communications media (Lister et al., 2009: 10).  Whilst such shifts were 
also associated with cultural changes  that emerged with the postmodern turn in the 
1960s, the emergence of the personal computer in the mid 1980s is  seen as particularly 
relevant.  Thus, for Lister et al., the defining characteristics of new media are that they 
are digital, interactive, hypertextual, virtual, networked and simulated (ibid.: 13). 
However, the authors warn against an essentialism regarding these characteristics, 
arguing that for example, when the quality of ‘digital’ is extended beyond ‘a source of 
possibilities, to be used, directed, and exploited’, it can be essentialised into ‘a totalising 
or overarching concept which wholly subsumes the medium in question’.  Thus, all of 
the outlined characteristics of new media may or may not be present in a new media 
object.  Also for Lister et al. is  a need to consider the ‘physical and material constitution 
of a technology’, as the materiality of the technology both ‘encourages and constrains 
its uses and operation’ (ibid.: 14) without resorting to a technological essentialism, where 
technology is reduced to its physical and material attributes.
Lister et al. also ask the reader to critique what is  new about new media, suggesting that 
‘apparently innocent enthusiasm for the “latest thing” is rarely if ever ideologically 
neutral’ (Lister et al., 2009: 11).  The authors argue that the celebration of new media 
‘cannot be dissociated from the globalising neo-liberal forms of production and 
distribution which have been characteristic of the past twenty years’ (ibid.). 
Nonetheless, despite such neoliberal underpinnings which could be thought of as 
characteristic of the current wave of ‘newness’ about new media, the authors  also stress 
that ‘taking these changes into account does  not mean abolishing all history because it 
(history) is full of similar moments of newness’ (ibid.: 3).  Situating these concerns to 
digital media art then, it becomes evident that a consideration must be given to (1) the 
media forms and material technologies themselves, whilst also giving thought to (2) the 
social, cultural and historical precedents in which ‘newness’ or a radical break with an old 
paradigm occurred.
Likewise, Margot Lovejoy calls for a history-friendly consideration of ‘new’ or electronic 
art.  For Lovejoy, the ‘cultural crisis’ of the current times are significant and materially 
distinctive, but are also ‘parallel to the wrenching cultural, aesthetic and social crisis 
brought about by the Industrial Revolution’ (Lovejoy, 2004: 1).  Thus, for Lovejoy, in a 
position similar to that of Lister et al, the ‘newness’ of the current, electronic age has 
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had precedents, Lovejoy arguing that regardless of which age we discuss, ‘artists’ vision 
and artists’ responses to the world are dominated by the conditions and consciousness of 
a particular period’.  In the ‘electronic’ or digital age, it is  important to study the 
zeitgeist and the art of that age, whilst also keeping an eye to the genesis  of these media 
forms.  For Lovejoy, these current trends have their lineage in the ‘machine age’ of the 
early 20th century (ibid.: 36 - 52), specifically in two ‘strains’ in avant-garde aesthetics, 
those of (1) the Dadaists  and Surrealists  who ‘developed strategies to use machine parts 
and photomontage as a means  of commenting on the alienating influence of rampant 
industrialisation and the commercialisation of mainstream art’ and (2) the 
Constructivists  and Futurists who ‘extolled the aesthetics of photographic reproduction, 
seeing hope in the Machine Age for a new kind of culture’ (ibid.: 6).  Through the 
consideration of these historical dimensions to our current ‘moment’ in digital or 
electronic art, we can arrive at an understanding that engages  the ‘newness’ of digital 
media and its specificities, whilst also avoiding a neologising account of digital media. 
For Lovejoy then, expanding the theories of Benjamin to the digital age is  an 
appropriate and fruitful endeavour, as the issues  brought forward by Benjamin, such as 
the aura, the author, where the artwork resides, the notion of an original artwork in a 
world of reproduction, and autonomy, are still pertinent considerations in the analysis of 
a work of  digital art.
Lev Manovich, whilst positing five principles  or characteristics  of new media (numerical 
representation, modularity, automation, variability and transcoding), also analyses ‘the 
language of new media’ through a historical lens, that involves  ‘placing it within the 
history of modern visual and media cultures’ (Manovich, 2001: 8).  In this work 
Manovich seeks to answer ‘what are the ways  in which new media relies on older 
cultural forms and languages  and what are the ways  in which it breaks  with them?’, 
whilst also considering ‘what is  unique about how new media objects  create the illusion 
of reality, address the viewer, and represent space and time’ (ibid.).  Thus, Manovich 
argues that whilst there is some ‘newness’ about the new digital media, to thoroughly 
understand them involves  approaching them with a view to their cultural precedents, or 
for Manovich, ‘we should approach new media in relation to other visual cultural forms 
and put it in historical perspective’.
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4.5.3 Digital Aesthetics
Based on the accounts  of the authors  above, I now provide a theoretical underpinning 
to draw from, one that defines three salient characteristics of digital media art.  These 
characteristics  are again picked up in chapters 7 and 8, where I argue that through the 
empirical research conducted for this project, the defining characteristics  can be seen.  I 
suggest that whilst characteristics  such as ‘digital’ or ‘numerical’ in Manovich’s 
formulation are pertinent for digital media art, this  account seeks to outline 
characteristics  that may help to elucidate qualitative and material differences  between 
digital art and the ‘traditional’ art forms on which much contemporary art theory is 
based, and often mapped to digital art in a way that does not take account of its  specific 
characteristics.  Briefly then, these three features lie under the banners of (1) object 
characteristics, (2) where the artwork ‘resides’, and (3) technical complexity.
Starting with the object characteristics of digital media art, Lovejoy suggests  that the 
advent of computers into the art world precipitate a distinctive split with ‘the paradigm 
of representation we have followed since the Renaissance’ (Lovejoy, 2004: 8).  The 
perception of such a digital artwork has changed from an ‘analogue’ process of viewing 
an art object, to requiring that an image be ‘called up for display’ as such an image is  ‘an 
information structure which has no physical presence in the real world’ (ibid.) in most 
cases.  I therefore suggest that the object characteristics  of a digital artwork are in 
contrast to their ‘analogue’ counterparts.  This  is confirmed by Lovejoy who argues  that 
‘electronic image-production is  immaterial, existing only as an image structure or 
accumulation of data, without physical substance’ (ibid.: 159).  There is a significant 
ramification for such a structure, Lovejoy positing that such a configuration ‘does not 
lead necessarily to the production of a material object unless  the artist makes  a conscious 
decision to translate it into one that can maintain a physical presence with a particular 
dimensional level within a perceptual field’ (ibid., emphasis added).
If we accept that the material or object characteristics  of digital media objects are 
different to traditional art objects  of paintings and sculptures, it is also likely, if not a 
given, that how we interact with such objects will show some specificities to the digital 
format.  I suggest that a digital art object can therefore be characterised by its 
interactivity which requires a response from the viewer, whereas a traditional art object 
may invoke a response but not require it.  This of course is a matter of degree rather 
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than a major break from the art of high modernism which also explored interactivity. 
Again, Lovejoy has influenced this assertion, as for her, ‘the viewer must choose between 
the options  to receive a single message from the many’ (Lovejoy, 2004: 165).  This 
material change in the artwork has  ramifications for the aesthetic qualities  of a digital 
artwork, which are now ‘information aesthetics’ (ibid.).  Thus, a digital artwork must be 
aesthetically designed not only to convey a narrative, but to engage the audience 
significantly enough to elicit interaction.  The artwork ‘must be designed to engage the 
interest of others sufficiently to make them want to participate in the experience of 
finding connections in the elements of narrative that are provided’ (ibid.), thus moving 
the aesthetic considerations from contemplation to action.
This  shift from ‘traditional’ aesthetics  to information aesthetics brings us to the second 
posited characteristic of digital artworks, that concerning where the artwork ‘resides’. 
Interactivity has  implications for both the artist and the viewer of the artwork, in that 
interactivity allows the viewer, or user, a choice in navigating and experiencing the 
artwork.  This loosens the authorial grip of the artist, and ‘deeply entwines  the functions 
of viewer and artist’ (Lovejoy, 2004: 167), placing some interpretative control into the 
hands  (or eyes and ears) of the viewer.  Thus, ‘what interactive art now solicits  from the 
viewer is not simply reception but an independent construction of meaning’, moving the 
site of the artistic experience, or encounter, firmly towards that of the viewer (ibid.).  I 
thus suggest that in this mutual construction of meaning between the artist, the artwork 
and the viewer, the ‘site’ of the art itself, the Benjaminian ‘auratic’ component is in flux 
and moves  from its  home in the ‘mythical’ unique art object towards  a more 
indeterminate place.
I posit that this  indeterminacy around where the artwork ‘resides’ also refers  to its 
broader place in the world, materially, applying also in a museum setting.  Thus, in an 
art world where the ‘auratic’ qualities  of the artwork are traded, commodified and 
capitalised upon, a digital artwork with its  indeterminate ‘aura’ is  problematic within 
that art world.  As Lovejoy observes, ‘up to now, the major museums have tended to 
acquire works which incorporate computer influence rather than computer graphics as 
part of their photography, video and sculpture collections’ (Lovejoy, 2004: 181), thus 
steering towards artworks  in which the computer component is  as  a ‘tool’ but away from 
such works in which the computer is  a medium in its  own right.  A pertinent example for 
this  is  net art.  Whereas traditional art forms exist in the context of a museum, or 
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‘locations chosen by artists  or art institutions from indoor to outdoor spaces’, a piece of 
net art does not require the presence of a museum or institution.  It thus  ‘resides’ outside 
of the museum space, again a problematic characteristic for institutions that thrive on 
the physical, mythical ‘aura’.
Moving on to the third characteristic of technical complexity, I suggest that this feature 
is pertinent to digital artworks as  the complexity of these works can bring about issues  of 
co-operative production, along with acquisition, collection and archival of the art 
object.  A technical complexity exists  in the non-linear, databased attributes of digital art 
(Manovich, 2001).  For Manovich, the traditional narratives  of the novel and cinema 
have been replaced by a ‘hypernarrative’ with its ‘trajectories through a database of 
collections of items  with no hierarchies’ (Lovejoy, 2004: 163).  Technical complexity is 
also manifest in the creation of the digital artwork, this  feature having social and cultural 
implications within the art world.  As  Lovejoy observes, ‘programming is  essential to any 
pioneering new use of equipment’, requiring digital artists to often ‘collaborate with 
engineers  or scientists or to study computer sciences for themselves’ (ibid.: 174).  This 
characteristic stands at odds  with the notion of the ‘lone genius’ to which I suggest the 
art world often inscribes as  much of an ‘aura’ upon as it does the artworks themselves. 
Thus, in a world where this  trope of the individual is heightened, digital art, with its 
technical complexity that requires collaboration, stands at odds to the traditional art 
world.  Again, for Lovejoy, ‘crafting work where there are pathways, nodes, links, 
networks, and connecting loops  between visual, sonic, textual, and graphic elements 
calls  for enormous skill.  Multifaceted procedures and coding require collaboration, a 
difficult aspect in a culture which promotes heightened individualism’ (ibid.: 194).
4.5.4 Hyperaesthetics, Altermodernity and Postmedia 
In this  section I analyse alternate paradigms of digital media from theorists within the 
artistic and cultural sector.  Whilst I will return later to Nicolas  Bourriaud’s  Altermodern 
Manifesto from which the polemic title above is drawn, I start by outlining a discussion by 
Peter Lunenfeld on the relationship between culture and technology.  For Lunenfeld, 
there exists a need to examine ‘how to talk about them [new technologies], how to move 
beyond reviewing contemporary technologies’.  For Lunenfeld, the answer is  ‘a 
discussion of some technocultural communities  and their artifacts’, or a ‘future 
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archaeology’ (Lunenfeld, 2001: 3).  Thus, he posits  three ways in which to discuss  what 
he describes as these ‘technocultures’, (1) commodity camaraderie, (2) technovolksgeist 
and (3) post ’89 theory 62.  
Lunenfeld has also analysed the human-machine relationship, contextualising it for the 
digital artist.  He observes how ‘the demonstration, or “demo”, has  become the defining 
moment of the digital artist’s  practice at the turn of the millennium’ (Lunenfeld, 2001: 
13).  He posits  a ‘demo or die’ ideology in which ‘artists and their machines  are on 
display’ (ibid.)in what is  not merely a futuristic prediction of ‘the artist as cyborg’, but 
that a development that ‘augurs the transformation of digital presentation into live 
performance’ (ibid.: 13), leading to a ‘techno-anxiety’, where the artist is expected to 
‘put work out to the world using inherently unstable platforms’.
This  ‘demo-or-die’ aesthetic is  for Lunenfeld  a post ’89 development, and thus has its 
own political dimension. For Lunenfeld, ‘it is no wonder that the demo or die aesthetic is 
caught up in a presumption of artistic labor with definitive use value’ (ibid.: 15) as, for 
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62 For Lunenfeld, previous notions of subjectivity were challenged with the ‘death’ of the author, which, 
while he is skeptical about,  nonetheless  forced a reimagining for the artist of his or her role in society.  As 
he observes,  ‘in the absence of such venerated concepts as genius and transcendence, digital artists  find 
themselves stripped of the ethos  around which most previous artistic communities were 
founded’ (Lunenfeld, 2001: 4).  He posits that digital artists  can no longer see themselves as having a 
shared purpose, rather that they have in common the ‘use of similar tools’ (ibid.).  This commonality 
centred around the technology is what Lunenfeld terms ‘commodity camaraderie’ (ibid.), referring as 
much to the software commodities of the digital age as to the collaborative potential of such 
developments.
For Lunenfeld, this  ‘camaraderie’ becomes a ‘neo-community’, or what Lunenfeld terms a 
‘TechnoVolksgeist’ - a latter-day ‘proto-social’ equivalent of a Bohemian zeitgeist, not limited by 
geographical borders  (ibid.: 8).  This TechnoVolksgeist serves  the need of providing a sense of 
commonality and understanding in a technoculture,  just as a Volksgeist provided the sense of 
commonality in a localised culture.  In situating the TechnoVolksgeist, he observes that ‘commodity 
camaraderie encourages inclusion not by blood, but rather by chip’ (ibid.: 9_.
Lunenfeld posits that ‘it would be absurd not to situate commodity camaraderie in a political 
context’ (ibid.: 9), which is where his post’89 theory is considered.  Lunenfeld argues that while 1968 is 
eulogised as marking a turning point in avant-garde art, this warrants a challenge with respect to digital 
art.  Lunenfeld thus posits  that digital media theorists are better served by considering the year 1989 as a 
significant political moment for techno-cultural production.  This  was the year of the fall of the Berlin 
Wall, the reunification of Germany, the Czech revolution, the beginning of the collapse of the USSR 
along with market-related events  in China that foregrounded ‘the notion that capitalism is in yet another 
of its periods of ascendancy’ (ibid.:  10).  At this juncture, ‘post-industrial capitalism would seem at this 
point as inevitable and all-powerful to the artists of the West as the Christian church must have been to 
artisans of 11th century France’ (ibid.: 11).  Thus, for Lunenfeld, a cultural producer embarking on their 
career post ’89 was embedded aesthetically in a capitalist zeitgeist and ‘begin with the centrality of the 
market and its forces’, in contrast with the post ’68 aesthetic theories where the use-value of art was in its 
opposition to capitalist expansion, and its value was in rebellion and resistance.   Lunenfeld also argues 
that due to the rise of cultural studies as an academic discipline, critics  began ‘mining all forms  of cultural 
production for “sites of resistance” to capitalist alienation’.  For Lunenfeld, this culminates in the cultural 
studies  discipline of the 1990s  where ‘Anglo-American scholars  were [...] writing as  though any smidgeon 
of  cultural bricolage was a revolutionary act and every fan club a conspirators’ cell’ (ibid.: 10).
the demo not to die, it has to function, or moreso, ‘it must work within the constraints of 
the ideology generated in the wake of digital technologies’ (ibid.).  Lunenfeld posits  that 
therefore the demo-or-die aesthetic is perfectly suited to what Jameson termed ‘the 
cultural logic of late-capitalism’, because technologically enhanced artistic projects 
require investment, making digital art ‘the product of transnational corporate 
capitalism’ (ibid.).
Moving again towards  an attempt at theorising the contemporary moment, Lunenfeld 
suggests that our contemporary technoculture is  not just ‘present’, but that it is a 
‘future/present’ which he describes as ‘a phenomenological equivalent to the future 
perfect tense’ (Lunenfeld, 2001: 28) in which ‘digital post-production techniques  will 
have become obsolete by the time you learn them’.    Thus, the future is implicit in the 
technological present, Lunenfeld positing that a discourse that moves  beyond 
contemporary critical theory discourses  needs to be opened.  He suggests  that 
contemporary critical theory ‘has proven itself only partially competent to account for 
these new digital objects and electronic systems’ (ibid.: 29).  For Lunenfeld, this future/
present tension can be examined in three ways.  The first ‘invokes the past to battle the 
present, reinvigorating the machine-breaking ideology of the Luddites’ (ibid.).  The 
second attempts to keep up with the transformations in present technoculture, which for 
Lunenfeld ends up being ‘an almost hysterical neologizing’.  The third is  a type of 
futurology, or ‘vapor-theorizing’, where science-fiction-like discourses hold sway in a 
hypothetical world of possibilities.  Lunenfeld then posits  a fourth way of negotiating 
contemporary technoculture, as an alternative to the first three discourses; ‘a 
hyperaesthetic that encourages  a hybrid temporality, a real-time approach that cycles 
through the past, present, and future to think with and through the 
technocultures’ (ibid.). This ‘hyperaesthetics  in real-time’ (ibid.: 37) takes account of the 
destabilisation of traditional aesthetic theory’s ‘study of stable forms’ (ibid.).  He posits 
that as an alternative, ‘a dynamic system, however, requires constant recalibrations in 
focus, a shifting between three temporalities’, deducing that ‘hyperaesthetics requires 
theorization in real-time’ (ibid.).  Lunenfeld posits that real-time theory can both be 
found and encouraged through the internet, suggesting that news forums, listservs - ‘the 
best hope for theory in real time’ - and bulletin boards can provide the real-time critique 
necessary for real-time theory to flourish, providing a much shorter lead-time than a 
print journal for valid peer-critique.  
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For Nicolas Bourriaud, the contemporary artistic setting is also problematic, in that ‘the 
historical period defined by postmodernism is  coming to an end’, leaving with it a gap in 
understanding the art forms  created in this movement of ‘creolisation’ (Bourriaud: 2009) 
which, for Bourriaud is replacing ‘multiculturalism and the discourse of identity’ (ibid.). 
Yet, the ideals  of modernity, those of ‘the higher value placed on the present, the sense 
of adventure and critical relativism’ (Vitorelli: 2007) still have relevance for Bourriaud. 
Thus, he posits an altermodernity, a paradigm that ‘refers to a totality of cultural and 
artistic practices that connect the modern spirit with the world in which we live’ (ibid.). 
It is  ‘an attempt to reexamine our present, by replacing one periodizing tool with 
another’ (Ryan: 2009), which takes account of globalisation and the cultural, social and 
political ramifications  thereof.  The altermodern paradigm takes account of ‘the local 
struggles  against standardisation’ that postmodern cultural theories and globalisation 
have resulted in.  For Bourriaud, the postmodern project of multiculturalism has 
resulted in a ‘global state of culture’ for artists, where the same ‘toolboxes’ are available 
to artists across the globe.  In defence of this position against a critique of issues of 
access, Bourriaud argues that ‘saying that it is the privilege of the artistic jet set is  a pure 
denial of the worldwide violence of the capitalist system, or an extreme 
naiveness’ (ibid.).  Bourriaud, rather would like to offer an alternate paradigm to the 
‘multiculturalist dogma’ that ‘jails the individuals  into their so-called “origins” and their 
“identities”’.  Thus, the altermodern paradigm takes  account of the beneficial critical 
offerings of modernism and maps them onto the contemporary, globalised, networked 
world, in which nomadism and migration of  identity and culture are characteristic.  
I suggest that this position has relevance for a survey of digital art, as  it takes account of 
the cultural cross-fertilisation that is facilitated by network technologies.  To engage in a 
reductio ad absurdum and suggest that all art produced in the digital age is also postmodern 
art is naive.  Therefore, Bourriaud’s  position allows  for works  of art to exist with 
temporal and spatial ambiguities, without having to categorise them within a 
postmodern paradigm.  Thus, ‘the artist becomes  “homo viator”, the prototype of the 
contemporary traveller whose passage through signs and formats  refers  to a 
contemporary experience of mobility, travel and transposing’ (Bourriaud: 2009).  As for 
the artistic work, it ‘expresses  a course, a wandering, rather than a fixed space-
time’ (ibid.).
Domenico Quaranta likewise grapples with notions of ‘post’ conditions, but with respect 
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to artistic ‘media’.  His argument is  pertinent to the study of digital media art as  it 
grapples with tensions specific to the genre.  Quaranta posits  two distinct tracks that 
chart contemporary art developments, and the growth of ‘new media’ art, suggesting 
that since the mid-nineties  ‘technology-based art grew exponentially, and the New 
Media Art world grew accordingly, but without adapting to these new 
developments’ (Quaranta: 2011).  For Quaranta, the response of the new media art 
genre was ‘inadequate to an art practice that was increasingly sharing the idea of art 
and the system of values of the contemporary art world’.  However, the technology-
based art was no more at home in the contemporary art world either, with ‘any attempt 
to import on the contemporary art platform the idea of art and the system of values on 
which the New Media Art world is grounded (that is, New Media Art as a category 
based on the use - and, often, the celebration - of technology) has failed miserably, 
garnering criticism both about the suitability of basing an artistic category on the use of 
a medium, and on the cultural value of celebrating technologies’ (ibid.).  This 
incompatibility between the ideologies of the new media and the contemporary art 
world thus lead Quaranta to question ‘how, then, can we underline New Media Art’s 
“specific form of contemporaneity” […] without violating these taboos?’.  For 
Quaranta, the concept of postmedia is  an appropriate one to adopt in this context.  From 
Guattari’s  first conceptualisation of the post-media condition, which signalled the end of 
‘the consensual era of mass-media’ and an evolution of media tools into political ‘tools 
of dissent’, to Krauss’s  formulation of post-medium to mean a move away from discourses 
to medium specificity in art, Peter Weibel’s  description of postmedia art is  that which 
‘comes after the affirmation of the media’ (ibid.).  To this end, all contemporary art is 
postmedia art, as the media, or media, have penetrated all forms of contemporary life, 
or as Quaranta observes, ‘given that the impact of the media is  universal and computers 
can now simulate all other media, all contemporary art is postmedia’.
Quaranta’s  analysis of art in a ‘postmedia’ art world is forward-thinking, especially if it 
‘rehabilitates’ digital art to a space within the art world where discussion, critique and 
examination of the implications of technology in art can take place.  If all art is 
‘postmedia’ art, nonetheless when the art world is  dominated by theories  of 
contemporary art, the voice of ‘new media’ is  still relatively unheard.  Thus, whilst 
Quaranta’s  work is a welcome framework through which to discuss  digital media art, I 
suggest that the specificities  of this  medium require further acceptance within the 
contemporary art world before we can say that art criticism is  beyond ‘media’ when a 
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subset of those works  are engaging critically with media.  Such works  are thus still 
‘specifically’ media art, digital art, or electronic art, and require analysis, discourse and 
critique as  such moreso than ‘postmedia sculpture’ or ‘postmedia painting’ etc, by virtue 
alone of  such works as created in ‘postmedia’ conditions.
4.5.5 Social Media and Art
Whilst this thesis  focuses  on ‘digital’ media and art, I wish to also draw attention to a 
subset of what can be considered ‘digital media’ that has been gaining attention in 
recent years.  That subset is what we know as ‘social media’.  Whilst web applications 
such as  Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and Flickr are, as examples, frequently 
foregrounded as online ‘social media’ platforms (Boyd & Ellison 2008), I suggest that 
what we understand by the term can be expanded to include mobile devices such as 
smartphones that allow for ‘ubiquitous’ computing, along with a turn to the ‘blog’ that 
allows for a bi-directional communication to occur between the producer of the online 
text and their audience.  Whilst ‘social media’ can be thought of as  non-specific to art 
insofar as they are utilised in the wider ‘popular’ society and culture, this  thesis  aims  to 
stress the interconnectedness of art with society.  Therefore this section is included to 
recognise how the practices and affordances of social media platforms can also apply in 
an artistic context.
At the very least, social media in an artistic context is  being foregrounded through the 
application of the technologies to arts  participation.  For example, the National 
Endowment for the Arts in the US issued a report in 2010 entitled Audience 2.0: How 
Technology Influences Arts Participation 63 .  The report argued the importance of social 
media, highlighting how arts audiences are indeed driven by social media applications. 
A summary of the report reveals  how ‘when compared with non-media participants, 
Americans  who participate in the arts through technology and electronic media – using 
the Internet, television, radio, computers, and handheld devices – are nearly three times 
more likely to attend live arts events; attend twice as  many live arts events; and attend a 
greater variety of genres  of live arts  events’(ibid.).  Of course, the National Endowment 
for the Arts  has also foregrounded how its offerings are available on YouTube and 
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63 see http://www.nea.gov/news/news10/new-media-report.html
Facebook, thus  linking the arts  institution itself with its  ‘audience 2.0’ through social 
media websites.  Likewise, similar accounts of ventures between the arts and social 
media occur closer to home, with one recent headline from the Guardian UK revealing 
how a startup website called Artfinder ‘brings social media to art’.  The report reveals how 
the website ‘offers identification and recommendation tools, as  well as  easy-to-build apps 
for galleries’ 64.  Likewise, the Light Space & Time online gallery has published a guide 
to ‘social media “netiquette” for artists’, aimed at encouraging artists  to use social media 
as  marketing and branding tools  for their works65.  Another stateside example is  from 
the Brooklyn Museum in New York which in 2009 set up its ‘1stfans’ project66  as the 
world’s  first ‘socially networked museum membership’.  A corresponding Twitter 
account (@1stfans) was also set up as a feed for recommended artists.  The social and 
participatory nature of blogging and online communities is cited by artists in this 
primary research as  a reason to get involved in open-source programming hardware and 
software such as Arduino and Processing (see section 8.5).
However, does the nexus between social media and art extend beyond social media as 
tool, either for participation or marketing, but for use by artists  as  a production medium? 
Again, looking to Brooklyn, the artist Lauren McCarthy revealed her project Showertweet 
in 2009, whereby every day she would send a ‘tweet’ to Twitter from the intimate space 
of her shower.  For McCarthy, this project centres  around exploring the eroding 
boundaries between public and private spheres afforded by technology, questioning the 
role of the physical body in intimacy, and how intimacy is  shared online through social 
media. 
The primary research in chapters 8-10 of this  thesis also suggests  that in Ireland, social 
media is becoming part of what artists include in their ‘arsenal’ of tools.  For example, 
in section 8.4.2 I describe a case study of a collaborative Irish work entitled Hard Drivin’ 
that combines physical installation of remote controlled toy cars  with connectivity to 
Twitter.  This project enables  participants to send messages to the installation and thus 
control the cars through a social media process.  In section 8.4.3 I describe locative 
media project, NAMALand, that ‘resides’ on users smartphones, again extending the 
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62 See http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/pda/2011/may/06/artfinder-social-media-art
63 See http://www.lightspacetime.com/newsletter/social-media-etiquette-for-successful-artists/
64 See http://www.brooklynmuseum.org/support/1stfans
notion of ‘social’ media to incorporate media that resides  on devices that allow for 
ubiquitous  computing.  NAMALand is  the latest in a series of locative media works by the 
artist, with other works  such as  Walkspace allowing users to overlay suggested routes 
through a city.  This  participatory work then allows the user of the Walkspace app to 
navigate their city in ways suggested by other users.
Thus I suggest that we may think about ‘social media’ as  potentially encompassing ways 
in which artists, arts institutions and the arts  audience can communicate and dialogue, 
as  in the case of the NEA report and Artfinder.  However, social media in an artistic 
context can also be thought of  as a production ‘tool’ or even a ‘medium’ for the artist.
Along with the potentials of social media in the art world however, are issues of 
production becoming an imperative.  Whilst blogs  are a way for artists to connect, share 
and peer review their work, there is  evidence from the primary research to suggest that 
this  can put pressure on artists to maintain constant connectivity online and be seen to 
be producing and writing about produced work constantly.  For one of my participants, 
Ivan Twohig, this  situation was ‘another symptom to this networked society - that you 
need to keep up that online persona, or you fall off the radar or people will think you’ve 
just stopped making things  or your work’s  not good enough any more’.  Thus, whilst the 
peer review and peer acceptance of social media had many benefits, nonetheless they 
created ‘all these kind of  built in pressures to being constantly viewed’.
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4.6  Conclusion
In this chapter I have analysed some debates pertaining to art, from that of an encounter 
to postmodern perspectives on art, towards newer theories that extend artistic discourse 
beyond that of postmodernism and into a realm where digitality, electronics and ‘new 
media’ are considered both for their medium specificity and for their place in the 
broader art world.  The chapter explored how the concept of ‘art’ has been a 
problematic one, especially within the cultural studies discipline, where the concept of 
‘artist’ is relegated in favour of the concept of a ‘symbol creator’.  It was  also argued 
that the ‘postmodern turn’, and its  associated ‘cultural turn’, was marked by an 
ahistoricity where previous tropes of modernist thought were deconstructed.  The nexus 
between this postmodern and/or cultural turn with that of late capitalism was also 
explored, and it was argued that this turn, and its associated neo-liberal cultural policies 
has implications for culture and art.  This informs the theoretical framework in the 
themed area of art, as it allows for an expansive model of the ‘potential’ of art as  an 
encounter whilst situating concepts of art and artistic production within the discipline of 
cultural studies.  Discussion of the postmodern turn and its nexus  with artistic 
production engages with the 5th themed area as outlined in chapter 1, that of the 
political-economic dimension to cultural production.
As a counter to this postmodern/cultural turn, theories of new media art were analysed, 
with attention paid to the ‘continuities’ visible in theories  of new media.  Whilst allowing 
for distinct aesthetic, material and object differences  that digital technologies afford, the 
chapter argued that excessive ‘neologising’ around ICTs leads  to an impoverished 
understanding of their role in digital art.  This  chapter thus informs the research with 
respect to the subject of ‘art’, digital art, digital aesthetics and both the specificities and 
universalities  thereof, and thus  engages with the key themed areas of (1) art, (2) 
technology and (3) innovation in the artistic context.
136
Chapter 5
Ireland, Cultural Situatedness and 
Identity
137
Chapter 5: Ireland: Art, Cultural Situatedness and Identity
5.1 Introduction
In this  chapter I explore Irish cultural identity through a survey of visual art through the 
last century.  This  is  for several reasons that pertain to the context of a study of digital 
media technologies and artistic production.  First, the era of high modernism was  an 
age of social, political, cultural and technological upheaval across Europe.  This  era 
provides a rich area for comparison with the current era of similar crisis and 
transformation.  Second, Ireland became a ‘postcolonial’ nation during this  period of 
upheaval, in 1922.  The significance of this  is  that while the whole of Europe, including 
Ireland, was undergoing profound transformation, Ireland was  also negotiating the first 
stages of postcoloniality.  This  in itself brought challenges and opportunities aside from, 
but pertaining to the challenges  of modernism, including tensions  pertaining to cultural 
expression.  Third, a revisiting of a previous, comparable time of change and 
transformation can provide a grounded historical context for study of the current 
changing cultural landscape.  This chapter therefore addresses the concerns  of the first 
theme outlined in the key questions  of chapter one, threading through both a historical 
look at Ireland’s postcolonial identity through to contemporary debates in art criticism 
which I argue, have not extended beyond postcolonial discourse as  much as the rhetoric 
of  ‘globalisation’ in the Celtic Tiger era would have suggested.
This  chapter starts with a discussion of postcolonial theory to provide a theoretical 
backdrop to situate the complexities of Irish visual culture from the early 20th century 
to current times.  I then proceed to explore the social and cultural contexts of cultural 
expression within Ireland, with respect to issues of identity in a newly postcolonial state. 
As Terence Brown notes, to not consider the social context in which the culture is being 
discussed ‘would be to suggest that high culture - intellectual endeavour and debate, the 
arts  - has  a life completely independent of the social reality in which it occurs’ (Brown, 
2004: preface).  Therefore, Brown, echoing the sentiments of the ‘social shaping of 
technology’ framework, posits  that culture and high art do not exist outside the social 
contexts in which they embedded, but rather that society impacts on cultural production 
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and reception.  It is therefore suggested that in line with the framework set out in 
chapter one, a ‘social shaping of culture’ approach is  important when exploring Irish 
visual culture from this historical viewpoint67.  
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67  Luke Gibbons has also researched extensively on Irish cultural expression, with his  1996 work 
Transformations in Irish Culture suggesting that culture should not be considered either outside society or 
inconsequential to societal matters.  Brown and Gibbons provide contrasting views  on popular culture and 
high art, with Gibbons undertaking analyses of popular culture,  and Brown paying significant attention to 
‘high’ art.   Nonetheless, both authors situate culture in a context that is friendly to a ‘social shaping of 
culture’ framework.  Therefore,  in this investigation into Irish visual culture, the contributions of both are 
explored, compared, and contextualised within the framework of  postcolonial theory.
5.2 Irish Visual Art in the 19th and Early 20th Centuries
5.2.1 The RHA gallery - symbolic of  the struggle in the visual arts?
According to Bruce Arnold’s  survey of Irish art, there is a misconception of a poor 
tradition of visual arts in Ireland.  Arnold observes that this  ‘fallacy’ suggests that 
‘Ireland’s contribution to the art of the world has been almost exclusively in the realm of 
the written word’ (Arnold, 1977: 6).  Through this  misconception, Jack B Yeats has  been 
singled out as ‘a unique and uncharacteristic phenomenon in a country which has little 
or no tradition of visual art, and no artists in the past of comparable stature’ (ibid.). 
Certainly, commentators  have noted a lack of investment in the visual arts which may 
have led to the misconception that there was not a tradition of visual arts  in Ireland. 
However, as  we will see, Jack B Yeats, whilst being possibly one of the best known Irish 
visual artists, is not alone in his significant contribution to the canon of  Irish visual art.
The 19th century saw many tensions in Ireland, which impacted on the landscape of 
cultural production.  The act of Union which came into effect in 1809 had, according to 
Arnold, brought about a loss of ‘social lustre’ to how Dublin was perceived culturally 
(ibid.: 93).  In parallel with this, the growth of London as an urban centre began to 
attract artists away from Ireland towards a richer cultural hub.  Notwithstanding this, 
some artists  who stayed in Ireland sought to promote and support the visual arts.  This 
involved the setting up of various academies and societies, leading to the establishment 
of the Royal Hibernian Academy (RHA) in 1823.  However, the RHA struggled for 
support with even artists  such as John Comerford (1770 - 1832) against the idea of 
academies  being put in place for artists, and polemically (and perhaps hypocritically) 
stating that ‘those who encourage young men to become artists were doing a real and 
substantial injury to society, they were destroying very excellent carpenters, smiths  and 
housepainters and creating a class of unfortunates  who never would be capable of doing 
any good for either themselves or others’ (Comerford in Arnold 1977: 105).
Commentaries from the early 20th century point to the ongoing zeitgeist in Ireland 
remaining that of one that looked towards  London for cultural expression.  A 1913 
source notes that the struggles in the RHA were ongoing, and had been due ‘partly from 
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the neglect and apathy of the public and partly from the difficulty which was  found in 
filling the ranks of the Academicians with artists who could paint’ (WG Strickland, in 
Arnold 1977: 94).  The commentator explained these difficulties, noting that any 
talented artist in Ireland would not wish to stay where their work had no outlet for 
expression and thus, they moved to London.  
Therefore, 19th century Ireland is perceived in the canon as culturally poor, with the 
cultural norm of the time apparently being one of exodus to London or beyond.  The 
‘demotion’ of Dublin as a cultural centre following the Act of Union seems to be a key 
factor in this.  However, was this  the case across  the board amongst cultural critics? 
Thomas Davis, whilst critical of an apathy towards  the visual arts, nonetheless 
encouraged a discourse of  the potential of  art, as we shall see now.
5.2.2 Thomas Davis and a National art
Thomas Davis voiced his  encouragement of the visual arts, calling for the exploration of 
a ‘distinctly Irish national art’ (Cullen, 1999: 65).  In his 1843 essay ‘National Art’, Davis 
explores  the function of art, the societal potential of art, while critiquing Irish society 
and calling on the public to support the arts.
Davis  begins his  essay with a romantic tableau of what art can do in terms of its  ability 
to accurately describe people, events  and situations  more vividly than the written word. 
He defines  the function of art as ‘a register of facts’, explaining that ‘so far as it can 
express  facts, it is  superior to writing’ (ibid.: 66)68.  Thus, Davis’ conviction about the 
visual arts  being a high form of cultural expression is  not in doubt - he is convinced of 
the power of the visual art.  However, once again we can see a critique of the zeitgeist at 
the time of the essay, with Davis  observing, in a critique similar to Strickland’s that 
‘nothing but the scarcity of faithful artists, or the stupidity of the public, prevents us  from 
having our pictorial libraries of men and places’ (ibid. emphasis in original).  Thus, 
Davis  is alluding to tensions existing in the cultural sphere of the time, between a desire 
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68 This challenges a much earlier work from Edmund Burke, who eulogised poetry for its ability to raise complex 
images in the reader’s imagination, in contrast to painting, whose images were mostly imitative and therefore less 
complex (Burke 1759 in Cullen 1999: 41)
to acknowledge the potential of art, and an admission of the practical difficulties  that 
existed in Ireland.
Davis  proceeds to speak up for the craft that is involved in painting - the process  of 
accurate depiction that results  from years of study of still forms as well as human 
anatomy.  He acknowledges the craft involved in drawing, use of light and shade and 
overall composition.  But he also goes  further to posit that ‘Art in its  highest stage is 
more than this.  It is  a creator’ (ibid.: 67).  This is because, according to Davis, ‘the ideal 
has resources beyond the actual’ (ibid.).  In effect, what Davis posits is the transcendental 
potential of art - it provides  more than an imitative view of reality.  Through the skill of 
the artist, mythical and legendary scenes are brought to life because of the imagination of 
the painter to cognise how those scenes looked and played out.
In a critique of the zeitgeist of apathy to the visual arts, Davis  follows  up his  point about 
the potential of art by positing that the creation of artistic works is  an ‘ennoblement’ to 
society.  For Davis, the next highest potential is  for a society to ‘inherit such works  and 
achievements’.  He then, once again draws attention to the spirit of cultural indifference 
at the time, observing that ‘the lowest stage of all is neither to possess nor to create 
them’ (ibid.).  Davis  however, posits  a remedy for this situation - he makes  a call to invest 
and educate in the arts, stating that ‘to collect into, and make known, and publish in 
Ireland the best works  of our living and dead Artists is one of the steps towards 
procuring for Ireland a recognised National Art’ (ibid.).  He cites the reward for this 
investment in the arts  as contributing towards a national identity, or as  he articulates  it, 
‘to facilitate the creation of  some great spirit’ (ibid.).
Davis  is  not frivolous  about the difficulties involved in evoking or invoking a type of 
‘national’ art however.  His critique of the Irish zeitgeist continues in his essay, noting 
how much is  yet to be done in Ireland to facilitate a culture sympathetic to artistic 
expression.  He acknowledges that there have been great Irish artists, but regrets the fact 
that they have moved away from Ireland towards  areas  of greater cultural richness, 
noting that ‘they live on the Tiber and the Thames’ (ibid.: 69).
Davis  then ends  his essay by calling upon and hoping for the establishment of a national 
gallery to house Irish art.  He expresses his  happiness at steps being taken to ensure that 
this  was becoming more of a reality, but stressed that public support was  also necessary 
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in making the goal a reality.  He ends with a message of hope and assurance in the 
public, stating that ‘we trust the public - for the sake of their own pleasure, their 
children’s profit, and Ireland’s honour - will give it their instant and full support’.
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5.3 Postcolonial theory
5.3.1 Introduction
As a former colony of Britain, the lens of postcolonial studies is  an appropriate way to 
contextualise Ireland’s social and cultural context.  The roots of this research approach 
include the work of Fanon, Said and that of the Subaltern Studies group of scholars that 
emerged from studies of Indian colonial history.  Their work set about giving 
underrepresented peoples a space to voice their experiences, separate and autonomous 
from the dominant discourse of  colonialism.
The field of postcolonial studies  was also influenced by Franz Fanon, who presented a 
psychoanalytical analysis  of the effects  of colonisation on the colonised people.  In his 
work Black Skin, White Masks, Fanon investigates identity in relation to colonised people, 
and the effects of being ‘other’ to the nation that colonises, and the corresponding 
confusion of being ‘other’ in ones  own land.  As McLeod reveals, ‘the “Negro” is 
deemed to epitomise everything that the colonising French are not.  The colonisers are 
civilised, rational, intelligent: the “Negro” remains “other” to all these qualities against 
which colonising peoples derive their sense of superiority and normality’ (McLeod, 
2000: 21).  Fanon posits  that often, the reaction against this ‘othering’ is  to try and 
appropriate the values of the colonising power.  However, this is often unsuccessful as 
the colonising power does not accept the colonised as being equal in status, no matter 
how much they try an acquiesce to the culture of the colonising power.  Fanon was a 
psychologist, and this informed his pioneering efforts to define the collective, socio-
cultural features  and ramifications of postcolonial inferiority and identity.  He therefore 
suggests that only when the sense of psychological inferiority in terms of identity can be 
healed, can the dominant colonial discourse be transcended (ibid.).
Edward Said was also an influential presence in the field of postcolonialism.  His  work, 
Orientalism (1978), looked at colonialism from the standpoint of the colonising power in a 
framework of Marxist and Foucauldian theories of power structures.  Said also analysed 
how the colonising power gathered information about the area they were colonising, 
and how this  knowledge was  based on assumptions  about the area, rather than through 
engagement with the people of the colony.  These assumptions were then presented as 
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facts  in the colonising country.  This presentation of ‘facts’ often justified the reasons for 
the colonial power enforcing their culture on the colonised area, because of the 
‘superiority’ or ‘sophistication’ of the power in relation to the ‘primitive’ or ‘degenerate’ 
colonised (Said, 1978: 52, 207).  
From the work of Fanon and Said emerges a suggestion that colonisation occurs on both 
a psychological and a cultural level.  As  McLeod suggests of the contributions, ‘Fanon 
shows how this works at a psychological level for the oppressed, while Said demonstrates 
the legitimation of Empire for the oppressor’ (McLeod, 2000: 21).  Therefore, to emerge 
from having been colonised requires a rethinking, not only of the dominant colonial 
discourses but of identity itself.  When the identity issues  are healed, it is  then that a 
rewriting of the dominant discourses can be attempted.  Thus, the place of culture - as 
not outside society, but situated and embedded - is  important when considering the 
postcoloniality of Ireland.  Likewise, the postcoloniality of the Irish state is also of 
considerable importance when discussing cultural production in Ireland.
5.3.2 Subaltern Studies
The issue of representing the colonised peoples  was investigated by a number of 
scholars in the Subaltern Studies group, including Homi Bhabha and Giyatri 
Chakravorty Spivak.  The term ‘subaltern’ refers to the opinions  and viewpoints of 
peoples  who are outside the colonial elite and their power structure.  According to the 
Subaltern Studies group, since these peoples  are outside that dominant, elite sphere, 
their opinions  are ignored, leaving no channel through which they can articulate their 
viewpoints.  Consequently, even if they do voice their viewpoint, there is no way for that 
viewpoint to be received by the dominant sphere. 
Homi Bhabha was influenced by the writings  of both Franz Fanon and Edward Said. 
Said had posited that ‘colonial discourse imposed a firm distinction between European 
and native identities’ (Hubbard, Kitchin, and Valentine, 2004: 53).  Bhabha challenged 
this  by suggesting that not only do the colonial texts  distinguish the identity of the 
colonised place in this way, but the texts  also blur the distinction.  He explained the 
notion of ambivalence in dealing with how the colonising country stereotypes  the 
colonised people.  Bhabha explains that stereotypes  are ‘a form of knowledge and 
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identification that vacillates between what is  always “in place”, already known, and 
something that must be anxiously repeated’ (Bhabha, 1994b: 66, in Hubbard et al., 
2004: 53).  Bhabha also noted the dialectic that results from colonial interpretations and 
stereotypes, insofar as a stereotype can be authoritative and yet be reductionist.  Bhabha 
also posited that beyond this dialectic is  a third space where essentialist reductions of 
‘oppressor’ and ‘the oppressed’ no longer hold as  binary oppositions  (Hubbard et al.: 
2004)69.  
Giyatri Chakravorty Spivak extended subaltern studies  to include issues  of patriarchy 
and gender.  One of her best known works, entitled Can the Subaltern Speak? (1988), posits 
that colonised women are doubly colonised and in effect, rendered mute.  In the first 
instance this  muting happens through colonisation.  Then, in the second instance - the 
double colonisation - the colonised woman is further muted by men, most obviously by 
the male colonisers, but also amongst her fellow colonised men.  Spivak notes that even 
the less insidious  colonisers  who sought to save women from certain practices  (she cites 
the example of Hindu women who performed ‘widow sacrifice’ by volunteering 
themselves to the cremation pyre of their husbands) engaged in the practice of silencing 
the subaltern.  Thus, Spivak concludes that the subaltern can speak, but there are no 
channels through which their voices will be heard (ibid.).
However, Spivak does not advocate categorising the subaltern as a quantifiable, separate 
group.  She was  influenced by Foucault and Deleuze and their work on constructions of 
selfhood and identity.  With her understanding of the power dynamics drawn from their 
works, she points out that in giving a voice to the subaltern through the conduit of an 
intellectual, there is a danger of confusing the representation of the subaltern with 
subaltern consciousness itself.  She warns of the danger of giving the subaltern a voice 
when by their very status  as  subaltern, no voice is  afforded to them.  As McLeod notes, 
Spivak advises against the ‘perceiving of the subaltern as  a “sovereign subject” in 
control of his or her own consciousness, and assuming that the intellectual is a 
transparent medium through which subaltern consciousness can be made 
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69 In relation to displaced peoples,  Bhabha noted that in this  third space is a hybridisation of cultures.  For 
example, in his  analysis of the Salman Rushdie affair, Bhabha considered that the concept of the third 
space ‘described the hybrid cultural practices of British Muslims and other displaced populations  who 
negotiate often irreconcilable fragments of different traditions and make their temporary home at their 
limits’  (Hubbard et al., 2004: 55).  He posits  that what results  from an engagement like this  is a group 
identity that ‘cannot be authentically Muslim or authentically British, but are both and neither at the 
same time’ (ibid.).  Bhabha also contributed to the studies of the so-called ‘third world’,  noting that there 
was a tendency to group cultures of  the ‘third world’ together, thus essentialising and homogenising them. 
present’ (McLeod, 2000: 192).  Thus, Spivak suggests that instead of hoping to give the 
subaltern a voice, it is more valuable to clear the space and allow them to speak. 
In her discussion of so-called ‘third-world’ women, Spivak notes  that even 
representations of subaltern insurgency usually allow the male subaltern more of a 
space through which to communicate, thus rendering such women more subaltern than 
the males of their group - the ‘double colonisation’ mentioned earlier.  Although using 
the example of women as  being doubly colonised, Spivak raises important concerns  for 
any group considered ‘subaltern’ (Hubbard et al., 2004.).  
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5.4 Ireland in a Postcolonial Frame
5.4.1 Introduction
In relation to Ireland and its emerging cultural identity at the beginning of the 20th 
century, a postcolonial analysis can mitigate against a reading of cultural production of 
the time through the dominant discourse of colonialism.  Gibbons is sympathetic to the 
postcolonial framework, noting that due to having been colonised, ‘Ireland is  a First 
World country, but with a Third World memory’ (Gibbons, 1996: 3).  In the context of 
the work of both Bhabha and Spivak, equating Ireland with the third world suggests 
that Ireland’s  postcolonial cultural landscape has  been informed by a historical status  as 
a colonised and subaltern group.  
5.4.2 The Cultural Zeitgeist at the Turn of  the 20th Century
Luke Gibbons  provides a summary of the cultural, political and social zeitgeist at the 
time of Ireland’s  accession as a postcolonial state, noting that historical dichotomies  of 
‘the dislocations between periphery and centre, the country and the city, tradition and 
modernity’ were played out in Ireland (Gibbons, 1996: 3), with the example of the 1916 
rising elucidating these dichotomies, where the proclamation of independence called 
upon the ancestral generations, but with the rising itself taking place in a hub of 
modernity and communications  technology of its time - the General Post Office in 
Dublin.  
For Gibbons, Irish progress towards modernity was hindered in a further dichotomy, by 
the emergent nation’s tendency to activate conservative forces.  Ireland, whilst engaging 
with its  past as  Fanon suggests as  a phase of postcolonial identity-building, did not 
engage critically with it.  Gibbons observes how ‘modernization is not solely an external 
force, but also requires  the active transformation of a culture from within, a capacity to 
engage critically with its  own past’ (Gibbons, 1996: 3).  However, in the case of Ireland’s 
relationship with modernity and transformation he remarks on how ‘it is  often the 
integration of Ireland into the new international order which activates some of the most 
conservative forces in Irish society’ (ibid.).    In Ireland’s case then, the engagement with 
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the past occurred in a way which reinforced old traditional ideologies, as opposed to 
critiquing and transforming them.  For Gibbons, ‘transformations induced by contact 
with the new may activate a transgressive potential already latent in the old, in the cast-
offs  and rejects of history’ (Gibbons, 1996: 5), in a practice of strategic essentialism, 
where often disparate groups band together in order to express solidarity for a common 
cause.  Such groups, in effect, put aside their disparate voices  to combine in a unified 
way for a strategic purpose, oftentimes in a postcolonial context (Barker, 2008: 244)70.   
Notwithstanding a certain turn to traditionalism, Gibbons  suggests  that due to Irelands 
fragmented colonial history, Irish culture ‘often evinced a “proto-modernist” outlook’, 
especially in the literature of the nineteenth century (Gibbons, 1996: 6).  Predating the 
behemoths  of Joyce and Beckett, the European success  of such literature came from the 
historical context the writers brought forth their work, or as Gibbons phrases it, ‘they 
were carrying with them the nightmare of Irish history’ (ibid.: 6) such as that revealed in 
Edmund Burke’s ‘aesthetics  of terror’ situated in Burke’s experience of an Irish person 
in the 18th century.  For Gibbons, in colonised cultures  natives  could feel like strangers in 
their own land, therefore evincing a particular cultural nationalism that differs 
significantly to the ‘xenophobic’ nationalism of colonial powers (ibid.: 6).  He observes 
that emergent countries  can tend to mimic the nationalism of the colonial power, in 
order to gain respect and recognition, which can also involve a reproduction of their 
own identities that self-validates their past, hence a turn to traditionalism and a 
corresponding tension with processes  of modernity.  I suggest that this  tension was 
particularly heightened in Ireland’s case, as  this  process  of identity reconfiguration 
occurred at the zenith of  European high modernism.
5.4.3 The Politics of  Culture in Ireland
Gibbons posits  a ‘frontier myth’ that was imposed on Irish culture during its  time of 
colonisation.  This colonial myth implied that ‘beyond a border lies  another culture or 
nation: beyond a frontier lies simply waste land, a wilderness awaiting the progress of 
civilization and “God's frontiersmen”’ (Gibbons, 1996: 8).  This myth precipitated a 
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70 One such Irish example was the case of James Gralton, who was deported for allegedly espousing 
radical communist views.  The spectre of communism in Ireland precipitated an alliance of the Catholic 
church, the state and the Irish Republican Army,  who all for their own ideological reasons,  wished to have 
Gralton removed from the country (Gibbons, 1996: 5), but who separately would not share ideologies.
reactionary, assertive culture, as  ‘to engage in cultural activity in circumstances where 
one’s culture was being effaced or obliterated, or even to assert the existence of a 
civilization prior to conquest, was to make a political statement, if only by depriving the 
frontier myth of its  power to act as  an alibi for colonisation’ (ibid.).  In the context of 
postcolonial studies, this  type of political culture stands  as an attempt by the colonised 
entity to give itself a separate and valid cultural voice; to assert their identity ‘people 
with history’,  as cultured, not wild.
Thus cultural production in Ireland was  politicised.  For Gibbons  this  was significant, as 
it acknowledged ‘the transformative capacity of culture in society, its  power to give rise 
to what was  not there before’ (ibid.).  Thus, the politicisation of culture did not only 
serve to provide a ‘voice’, as  traditional postcolonial readings suggest, but also to 
transform71, situating culture as an actor in change - not just a retrospective voice that is 
a representation of change.  In a postcolonial setting, this  voice becomes more complex, 
as I now analyse through the work of  Terence Brown.
5.4.4 Ireland’s Cultural Complexity
Terence Brown posits an alternate interpretation of Ireland’s relationship with culture, 
acknowledging Ireland’s postcoloniality as seminally influential in forming the cultural 
zeitgeist at the beginning of the 20th century, having freed itself from the colonial power 
that had been a feature of its identity for 800 years (Brown, 2004).  At this  time, the 
canonical texts of the new emergent Ireland propounded the view that ‘a free Ireland 
would embark upon a radically adventurous  programme to restore the ancient language, 
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71 Gibbons acknowledges that his viewpoint is  contradictory to the deterministic positioning of art as 
outside politics and society.  His viewpoint is also contradictory to some sociological framings of culture, 
whereby according to Gibbons, there is a relegation of ‘questions of culture entirely to the margins of the 
social process’ (Gibbons, 1996: 9).  He critiques both standpoints as ‘reductionist’, observing that with 
both of those viewpoints, ‘cultural representations  are at one remove from society, and hence are in no 
position to act as agents of  historical change, or to help us understand social processes’ (ibid.). 
He argues that this reductionism only serves to reflect its  own idealistic viewpoint, because it still places 
ideology and cultural identity into vague contexts that are not easily defined.  He notes Raymond 
Williams’ call to ‘de-etherialize’ culture and instead to view culture as  ‘a material force in its own right in 
negotiating the structures of experience’ (ibid.).   Williams, according to Gibbons was an exponent of 
cultural materialism, which called for the promotion of the study of culture to within the remit of 
sociology.  Gibbons,  in supporting this, claims that ‘cultural identity ... does  not pre-exist its 
representations or material expressions, but is in fact generated and transformed by them’ (ibid.: 10).  He 
explains that ‘culture transforms what it works on: it does not produce it ex nihilo.  Representations draw 
their “raw materials” from extra-cultural spheres of activity (such as  politics, economics, kinship systems), 
but then subject them to symbolic transformations of  their own making’ (ibid.: 11).
to discover the vitality residual in a nation devastated by a colonial power, and would 
flower with new social and cultural forms, testaments  to the as yet unrecognised genius 
of the Gael’ (ibid.: 3), in an echoing of Gibbons’ account of the latent transgressive 
elements being activated at a time of transformation.  Brown thus attributes the 
conservatism associated with traditional values as responsible for holding back the 
cultural and social progress envisaged by these canonical texts, particularly in the early 
years after independence (ibid,).  
For Brown, the culture and society of the Irish state became much more homogenous 
than before Ireland was partitioned, negatively affecting the social and cultural 
landscape in the new state.  Whereas previous to partition there was a sizeable minority 
of Presbyterian and Protestant citizens, once Ireland was partitioned, ‘Episcopalian 
Anglo-Ireland’ remained as a strong aspect of Irish identity only in the six counties  of 
the partitioned North, with its citizens in the south rendered effectively mute, culturally. 
This  left the Catholic majority in the South with an unchallenged remit to ‘express its 
social and cultural will unimpeded by significant opposition from powerful 
minorities’ (ibid: 8).  The removal of this sizeable cultural minority also removed a clash 
between nationalist and Anglo-Irish ideologies; a dynamic that Brown considers 
important for a rich cultural and intellectual sphere.  For Brown, this  affected the 
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imaginative potential of the new state to creatively solve issues of cultural diversity, 
postcoloniality and modernity72.
Brown is  thus pessimistic about Irish society after independence as in any way forward-
thinking, creative or innovative in its  cultural expressions.  He notes  that ‘those Irish 
writers, painters, and polemicists therefore who chose to identify and celebrate an 
ancient rural national tradition in Ireland were required to ignore much of 
contemporary Irish social reality’ (Brown, 2004: 80).  With the advent of the Gaelic 
revival and the Gaelic league, supported by Eamonn De Valera73, a traditional, rural 
and conservative image of nationhood was encouraged.  Brown observes  that approval 
went to writers who maintained the status quo and ‘dwelt in a conservative and 
nationalistic fashion on rural aspects of the country’s life’.  In conjunction with this, the 
establishment of a censorship board served to ‘repress writings which might disturb 
conventional moral sensitivities’ (ibid.: 85), thus  cementing the place of traditional-
looking works  and diminishing the cultural zeitgeist for radical or exploratory texts 
pertaining to nationhood and Irish identity. 
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72 The picture that Brown subsequently paints  of the homogenous twenty six counties  is  one that is in 
stark contrast to the romanticism of nationalist bombast about revolution.  He points out that the 1926 
census  recorded 61% of Irish people as living outside towns or villages.  Therefore the country was hugely 
rural at a time that it was beginning to identify with its own postcolonial cultural voice.  What this meant 
for Ireland was that a significant number of its  people were concerned with land rights  moreso than 
political or cultural transformation.  As to why there would be a preoccupation with land rights,  Brown 
also elucidates;  notably a post-famine farmer was likely to not own the land he worked, and was also 
probably required to divide it amongst his family so that they could earn a subsistence living (Brown, 
2004: 11).  Therefore, to achieve ownership of ones own land was hugely important for individual wealth 
and as  a symbol of inclusion in a new nation and triumph over an unjust colonial regime - more 
important than looking outside that sphere, towards large-scale political, societal or cultural 
transformation.
The religious homogeneity that resulted from partition also embedded Catholic ideologies into society 
that, in Brown’s  opinion, may have been challenged more robustly had the sizeable Protestant minority 
still been present.  This again raises the question of critique in Irish society at the time of its  emergent 
postcoloniality.  There was an existing loyalty to the church after the famine, when mass  was regularised 
and other devotional celebrations such as the novena and the procession were introduced.  However, 
when Ireland was struggling for its independence, the church became more symbiotic with identity 
through aligning itself with land rights  issues; Brown noting that ‘Irish Catholicism increasingly became a 
badge of national identity at a time when the church also felt able to propound doctrines that enshrined 
the rights of  private property’ (ibid.: 19).  
In relation to traditions and their intertwining with identity, Brown notes that due to the economic 
conditions, the rural population had to rely on traditional technologies, because economically, adopting 
new ones  was  not a viable option.  He notes that when Irish writers looked to this aspect of ‘Irishness’, 
they were likely to emphasise ‘those aspects  of that life which suggested an undying continuity, an 
imperviousness to change, an almost hermetic stasis’ (ibid.:  76).   However, Brown notes  that far from 
being static and impervious to change, he believes that the Irish people were quite open to modernisation, 
citing the bicycle and the paraffin oil lamp as examples of new technologies that the Irish people adopted. 
He also notes  how the Irish countryman was ‘ready to use horse-driven threshing machines, prepared to 
experiment with steam, and in the 1930s he began to welcome the tractor’ (ibid.).
73 a participant in the rising and subsequent prime minister and president of  Ireland
It is  therefore evident that in terms of cultural traditions, the conservatism encouraged 
in the early years of the state was not transformative, but regressive.  The homogeneity 
created by partition created, according to Brown, an intellectual and cultural poverty for 
the new state.  This  is especially evident when Brown proceeds  to catalogue the 
contributions  made to Irish cultural identity by the ‘Anglo-Irish’, who were subsequently 
removed from further contributions after partition74.  
 5.4.5 The Anglo-Irish Contribution to Culture
According to Brown, the artist George Russell (Æ) labelled the traditionalists and the 
conservatism of the new state as ‘prevailing national narcissism’ (ibid.: 110).  Æ felt 
there was  far more to gain from infusing Irish cultural identity with international 
knowledge.  As Brown points  out, the strength of Æ’s  point lies  in the contribution that 
the Anglo-Irish made to the culture, due to the openness of the Anglo-Irish to 
international ideas.  In the words of  Æ:
‘[Ireland] has given birth, if it accepts  all its children, to many men who 
have influenced European culture and science, Berkeley, Swift, Goldsmith, 
Burke, Sheridan, Moore, Hamilton, Kelvin, Tyndall, Shaw, Yeats, Synge and 
many others of international repute.  If we repudiate the Anglo-Irish 
tradition, if we say these are aliens, how poor does  our life become’ (Æ: The 
Irish Statesman, 3 Jan 1925: 522 in Brown, 2004: 111).
It was  not long before WB Yeats  himself rode in to defend the Anglo-Irish.  In a famous 
speech to the Seanad in 1927 that railed against the oppression of the Catholic church, 
Yeats pointed out the contribution of the Anglo-Irish to the culture and political wealth 
of the country.  He argued that the Anglo-Irish ‘have created most of the modern 
literature of this  country’ and ‘have created the best of its  political intelligence’ (Brown, 
T. A. (Terence A.), 2004: 119).
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74 Please see the chapter 5 addenda in appendix A for an overview of the Irish visual landscape in the 
late 19th and early 20th centuries, that also provides a case study of the Anglo-Irish contribution to 
culture, including that of Mainie Jellett, who contributed much to the understanding of the modernist art 
movement in Ireland
In an earlier, 1913 article, Yeats critiqued the orthodoxy of the arts  in Ireland, stating 
that ‘the arts  are very conservative’ (Cullen, 1999: 80),  and that ‘they [artists] are not 
radicals’ (ibid.).  He is  also observant of the arts being somewhat against the abstraction 
of modernist artistic practices, noticing ‘contradictions  among my friends  who are still 
convinced that art should not be “complicated by ideas”’, and stating that ‘if they have 
grown rebellious it can only be against something that is modern, something that is not 
simple’ (ibid.).
Thus, in the early stage of the 20th century, the zeitgeist of cultural poverty and 
conservatism in the arts was  still prevalent in Ireland.  The views of Æ and Yeats  show 
that at the era of high modernism, where Europe was  embracing new and radical 
thought and cultural expression, there was a tendency in Ireland towards  conservatism 
and looking inward to old traditions.  Yeats  and Æ voiced a significant opposition to this 
conservatism, but their status  as Anglo-Irish meant that their views were in a minority 
against the powerful forces  of church ideology and its  alignment with state policy. 
Nonetheless, the arguments  of Yeats and Æ represent a voice in early 20th century 
Ireland that advocated progress, innovation, multiculturalism and diversity over 
tradition and conservatism.  
Therefore, in discussing the genesis of Irish culture in the last century, it is  evident that 
the subject is  complex.  Ireland’s postcolonial identity in the decades after independence 
was  formed from disparate upheavals; tensions  between tradition and modernity; the 
loss  of the sizeable Protestant minority due to partition; and reduction in status of those 
of the minority who were left in the new state in a position of having to struggle to be 
heard.  I have fallen short of describing the Protestant minority as  ‘subaltern’, although 
in this context it is  tempting to label them as such, but their loss of status was  certainly 
significant not only for themselves  as  a minority group, but for Irish cultural identity as a 
whole.  Brown presents  a view of cultural traditions as  backward, particularly in the 
early years of the free state.  However, there is  a fluidity to identity over time - that what 
may hold dear for a group to identify with may change and progress  when different 
cultural influences enter.
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5.4.6 Mainie Jellett - a Modernist Innovator
One artist who practiced in the early years after the Irish state was formed, and who 
embraced modernist ideas  in her practice was  Mainie Jellett (1897-1944).  She was  one 
of the ‘Anglo-Irish’, a daughter of a protestant Dublin family.  She became known as 
‘the main instigator of abstract painting in Ireland’ (Cullen, 1999: 86), and along with 
Evie Hone (1894-1955) has also been termed ‘the great innovators in modern Irish 
painting (Arnold, 1977: 146).  Significantly for a postcolonial context, having done her 
primary artistic training she started studying cubism with André Lhote and Albert 
Gleizes  in Paris in 1921 - the year before the founding of the Irish state, and the peak of 
the modernist era.  Thus, she was  temporally, culturally and socially situated in such a 
way as to have influenced the artistic movement of the new state through her decisions 
to work abroad and subsequently to bring what she learned back to Ireland.  Jellett, as 
well as  becoming a competent artist employing abstract and Cubist techniques, also 
instigated the Irish Exhibition of Living Art as a reaction to the then conservatism of 
the RHA.  Arnold stresses the importance of Jellett’s  contribution as both an artist and 
patron of the arts through her teaching, noting that ‘more than any other painter she 
made known in Ireland all the challenges and opportunities  which are associated with 
the twentieth century’s greatest art movement - Cubism’ (ibid.).
In her own writings she provided her audience with an insight into her ideology around 
her art.  In an essay from 1943 entitled ‘My Voyage of Discovery’, she details  her artistic 
process  and her thoughts on national art.  Amongst her beliefs was a belief in the 
necessity for the artist to possess  skill and craft.  She states  ‘I believe in the necessity of a 
highly developed sense of craftsmanship; every artist should be capable of executing 
adequately whatever job he is entrusted with’ (Cullen, 1999: 88).  She also posits a 
modernist critique of the elitist rhetoric surrounding the artist, stating that ‘the idea of 
an artist being a special person, an exotic flower set apart from other people, is  one of 
the errors resulting from the industrial revolution, and the cause of artists being pushed 
out of their lawful position in the life and society of the present day’ (ibid.).  This point 
is  significant, as at once it alludes to the artist potentially occupying a somewhat 
privileged position in society, yet it suggests  that the artist is also ordinary and everyday, 
also as  much socially, politically and culturally situated as  the rest of the populace. 
Jellett elaborates  on this point, stating that ‘artists  as  a whole are people with certain gifts 
more highly developed than the majority, but for this very reason their gifts  are vitally 
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important to the spiritual life of that majority’ (ibid.: 89).  Thus, the artist is in a position 
whereby the combination of their expressive abilities  and their situatedness  allows  them 
to potentially be able to interrogate society from within.
Applying this  to a national context, she states  that ‘the art of a nation is  one of the 
ultimate facts by which its spiritual health is  judged and appraised by posterity’ (ibid.). 
Jellett attributes  the ‘chaos’ of the time to an isolation of the artist from the people. 
Again, this  point is significant, as it echoes the sentiments of other modernist authors on 
aesthetics, culture and society such as Adorno, Benjamin and Marcuse, who all 
suggested that the artist is also a citizen, is  not apart from society, yet had a privileged 
position in society in which to critique the inadequacies of the time and provide an 
alternative space for discourse.  Jellett’s stance alludes to the potential of the artist to 
hold not just a politically privileged space for discourse - of societal and ethical matters - 
but also a spiritually privileged space.  Perhaps Jellett, as  a protestant citizen felt the need 
for an alternate space away from the overwhelming Catholic majority that was created 
at the founding of  the state.
Jellett is  not obtuse in her modernist stance.  Openly she states  that ‘I believe in the truth 
of the ideals  which inspire what is  commonly called “the Modern Movement” in art’, 
but she also observes that there has  been a dearth of opportunity for the artistic fruits of 
this  movement to be seen in Ireland (ibid.: 89).  As commentators previous to her, she 
hopes that some of the great modernist artworks may make their way into a national 
collection for art.  Ironically however, she retreats  from the idea of the modernist era 
producing ‘great’ art, noting that ‘I do not consider the present period is  capable of 
producing a great art’ (ibid.).  She considered that the time she was writing in was  a time 
‘when one civilisation is in its  death throes and a new civilisation is struggling for 
birth’ (ibid.).  For Jellett, this was true in both an Irish context as well as a European one. 
The new Irish state was struggling to find its identity after gaining its independence, and 
Europe was in the grip of the second war of the century.  For Jellett, the modern 
movement in art was  nonetheless  valuable for its potential to lay down new foundations 
for when times stabilised.
Jellett, therefore, is  an example of a modernist innovator emerging from a postcolonial 
Ireland.  How she was  situated - a protestant migrant who subsequently returned - 
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provides and interesting case study of the issues of identity, nationhood and cultural 
production in a postcolonial state.
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5.5 After Post-Colonialism
5.5.1 Nationhood, Identity and Culture
In the case of Irish cultural production, it is important to consider what is  meant by the 
nation-state of Ireland.  A nation-state is  a political entity that has  dominion over a 
particular territory.  It is  not a natural classification of humankind; the concept of 
nationhood has been alien to humankind for most of its existence.  It is therefore a 
construct, both socially and culturally, and represents a means through which 
classification and identification can occur (Barker, 2008: 252).  This  identification 
contributes to a sense of national identity, or ‘a form of imaginative identification with 
the symbols  and discourses of the nation-state’ (ibid.).  These symbols and discourses 
contribute to the formation of a cultural identity, and thus have an influence on cultural 
expression.  In the case of Ireland, the reaches of Irish cultural identity extend beyond 
the borders of the nation-state, i.e. the republic, because of partition.  Thus, there is a 
sizeable minority of people who consider themselves  to be culturally Irish, but because 
they are outside the republic of Ireland and in the six counties  of northern Ireland, 
politically they are part of the United Kingdom.  It is  therefore evident that there are 
complex, postcolonial issues surrounding Irish cultural expression, dating from the time 
the state was formed.  
However, it is  also important to look beyond postcolonialism and to consider other 
frameworks  of cultural production, in order to evaluate not only the historical but 
contemporary cultural identity in the context of Ireland.  Stuart Hall, for example, has 
contributed significantly to studies of cultural identity, Barker noting that ‘Stuart Hall’s 
anti-essentialist position about cultural identity takes  into account that as  well as points 
of cultural similarity, cultural identity is  organised around points of difference, so 
cultural identity isn’t fixed, it’s a process  of becoming - cultural identity is continually 
being produced within the vectors of  similarity and difference’ (Barker, 2008: 229).
Hall’s  observation shows  that issues of cultural identity can in fact swing between 
semblances of strategic essentialism (his vector of similarity; albeit for a given purpose) 
and rejection of essentialism in order to distinguish oneself/group from another in an 
assertion of identity (his  vector of difference).  This  lends  itself to the consideration of a 
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‘social shaping of culture’ framework as posited in the introduction of this  chapter.  As 
Barker observes, ‘any given national culture is understood and acted upon differently by 
diverse social groups’ (ibid.: 252).  This is simpatico with the observation of Terence 
Brown, referred to in the introduction of this paper, that to ignore the social context in 
which the culture is  being discussed would be akin to suggesting that high culture and 
the arts are independent of the social reality they are embedded in.  My research 
framework (chapter 1) suggests that this is  not the case, and that society and culture are 
mutually constitutive.  
The implication of this for any form of cultural expression is made clear in Barker’s 
assertion that the cultural symbols  and discourses  help comprise a sense of a national 
identity.  Therefore, it can be noted that national identity is not just a socially 
constructed phenomenon, but also a culturally constructed one.  This places  cultural 
production and expression into an integral part of the overall cultural and societal 
zeitgeist at any time in a state’s history.  Linking this with Hall’s observation that cultural 
identity is fluid and continually being redefined, it is  possible to see how changes to 
social and cultural identity can inform a sense of national identity.  This also points  to 
the importance of not ignoring aspects  of that culture in contemporary times of crisis 
and change, such as digital media and ‘high’ digital media art production. 
5.5.2 Issues of  Emergence
Whilst considering Ireland’s  case in a postcolonial frame has yielded benefits in terms of 
revealing complexities in cultural production, it is  argued that Ireland is not a ‘typical’ 
postcolonial state.  Thomas McEvilley, for example, has  argued that whilst the four 
phases  of postcolonial identity-building are evident in India and West Africa, Ireland 
does  not fit in with these four phases.  For McEvilley, ‘the situation in Ireland is  more 
complicated, in at least two ways, than the Indian and African models  which are often 
treated as the post-colonial norms’ (REF 13).  
To review these four stages of identity-building briefly, McEvilley posits  that they are as 
follows.  The first stage is the pre-colonial, or ‘Edenic’ pre-modern period.  In this 
period, ‘cultural identity was simply a given, unquestioned and unrelativized by intrusive 
contact with other cultural realities’ (ibid.: 12).  Thus, according to McEvilley, every 
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culture ‘felt itself the centre of its world’ (ibid.).  The second stage is  then the colonial 
period 75  where ‘the cultural identity of the colonised became deeply alienated’ with the 
result of ‘self and other in effect exchanging places’ (ibid.).  This  stage is significant 
according to McEvilley, as cultural identity became politicised, acting as ‘a weapon that 
was  used to simultaneously buttress  their [the colonisers] own hegemony and undermine 
or damage the will and self-confidence of the colonised’ (ibid.: 13).  The reaction of the 
colonised peoples becomes  then one of a certain complicity with this framing of culture. 
Thus, the colonised ‘overwhelmed by mental colonisation’ ends  up ‘lured into a 
deliberate imitation of Western canons in an attempt to take on a Western, supposedly 
universal, identity’ (ibid.: 13).  For McEvilley, it is  in this third phase that independence 
from the coloniser is achieved, and a reactive ‘rage and resentment’ against the coloniser 
takes place, involving the ‘denigration’ of the coloniser culture and a ‘recovery and 
reconstitution of his  own once-scorned and perhaps  abandoned identity’ (ibid.).  Finally, 
the fourth phase begins  when a generation is  born and raised after the colonisers  have 
been removed.  According to McEvilley, this  generation ‘tend to experience late colonial 
and immediate post-colonial rage as ancient history’ and are likely to ‘accept their 
heritage as they find it’ (ibid.).
Back to Ireland then, and its status  as  a ‘special case’.  McEvilley posits  that partition in 
the North has interrupted these four phases of postcoloniality, explaining how ‘in 
Northern Ireland the colonial oppressors have not withdrawn’ (ibid.: 13).  Thus, Ireland 
is ‘stuck’ in phase three, ‘impossible to move into the fourth phase, of accepting hybrid 
identity without inner conflict, while the occupiers  are still within (ibid.: 14).  Another 
issue for the Irish case is  that ‘the Irish are neither non-white nor non-Western’ and are 
therefore not distinguishable either through race or culture.  I suggest that McEvilley’s 
arguments  point to an ongoing ‘moment’ of being caught in the third phase, where 
Ireland is, indeed, a number of generations ‘post’ colonisation, but yet due to partition 
this third phase is yet currently still enlivened.
In terms of cultural production in these circumstances, I suggest that an article by 
Desmond Bell can shed light on issues  of production in a state that achieved its  ‘phase 
three’ postcoloniality at a time of high modernism.  Bell considers that Ireland was 
‘largely untouched by the high tide of European modernism and cultural 
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75 Which McEvilley conflates with the ‘Modernist’ period
internationalism’ (REF 228), suggesting that as a state, Ireland has ‘passed effortlessly 
into a post-modern malaise (ibid.).  Again, remembering when Ireland achieved its 
independence, in 1922, is  key to understanding why and how this  occurred.  As Bell 
observes, ‘cultural nationalism was able to present itself unchallenged in the context of 
the struggle for national independence’, making it ‘the socially radical aesthetic’ over the 
modernist flourishes of the Cubists, Constructivists, Surrealists and Dadaists  (ibid.). 
Thus, rather than Ireland passing through a period of ‘socially engaged modernism’, 
the ‘modernism’ that Ireland experienced was rather ‘a consequence of the economic 
MODERNISATION of the sixties rather than of the social ferment of twentieth-century 
Europe’ (ibid.).  By this time, according to Bell, the modernist artistic movement had ‘by 
then already run out of steam globally’ and had also ‘eschewed its  politically radical 
origins’ (ibid.), leaving Ireland with what Bell describes as  a ‘pseudo international style 
and sensibility’ that was  not encouraged by a ‘radical avant grade’ but by ‘the purveyors 
of  consumer capitalism’ (ibid.: 229).
Thus, Ireland, suggests Bell has ‘prematurely entered the post-modern era’ whereby we 
are experiencing a number of malaises, notably ‘in the sphere of economic ideology, 
“monetarism” without a prior social democracy’.  Similar naiveties  occur in politics 
where there exists  a ‘new right’ without what Bell terms an ‘old left’, and where the 
‘national question’ remains ‘materially unresolved’ (ibid.).  In the social sphere, Bell 
considers  that a return to ‘family values’ has occurred ‘without the advanced of 
feminism’, and that we are ultimately ‘entering the future […] walking backwards’ as 
‘modernism remains an untried project’ (ibid.).
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5.6 The Contemporary Cultural Setting
5.6.1 Introduction
In political economic terms, neo-liberal globalisation is central to understanding how 
the economy in contemporary Ireland has  been transformed since the 1970s due to 
membership of the EU and the country’s subsequent new status  as a favoured site for 
inward direct investment by USA-based multinationals, especially ICT corporations. 
From a primarily rural and agricultural economy, Ireland has become one of the most 
highly internationalised economies in the world by most relevant metrics.  The 
prevailing neo-liberal forms of globalisation also help to account for the easy and 
massive flows of finance and credit which fuelled the property speculation bubble 
culminating in the current crisis, even if some of the prior socio-cultural factors  also 
help understand some of the extreme forms of ‘irrational exuberance’ that animated 
Irish property developers and speculators.
In considering the nexus of Irish identity and cultural production in this context, 
globalisation is one change that has affected Ireland’s modern social and cultural 
identity, along with its  economic one.  Globalisation has facilitated new and varied sites 
of interaction, and is thus an important concept to consider for any study of 
contemporary cultural production in Ireland.  As Barker observes, much more now than 
for example in the 18th century, the modern person has  more sites  in which to interact. 
People still interact on a local scale in work, with family and with friends, but also on a 
much more global scale through the advent of television, e-mail, the internet and 
through travel (Barker, 2008: 231).  This has led to a diversification of identity, Barker 
noting that ‘discourses, identities and social practice in time-space form a mutually 
constituting set implicated in the cultural politics of identity and the constitution of 
humanity as a form of life’ (ibid.).  With these growing sites for interaction, there are 
implications for cultural production - how the producer is  situated, how he or she 
interacts  with the new sites for expression, and how, reciprocally, audiences  of culture 
receive and interpret cultural productions. 
Malcolm Waters, in a phrase reminiscent of Manuel Castels’ adulation of the network 
society, speaks of a change in time and space relationships  due to globalisation.  Waters 
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describes  how central features of globalisation are ‘compression of time and its 
elimination of space’ (Waters, 2001: 182).  While obviously problematic in its 
generalisation, Waters’ point does have resonances  with Barker’s  observations about new 
and divergent sites of identity, and how globalisation facilitates those divergent sites. 
Again, these divergent sites include sites of  cultural production and reception.
However, where the determinism of Waters is problematic is in his prediction of an 
increasing consciousness in the form of ‘an emerging reflexivity or self-conscious 
intentionality with respect to the globalization process’; also calling it an ‘emergent 
holistic consciousness’ (ibid.).  The general mechanism of how this  potential is possible is 
clear enough; with national identity being a socially constructed phenomenon, the 
increase in globalisation may elicit a deconstruction and transcendence of that national 
identity, as  access  to diverse social groups begin to form cultural identity through various 
channels  of cultural communication and expression.  However, this potential is 
contingent on many facets  of political, social and cultural norms, and never in the 
history of humankind has  one ideology been able to transcend the entirety of diversity 
of  the race to become ubiquitous.  
Notwithstanding the difficulties  posed by the determinism of Waters, validity to the 
claim that globalisation does  have an effect on culture stands; through the globalisation 
of communication systems, there are more sites  where cultural identity can be 
constituted differently.  As  Waters points out, the advent of globalisation can have the 
result of individual opinions  and tastes  having a more global reach.  In terms of the 
validity of the meaning of these opinions and tastes however, it is easy to find arguments 
that are less than optimistic about globalisation.  If globalisation provides  increasing sites 
for diversifying identity, this occurs alongside a possibility that globalisation facilitates  the 
loss of  meaning76.
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76 Certainly, Jean Baudrillard did not share the optimistic views of Waters in relation to globalisation. 
Citing Pavlovian experiments in which the stimulus bore no relevance to elicited responses, Baudrillard 
posits the concept of the hyperreal where not only has reality become surreal - something that Baudrillard 
admits was  ‘still in solidarity with the real it contested’, but that the hyperreal goes beyond the real into the 
irreal.  He notes that ‘irreality no longer belongs  to the dream or the phantasm, to a beyond or a hidden 
interiority,  but to the hallucinatory resemblance of the real to itself’ (Cahoone, 2003: 430)  (italics in original). 
Baudrillard claims that there is a denegration of the real down to representations and copies  of the real in 
the form of simulations of real artefacts.  With Baudrillard’s painting of modernity and globalisation in 
this way, he is causing us to question the meaning contained within these simulations.
5.6.2 Culturally Globalised, or Stuck in a Postcolonial Moment?
More recent commentaries on artistic production in Ireland help to illuminate the 
contemporary globalised cultural context of Ireland from the 1970s  through the 1980s, 
1990s into contemporary debates.  Through a chronological analysis  of these 
commentaries, I build up a picture of the artistic zeitgeist during more recent decades. 
These more recent accounts can therefore help to form a cultural, societal and temporal 
context when considering developments  in digital tools and their place in artistic 
production.  Surprisingly, in the context of the above discourse on the potential of a 
globalised world to enable a transcendence of national identity, the commentators below 
still allude to a strong ongoing historical narrative.  
The first of these commentaries  from 1975 is  by Cyril Barrett, an art historian and 
curator, who in his  article, explores the absence of a nationalism in art.  The second piece 
is a contribution to Circa magazine from Tom Duddy, a lecturer at NUI Galway.  In this 
article from 1987, Duddy critiques the ‘provincialism of the right’ and calls  for a 
‘provincialism of the left’ in which historical, economic and social factors  are 
considered.  The third commentator, Declan McGonagle, is an art curator, former 
director of the Irish Museum of Modern art, and current director of the National 
College of Art and Design.  In this offering, which is based on an address  from 1990, 
McGonagle critiques regionalism in favour of an exploration of locality/localism.  He 
also explores issues of postcoloniality and explains the discourses  around postcoloniality 
that still existed into the 1990s.  A short essay by journalist and arts correspondent Ian 
Kilroy written in 2007 elucidates some contemporary discourses  from the ‘Celtic Tiger’ 
era of economic growth in Ireland.  Finally, a 2010 article by Luke Gibbons weaves 
together issues of modernist artistic expression, the famine and the representation of the 
real in Irish visual culture.
5.6.2.1 Cyril Barrett and the lack of  ‘nationalist’ art in Ireland
In his article Irish Nationalism and Art, Cyril Barrett (1975) suggests  that whilst in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, there was a heightened sense of political nationalist 
sentiment, this nationalism was not evident in artistic works.  The artist Jack B Yeats, is 
held up for critique, Barrett claiming how ‘some people may be inclined to regard 
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[Yeats] as a nationalistic artist’ (Cullen, 1999: 276), but he himself is  not of the opinion 
that Yeats’ work made an impact on nationalist sentiment.  Of this, Barrett notes that ‘it 
is  arguable that these were the finest things that nationalistic art has  produced in 
Ireland, but they might not have been very effective in arousing national sentiments; 
they were too subtle for that’ (ibid.) as Yeats  mainly portrayed scenes  of the ordinary, 
everyday life of Irish people who are ‘never suffering’ in those scenes.  He observes  that 
there are ‘no unemployed loafers, no down-and-outs, no struggling small farmers, no 
women and children in urban or rural hovels  suffering from malnutrition or prematurely 
aged’ (ibid.: 277), and thus do not betray a political or nationalist sentiment to the works.
As to why this lack of nationalist sentiment in art exists, Barrett posits that prior to Irish 
independence, there was not a demand for nationalistic art amongst gallery audiences, 
suggesting that had there been a public demand for that kind of art, it would be 
evidenced the canon.  Whilst Barrett acknowledges that the ‘ascendency’ would not 
have taken kindly to representations of Irish nationalism, he surprisingly does not 
consider this  to be an adequate explanation for the lack of nationalistic art, noting that 
the wider gallery-visiting public would have comprised a larger majority than that of the 
ascendency77, concluding that ‘the apathy towards a nationalistic art was not confined 
either to the administration or to those who implacably considered themselves 
British’ (ibid.).  Also, access to the gallery was  not an issue for the public due to the 
facilitation of penny admission rates to encourage public participation.  For Barrett, the 
canon suggests  that the concerns  of the Irish public, and the artists  alike were in 
landscapes and seascapes.  Of one well known work78  he observes  that while set in 
Ireland, it ‘could have been painted elsewhere’ (ibid.: 280), also claiming that other 
works  are generic, giving ‘no hint of the national passions which were eating out the 
hearts of  some of  their fellow-countrymen’ (ibid.). 
In the light of postcolonial theory, these assumptions  are problematic.  Regarding 
gallery attendance, Barrett fails  to consider how such a ‘Royal’ institution was  symbolically 
loaded for the general public.  The work of Pierre Bourdieu on public attendance at art 
galleries and museums enforces this, with Bourdieu positing a ‘hierarchy of legitimacies’ 
with respect to cultural tastes  (Jenkins, 2002: 132).  In the Irish context, mere freedom of 
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77 For example, he observes  that 128,650 people visited the National gallery in 1865, noting that those 
visitors could not all have been comprised of  the ascendency (ibid.: 279)
78 Nathaniel Hone’s Cattle at Malahide
access would not have been enough to counter the socially and culturally loaded 
symbolism of the gallery.  Thus  the apathy of the public towards the artistic spaces and 
institutions is  better analysed in terms of their assumptions that those institutions would 
not express subjects and works within their hierarchy of  legitimacies.
5.6.2.2 Tom Duddy and Provincialism
Tom Duddy observes  the tendency for art critics to cite geography as  a distinctive 
feature of Irish art in his  article from Circa art magazine (Duddy, 1987: 14).  Citing 
critics such as Brian Fallon and Dorothy Walker, Duddy notes the tendency for critics to 
somewhat downplay formal aesthetic influences in favour of highlighting the artist’s 
having been influenced by the Irish landscape.  Duddy notes  of several modernist and 
contemporary artists  such as  Barrie Cooke and Camille Souter, that according to art 
critics, their work ‘may appear expressionistic or abstract in varying degrees, as if all 
these artists were under the influence of modernist values, but in fact the sources  of 
their inspiration lie elsewhere’ (ibid.).
Duddy explores and critiques this  tendency as being a need to categorise, and a ‘need to 
identify a strong native impulse’ or creative genius.  According to Duddy, this  need to 
categorise results in powerful concepts  emerging in art criticism in Ireland - concepts 
such as ‘nature, native genius, locality, place, and physical distance - distance from 
urbanity, complication, and influence’ (ibid.).  For Duddy, these concepts  aggregate 
together to form ‘a romantic vision of the sources of ethnic artistic identity’ (ibid.) which 
leads to a conservatism in art criticism and a ‘protectionism’ that ‘will not allow for 
completely new things, for timely development and change, for constructive influence 
from abroad’ (ibid.)79. 
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79  Duddy critiques the dominant visual ideologies that exist in Irish art criticism, noting that the 
romanticised subjects discussed ‘are given priority over such “dirty” materialistic concepts as economy, 
market, commodity, visual ideology, conspicuous consumption, and the sorts of useful explanatory terms 
used by historians like Hadjinicolaou and sociologists like Bourdieu’ (ibid.).
This critique leads me to raise the issue of postcolonial thinking and the tendency even into the late 1980s 
towards a discourse in Irish art criticism that was informed by the postcolonial status of the Irish state. 
For example, Duddy himself makes  oblique references  to postcoloniality, noting that ‘the idealists, 
nativists, transcendental regionalists, and informal formalists seem to have decided that Ireland can stand 
alone culturally’ (ibid.).   Thus, in an assertion of Irish ‘uniqueness’ and difference, a highly loaded, 
postcolonial discourse is  still playing out whereby Irish artists are critically lauded for their apparent use of 
this ‘uniqueness’ pertaining to being Irish.
In an attempt to provide alternative discourses, Duddy suggests  how critics could engage 
with more practical, materialistic subjects pertaining to globalisation, commodification, 
capitalism, the art market and such ‘dirty’ concepts  that foreground ‘the poignant and 
often telling relationship between art, money, and life’ (ibid.: 98).  Such an approach 
thus situates the artist socially as a human being who needs to function in capitalist art 
markets.  He concludes  by suggesting that a progressive discourse in Irish art criticism 
‘acknowledges the distinctive position of Ireland and Irish culture’ but set out ‘to give 
more than a geographical or quasi-racialistic account of  that distinctiveness’ (ibid.: 99). 
5.6.2.3 Declan McGonagle - a Critique of  Regionalism
Declan McGonagle’s critique of regionalism discusses geographical factors  in art 
criticism, whilst also exploring issues  of postcoloniality in the Irish setting.  McGonagle 
explores  the concept of regionalism as implicitly containing ideologies  of hierarchy, with 
the perceived ‘centre’ at the top of the hierarchy, and regions  being subordinate to that 
centre, in deference and acceptance of that power relationship.  For McGonagle, 
acceptance of this model replicates and perpetuates those power dynamics, leading to a 
significant ‘depoliticisation of art and culture and the removal of social meaning lest the 
hierarchy is  actually challenged’ (Cullen, 1999: 101).  His remedy is  to critique the 
ideology of  regionalism in favour of  locality/localism.  
This  critique involves challenging the colonial discourses, McGonagle noting that ‘art 
deserves  a future only in as much as it addresses and goes  beyond the dominant set of 
colonial relationships that still apply in terms of class, gender, race in these islands and 
elsewhere’ (ibid.).  For McGonagle, colonisation is  only complete when ‘the colonised 
colonise themselves’ in deference to the colonising entity, thus negating and distorting 
their own culture.  McGonagle cites  the Irish leprechaun and Scottish tartan as 
examples  of this  self-colonisation that makes  the culture somehow ‘safe’ for the 
coloniser, and local elites.  This is the culture of regionalism, whereas for McGonagle, 
the culture of localism is a more complex process, involving genuine expression through 
situatedness  of the cultural producer.  Again, linking this process  to colonialism, 
McGonagle notes  that the axis of centre/region has  connotations of a sphere being 
either within or outside the colonised boundaries.  For colonisation to work, the 
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colonising entity needs to devalue that culture which is  outside the boundaries, and to 
‘render it invisible because it is not defined as culture’ (ibid.: 103)80.  
McGonagle thus posits that the agenda of ‘localism’ to be prioritised in discourses of 
Irish art, in opposition to the ‘regionalism’ associated for him with a colonial framing. 
Whilst this  work raises important issues of postcoloniality and how that status is 
negotiated, I suggest that it nonetheless  reveals a preoccupation with region, geography 
and land in Irish art criticism.  The issues around a ‘local’ Irish identity, a specialness, 
and authenticity of Irish culture still dominates for this  prominent cultural gatekeeper 
and critic.  I suggest that despite discussions of globalisation and debordering, this is 
inherently a postcolonial issue where Irish cultural gatekeepers  are yet concerned with 
the need to assert ‘Irishness’ as separate, unique and distinctive.
5.6.2.4 The Feel-Good Gulag
I now consider an essay commissioned by the Arts  Council, following their 2006 survey 
into the attitudes  of the Irish public regarding art and culture81.  Following the 
publication of this report, the Arts  Council asked critics  and commentators  to 
contribute essays  on the theme of the value of the arts.  Here I will focus on one key 
essay where Ian Kilroy traces the function of art in Ireland, its role in society and how 
art is used in the political sphere.
Kilroy posits  that in previous  centuries in Irish cultural history, art helped to construct a 
type of national unity.  For Kilroy, this dream of unity emerged in the 20th century with 
WB Yeats, brother of Jack, the artist, arguing that ‘there is no nationality without 
literature’ and that through this ideology, ‘Ireland would be dreamed into being’ and at 
the centre of this  birth would be the nationally lauded artist (Kilroy, 2007).  In contrast 
to this, nation-building has been replaced in current times  by monetary issues.  Kilroy 
notes how the (then) minister for arts  and culture, John O’Donoghue proclaimed that 
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80  In the case of MOMA in New York,  it has colonised the ‘universal’ and not the ‘marginal’.   For 
McGonagle institutions such as MOMA ‘empowers the metropolitan and disenfranchises the local’ (ibid.).
81 The Public and the Arts, Arts Council of  Ireland, 2007
‘the importance of cultural identity was never more relevant than now in times of 
increased globalisation’ (ibid.).  Thus, whilst at government level there is a value 
attached to the arts  in terms of our national cultural identity, the value is  not placed on 
the cultural value, but in market value, Kilroy observing that ‘the sub-text here, of 
course, is that the benefits accrued lie outside the artistic sphere. They are prizes won in 
the global marketplace. In other words, they further the aim spelt out on the 
Department of Arts  website: that the arts stimulate and help maximise “economic 
returns and employment”. There is  no idea here of intrinsic worth, everything is 
utilitarian’ (ibid.).
For Kilroy, such state intervention has created an illusion for the artist where they are 
‘firmly in bonded service to the grandeur of the state’ (ibid.).  This ‘incarceration’ into 
bonded service, for Kilroy is the feel-good gulag - a cultural and social zeitgeist where 
‘its receding colonial history frees  it from the first-world guilt that its  privileged, pro-
American status  should otherwise provoke’ (ibid.).  Kilroy posits  that in this feel-good 
gulag, ‘criticism and comic caricature are not encouraged’ because as artists  ‘we have 
never had it better’ (ibid.).
Ultimately, for Kilroy, the relationship between art and the state is problematic.  He 
suggests that art can be employed politically to maintain the status-quo82, and thus, 
artists can be courted by politicians  in order to ‘be absorbed into the arsenal of power, 
and simply ignored when it is of no use’.  In this respect, state attention in the sphere of 
art can bring about a devaluation of art due to how the state uses art for its own ends. 
For Kilroy, the challenge for the 21st century Irish artist is  to become a ‘bad citizen - one 
that speaks his mind lyrically and on his  own terms, offering an individual testament in 
the service of nothing other than the truth of the artistic act itself; and often, ultimately, 
although ironically, contributing to the health of  the democracy in the process’ (ibid.).
Thus, whilst Kilroy’s  essay points  to tensions regarding culture in the ‘Celtic Tiger’ era 
of globalisation, it also problematises the issues of being a cultural producer in an era of 
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82 For Kilroy, the increase in wealth brought about by Ireland’s economic boom of the 1990s did not lead 
to a valuing of art for its aesthetic and transformational abilities.  For Kilroy, if the boom had encouraged 
true artistic production, Ireland would be experiencing a ‘Medici-like renaissance’ where the increased 
wealth would be improving institutions such as our national theatre, and providing a cultural presence in 
the sprawling suburbs.  Kilroy asks where such works of art are,  answering that ‘the latter day Medici 
developing all the new property in the state seem not to be embracing the role’.
late-capitalism, an issue echoed in the previous chapter’s  problematisation of art within 
postmodern constructs which, as Jameson argues are bound up with capitalism itself.
5.6.2.5 Realism and the Unrepresentable
In this 2010 essay Words Upon the Windowpane: Image, Text, and Irish Culture, Luke Gibbons 
queries why there were no realist artists  of the stature of Millet or Courbet in Ireland in 
the 19th and 20th centuries.  For Gibbons, this did not have to do with a creative or 
technical ability, but that ‘the difficulty at the aesthetic level would rather appear to be 
with the discourse of realism itself, with the demand that art hold the mirror faithfully up 
to nature’ (Elkins, 2010: 43).  Gibbons explains that French realism had its  origins in a 
dignifying of the poor, whereas  the poor in Ireland ‘were staring into the abyss, in the 
midst of  the Great Famine83, which removed almost half  the population’ (ibid.).  
With this  ‘unrepresentable’ past shadowing artistic production, Gibbons posits  that the 
devastation of the famine was not depicted in any artistic content, rather that it expressed 
itself in artistic form which resisted realist depiction.  For Gibbons, ‘it is  only through 
disfiguration, rather than the ordering illusions of mimetic art, that these disturbing 
areas  of experience are rendered intelligible - that is insofar as  they make sense at 
all’ (ibid.: 44).  This  referred to the particularly brutal Cromwellian period of 
colonisation which for Gibbons, had an ‘overt ideology of genocide and 
expropriation’ (ibid.: 45).  This ideology caused ‘successive shocks and convulsions’ in 
the Irish psyche84, which in an artistic context meant that ‘the available styles and 
protocols  of painting would have been unable to render the extremes of Irish life’ (ibid.). 
Gibbons draws on the work of Lyotard and his exploration of the Kantian sublime to 
further this point.  In Gibbons’ words, Lyotard posited that the sublime is ‘a liminal 
form of experience that addresses  itself to the “inexpressible” and the 
“unrepresentable”’ (ibid.: 46).  
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83 For Gibbons, the Irish famine was too terrible to represent,  even 100 years after its occurrence, when 
no commemoration took place.
84 through the ‘Cromwellian atrocities’, the ‘Williamite Wars’, the ‘horrific famine of 1740/1741’, the 
1798 rebellion, the Great famine, land wars,  the war of independence and the more recent northern 
troubles (ibid.)
Thus, by considering Ireland’s colonial past, Gibbons asserts not that the Irish did not 
represent their stories visually, but could not represent them with the visual tools  of the 
day.  This  context provides  a counter to the work of Barrett, whose suggestion that the 
preoccupations of Irish artists  in the canon were of seascapes and landscapes.  Yet, 
almost a century now since Ireland acquired its postcolonial status, I suggest that issues 
of  postcoloniality and coloniality itself  foreground art criticism in Ireland.
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5.7 Conclusion
To conclude, this chapter has been intended to situate cultural production through an 
exploration of cultural identity in the Irish context.  It is evident through the study of 
both Irish and international contemporary scholars  that Irish cultural identity is  notable 
by some characteristic dialectics.  Both Brown and Gibbons have posited sometimes 
contrasting and sometimes parallel views  on the nature of culture and tradition - both 
acknowledging the transformative power of culture - but Brown precipitating a 
questioning of what kind of tradition is transformative.  Internationally, postcolonial 
theory and subaltern studies  have contributed to an understanding of Irish cultural 
identity, the psyche of a colonised state, and the complexities of cultural production in 
such a context.  The complex issues raised include those of representation, selfhood, 
validity and inferiority amongst colonised peoples, revealing complexities  pertaining to 
the theme within the key questions  of ‘situatedness’ as  introduced in chapter 1, whilst 
also contextualising that situatedness  with concepts  of a situated, postcolonial culture in 
which artistic production is undertaken.  Thus secondarily, the chapter informs the key 
themed area of  art.
With respect to art criticism in Ireland, the chapter argued through the analysis of 
selected works of art criticism, that despite its recent move towards a globalised society, 
Irish art criticism has relied heavily on tropes  of postcolonialism.  This longitudinal 
study of selected articles  reveals  that these tropes are still in existence, and thus 
foreground art criticism in Ireland.  This  argument is pertinent to a study of digital art 
in Ireland, where not only are there tensions between tropes of ‘contemporary’ and 
‘new media’ art, but where issues  of a ‘special’ postcolonial art are at odds with the 
aesthetics of  digital art.
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Chapter 6: Methodology
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I outline the methodological approaches  undertaken for this research 
project, including decisions made between qualitative and quantitative research 
methods, and a justification for applying the chosen methods.  As outlined in chapters  1 
and 2, significant research has been carried out on innovation in the commercial 
production of digital media, both in Ireland and abroad.  The decision to complement 
the extant research with a survey of art, including non-commercial cultural production 
has required a thorough introspection on the most appropriate methods  to utilise in this 
research project.  Thus, an initial step was  to analyse the use of largely qualitative 
methods and compare them to a quantitative or mixed approach.  The result of this 
yielded qualitative methods as the most appropriate to use.  This was based on an 
analysis of the methodological issues  in cultural studies  research, and a problematisation 
of  the limits of  quantitative research in the discipline of  art.
Keeping awareness always on the key questions as outlined in chapter 1, the next step 
was  to devise the most appropriate qualitative methods  to use for this project, which 
would yield the most fruitful outcomes to an investigation of those questions.  I thus 
devised an approach which would enable an in-depth survey of the attitudes  of 
individual artists  and art workers, whilst also offering a breadth of attendant knowledge 
about the digital art sector, through an ongoing ethnography of the area at both meso 
and macro levels.  This  combination of a depth and breadth model is in keeping with 
the theoretical framework which aspired to a tripartite survey of micro, meso and macro 
levels of  enquiry.  
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6.2 Research Issues
6.2.1 The Limits of  Quantitative Research in Art
The positivist framework associated with quantitative research has  many benefits  – it 
helps  the researcher make sense of their research output, assists  with quantifying 
frequencies of occurrences, and provides  empirical evidence to support their data. As 
Bertrand and Hughes  note, ‘[positivism] has faith in the scientific method, which it sees 
as  leading to the growth of objective and verifiable knowledge (rather than mere 
superstition and guesswork)’ (Bertrand & Hughes  2005: 9). This framework is  thus 
valuable for delineating texts containing intellectual and academic rigour from poorly 
researched, speculative work. 
Applied to the context of art however, this  positivist framework, whilst having benefits 
also has limitations, especially when it comes to the research agenda noted in chapter 1. 
As we saw in chapter 4, the discipline of cultural studies has  struggled with the notion of 
the artist as  being ‘special’ or different from others, and indeed in certain Marxist and 
other economistic interpretations, art is seen as just another form of labour (Barker 
2008: 64).  These frameworks are essentially positivist, as  they attempt to reduce art or 
the artist to measurable, quantifiable definitions and entities.  This is  problematic with a 
subject matter such as  ‘art’, which has defied empirical measurements since the time of 
Plato85  as  it excludes valuable qualitative information about art, artists and artistic 
process.  Therefore in chapter 4, I posited a hypothesis that the meaning of art can be 
explored by the value of a qualitative encounter between the artistic text and the observer. 
Such a hypothesis has  implications for this research, as  it interrogates  key questions 
surrounding how we may understand art and artistic practice in digital media.
As Bertrand and Hughes observe, post-positivism consists  of ‘an ontology of critical 
realism, an epistemology that still seeks knowledge (but admits that verification is not 
achievable and judges success  on Popper’s principles the search for a relative objectivity 
through the critical community of scholars), and a methodology open to qualitative 
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85 In fact, Plato considered artists to be so problematic that ‘on account of their dangerous influence, 
Plato in The Republic (c.375 BC) banned artists and poets from his ideal state’(Kul-Want and Piero 2007: 9)
methods and the grounded theory arising from these’ (Bertrand & Hughes 2005: 10). 
Thus, a post-positivist framework allows for objectivity of the academic discipline, 
respect for considered intellectual grounding in a subject, whilst also allowing for a 
relative objectivity in keeping with the insights  gained from an ongoing ethnography of 
the sector.
6.2.2 Methodological Issues in Cultural Studies
David Morley has  critiqued the methodological issues ‘which have been of concern 
within academic media and cultural studies in recent years’ (Morley 2006: 88).  He 
suggests that ‘it may be that we should look far more attentively than is usual in 
academic circles to what literary and artistic practices can offer us as methodologies for 
understanding the social and cultural worlds in which we live’ (ibid. emphasis added). As 
a means  of affording us  some examples of a valuable methodology, he provides  the 
examples  of artists Susan Hiller and Krzysztof Wodiczko.  He explains that the artists 
‘both mobilise the devices of fiction and rhetoric as interrogative tools for the 
understanding of the institutional power structures of the contemporary world’ (ibid.). 
Thus, Morley suggests  that the subjectivity of the creative practice of both artists, and 
their artistic devices of fiction and rhetoric are valid processes through which to 
interrogate complex power dynamics.  However, just as  a subjective process can 
contribute to a debate, Morley also suggests that artists can contribute to a relative 
objectivity as providers of intellectual debate around institutional power structures that 
they investigate and question.
Morley also observes  that the value of Susan Hiller’s  art is in the intellectually 
challenging nature of her works (ibid.: 89), explaining that her work After the Freud 
Museum helps ‘to resituate Freud’s  work in a broader comparative perspective’ (ibid.). 
This, as Morley points out is a case of ‘a conceptual artist using imaginative means to 
dislodge some of the accumulated “certainties” surrounding one of the central figures  of 
European intellectual history’ (ibid.: 90).  He further explains that those strategies can be 
used in a more day-to-day way ‘as  rhetorical devices for the interrogation of our taken-
for-granted assumptions  about the social problems of the contemporary world’ (ibid.: 
91), citing Krzysztof Wodiczko as an example.  Wodiczko’s  work, Homeless Vehicle, is  an 
art object consisting of an adapted supermarket trolley with multifunctions  for its  user 
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that ‘demands that we acknowledge the existence of the crisis  of homelessness, “reflect 
upon its  causes and respond to the question it provokes: if not this, then what do you 
suggest?”’ (ibid.). 
Therefore, an exploration of both the intellectual and the subjective value of art can 
provide an enhanced methodology for cultural studies  researchers, with Morley 
supplementing this  position by analysing how some visual artists  have used ethnographic 
techniques in their work.  He observes  that in doing this, the artists raise issues ‘of 
identity and autobiography, the real and the fake, the factual and the fictional and the 
status  of documentary evidence’ (ibid.: 100). Thus, the methodological combination of 
objectivity and subjectivity that a creative, yet academically grounded artist can provide, 
can voice broader societal concerns in a non-traditional format which yet allows for peer 
review and critique.
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6.3  Techniques for Qualitative Fieldwork Research
6.3.1 Qualitative Methods - Justification For a ‘depth’ Model
Maykut and Morehouse (1994) observe a perception within the natural sciences that 
qualitative research methods  are in some way ‘unscientific’ or lacking in methodological 
rigour (Maykut and Morehouse, 1994: ix), mainly due to a historical grounding in 
philosophical paradigms that were largely positivist (ibid.: 3) and which encouraged 
statistical models  aligned with what we know as quantitative research.  The authors 
suggest how qualitative research can hold a somewhat subaltern position, positing that 
‘as  qualitative research is still a minority voice, it needs strong defenders’ (ibid.: 2).  It is 
on this  basis that they outline their reasons for encouraging researchers to consider 
qualitative research techniques.
They compare the philosophical positions  of qualitative and quantitive research, with 
the former based on a phenomenological perspective and the latter on a positivist one, 
arguing that throughout scientific history, the positivist paradigm ‘has  come to mean 
objective inquiry based on measurable variables and provable propositions’ (Maykut and 
Morehouse, 1994: 3).  Thus, ‘it is  the insistence on explanation, prediction, and proof 
that are the hallmarks of positivism’ (ibid.).  For the authors, the human sciences such as 
psychology and sociology have often looked to the natural sciences such as physics  and 
chemistry for their research methodology.  This  connection, based on ‘a belief in 
objective observation, quantifiable data and verifyable truths’, has  held sway in the 
human sciences as  a way of ‘doing science’ to the exclusion of any ‘non-experimental, 
non-objective ways of  doing science’ (ibid.: 7).  
In contrast, phenomenological research entails  ‘a focus on understanding the meaning 
events  have for persons being studied’ (Patton: 1991).  Scholars such as Lincoln and 
Guba (1995) have argued that ‘qualitative research is  based on a fundamentally different 
set of axioms or postulates than is the dominant approach to research, that is, the 
positivists’ position on research’ (Maykut and Morehouse, 1994: 10).  Therefore, 
qualitative research provides an alternate paradigm to the dominant positivist one.  
Lincoln and Guba posit the various postulates of the positivist paradigm and compare 
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them to the postulates  of the alternate phenomenological paradigm.  In the positivist 
paradigm, the world is one entity which can be known by studying its  component parts. 
This  contrasts with the phenomenological paradigm, in which multiple socio-
psychological realities exist.  In the positivist paradigm, there exists the notion of the 
value-free observer, whereas  in the phenomenological paradigm, the researcher and the 
subject of research are connected and interdependent.  Causality is also treated 
differently amongst the two paradigms.  In the positivist one, events are procedural, with 
one event causing another.  In the phenomenological one however, events are seen as 
mutually constitutive, so instead of a unidirectional chain of events, multidimensional 
events  are possible.  The results  of research in the positivist paradigm abstract outcomes 
to generalised rules  which can hold for different times and places, whereas  in 
phenomenological research, the results are seen as  tentative and specific.  The goal of 
the research is  also different between approaches, with the positivist approach seeking 
the proof of a hypothesis  by experimental verification, and, in contrast, the 
phenomenological approach seeking to discover new postulates86.
In the context of this research project then, I suggest that the qualitative approach is 
more aligned to the ‘depth model’ of analysis  as  proposed for the research framework 
described in chapter 1, thus making it a suitable methodological approach for a survey 
of cultural production.  For example, David Silverman suggests  that ‘what counts  as 
“detail” tends to vary between qualitative and quantitative researchers’, with qualitative 
researchers  finding ‘detail’ in ‘the precise particulars  of such matters  as people’s 
understandings and interactions’ (Silverman, 2005: 9).  For this  project, where the core 
agenda concerns an understanding of the sites of innovation, the ‘role’ of art and 
cultural production and the extent to which digital artistic practices are enabled, the 
‘non-positivist’ approach to enquiry is more suited (ibid.).  This ‘fit’ of methods have 
been further happily validated by a note from Steiner Kvale who attested to the mixed 
qualitative methodologies applied by Theodor Adorno in his study of authoritarian 
personalities, Adorno using ‘a sophisticated interplay of open qualitative interviews and 
highly structured questionnaires  for producing and validating data’ (Kvale 2007: 46). 
Thus, this  research project, in aligning itself theoretically with the Frankfurt School of 
critical theory, also aligns  itself methodologically with the approaches of one of its  seminal 
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86 This, however,  has  been changing somewhat, and the turn to qualitative research is  being partly driven 
from the scientific community as it is  from the human sciences community.  To explain further, I briefly 
divert the reader to the chapter 5 addenda of appendix A, where I interrogate approaches to quantum 
physics and the theory of  relativity, whilst keeping the complicated science to a minimum. 
members, Theodor Adorno.
6.3.2 Techniques Applied
Having examined the range of qualitative techniques available for this  research project, 
it was deemed that a combination of qualitative methods was appropriate for the 
project.  These methods  consisted of (1) in-depth interviews with digital artists, (2) case 
studies of selected digital art works  and (3) an ethnography of the digital art sector 
which included gallery visits, workshops and talks.
6.3.2.1 Interviews
Steinar Kvale (2007) has posited a 7-stage interview process, consisting of thematising, 
designing, interviewing, transcribing, analysing, verifying and reporting.  This 
framework places the ‘act’ of interviewing within a holistic undertaking where the 
predesign of the interview is considered, along with the ‘postproduction’ aspects of 
transcription and the communication of the interview findings.  For this project, this 
model was adopted for the interview process  and is fully outlined in its  7 stages in the 
appendix. 
6.3.2.2 Ethnography
Ethnographic work involves  a contextual observation of a sub-culture or sub-group, or 
for Silverman, ‘ethnographies are based on observational work in particular 
settings’ (Silverman, 2005: 49).  Based on an anthropological precedent, ‘if one is really 
to understand a group of people, one must engage in an extended period of 
observation’ (ibid.).  In the context of this  research project, ethnographies  of selected 
organisations and institutions  were carried out, along with ethnographic participation in 
the digital art sector through attendance at exhibitions, talks  and workshops.  Whilst 
ethnography and ethnomethodological research is  not without its  complications  (Berger, 
2000: 145), it provides  a ‘real world’ view of the participants  in their own everyday life 
and also concerns  itself with ‘actions people undertake in the company of others  like 
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themselves’ (ibid.).  Thus, in this research project where intersubjectivity at three levels 
of enquiry is  of concern, I suggest that this  dimension to the research adds to the 
understanding of the digital art sector through the ‘on the ground’ interactions with that 
sector.  For Berger, ‘the researcher does not try to interpret the meaning of everyday 
activities  but, rather, to find the rules  or codes by which people interpret statements 
made to them by others, through which they make sense of the world’.  Applied to 
digital media then, the ethnography performed for this research project has not 
attempted to ascribe meaning to artistic practices or techniques, rather to find the rules 
and codes  at play in the subculture of digital art, including the complex interplay 
between individuals and institutions, through which digital artists make sense of their art 
world.
This  ethnography was practiced by becoming actively involved with a digital art group, 
DATA, in Dublin.  This group mounted regular talks and workshops, those of which I 
started attending in 2008.  My attendance continues up until this  time of writing.  As  an 
attendee of these talks, my ethnographic practice was  to take notes on the content of the 
talks  whilst listening to and observing the interactions and debates that ensued.  I 
refrained from offering my opinions on the material, nor did I critique the subject 
matter at any time, as  I did not wish to be identified as a researcher in digital media, lest 
the research become a point of distraction for these talks.  I also wished to maintain the 
confidentiality of the work as  it was in progress, as several other attendees  at the talks 
were also participants  in the research, and to bring about their involvement through my 
own involvement would also influence the direction of the talks.  I thus remained a 
passive participant, whilst also learning the language, codes, culture and key debates 
within the digital art subculture.  This  in turn influenced the foregrounding of certain 
topics  in the following empirical chapters, as this  tacit knowledge gained from the 
ethnography allowed an understanding of the key and critical themes which emerged 
for digital artists themselves.
6.3.2.3 Case Studies
The combination of interview data and ethnographic immersion in the digital art sector 
facilitated an understanding of contemporary digital artworks, along with an 
understanding of digital art organisations and groups  in Ireland.  This  allowed for the 
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third methodological component of case studies to be brought into the research project. 
However, as Silverman has  observed, performing a case study for the sake of description 
is ‘a tricky activity which is inevitably theoretically laden’ (Silverman 2005: 127).  This  is 
problematised by Silverman as  ‘if all you aim to do is simply to ‘describe a case’, you 
may rightly get the response: ‘so what?’’.  Thus, the inclusion of case studies in this 
research project does not, following from Stake’s identification of three types of case 
study (2000: 437-8), fall in to the ‘intrinsic case study’ type, where for Silverman, ‘no 
attempt is  made to generalise beyond the single case or even to build 
theories’ (Silverman 2005: 127).  Rather, this research project has included the more 
theoretically grounded ‘instrumental case study’ type, where ‘a case is  examined mainly 
to provide insight into an issue or to revise a generalisation’ (ibid.).  In this  project, the 
cases are included to provide an insight into production aspects  of digital art, as  in two 
studies of digital art pieces 87, into the broader contextualisation of digital art in a 
macro-level context through a study that deals with media engagement with the arts  in 
general and one that analyses funding issues for a digital art group88.
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87 As included in chapter 8 where studies of  the digital art pieces Hard Drivin’ and Corrupt are undertaken
88 As included in chapter Chapter 10 where studies of media engagement following the government-led 
Farmeligh conference, and DATA, a digital art group in Dublin which lost its funding are undertaken
6.5  Conclusion
In this chapter I have analysed the available research methods available for the study of 
digital media.  The chapter argued, through a problematisation of research issues in art 
and cultural studies, that for a survey of cultural production, qualitative methods yield 
more relevant, meaningful results  than attempting a positivist interpretation of art and 
cultural production of digital media.  Having justified the decision to employ qualitative 
methods, the chapter then analysed the qualitative techniques employed, including 
interviews, ethnography and case study and outlined how these techniques were applied 
to this research project.
This  chapter concludes the theoretical and methodological aspect of the thesis.  In the 
next five chapters, I move to analyse the empirical aspects of the research, starting with 
an overview of the initial research findings in chapter 7, and three themed chapters  that 
emerged from the empirical work in chapters 8-10.
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Chapter 7: Summary of  Research Findings
7.1 Introduction: Key Themes From Empirical Research
In this  chapter, I introduce key findings from the empirical dimension of the research. 
In chapter 1, I suggested that a clear-cut delineation of these levels exists  mainly 
hypothetically, and how in practice such levels  are synergistic, overlapping and mutually 
constitutive.  Nonetheless, in chapter 8 I focus  mainly on concerns at the micro level of 
enquiry, where artists have discussed their challenges and opportunities with respect to a 
digital practice.  This chapter is  influenced by elements of chapter 4, where I outlined 
some major characteristics of digital art, or a digital aesthetic.  These characteristics are 
further expanded upon in chapter 8, through the micro-level accounts.  In chapter 9 I 
broaden this focus to speak with workers  at an institutional level, examining their meso-
level interactions with artists  at the micro level and also state bodies  at the macro level. 
Chapter 10 discusses  macro-level factors pertaining to digital art such as  political and 
economic challenges within a broader cultural air of  ‘crisis’.
As we saw in chapter 1, the key questions for this  thesis centre around how artists 
interact with ICTs to produce cultural artefacts in Ireland.  In positing these questions, 
broad concerns of ‘situatedness’ permeated the enquiry and the theoretical framework, 
driving the enquiry towards  situating digital technologies as embedded in social, 
political, cultural, technological and economic concerns.  Chapter 2 interrogated these 
issues  of technological situatedness through an analysis  of theories of the technological 
and societal relationship, arguing that technologies, while they have a place in 
influencing a broader societal context, can not be seen as ‘determining’ society, without 
considering how they are also ‘determined’ by social and political factors.  This  framing 
of technology as socially-situated has mapped to chapter 8 where I investigate the role of 
technology in digital art practice and artists attitudes to digital technologies, whilst also 
considering digital aesthetics, collaborative practices  and an open-source ethos that 
underpins much of  the use of  technology.
Chapters 3 and 4 investigated major theories  of cultural production and the role of art. 
In chapter 3, it was argued that cultural production could not be seen as outside political 
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and economic concerns, but cultural production was again ‘situated’ within these 
influences.  Chapter 4 identified weaknesses in postmodern influence on cultural studies 
in its positioning of ‘art’ as ‘just another form of labour’.  These threads are brought to 
chapter 9 where I investigate concepts of ‘art’ and digital art with actors  at the meso-
institutional level, whilst also analysing reactions at the micro level to institutional 
positions on digital art, its role and its  validity as  an art practice, and the extent to which 
artists are supported and enabled in their digital practice.  Again, in situating the place 
of technology at this meso level, I examine issues  of collection, acquisition and archival 
of digital works that emerge for meso-level actors.  This is to aim at a balance that veers 
away from fetishising technology, whilst also acknowledging that for actors  at this meso 
level, technology causes material challenges in their work as gatekeepers.
Chapter 5 incorporated a theme of a cultural situatedness in a postcolonial state.  The 
chapter revealed how contemporary art criticism in Ireland often referenced the state’s 
postcoloniality.  This  theme is mapped to chapter 10 where the ‘cultural air’ at a time of 
political, and economic crisis  is considered.  Also influencing this  chapter is  again matter 
from chapter 3, where the role of the state was foregrounded in the production of 
culture.
7.1.1 A Spectrum Hypothesis
As outlined in chapter 1, the approach informing this thesis  engages  with the place of 
technology in art practice, without leaning towards  a techno-centric account.  During 
the empirical process where interviewees  were asked about the role of ICTs  in their art 
practice, a conceptual ‘spectrum’ emerged.  I have found this spectrum to range from 
what are considered as  the most ‘traditional’ and well-established of practices  - those 
involving video art - to those practices  seen as highly conceptual, radical or 
experimental, such as net art, augmented reality and physical computing.  For example, 
during the ethnography of the digital art sector, I encountered an installation of the 
work of video artist Clemens Von Wedemeier that for the curator was ‘digital’ as it had 
been transferred to Blu-Ray from 35mm.  I suggest that this  example was at the 
‘traditional’ end of the conceptual spectrum of the role of ICTs in digital art as here, 
digital technologies functioned as a transferral tool.  At the other end of the spectrum, I 
encountered works  that fed networked information oftentimes  from remote systems, into 
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self-authored programs that reconfigured this  information.  In one instance data was 
acquired from real-time information from a shipping buoy off Hawaii, into a computer 
program that then, using physical computing, would move a spirit level according to the 
intensity of movement of the buoy.  The combination of using networked, remote 
information, and ‘parsing’ it into a moving sculptural piece using programmed physical 
interfaces  was considered as belonging to the end of the conceptual spectrum where 
highly experimental practices were encountered.
 
Whilst it could be argued that the spectrum could incorporate ideas of ‘no role’ for ICTs 
in art, I suggest that this may not be so clear-cut.  In the context of my review of the 
arguments  by Lister et al., Lovejoy, Bourriaud, Lunenfeld and Quaranta outlined in 
chapter 4 relating to digital, new media and electronic art, it is well established and 
accepted that a ‘no role for ICTs in art’ position is already well discussed.
I also found that this spectrum concept could be mapped to two other concerns - 
institutional acceptance and the range, status or role of technology as tool or medium. 
When the spectrum concept was  mapped to these areas, certain correlations between 
the type of practice, institutional acceptance and successful funding became apparent. 
For example, at the ‘traditional’ end of the spectrum, artists  working mainly through 
video art saw the technologies  in their practice as ‘tools’.  These artists  also largely felt a 
high level of institutional acceptance from galleries.  In the main, they also reported 
more favourable application results  from funding bodies.  The art institutions themselves 
also showed a high level of acceptance of these practices, and generally when asked 
about the topic of digital art, or art and technology, tended to default to speaking about 
video art.  Such findings  imply that video art (and not for example net art, augmented 
reality or physical computing) was the accepted type of practice associated with the 
term ‘digital art’.  I thus suggest that the spectrum concept can be considered with 
regard to the range  of  institutional acceptance encountered by digital artists.
At the other, ‘experimental’ end of the spectrum however, the practitioners themselves 
were more inclined to discuss the use of technology as more than a ‘tool’.  There was 
acceptance of a ‘digital aesthetic’, a digital art medium, and even reference to electronic 
and digital art as moving beyond a medium and towards  a ‘meta-medium’.  At the 
institutional level however, there was  a reluctance to consider these works as  art, with 
one participant from a Dublin city centre arts institution observing that in her opinion a 
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digital practice is  ‘not art, it’s  craft’.  The artists engaging in these more experimental 
practices also frequently cited funding as a negative issue for them, with many 
participants  feeling that funding channels were largely unavailable to them.  Therefore, I 
suggest that the spectrum concept also applies  to the range of accounts  that emerged 
regarding recognition and acceptance for funding.  I outline the conceptual spectrum 
below in figure 7.1.
Figure 7.1: spectrum of  practices, acceptances and attitudes to ICTs in art
Whilst the elements of this  spectrum - artistic practice, institutional acceptance, funding 
and use of technology - overlap in practice, in the figure above they are disaggregated 
for clear identification of the ranges of values, opinions  and accounts  that were 
encountered in the empirical research.  For example, from the chart above, it becomes 
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clear that video art could be described as  along the ‘traditional’ end of the conceptual 
spectrum, video practitioners tend to see technology as  a tool, they report high levels of 
acceptance from institutional gatekeepers and they report high success rates for funding.
I suggest that this  spectrum of practices, attitudes, supports and challenges exists at the 
micro, meso and macro levels  of enquiry.  This  conceptual ‘spectrum’ therefore 
continues  in chapters  8, 9 and 10 as complex issues of use of technologies, support and 
enablement of digital practices are analysed in a ‘depth’ model of micro, meso and 
macro levels, along with the ‘breadth’ model that the spectrum hypothesis adds to the 
overall framework.
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7.2 Overview of  Key Findings
7.2.1 Chapter 8 Findings
In chapter 8 I employ the spectrum hypothesis to analyse the use of ICTs in art from a 
micro-level perspective.  I analyse artist attitudes to the use of ICTs through 
ethnographic interviews  with art practitioners  who range from digital video artists 
utilising now well-established digital devices, to artists  who employ emergent digital 
means in their practice.  The findings from applying this hypothesis  revealed how artists 
who used the more well-established devices such as digital video recorders and computer 
video editing suites  were mostly more inclined to see these technologies  as ‘tools’ for 
their work.  At the other end of this  spectrum, the artists who worked with emergent 
technologies such as  augmented reality and emergent open-source hardware and 
software were more inclined to situate ICTs as  an artistic ‘medium’.  This finding relates 
back to the key question pertaining to the role of technologies  as  tool or medium for 
artists, revealing that the ‘answer’ to this key question lies not in an either/or 
delineation, but in gradations  of use and contextualisation by artists.  This analysis  also 
revealed attitudes  to technological determinism across  the spectrum, revealing how some 
artists prefer to think of technology as a ‘tool’ as  to not be determined by it, whilst other 
artists heavily use technology in an anti-determinist critique of it.  In this analysis, I 
deploy certain concepts from the literature review and chapter 2 to provide a reflection 
on the key question of  the place of  ICTs in art.
Chapter 8 is also engaged in an analysis of the digital aesthetic and its  links with 
innovation, providing an insight into the set of key questions that pertain to 
conceptualisations of aesthetic dimensions to digital art, along with the key question that 
asks how artists  use ICTs to innovate.  This  chapter reveals  a major finding regarding 
the aesthetic specificities or ‘features’ of digital art practice that are (1) specifically 
collaborative, (2) open-source and (3) repurposing.  The chapter also finds that these 
aspects  function also as  sites  of innovation for digital art practitioners.  These 
specificities  however are complemented by linking up with themes from chapter 4, 
where art was discussed as both a social form of capital and a site of potential 
‘encounter’ and transformation.  I thus  argue how art, irrespective of medium has the 
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potential to provide political critique and ‘encounter’, in a move that veers from 
fetishising the specificities of  digital art.
7.2.2 Chapter 9 Findings
In chapter 9 I reveal findings from the primary research as to how digital artists  are 
supported and enabled by institutional gatekeeping structures.  This chapter engages 
with the key questions on the theme of art, this  time with how digital art is produced 
and represented in Ireland.  It also reprises the theme of situatedness, with consideration 
given to how digital artists are situated within a broader culturally-loaded art world and 
are subject to assessment, evaluation and critique from within that world.  The chapter 
reveals a perception of under-representation and lack of acceptance of digital art 
practices within the wider art world by digital artists.  The chapter also finds  that a 
certain ‘situatedness’ applies  to institutional gatekeepers, and that they are placed within 
an art world that can find issues of categorisation by medium or material, conceptually 
problematic.  This expands  on concepts of digital art as introduced by Quaranta and 
Bourriaud in chapter 4.  
A primary finding in this  chapter reveals  that this nexus of situatedness  can prevent 
digital art from a sympathetic assessment at meso level due to this  position in 
contemporary art discourses.  This  furthers the critique of Quaranta’s  work by 
observing how the negative ‘fetishisation’ or positioning of digital art within the 
contemporary art world first needs to be transcended before a ‘postmedia’ discussion 
can occur.  The section also produces  a finding on concepts  of postcoloniality in Irish 
art critique, positing a second scenario for the rejection of digital art at meso-level.  This 
finding reveals  that Irish art criticism is  still entrenched in romantic postcolonial notions 
of ‘specialness’ of Irish art.  Digital art challenges  those notions and is  therefore 
marginalised.
One main finding from this chapter finds  that at an institutional level, conceptual and 
practical issues pertaining to digital art emerge that can prevent its acceptance at this 
institutional level.  They are (1) issues  of context, categorisation and affiliation, (2) 
suspicion about where the artwork ‘resides’ if heavy technology use is  employed and (3) 
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that digital art often interrogates and can undermine the role of the institution or 
museum by not requiring it for display and exhibition.
The chapter also finds that in the face of the perceived lack of acceptance or gallery 
representation, digital artists adopt strategies  and attitudes that involve (1) disengaging 
from the ‘traditional’ contemporary art world, (2) detaching from support systems and 
(3) proactively looking to institutions, festivals  and exhibitions  abroad for representation 
and support.
7.2.3 Chapter 10 Findings
Chapter 10 addresses the set of key questions  pertaining to art practices and their 
situatedness  within a macro-level political and economic domain.  When I began this 
research in January 2008, there were mere rumblings in Ireland of impending financial 
instability, with discourses  of the decline of the property industry couched in a discourse 
of ‘soft landings’ in the sector.  The Irish citizenry was also still being reassured by our 
then political leader that the economy was sound, and how those economists  and 
commentators who were in critique of the financial policies  and unfettered expansion of 
the property and banking sectors  were ‘sitting on the sidelines, cribbing and moaning’ 
about it.  Bertie Ahern, in the same speech to the Irish Congress  of Trade Unions 
mused how ‘I don't know how people who engage in that don't commit suicide’89, a 
statement for which he later had to retract and apologise for.  This discourse continued 
well into 2009, when even after the anything-but-soft landing in the property market 
had become a full-blown economic crisis, Ahern suggested in an interview that critics of 
the then government should ‘dig the garden or grow bluebells  or do something useful’90 
rather than be critical of  the economic policies and regulations.
I include this  short political vignette to foreground my methodological decision to 
highlight the temporal dimension of ‘crisis’ into the research.  Drawing on influences 
from the Frankfurt School, as analysed in chapter 3, where the work of art was not 
treated in isolation from its  environment, nor was the artist, I considered that the steep 
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89  Source:  RTÉ News and online content at http://www.rte.ie/news/2007/0704/economy.html 
retrieved April 27th 2011
90 Source:  The Irish Times, November 30, 2009
and sudden decline of the Irish economy would not be isolated to financial or property 
matters.  With this in mind, a main finding of chapter 10 reveals  that historically, the 
arts  have been foregrounded in Ireland, and argues that the ‘turn to culture’ in the 
current crisis  is  not without historical precedent.  The chapter also finds  evidence of a 
current trope that situates  the arts as ‘rescuer’ to the problems facing the Irish economy. 
These findings  were from evidence in short case studies of (1) a historical political 
engagement with the arts, (2) a think-tank set up when the current crisis emerged, and 
(3) a short study of  media foregrounding of  the arts.  
The chapter also finds  that in two major funding bodies in Ireland, the Arts Council 
does  not appear ‘open’ to digital artists, whereas Culture Ireland plays a more 
supportive and enabling role for the digital art sector.
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7.3 Conclusion
This  chapter has  outlined some key findings from the empirical research conducted for 
this  study of innovation in digital media.  It posited a ‘spectrum’ hypothesis through 
which gradations  of use, support and gatekeeping of digital technologies  within the 
artistic sector could be contextualised.  The chapter also outlined how the review of 
literature in chapters 2-5 traced the key questions through to the empirical work.  The 
next three chapters address the three key themes  from the research, starting in chapter 8 
with an analysis of ICTs in art as tool or medium, and the digital aesthetic with respect 
to sites of  innovation.
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Chapter 8: ICTs and the Digital Aesthetic
8.1 Introduction: A Usage Spectrum
In chapter 7 I suggested a ‘spectrum’ hypothesis  to indicate some headline findings 
concerning the usage of ICTs in the artistic sector.  This was in response to the set of 
key questions in chapter 1 pertaining to the technology/society relationship, and its 
application within the artistic sector.  These debates in the research literature situated 
technology as  alternating between ‘determining’ in some cases, but also ‘determined’ by 
social context.  Thus in the art world, technology can function not only as a ‘tool’ but 
also as ‘medium’ which can be either a McLuhanite ‘determining’ medium, or a fluid 
one that is  shaped by users.  This chapter therefore aims to situate the arguments 
analysed in chapter 2 to the empirical research findings. 
I am aware that the conceptualisation of a spectrum is contextual and that for some art 
theorists, the basis of the spectrum, which delineates partly by ‘medium’ is  a site of 
ambivalence91.  This underpins  Quaranta’s  framework as  discussed in chapter 4, in 
outlining the need for a conceptual frame which unifies the opposing views of the 
contemporary and new media art worlds.  Thus, whilst there may be a move in 
contemporary art towards  a discussion of a ‘post-medium’ condition, I nonetheless 
argue that my categorisation applies pertinently to digital art, as digital art has not yet 
been incorporated into contemporary art discourses, but exists closer to media art.  I 
argue that if digital or electronic artists have a desire to be termed as such, this  desire 
points to a conceptual difference in aesthetic, in motivation and in the creative output 
alike that needs  to be understood outside contemporary art discourses.  Therefore, a 
second aim of this chapter is  to investigate this  spectrum of digital practices, or practices 
involving the use of technology, that I suggest artists not only engage in, but also 
innovate through.  
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91 For example, I spoke with the writer and researcher Maeve Connolly who observed that ‘if you were 
talking to a lot of people in art education at the moment,  or a lot of art practitioners, the idea of any kind 
of categorisation that relates to medium is problematic’.   She explained how in the contemporary art 
world ‘people perceive those kind of labels  as ghettoising’, and unhelpful insofar as it creates a barrier to 
the understanding of their work.  Connolly did concede that there exists a group of artists  for whom the 
particularity of the medium they use is  central to their work.   She suggested that these artists may ‘have 
ideological or political commitment to the idea of some of the values that are represented by networking, 
in the technological sense’, and that these artists  may point to the particularity of their practice ‘by saying 
they are a digital media artist’.
The chapter thus interrogates the place of technologies  as  tools in art.  It then examines 
whether and how ICTs are viewed as more than a tool in certain art practices.  There 
then follows three sections  outlining three specificities  of digital media art practices  that 
are afforded by new ICTs, which I suggest also can be understood in the context of sites 
of innovation, as analysed in chapter 2.  Thus, this chapter, through engaging with the 
key questions around technology and its  societal relationship also engages with elements 
of  the debates concerning the use of  ICTs for innovation in art.  
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8.2  ICTs as Tools in Art
8.2.1 Introduction
I start my analysis  at the end of the spectrum where artists  consider technology as  a tool 
in their art practice.  As introduced in chapter 7, these artists mostly comprise 
practitioners in the field of video art, although there was one artist working with more 
experimental practices  who shared this view.  In the interviews, the participants  were 
asked what they considered to be the role of digital technologies in their work.  In this 
section, I outline the opinions  of those artists who considered the digital technologies  as 
tools, and not an outright medium.  This is in order to expand on the debates on the 
technology/society relationship as analysed in chapter 2.
8.2.2 An Arsenal of  Technology, A Tool, Means
The video artist Jesse Jones  expressed some concerns  regarding the use of digital 
technologies.  For Jones, a concern in her practice is  that she ‘wouldn’t want to fetishise 
one medium over another, like analog or digital’.  This informant prefers  to think of her 
practice as involving an ‘armoury, or arsenal of technology’, and the role of that 
technology being ‘about how you extend your means of production into the world’. 
Jones related how technology fitted in to her overall practice, observing that ‘I really feel 
that it’s about how you taper technology to suit your practice and your thought process, 
and I think in a lot of ways, for me the technology is totally secondary to the ideas that 
go into the work’.  Thus, for Jones, digital technologies are firmly on the end of the 
spectrum where they are tools  of production.  Jones engages with ICTs on a case-by-
case basis, and fits appropriate use of technology into her artistic oeuvre in a pragmatic 
way.
The video artist Gerard Byrne expressed similar views to Jones in that he prefers to 
think of the technologies  as a ‘means’.  He observed how ‘these matters’, regarding the 
place of technology as a tool or medium, ‘are resolved at the moment of dissemination’, 
suggesting that the artwork is assessed at the moment of its  reception by an audience, 
gatekeeper or taste maker, and at that point it becomes moot as to what means  were 
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employed to get to that point92.  Byrne’s background involved working with ‘a group of 
practitioners who work with technology and at the same time are ambivalent about the 
positivist rhetoric that surrounds technology’.   This influence has  caused him to reflect 
on his use of lens-based technologies, positing how ‘you somehow have to take on board 
the implications of the proliferation of that type of imagery in the contemporary 
world’93.  Thus, in a contemporary setting where audiences are familiar with imaging 
technologies, the artist has to work to transcend the aesthetic tropes  of those 
technologies to produce a considered work.
Jaki Irvine agrees, noting how ‘some things  are still more appropriate in one form rather 
than another’.  However, Irvine points  to another point of concern regarding the choice 
of tools used for dissemination in that there is potential for ‘a fetishism of the actual 
machinery’ of older technologies  such as  slide projectors  and 16mm film.  However the 
fetishism Irvine acknowledges for older technologies also applies  to newer technologies, 
and is, I suggest, one of  the ‘implications’ that Byrne referred to.  
A concurrent account emerged from the other end of the spectrum however, revealing 
how such a conceptual frame of usage can not be applied rigidly.  This participant’s 
(who wished not to be named) art practice explores physical computing, but expresses  a 
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92 Nonetheless, I felt that the means available to Byrne could potentially affect the type of work he could 
produce.  Thus, a question to him was how those ‘means’ have influenced the artistic practice, even if 
those means became moot at that moment of reception by an audience.  Byrne answered by citing an 
example of his work - a photographic project entitled A Country Road, A Tree, Evening.  Byrne explained that 
the photos  were shot in the analogue medium of film photography.  At one point in the project, Byrne felt 
that this might be a significant factor for the work, but concluded that he ‘wasn’t going to make the project 
hinge around that’, because the project was about a situation, and not about ‘crafting photographic 
imagery into a look, which Photoshop seemingly makes readily available’.   Byrne explained that he had 
been aware that the project could have proceeded in the trajectory of using Photoshop to craft a highly 
manipulated image.  However, Byrne’s  wish for the project was to photograph a situation that for him was 
‘visually contradictory’. This desire brought about the decision to shoot the photographs  in the analogue 
medium.  This, for Byrne, reflected the visual contradiction of the work, in this  instance a high-contrast 
image crafted to point to an assumption that the work was produced digitally.   Therefore, whilst giving 
consideration to the digital aesthetic and how that aesthetic could be employed in a contradictory way, 
Byrne did not want the project to ‘hinge’ around the means of production, lest it become like ‘bad digital 
art where somehow the means is the point’.
93 To illuminate this point, Byrne cited the example of his recent work A Thing  is a Hole in a Thing it is Not 
where most of the participants were non-actors.  Byrne found that these participants were nonetheless 
quite comfortable with being filmed, and he suggested this was due to their increasing familiarity with the 
lens in their everyday life.  An implication for Byrne was that as an artist, ‘you can't work with those 
means of production without having to negotiate the literacy of your audience’.   For Byrne, that is  the 
most important ‘effect’ of digital technologies in terms of his practice - there exists an audience who is 
familiar and comfortable with lens  based media,  and therefore the type of encounter with that media 
needs to be taken account of when producing a work.  This elucidates how, for Byrne, consideration to 
the reception of the work is  of concern, superseding the place of the technologies used in production, 
whilst also being somewhat involved in a balancing act of awareness  of the proliferation of such 
technologies at an audience level.
view more in line with the video artists.  When this  participant was asked about the role 
of technology in allowing her artistic message to be expressed, she explains  how the 
technology is ‘just a medium that I’m comfortable with’ and while technology can 
facilitate the creation of such works, ‘I don’t know if you need technology for that to 
happen. There are a lot of socially engaged artists that don’t use technology at all’.  For 
this  artist the digital technologies that she employs - much like the accounts of the video 
artists examined above - are considered a means  of production, and highly dependent 
on the context of  use, and the appropriateness of  when they are deployed.  
I suggest that these accounts point to technology usage for some digital artists as  a tool. 
Byrne, Irvine and Jones, all video artists, suggest that the tools of their production are 
digital, whilst also suggesting that they are only tools.  In the context of the material 
explored in chapter 2 where it was argued that technology can appear to determine a 
‘message’, I suggest that these artists  are seeking to distance themselves from a state of 
being determined, through the framing of technology as  ‘tool’ to be used, controlled 
and be in charge of.  This stance, whilst an anti-determinist one implies  that to heavily 
use technology in an art practice is to be determined by it, in what may be indicative of 
a fear of the work being labelled or defined by others’ attitudes towards  the technology. 
However, other artists present themselves as ‘digital’ artists and largely see technology as 
an integral part of their practice, viewing ICTs as a medium, whilst also exhibiting a 
similar stance against being determined by the technology.
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8.3  A Digital Aesthetic
8.3.1 Introduction
The research elicited the views  of a cohort of artists  who ideologically situate themselves 
as  ‘digital’ artists.  These artists  were more likely to attest to the specificities  of digital 
and electronic art and a digital aesthetic.  In this section I examine what these 
participants  reveal about their practice, along with suggestions as to how the dimensions 
and parameters  of digital art differ from other arts practices.  This  account therefore 
interrogates  issues of a ‘specific’ digital aesthetic resulting from the features  or 
characteristics  of digital art.  I suggest, drawing from themes reviewed in chapter 4, that 
digital art objects  display three specificities in aesthetic form, which are the result of (1) 
their object characteristics, (2) where the artwork resides  and (3) the technical complexity 
of digital art, as identified in chapter 4.   I also suggest that there exist three sites of 
innovation in digital art that are related to their specificities in aesthetic form.   The 
three aesthetic specificities can be identified as  (1) that digital art is collaborative, (2) that 
digital art practices align themselves  with the Open Source and Creative Commons 
movements  and that (3) digital art practices  are often concerned with the reconfiguring 
of existent materials - both physical objects and information datasets.  First however, I 
address  the argument posited in the previous section regarding a link between heavy 
technology use and a question around such use, positing that the use of technology in 
digital art does not necessarily correlate with the art or artist being determined by 
technology.
8.3.2  Digitally Determined, or Aesthetic Critique of  Technology?
In the empirical research process, I encountered a set of digital art practitioners who 
analysed complexities  and specificities pertaining to the material quality, the subject 
matter and the intent of their work.  Quite often, the artists use technology to critique 
technology, but unlike the artists above who see technology as  a tool, some of these 
artists employ media ‘to question itself, rather than merely to use it as  a tool to make an 
artefact’, as Jonah Brucker-Cohen, posits.  For Brucker-Cohen, the use of technology in 
this  way facilitates a critique of a lager zeitgeist.  ‘My work questions technology and 
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networks  by providing a critical perspective on how networks are used and experienced 
in both public and private locations’ explains  Brucker-Cohen, adding that his  work 
‘focuses  on challenging what digital media is capable of and the rules of these 
communications platforms that it enables’.  In this  case of this artist, the technology is 
employed not as a tool for production, but in its own right as a medium to be critiqued 
through itself.
Likewise, Benjamin Gaulon outlines how much of his  work ‘is about a critical view on 
technology, the idea of exposing planned obsolescence, issues relating to e-waste and 
environmental issues, but also the limit of technology and the failure of technology’. 
Thus if adopting a critical stance towards technology, the artist must be familiar with it. 
‘There is  this  thing about being critical towards technology’ Gaulon observes, ‘but at the 
same time I believe that you can only be critical by knowing more about it’.  This 
suggests that, as Brucker-Cohen posited, the use of technology to critique technology 
involves  more than the use of technological tools.  For these digital artists, their critique is 
of the medium of technology.  For Gaulon ‘it’s  not just a medium - of course when you 
talk about computers it’s  more than just a medium, cos  it’s a meta medium, or it’s more 
than just a tool’.  In its  specific nature as a medium, a computer is ‘a medium for 
diffusion’ but that also, within that medium ‘you can reconfigure information - the fact 
that it’s  all this binary, that means you can reprogram any type of information […] but 
the fact that you can literally access any information to a lower level and to binary, 
brings  another level of communication, in the sense that you can reprogram that 
medium’.  Thus, an artistic critique of computer technology as medium reveals  the 
underlying logic of the medium, the inconsistencies of the medium and the limits  of 
that medium.
Cliona Harmey also attests to specificities of working digitally, revealing that ‘I think it 
has really particular ways of working that is very different to other art mediums’.  When 
asking her to explain how working as a digital artist differed to, say her background as a 
sculptor, she suggests  that a major difference is  ‘the method of working.  You have to 
pre-programme stuff so you have to pre-think things in a way that say maybe a painter 
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wouldn’t, where you can work very spontaneously’94.  She also suggests that using 
technology in an art practice is also a challenge for an artist, noting that ‘it  takes a while 
to internalise it and to use it in a meaningful way’. 
However, Harmey’s practice is also concerned with ‘sometimes rejecting technology or 
using very low end technologies’.  Her reason for doing this is  again, as  a critique of 
technology:
“that’s  what is  important, that people look critically at technology, 
and that you’re not totally seduced by it, because it’s  totally 
powerful, it’s  amazing.  But at the same time I think there’s that 
thing, I would think that it’s  an artists job if they’re working with 
technology to think a little bit critically about it as well”
A reconciliation of the tensions  between using technology critically and yet 
appropriately has  been for Harmey to return to a sculptural practice that incorporates 
technological elements.  Harmey suggests a materiality to technology, just as  there is a 
materiality to the more traditional sculptural mediums, noting that ‘in some way it’s the 
joy of working with materials, and the very particular material that technology is’.  Thus 
for Harmey, technology is a medium and a material.
I therefore suggest that these accounts reveal how unlike the cohort of artists  who see 
technology as  a tool, wishing not to be determined by it, these artists  working heavily 
with technology as a medium do so also in an anti-determinist stance.  Thus, these 
artists use technology not in a fetishistic celebration of it and its  McLuhanite ‘effects’, 
but because they wish to critique it through a deeper understanding of its  uses, effects 
and limitations.  Therefore, certain views of the contemporary art world, as  outlined in 
chapter 4 erroneously ‘read’ digital art as  a celebration of technology (Lovejoy, 2004), 
when its  heavy use in an artistic context can often be a strong move against being 
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94 Harmey outlined her work Dublin Port as  an example of this.   She recounted that ‘in the Dublin Port 
piece, I started the programming myself but I got to the stage where it was going to take me months and 
whether I would get it to work.  So I got Brian Solan to program the back end for me, and then I just did 
the front end.  What’s interesting for me about that piece is  that it takes  real time information but it 
displays it very slowly, so it displays it almost at the speed of the ships coming in.  In one way I was 
looking at it as a type of flag as well.   I’m really interested in signals and different systems of transmission, 
but what has  happened this year is that I’ve been making things that are deliberately slow, to almost be a 
bit resistant to real time’.   Online documentation of the work:    http://www.clionaharmey.info/pix/
pix2.htm
determined by it.  I therefore also suggest that this critique of technology functions  as  a 
form of user-based innovation in what was outlined in chapter 2 as  a parallel function 
for traditionally understood R&D functions.  By investigating technology at a level above 
that of a consumer or user, the digital artist can be understood to be ‘researching’ the 
technology, finding novel uses for it, and thus innovating through it.
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8.4  Innovation Through Collaboration
8.4.1 Introduction
Earlier, I introduced three specificities of digital and electronic art that I suggested also 
functioned as distinctive sites  of innovation.  In the following three sections, I analyse 
what emerged during the empirical research with respect to these three dimensions.  In 
this  section I examine how many of the participants attested to the collaborative aspect 
of digital art, revealing how innovation in digital art often occurs collaboratively in line 
with those theories of innovation that suggest how in the digital media content sector, 
innovation occurs through the absorption and acquisition of multiple or various forms 
of  knowledge, including tacit skills.  
One ethnographic example of this  collaboration occurred in September 2010 when I 
participated in a workshop run in conjunction with the TWEAK digital art festival in 
Limerick.  For this  workshop, participants were invited to suggest proposals for a 
collaborative project.  I submitted a proposal for an artwork entitled Zen Pool, outlining 
the hardware and software requirements for the project, along with a project timeline 
and conceptual overview.  However, through funding cuts, the workshop was  cut short 
and the project could only be realised in prototype format.
Nonetheless, the project prototype was exhibited at the festival, revealing how it is  not 
necessary to have had a final version of the work ready for the exhibition.  One 
informant, Ivan Twohig commented on this, as he was present at that exhibition (before 
we had been acquainted through the interview process) and recalls  having interacted 
with the piece.  Twohig commented how ‘I’ve done a few things based around the idea 
of the prototype, and that’s definitely something that’s very much accepted in say, […] 
this  80%, 90% internet-based community that is  maybe 10% exhibition’.  For Twohig 
the digital art sector is often based on peer-review and collaboration, noting how ‘your 
audience is your peers and it’s much more community based’.  I thus argue that 
community ethos is a strong feature of digital art practices, and through that community 
dimension the crucial ‘testing’ of ideas  (or innovations) occurs, as seen in the example 
above, where feedback and peer-review assist in the creative process of developing the 
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artwork.  Through a case-study in the following section I outline how the digital artist 
and the artwork itself  benefits from collaborative practices.
8.4.2 Hard Drivin’: A Case-Study in Collaboration
During the course of the ethnography of the digital art sector and subsequent 
interviews with both Gaulon and Twohig, I became familiar with one of their 
collaborative works, and thus I present it as a short case study to expand on the subject 
of collaboration.  I follow this  with some perspectives from other artists about the 
collaborative nature of their work, and their desires to encourage and facilitate 
collaborative practices.
Hard Drivin’ (see figure 8.1) by Gaulon, Twohig and Solon consists  of a Twitter-
controlled installation comprising a 3D physical terrain and two remote controlled toy 
cars.  The 3D polygonal modelling was  created by Ivan Twohig, the remote controlled 
cars were ‘hardware hacked’ - or repurposed95  for control through a computer - by 
Benjamin Gaulon, and Brian Solon provided programming assistance with the Twitter 
interface.  For Gaulon, ‘Hard Drivin’ is also an example of collaboration’, the informant 
continuing that ‘it’s very crucial thing about working with other people, especially when 
you’re starting to deal with more complex projects - you definitely need a team.  Well 
you could do everything by yourself but I think it brings things  to another level when 
you work together’, suggesting that the innovative potential for the work is  higher in a 
collaborative environment.
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95 See section 8.6
Figure 8.1: Installation of  Hard Drivin’ at Tweak Exhibition, September 2010
Thus, for Gaulon ‘Hard Drivin’ was really about collaboration first’.  Twohig’s work with 
3D polygonal sculptures  drew Gaulon’s  attention to possibilities  of creating a physical 
environment in which the cars  would run.  Gaulon was  aware of this  innovative 
potential of a collaboration, his primary motivation being to engage in a collaborative 
project that would complement both artists’ skills.  The genesis of the project was thus 
from a desire to collaborate with Twohig and his  3D sculptural works, combining those 
skills with his own physical computing and hardware hacking proficiencies, to make a 
more proficient work:
“we thought how can we make it that it’s not just a game where you 
have remote control cars, but there’s  more to it?  And then the idea 
of Twitter came, and then I got quickly stuck with that, and Brian 
came along to input a lot of ideas  on how it could work in terms of 
the car following people, and that you have a command line that 
you can make the car follow somebody’s  reprints, so he really 
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brought a lot of input to that.  So it was a really good mix that ties 
all of  our practice together in one project”
From this account, it is evident that collaboration was  Gaulon’s primary motivation for 
working with Twohig, as it increased the innovative potential of  the work.
Twohig’s  account suggests  similar benefits to the collaboration.  He observes how as an 
artist, the assortment of technologies  available to him could be overwhelming.  However, 
when an artist engages with other artists with complementary skillsets, a project can 
seem more achievable:
“because we’re surrounded by technology that we don’t 
understand, you can have an idea for something relatively simple, 
whereby an action involves a reaction, or you want to control some 
sort of something, but getting something like that to happen is  … 
there’s so many different people involved in making that happen”
This  suggests that for Twohig, the frustrations around employing technology in an 
artistic practice could be somewhat offset through collaboration where skillsets 
complement each other, allowing for greater innovation in the works.  Twohig attests  to 
the creative benefits of working in artist collectives, suggesting that ‘there’s a lot of 
creativity in the teams, like small groups of media artists like Troika96  and people who 
do these massive projects because they see themselves  as a studio’.  Thus, the 
establishment of a permanent collaborative working environment is important to 
Twohig, as  it provides a baseline level of interaction with other artists, whilst also 
increasing the innovative and creative potential on a per-project basis.
The accounts of the two artists therefore reveal how the potential of the work is 
increased through a collaboration that pools  both their skillsets  to advance the work 
further.  I thus argue that the collaborative environment, whilst more fluid and project-
based than a traditional R&D department, functions as a site of innovation, where 
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96  Troika is  a London-based collective of three artists, Eva Rucki, Conny Freyer and Sebastien Noel 
whose practice merges digital and experimental art.  They have also published a number of books and 
texts on digital art and design  SEE: http://troika.uk.com/
acquired tacit programming, artistic and electronics  skills are pooled in order to develop 
the artwork further than if  one of  the artists had attempted the project alone.
8.4.3 Collaboration: Findings on Artist Perspectives
In the course of my interviews, other artists spoke about the benefits of collaboration. 
Cliona Harmey observes how ‘you can do it on your own but it’s  much harder, and takes 
much longer’.  For Harmey, the collective nature of digital art has  switched the focus of 
the work itself.  Harmey observes that this is way of working is  becoming more accepted 
and it is becoming a more normal way to work, noting that ‘what’s  interesting now is 
that there’s a lot more collective activity, so a lot of projects  are much more about 
interaction with people’.  This  collaborative experience is  a positive one for Harmey, the 
benefits  emerging that the overall project could advance more quickly and to a higher 
level of  accomplishment than a solitary one.
Jesse Jones also expresses not only an openness  to collaboration, but an active drive for 
involvement with other artists  that translates  into a research group in the RUA Red arts 
centre where she currently holds  their digital art residency.  Her research group, entitled 
In These Troubled Times aims to interrogate the current crisis  through collaborative 
discussion of artistic texts 97.  She expresses the benefits  of collaboration in the form of 
peer research, including the possibility of  extending the boundaries of  the knowable:
“I feel a huge sense of wanting to be part of a community of other 
artists. I mean especially because of the project that I’m working on 
and we met through. I really like peer research and I like to be in the 
thinking space with other artists where they don’t totally know what 
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97 Following an initial meeting with Jones when I had been invited to RUA Red by their development 
officer who had seen some of my work online, I was invited to participate in the research group.   From 
this  initial encounter and involvement in the research group, I then interviewed her.  According to Jones’ 
mission statement for the group, ‘In These Troubled Times is an expansive collaborative research group, 
investigating economic and social models proposed in  speculative fictional texts. From Swifts's A Modest 
Proposal to JG Ballard, the project aims to animate these captivating fictions as preamble to emerging 
political orders and how these relate to the present conditions  of reality. Through readings, screenings and 
workshops  over the course of 6 months, with the collective ambition to,  debate, cogitate, perform, gesture, 
agitate, plan, work, publish our findings as art practitioners’
I’m doing. Because I think that there is a shared space of not knowing 
that’s potentially possible, rather than us all seeing our work when we 
go to an exhibition and we say well done”98.
Thus, collaboration for Jones elicits  a form of increased innovation and creative 
potential through a shared means of  knowledge production.
Innovation through networked collaboration is  evident in the work of Conor Mc 
Garrigle, particularly in his NAMALand (see figure 8.2) augmented reality project 99 . 
NAMA100  was set up to manage ‘toxic’ properties  following the financial crisis in 
Ireland, but has not published an official list of properties  in its  ownership.  However, 
McGarrigle relates how he found ‘an anonymous blog which had put together a very 
comprehensive database’ of the properties owned by NAMA.  McGarrigle was granted 
permission to take the data from the blog, and build an augmented reality artwork from 
that list of properties.  ‘So it’s collaborative’, McGarrigle asserts.  He explains how there 
are many disparate parties  interested in attempting ‘to get at the truth of the matter, to 
make this information visual and accessible, when in an official way you can’t know this. 
It’s forbidden’.  Thus, McGarrigle’s collaborations centre around the idea that a shared 
and varied skillset - in this  instance the original blogger’s skills at investigating media 
sources  and court proceedings to find an unofficial dataset of NAMA properties, and 
McGarrigle’s ability to visualise the data - has resulted in a larger level of innovation 
where an art piece is  accessible to a wider public audience in the form of an augmented 
reality iPhone app. 
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98 Through my involvement with the research group as part of my ethnography of digital art, I can attest 
to Jones’ sincerity in her desire for collaboration.  Frequently, texts  are selected for analysis  and discussion 
by group members and it is not the case that Jones situates herself  as the ‘leader’ of  the research group.
99 The piece works through location awareness capabilities of smartphones.  When a user is  in close 
proximity to a NAMA property, whilst running the app, the application displays a graphic of the Monopoly 
man, signalling that the user is viewing a property they currently own through state investment. 
The rather tongue-in-cheek description of NAMALand declares that ‘At NAMAland we like to look on 
the bright side,  OK the downside of NAMA is that it's  costing you €40 billion, the upside is that you now 
own some of the best (and worst) properties in Dublin. So grab your phone, put on your tophat and enjoy 
your new role as a property tycoon with our augmented reality tour of NAMAland‘   FROM  http://
www.walkspace.org/namaland/
100 The National Assets Management Agency
Figure 8.2: NAMALand Application Interface showing points of interest on a radar (upper right) and 
as ‘Monopoly Man’ icons, along with textual information in the main lower panel.
I therefore suggest that these accounts link the aesthetic characteristic of digital art as 
specifically collaborative with a function that enables  innovation.  Thus, the often per-
project, fluid ‘teams’ of  collaborations between artists function as sites of  innovation.
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8.5  Innovation Through Knowledge-Sharing
8.5.1 Introduction
In this  section, I discuss how open-source software and hardware tools are integral to 
certain digital art practices.  As  revealed in the previous section, digital art often involves 
collaborations  with (sometimes remote, anonymous) actors  for the sharing of content 
and of knowledge.  However, this  artistic collaboration often extends  to mutual 
exchange of skills and competencies  through the use of open-source software and 
hardware.  Through using open-source resources, artists can teach themselves the skills 
required for their work and foster innovation.  They cite the support from forums on 
open-source platforms as important, freely available resources.  In conjunction with 
Creative Commons licensing for their works, they can then ensure due recognition for 
completed works without having to explore complicated copyright ‘all rights reserved’ 
routes.  For the artists then, the resources  that they were beneficiaries  of through forums 
etc, can then be redistributed when their work is completed.  I therefore posit that whilst 
collaboration as  a characteristic of digital art enables the transfer of skills, the sharing of 
knowledge through open-source channels enables the acquisition of competencies in 
programming, authoring, networking and electronics, thus  fostering innovation much as 
‘training’ would in traditionally understood paradigms of  innovation.
8.5.2 Corrupt - An Open-Source Net Art Piece
An example of this  mechanism is Corrupt101, an open-source net art piece by Benjamin 
Gaulon (see figure 8.4).  This  piece consists of server-side software which enables the 
participant to upload an image file of their choice.  The Corrupt software selectively 
interferes  with the file, removing chunks of data from it in ten reiterations  of the file, 
resulting in a visual output of the file displayed in its  original format, and also in the ten 
corrupted versions.  This  work is  influenced by an investigation of the limits of 
technology.  Through the transformation of the digital files by the Corrupt interface, the 
user experiences the vulnerabilities  of the medium, how technology can break, and how 
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101 See http://www.corrupt.recyclism.com/ 
the ‘glitch’ in data can itself become part of an aesthetic.  I suggest that this  furthers  the 
argument posited earlier that heavy technology use in digital art can involve, or enable 
and facilitate a critique of technological determinism, rather than fall foul of it as 
contemporary art theory often argues.
In terms  of the place of open-source in this project, I find that projects  such as  Corrupt 
are built using the open-source Processing computer language.  Processing is  widely used in 
the digital arts for data visualisation, visual digital art and interactive graphic 
representation102.  The basic ‘core’ of the software (libraries for functionality) can be 
included in a developer’s  own code without the developer having to provide their own 
code back to the Processing forum or Wiki.  Users  are also allowed make changes  to the 
core, as long as  the changes are resubmitted to Processing.  I suggest that this facilitates 
even more low-level development, leading to the fostering of innovation through 
development channels and the sharing of  knowledge.    
Figure 8.3:  the Corrupt net art interface, showing images in various stages of  ‘corruption’
The sharing of such tools facilitates the learning process for digital artists, adding to that 
‘tacit‘ knowledge that is  important for innovation.  This ethos  of sharing is also 
prevalent in how the artists  treat their completed works.  Just as  the Processing 
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102 Processing was developed in 2001 at the MIT MediaLab.  Significantly it is an open-source language, 
freely available from the Processing website13.  However, the language is also richly documented by 
enthusiasts, along with tutorials, examples and an online help forum.  This support is as much a resource 
as  the programming software,  as it encourages  participation amongst the Processing community online, 
which benefits both the software developers and the users.  The licensing for the software is  through the 
GPL licensing platform.
environment has been released under GPL licensing, Creative Commons  licensing was 
employed for the Corrupt software.  In this  instance, the Attribution-NonCommercial-
ShareAlike licence was  chosen for the software, meaning that users  can copy, transmit, 
distribute or adapt the work under the conditions  that the author is  attributed, the work 
is non-commercial and that the distribution is with a similar licence103.  This I suggest is 
a further means for enhanced innovation where other users can develop the work akin to 
an ‘incremental innovation’ without the concerns of  doing so illegally.
For Gaulon, the open-source and Creative Commons ethos has  had ramifications for the 
work.  He suggests that the use of these tools facilitates a greater level of 
experimentation with technologies  than if he were to produce the works using 
proprietary means.  He outlines how significant this has been for his practice, noting that 
‘it is a very important thing for me in a way, that if you make an analogy with painting 
for example, you can either buy your pre-made paint or your can make your own 
pigments  and mix your paint and find new techniques’.  Thus, the exploration has 
extended beyond using the technologies  as a means; the experimentation at such a 
granular level is  akin to reconfiguring the medium and the materials themselves.  ‘From 
my experience of making software or tools, you shape it to what you want and what you 
think that software should be doing.  And this of  course brings an aesthetic’. 
Thus, the collaborative qualities  of digital art are enhanced, supported and facilitated by 
the adoption of open-source software and hardware, and the use of Creative Commons 
licensing at the point of distribution.  I suggest therefore that innovation is  also 
facilitated by the use of open-source and Creative Commons licensing in a paradigm 
close to the one of incremental innovation, where innovations are improved gradually 
through knowledge inputs of  various skilled users.
8.5.3  Open-Source: Further Artist Perspectives
Other artists such as  Conor McGarrigle, Cliona Harmey and Ivan Twohig have also 
employed open-source software and hardware technologies in their work.  For 
McGarrigle, the use of such technologies  fits  in with the social shaping of technology 
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103  See http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/ for the parameters of this particular 
licensing
perspective, allowing the artist to reconfigure and tailor the technologies to their best fit. 
‘It’s this idea of engagement’ posits  McGarrigle, ‘that there actually artists involved in 
the shaping of the technology, and opening it up to a wider constituency of users, and 
even to a certain extent maybe democratising the technologies’.  Thus, the use of open-
source software facilitates wider accessibility of use, not only for the artist but for the art 
audience.  It also has acceptance within the digital art community, McGarrigle 
observing how ‘there’s a different approach to what constitutes  community work as well 
because it’s always acceptable to build on work that has gone before you’.
Cliona Harmey also discusses issues of the democratisation of technology, observing 
how technology is ‘in everything, and particularly now’ in contemporary western society. 
She also posits  that ‘if you think about it, even in the last two or three years, how 
radically it’s changed, so I think it should be interrogated.  You have to’.  Harmey argues 
that having some technological accomplishments  facilitates  a critique of the 
technological means.  For Harmey, open-source frameworks  help to develop that level of 
technological understanding required of that critique.  She suggests  that ‘you’ll never 
understand the whole thing’ of technology, but continues by positing ‘that’s  why I think 
things like Processing are very interesting because sort of give you an insight into how the 
languages are structured and it’s very doable.  And there are so many resources for 
teaching yourself how to do stuff.  Open source is  amazing’.  For Harmey, open source 
frameworks  are a resource that can enable a critique of the technological means of 
current times, where the realities of consumerism and proprietary technologies  are of 
concern.
Ivan Twohig’s perspective conjoins  his  opinions on open-source resources and his 
observations  on peer review and acceptance.  Twohig compares the positive, supportive 
ethos in the digital art world with the open-source world, suggesting that the ‘shift’ in 
reward systems towards  the artists’ peers  is similar to the shift away from proprietary 
software as characterised by the open-source movement.  ‘It’s  that the peer group for 
digital art, it’s  about that shift like say open source, the community’.  Thus, the 
community of practice and of learning is  of significance for digital artists such as 
Twohig.  
I suggest that these accounts  suggest that digital artists  associate a freedom of learning 
and upskilling with open-source resources, and these resources  comprise learning tools 
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and resources that add to the pool of ‘tacit’ knowledges and competencies within the 
digital art sector.  The open-source resources also supply tools  for creating and 
outputting artistic works, and I suggest that the learning and supply functions  of open-
source resources  thus enable innovation and act as a site of innovation in the digital art 
world.
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8.6  Innovation Through Repurposing
The final specificity of digital art that I explore is  that of the repurposing of materials as 
an integral part of the practice.  I suggest that this  repurposing has  the potential to lead 
to ‘radical‘ or unexpected innovations  through the hybridisation of previously 
unconnected artefacts.  Over the course of the research, I have come to the 
understanding that part of a consideration of a ‘digital aesthetic’ includes  consideration 
to how artists  in this genre frequently repurpose already existent materials  and resources, 
both software and hardware.  In a practice known as  ‘hardware hacking’, digital artists 
make use of an obsolete technological product and repurpose it for an unintended 
use104.  Data ‘scraping’ involves collating disparate sets  of information through selective 
‘mining’ of data from publicly available resources 105, in what I posit is a form of radical 
knowledge innovation.  
For Ivan Twohig, the reconfiguration present in his practice is  situated within his fine art 
background.  He sees part of the reconfiguration process as connected to a 
reconfiguring of perspective.  He observes  that ‘I think creativity is about, if there is a 
role for the artist, it’s  about being able to be that fluid point of creativity, to spin the 
situation and look at it from a fresh point of view’.  In Twohig’s work, we see a literal 
‘spinning’ of perspective, as  the points  of view are reconfigured and reassessed, as  in his 
3D Skulls sculptural works and his role in the Hard Drivin’ project.  We also see a 
reconfiguration of materials - both artistic and from popular culture - in Twohig’s 
homage to Nam June Paik. The installation Nam June Paik Man consists  of magnetic tape 
on board, with a playhead attached whereby participants can become the playhead of 
the tape player. ‘I love that point of view that you are the reading head or you are the 
player’, notes Twohig in relation to the influence Nam June Paik had on his  work. 
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104  For example,  at a workshop on hardware hacking that I attended at the Irish Museum of 
Contemporary Art as  part of the ethnography of digital art, an obsolete but functional flatbed scanner 
was ‘hacked’ - repurposed - to become a functional, and humorously entertaining musical concertina
105 For example I was involved in a project where the online tool ScraperWiki was used to mine data from 
the Irish Road Safety Authority, An Garda Síochána (the Irish police force) and city and county councils 
to compare and visualise road deaths, penalty points  and speed cameras in a way that was  not 
immediately transparent.  The project showed that the amount of penalty points applied in the Dublin 
City Council area, and the number of speed cameras was very much out of line with the rest of the 
country, suggesting that in this  instance, the introduction of speed cameras could be seen as a money-
making venture, less concerned with road safety than in other parts of the country.  That data could not 
have been sourced from the separate websites alone,  and needed a combination of data scraping/mining 
and visualisation to create viable journalistic content.
Twohig, in a 2008 presentation to DATA revealed the following about Nam June Paik 
Man:
“so there were drawings from people playing Pacman, and I 
recorded Pacman onto these tapes as  people played, so that you 
get these drawings that are maps then of the game that you 
played.  So if you run the head over ... the reason that it's called 
Nam June Paik Man is because in the 1970s  did a piece called 
Random Access, whereby he took people's narratives106”
Thus, not only is Twohig ‘reconfiguring’ a previous work of Nam June Paik, he is 
secondly reconfiguring the audio soundtrack of the popular video game Pacman into a 
work that thirdly, reconfigures  the objects of magnetic audio tape and playhead.  The 
work itself becomes a complex conjunction of repurposed items, conceptually, culturally 
and materially107 that nonetheless comprise a new work, or innovation.
Another informant, Cliona Harmey, also started her artistic training in sculpture, and 
her sculptural work provides another example of how digital artists  combine digital data 
with what Harmey terms ‘object hacking’, to form new object. Harmey’s sculptural 
work uses both open-source software and hardware, combined with the repurposing of 
materials  from a large furniture and homeware retailer.  For Harmey, this is another way 
of critiquing the materials  available to us as consumers, extending her critique of 
technology to also incorporate large-scale consumer products.  As she describes of her 
practice, ‘one way of doing stuff, what I’ve been doing a lot of recently was just buying 
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106 See Twohig’s DATA presentation on YouTube http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2wj99kZxz2E
107 A direct repurposing from a purely digital format to a material one is  seen in Twohig’s work The Fall. 
Here, Twohig wished to explore the transition between a falling figure as  a default virtual element in 
Google’s Sketchup program, and its inception as  a material reality.  For Twohig ‘you're always  making 
proposals, you're always  trying to project what your idea is  going to be, what your plan for the space is’. 
However, these plans are always  virtual, using for example, the virtual falling man in a Google sketch as a 
‘filler’ type element in a broader proposal or artistic submission.  Twohig relates  in the same DATA 
presentation as above, how he unfolded the virtual 3D falling man from the Google Sketchup program, 
used another software program called Pepakura to unfold the figure into flat dimensions, and then 
proceeded to print out the unfolded elements onto A0 card.  He then reassembled the elements to make 
multiple,  scaled copies  of his falling man.  For Twohig, this repurposing challenges the intent of the virtual 
figures - they were never designed to be printed in reality.   As he observes  of the eventual installation in 
Dublin’s Digital Hub ‘these are architectural drawings  and that's the intention of them ... so I'm just 
playing around with the idea of them falling through architectural structures’.  The figures  were never 
intended to be made material, unlike the architectural designs they were to support,  so for Twohig, this 
repurposing of the virtual falling man into the real world reflected a challenge for him when submitting a 
proposal - what remains  virtual?  How do we articulate artistic ideas that by their nature, often have to 
first exist in the virtual world?
things from IKEA and reconfiguring them […] so I think that’s another option, to 
reconfigure other systems’.  Thus  in Harmey’s  practice, the repurposing or 
reconfiguring that I am exploring in this  research does  not only apply to software or 
technology - it  extends to household products  that can be repurposed as sculptural 
components in a digital art practice.
A piece of work encountered during the ethnography that elucidates the principle of 
reconfiguring is Jonah Brucker-Cohen’s work !Alerting Infrastructure!.  The piece works 
thus: each time a computer user visits the gallery website, a pneumatic jackhammer 
suspended by cables in proximity to the gallery wall is switched on for 30 seconds, the 
action of which is  to cause slow destruction to the gallery wall.  Thus, an ‘innocuous’ 
website hit counter is, through the use of networked technology, repurposed to perform 
a physically destructive act on the gallery space itself108.   
These accounts  reveal how in the digital art genre, the concept of repurposing in the 
digital art domain can involve materials which range from software to hardware objects, 
and from gaming consoles to IKEA products.  I suggest that whether the repurposing is 
through consumer objects, technological hardware or computer software and code, the 
ethos of repurposing is one that is integral to the aesthetic of digital art.   I also suggest 
that repurposing can also contribute to incremental and/or radical innovations in a 
digital art practice, through reconfiguring materials for unintended use and therefore 
revealing an unforeseen and innovative application of  the material.
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108 The complexities  within the work impacted me further the next time I wished to visit the IMOCA 
website.  Having seen and heard the destruction of the physical space whilst standing in the gallery 
through the random and unpredictable act of online users visiting the site, an element of conflict arose.  I 
became acutely conscious that the hit counter on the website - usually displayed as  a positive marker of 
popularity - would be mobilised in this instance for the destruction of the very space the hit counter in 
essence, depended upon.  Thus, the repurposing was not just confined to utilisation of the software alone, 
the reconfiguration of  the software became a vehicle for the reconfiguring of  the gallery itself.
8.7 Art and the Political
In the previous four sections  I attempted to unpack three specific dimensions of digital 
art and how they are connected with the question of how artists innovate using ICTs. 
However, the work also aims to situate the digital art sector to a wider art discourse, as 
digital art is  situated within the broader art world.  Thus I now attend to a topic that 
during my research emerged consistently amongst the digital artists, but which I could 
not situate as any way particular or specific to digital art.  That topic is  political critique, 
and how art - regardless of medium - can facilitate a critique of politics, ideology and 
authority.  Thus, this topic relates  to my fifth main set of research questions as set out in 
chapter 1 pertaining to art and its political contexts.  Therefore whilst the overall 
research project is  focused on a survey of digital art, I suggest that this  section is 
indicative of  stances adopted by artists and is applicable to the broader artistic context.
As seen in the analysis of works in the previous  section, some digital artists explicitly 
engage in a political critique.  Perhaps the most politically recognisable of pieces 
discussed to date is NAMALand by Conor McGarrigle109.  However, artists across the 
spectrum of digital practices have attested to me how their work often seeks  to 
challenge, subvert or undermine dominant discourses.  In the case of Benjamin Gaulon, 
that manifests  in a critique of consumer culture.  It forms the basis for critiques  of 
networked systems in Cliona Harmey’s practice.  In the work of Ivan Twohig, it is  the 
critique of  perspective itself.  
A critique of a consumerist ideology is evident in the work of a Dublin-based artist who 
was  interviewed but who wished to remain anonymous.  An early work of this artist 
involves  the creation of a machine that would play sounds of applause and 
encouragement when a participant activates it through pressure sensors.  This artist had 
worked in a marketing company as a graphic designer and had become disillusioned 
with how the marketing industry encourages  unnecessary consumption, and so she 
decided to create this  piece as  a tongue-in-cheek critique of how happiness can be sold 
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109 McGarrigle explained to me how ‘people are saying that it’s a tool for political comment, and I think 
if you can get people to think of augmented reality as a tool for political comment or critique, that’s 
fantastic.  You’ve added something that’s really quite concrete.  Once you’ve got this idea that this is tool 
for political critique or political comment,  for me the work is  done.  It’s  engaged with people in kind of a 
real way, engaged with real issues and things that are important to people, and that are topical and 
relevant.  So certainly in that way, as an artwork it has engaged with a wider public’.
to us in trite ways - in this  case through a machine that would give the participant a 
meaningless but emphatic applause.  She explains  how ‘I was just coming out of 
working in marketing and I was  really aware of the mechanisms […] I think working in 
marketing was probably the last straw, because I thought there was something really 
sinister about it, not that I was doing anything particularly bad, but I just realised that I 
don’t really want to sell crap to people that they don’t need’.
Other artists and arts workers  have spoken about the potential of art to facilitate critique 
and open up new sites of understanding.  However, some of these artists  would not 
place technology at the centre of their practice of critical engagement with societal 
issues.  Jesse Jones makes  the observation that technology can potentially hinder political 
engagement.  For Jones, ‘there is  something about the disjuncture between technology 
and the embodied political gesture that is really really difficult for me to reconcile’. 
Jones attests  to a stance around technology where ‘I try to live in the world with 
technology as a tool and having a function, but not pre-determining anything in terms 
of my arts  practice or in my relationship with reality’.  As  examined earlier, Jones’ 
concern for her practice is  that it is peer-engaged and collaborative.  For Jones, the role 
of technology can however hinder this  practice.  ‘I think it’s  really important to sit down 
and speak to somebody face-to-face, and meet with groups  of people, and collaborate 
together in the same room’ observed Jones.  ‘I think there is a feeling definitely that I 
have, that social media and the reliance on technology has incubated us away from each 
other, and incubated us away from the political’.
However, Jones argues that the visual image in popular culture has the potential to 
inform, provide critique and engage with political discourse.  ‘This  incredibly rich 
tapestry of the visual within popular culture that kind of has  the ability to excavate 
knowledges about ourselves and about society, and form political critique and 
trajectories of possibility for us as  a society’, argued Jones.  She also attested to the 
potential of cinema, positing that ‘I think that watching films can actually be a 
revolutionary act. It depends on what films you watch. And how you watch films’.  
Jaki Irvine also speaks  about the potential for critique, revealing how ‘I think there are 
times that an artist is just an ordinary person who needs to protest, the same as 
everybody else’.  However, for Irvine this protest may not be an overtly political protest, 
but might nonetheless point to an alternate political and ideological landscape.  Thus, 
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the protest might involve exploring ‘the possibility of not agreeing to think exactly what 
you’re told to think, or think about even’.  For Irvine, this potential for opening up a 
space has been particularly pertinent during Ireland’s financial crisis.  ‘It’s  not even the 
possibility you might think about something other than what you’ve been told to think 
about, we’re almost at the moment because of the crisis, being told to focus  on this thing 
and nothing else, and I love the thought that there are other things besides this  thing 
that we’re all supposed to be thinking about’ explains Irvine.
For Irvine, the opening up of space through art also centres  around permission to think 
alternate thoughts: ‘It seems really totalitarian that there’s only this thing, and it also 
gives the impression that we’ve no right to think about other things at the moment. 
That the very thought about things  other than this thing is  a luxury’.  For Irvine, this 
movement to alternate thought ‘could be vaguely political with a tiny little “P” to refuse 
to think about those things - to say actually I want to think about something you tell me 
is entirely irrelevant’.  For Irvine, articulating this reality is  an important part of her 
practice.  ‘I think if we’re talking about the role art plays, the insistence that there is 
more, that feels important.  I don’t know why it feels important.  It’s not other, it’s not 
posed, it’s not in opposition to, it’s  not outside of, it’s not this  either-or scenario.  It’s 
insisting we are in this thing’.
This  section has  examined how art in its  potential has  a facility for political critique. 
Some of my artist informants do not see technological means as  integral to their 
practice, and Jesse Jones posited how technology can distance citizens  from each other. 
Yet some other digital artists  often see technology and the critique of it as  central to a 
broader political critique of how society is  organised and governed.  I suggest that this 
finding challenges the spectrum hypothesis, revealing how the political potential of art to 
critique the status  quo is evident across all parts  of the spectrum, irrespective of the level 
of  technology use as either tool or medium.
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8.8  Conclusion
In this  chapter I posited a spectrum of practices, ranging from the use of digital 
technologies as  tools, towards  at the other end of the spectrum, a consideration of a 
digital medium.  Through examining contrasting perspectives  from artists who debated 
the place of digital technologies in their practice, I conclude by suggesting that there is a 
spectrum of acceptance of digital means as a medium in their own right.  Some artists 
purely considered technology as  a tool.  Others wished to engage heavily with 
technology, but not for its  own sake, but to critique what they consider to be a medium 
in its  own right.  Thus, there exist tensions amongst artists  themselves, and between 
artists and institutions as to validity of art practices  involving heavy technology use, but 
with, I suggest, a commonality regarding a reluctance to be ‘determined’ by technology.   
The chapter also suggested three specificities  of digital art in terms of its  aesthetic 
qualities.  These qualities could be analysed as sites  where innovations, both radical or 
incremental could occur.  The chapter suggested that certain knowledge acquisition 
practiced in the digital art sector through collaboration could be compared to the 
traditional R&D functions.  It also argued that similar to analyses of the digital media 
content sector, knowledge production in the artistic sector is  formed through ‘soft’ or 
tacit skills, and innovation occurs through the acquisition, use and transfer of  such skills.
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Chapter 9
Enablement of  Digital Art Practices
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Chapter 9: Enablement of  Digital Art Practices
9.1 Introduction: Issues of  Support
In chapter 7 I posited a conceptual spectrum of practices in digital art, which in this 
chapter I examine whether or how this is  concomitant with an associated spectrum of 
acceptance and of support/enablement of digital art in Ireland.  I address  this by 
analysing the relationship between the micro-level actors  and those at the meso level, 
providing accounts from both levels that (1) foreground attitudes from the micro level 
towards  the meso and (2) provide a perspective from the meso level that problematises 
digital art.
Maeve Connolly suggests that ‘I think there is a small group of artists, or small 
proportion of artists, and they’re not necessarily very well represented in Ireland’.  For 
Connolly, this is the sector of artists who choose to categorise themselves  as  electronic or 
digital media artists.  Thus, digital artists  were queried for their perspectives on the 
reception of their art at gallery level, linking the micro and meso-level perspectives  from 
both practitioners and institutional gatekeepers.  The findings suggest that video artists 
are more positive about their experiences  of support and enablement than those 
practitioners on the other end of the spectrum, who describe a relative lack of support, 
through representation, at gallery level.  From these findings, artist strategies  in the face 
of this perceived lack of institutional support are analysed, revealing strategies of 
disengagement from the institutional settings along with one of  seeking support abroad.
Representatives of arts  institutions were interviewed for their perspective on digital art 
at the meso level, including issues they face when considering the mounting of a digital 
art exhibition, or collecting works of digital art.  This perspective also reveals problems 
at the meso level both conceptually and materially with exhibiting, collecting and 
archival of digital works.  I suggest that the ‘spectrum’ hypothesis  of support and 
enablement through representation thus holds  true at this  meso level, with institutional 
gatekeepers less reluctant to mount an exhibition of ‘digital’ video art than one heavily 
employing ICTs.
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This  chapter therefore interrogates issues  of representation, support and enablement at 
a micro and meso level, and concludes by suggesting a possible opportunity for the 
digital art sector in Ireland to ameliorate this situation.
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9.2 It’s No Fun Being Digital in an Analogue Art World
9.2.1 Introduction: Under-Representation
In this  section, I examine the lack of support through gallery representation that is 
perceived - and explained - by some digital artists.  I interviewed an experienced gallery 
director whose evidence sheds light on the situation from the meso level of gatekeeping 
and institutional relevance.  The last chapter indicated that digital art frequently 
involved the reconfiguration of materials.  This section argues  that a ‘reconfiguration’ of 
how digital art is positioned by art galleries and institutions is required for an 
understanding of the aesthetic of digital art.  A cohort of the artists interviewed suggest 
that such under-representation is  a particularly Irish situation, with several artists 
attesting to the more positive reception of  their work abroad.
For Cliona Harmey, the digital art sector in Ireland has  suffered from a lack of 
representation.  ‘I think it’s very under developed here’ observes  Harmey.  ‘I don’t know 
if you’d agree, but I’d say, I mean there’s  a lot of activity but […] I don’t think it’s in the 
mainstream art market’.  The underdevelopment extends beyond representation of the 
work to commercial concerns  (which I will discuss further in the following chapter).  For 
Harmey, this  under-representation is coupled with a lack of comprehension about the 
attributes of digital art.  Harmey posits that ‘I think there isn’t really an understanding 
of what digital art or digital media are outside a small community’.  She suggests that 
this  is an Irish situation, noting that ‘in England and definitely in Europe it would be 
more recognised’.  For Harmey, the lack of representation in Ireland is due to only a 
small community of interested parties in the attributes of digital media, which then 
results in a lack of  opportunities for exhibition or for commercial representation.
Another digital artist and lecturer who wished to remain unnamed suggests  that a 
broader cultural discourse around digital art is  not well established in Ireland.  For 
digital art practice, ‘there is  more of a culture of it in other countries like France or […] 
the Netherlands’.  In those countries there are well established networks of digital artists 
and collectives.  ‘People know each other and you know about different things going on 
in different countries’ she observed, citing her own experiences  of working abroad.  For 
this  artist, the contrast in Ireland is that ‘there’s  a very small group of people who do 
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that here’.  The artist also traces  this cultural zeitgeist to an educational level.  She 
outlines her familiarity with the attitudes within a Dublin art college, and how a 
particular postgraduate degree in digital art is  not taken seriously, even within the 
institution offering the course.  She explains how in her experience of the institution ‘I 
don’t think it was really taken seriously by maybe the other arts. There were several 
MAs going on, and the other ones that were going on, I didn’t think that they thought it 
was  a real masters’.  Again, this artist suggests that the lack of acceptance of the digital 
art mediums was an Irish phenomenon.  ‘I think that’s  true for everything [Irish]’, she 
notes.  ‘I mean you have actors and if they say there are good in America they must be 
good’.  Thus, the cultural zeitgeist in Ireland is not one of acceptance of Irish digital 
artists.  However, this artist suggests  that the phenomenon is  not particular to digital art, 
but reflects a broader attitude to the arts.
A further illustration of this comes from a director of a contemporary art gallery that 
specialises in digital art.  He suggested that while ‘digital art in Ireland is  a big word I’d 
say […] I’d say it’s a very small scene’.  For this  participant, the digital art sector is 
culturally loaded with complex aesthetic concerns, and therefore ‘big’, but at once it is 
also a very small sector of artists.  For an art institution such as his  that is concerned 
with foregrounding digital art, the size of the sector and therefore the audience, is 
problematic.  He describes the frustration of the directors  when mounting a digital art 
exhibition:
“So, the last big show we had, Enchantillion, it was twenty five artists 
from France, from different towns, different groups  of artists. 
Basically, the last part was two friends of mine from Strasbourg 
who have really amazing work, and they got their own funding. So 
basically we just provided the space, they got their own funding to 
come and do the show. And we did the opening, there was  nobody. 
Like, literally us.  Nobody came, not one person. I think we had two 
students came, of mine. So I’m just thinking, why do I bother doing 
things if  nobody cares?”
This  reveals how representation of digital art is an issue that exists  at the micro and 
meso levels  of analysis.  The digital artists themselves feel a lack of representation.  The 
critique of the educational institution as  portrayed above was that digital art was not 
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worthy of serious consideration.  The art institution wishing to foreground digital art 
could not find an audience for the launch of one of its  exhibitions.  I suggest that the 
perceived lack of support for digital art through representation is  due to several factors 
which I explore in the following section.
9.2.2 Problematising the Enablement of  Digital Art
In this  section I examine why there is  a perceived lack of support of digital art in 
Ireland.  From the interviews conducted with artists and gatekeepers, and through case-
studies, I have identified three issues pertaining to digital art which may prevent its 
acceptance, understanding and concomitant representation.  These are (1) context, 
categorisation and affiliation, (2) suspicion about the produced work as technology and 
not art, and (3) that digital art interrogates the role of the museum.  Thus, if a digital 
artwork can not be easily contextualised, issues  of suspicion around the artwork as  a 
work of technological fetishisation, and a subsequent reluctance to value or collect the 
work ensue.  This is  not however to suggest that there are not valid issues  pertaining to 
the collection and exhibition of digital art.  These issues  will be addressed later in 
section 9.4. 
9.2.2.1 Context, Categorisation and Affiliation
In chapter 4, I problematised current discourses  in art theory and education with respect 
to categorisation of artistic works  by medium, suggesting that digital art can be 
marginalised within contemporary art discourses.  Here, I further examine issues of 
categorisation, affiliation and context of the digital artwork, arguing that two possible 
scenarios  exist that impede the support of digital art in Ireland.  The first scenario (1) 
reflects  some theoretical perspectives from chapter 4, and argues that if there exists  a 
current trend in art theory and criticism in Ireland to reject labelling of an artwork by 
medium, to be a media-specific digital or electronic artist may be problematic within the 
broader art world.  The second scenario (2) reflects  theoretical perspectives from chapter 
5, and argues that in the light of Ireland’s  postcoloniality and its  affect on art criticism 
where ‘natural’, ‘uniquely Irish’ subjects, materials  and aesthetics  have been eulogised 
and romanticised, the digital art aesthetic resides outside of that romantic, postcolonial 
frame and is therefore liable for rejection by arts institutions.
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Maeve Connolly addresses the first scenario with respect to curators and institutional 
gatekeepers and how artists  themselves categorise through affiliations.  She explains  that 
for artists, ‘people don’t want to be in a set that they haven’t chosen. And I think it’s a 
really interesting, and really pronounced phenomenon in art practice at the moment, 
that people communicate the particularity of what they do through their affiliations and 
their associations’.  Thus, whilst it may not be de rigueur to categorise by medium, the 
artists themselves  self-categorise through more tacit allegiances and associations, 
according to Connolly.  
Whilst this trend may seem like a positive one for digital artists - and we have seen in 
chapter 8 how community is important to digital artists - if this  trend is  also applicable 
at a curatorial level, then it may have more negative implications for digital artists.  ‘A 
curator is going to make selections  and groupings  of artists that relate to their own 
research, their own enquiry’ Connolly observes.  ‘In a lot of cases  they are not going to 
restrict themselves  by pre-existing categories’.  It is therefore at this  meso, gatekeeping 
level that I suggest issues  of representation occur.  At once, at a micro level, digital artists 
can and do form communities  of affiliations.  However, their affiliations are more 
medium-based than in other art forms.  I suggest that when this medium-specific genre 
is forwarded for consideration at the meso level, the reluctance to view the work by its 
categorisation as digital or electronic art puts the work at a disadvantage.  Thus, for a 
curator to include a corpus  of work that is based on its  medium specificity as digital or 
electronic art, invokes  the negativity associated with medium specificity to make such an 
inclusion potentially detrimental to their curatorial career.  As Cliona Harmey observes 
of curators evaluating a digital art proposal ‘they might not be able to categorise what 
the outcome might be’, and thus reject the work.  If we consider the second scenario of 
an art critique in Ireland that is despite a move towards globalisation, still postcolonial, 
(as  I have argued in chapter 5), a curator or institutional gatekeeper in Ireland who is 
situated within that postcolonial discourse in art criticism further places themselves in 
danger of reducing their own cultural or social ‘capital’, as outlined in Bourdieu’s 
theories.  The gatekeeper is  therefore more likely to hold on to or advance their ‘capital’ 
through engaging with existing critical tropes.
However Jaki Irvine, a video artist, does  not perceive an issue of acceptance of her work 
for grants and project funding.  Irvine however expresses  a difficulty with categorising or 
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contextualising how a project might evolve when first applying for funding.  Like 
Harmey, she feels that it is potentially difficult for both gatekeepers and she herself to 
categorise the work before its completion.  ‘What’s  more awkward’ reveals Irvine ‘is the 
crossover between cinema and art, and that borderline that artists find themselves’.  For 
Irvine, this  crossover of mediums  means that extra documentation detailing the projects 
is  required for the institutional gatekeeper.  She explains  how ‘the requirements of 
scripts and those sorts of things, they’re very different to setting out what your project 
might be in advance’.  Therefore, while Irvine as a video artist does not suggest that 
representation in itself is  an issue, she does reveal how there does exist for her a difficulty 
in categorising the work before its  completion.  I suggest that whilst that difficulty exists 
for video artists, this difficulty is  exacerbated in digital art practices, where multiple 
technologies, systems and aesthetics  combine with an often interactive dimension, the 
direction of  which may not be easily predicted at project planning stage.
Another issue of categorisation or contextualisation for Irvine occurs  in the peer-review 
process.  She explains how for the most part, peer review works quite well, as the peers 
are other practising artists  who are generally sympathetic to the practice, be it in visual 
arts, music, dance etc.  However, Irvine suggests that if the work is  in some way au-
courant or highly contemporary, there are potential inadequacies with the peer-review 
system.  She posits ‘if somebody is  making work that is at the edge of contemporary, 
and the panel of peers  haven’t got their heads around it yet, if the work is  potentially 
peerless, then you can see where a problem might lie’.  She explains  how in that instance 
the artist is  ‘asking people to imagine something that might be at the forefront of 
something but nobody else has  imagined yet’.  Thus, there exists  a potential situation for 
any art form to be so contemporary as to be ahead of its  peers.  I suggest that this issue 
may be particularly pertinent in the case of digital and electronic art, where the nature 
of the practice is often to interrogate emergent technologies, technological means and 
systems.  I suggest that because digital art employs  emergent technologies, by the time 
they have been accepted as ‘contemporary’, the practices have been superceded.  The 
work can only be classified by a cohort of peers as  ‘contemporary‘ art once it has been 
accepted as such.  If, as  Irvine posits, a practice is  so experimental as to have not been 
fully accepted into the ‘contemporary’ canon, how can an audience of peers evaluate 
the work through an established theoretical construct of  ‘contemporary’?
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Thus I propose that at a curatorial level, if the specificities of digital art are not 
investigated, explored and considered on their own merits, the judgment of the work 
defaults to the context of a zeitgeist where medium specificity has negative connotations. 
I also propose that digital and electronic art practices are quite often au-courant and 
experimental and thus are not easily categorised within ‘contemporary’ art discourses. 
When perceived negatively at curatorial level then, the natural course for the curatorial 
team is to reject the work on a ‘theoretical’ ideology residing in concepts of the post-
medium condition and contemporary art.  I argue that this reflects  a gap in 
understanding between the micro and meso levels  of communication in the art world. 
In the next section I explore how digital art can be greeted with suspicion by the art 
world.
9.2.2.2  Suspicion
Benjamin Gaulon suggests that he has experienced particularly in Ireland a certain 
scepticism in relation to digital art practices, suggesting that the gap between the micro 
and meso levels is an Irish phenomenon.  This  scepticism concerns who the creator of 
the art is - if it is  the artist or the technology.  He observes that ‘there’s  always this 
suspicion with computer-based artwork - there’s  always  this  question of who’s  doing the 
art and all that, which I think is not relevant’.  For Gaulon, the suspicion around digital 
art is  due to ‘generation’ and ‘tradition’ in the art world, combined with an institutional 
zeitgeist of ‘people trying to keep things  the way they were’.  Thus  for Gaulon, 
entrenched views on the very role of technology and computers in art is still prevalent in 
art discourse in Ireland. 
This  entrenchment may explain a situation that Conor McGarrigle describes which also 
points to a suspicion within the art world regarding digital art.  He relates  that when his 
NAMALand piece started to gain publicity and notoriety within the mainstream ‘non-art 
media’ as  he expresses it, there was ‘very little’ response to the work by the art 
institutions themselves.  He describes how ‘when I made [NAMALand] and sent it out to 
people, it was the mainstream, non-art media that responded to it and were interested in 
it’.  In contrast to this, ‘the press  release and the information about it went to the art 
press  and it didn’t get taken up at all’.  I enquired as to possible reasons  for this, and 
whilst McGarrigle could not be entirely sure, he nonetheless  suggested that it was 
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perhaps because the gatekeepers  consider the work to not exist as  art.  ‘My guess from 
my experience’ reports McGarrigle, ‘would be that they see it as  technology in some way 
and it’s not art’.  
I suggest that these accounts, in the light of the second possible scenario involving 
postcolonial issues  in art criticism, can be explained by an ongoing conservatism and 
traditionalism in Irish art critique, as analysed in chapter 5.  The skepticism and 
suspicion revealed by the participants is framed as pertaining to technology use. 
However, I argue that this suspicion around technology stands as somewhat of a ‘red 
herring’, and that it is a more likely scenario that the consensus, or centre of gravity of 
art criticism in Ireland is still bound up in romantic, postcolonial attempts to foreground 
our heritage, our ‘specialness’ and our ‘unique’ Celtic spirit as to make a discourse of 
‘grey box’ digital art marginal in the face of ‘earthy’ sculptures  and ‘evocative’ paintings. 
Thus, digital art challenges  existing postcolonial tropes  through the more ‘universal’ 
aesthetic of  the digital age.
9.2.2.3 Interrogation
I suggest that another barrier to representation of digital art is  that by its very forms in, 
for example, net art, remote installation, and augmented reality, digital art interrogates 
the role of the museum.  This  was argued in chapter 4, where it was  posited that digital 
art questions the default ‘art as commodity’ form of the traditional art world, where 
artworks exist as  ‘property’ of an owner, can be bought and sold and have scarcity or 
‘auratic’ value.   Digital art which often employs collaborative processes  and engages 
with Open Source and Creative Commons  models  of intellectual property thus stands 
in opposition to the default ‘art-as-proprietary’ trope.  
As discussed in chapter 4, the object characteristics of digital art include an ambiguity 
regarding where the artwork resides.  I propose that this  object characteristic of digital 
art can impact negatively on representation, when the digital artwork questions the 
position of the museum or the archive by not requiring a physical space in which to be 
represented, such as net art.  As Maeve Connolly observes  ‘there are a lot of artists who 
are trying to pose some kind of question or challenge, maybe, to museums or to archives 
through their use of technology’.  She suggests  that within a tradition of questioning the 
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role of the museum in mediating relationships  between the art and the audience, digital 
artists may ‘produce demands for the presentation of their work that they know are 
somehow logically unfeasible’.  Thus, as in the case of some works  briefly described in 
chapter 7, the work resides  as instruction or documentation, or as Connolly suggests 
‘effectively their work is becoming, to some extent, like a conceptual piece’.  I suggest 
that whilst many of such works are of a quality deserving accessioning and archiving in 
an institution, they are often not collected due to the complexities of documenting, 
storing and archiving the pieces.  
Whilst the art world in other countries  such as  the US, Spain and the Netherlands 
accept that digital art can reside outside the gallery, the Irish situation appears more 
problematic.  A participant who wished not to be named, reveals  that in Ireland, the art 
world is  ‘very gallery based’.  This informant stated that digital works  are ‘always 
existing outside the gallery so you’re always having to negotiate the idea of “is  it an 
artwork, is it not an artwork”, because if it’s  in a gallery, that’s  already been decided’. 
For this participant, ‘you’ve a fair idea that when you enter the gallery, what’s in it is art’ 
as  the gallery stands as the gatekeeper of the judgement of art.  Thus, even if the work 
is incongruous, once within the gallery space the viewer can be assured that ‘if it doesn’t 
look like art, it is’.  The implication for a gallery viewer is  that even if a work is  not 
immediately recognisable as art, the fact that the institution have exhibited or collected 
it gives  the work the status - or aura - of art.  However with a piece of digital art, the 
work may reside on the internet or on a mobile phone, and the status of the piece as  a 
work of art is more contested, having to negotiate its position as an artwork from a 
position outside the museum space.  Therefore the discussion of the piece as a work of 
art happens  independently of the museum, challenging or even undermining its  position 
as  gatekeeper or arbiter of taste.  I suggest, again with a postcolonial lens, that if 
historically Irish art collections were built up by a foregrounding of ‘Irishness’, a more 
universal or ‘globalised’ aesthetic of digital art is problematic to such institutions, 
causing them to reject them for collection or acquisition. 
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9.3  Artist Strategies and Attitudes
9.3.1 Introduction: An Attitude of  Disengagement
In this section I introduce some attitudes and strategies adopted by digital artists  in the 
face of what they consider to be a palpable reluctance on the part of arts institutions to 
represent their work.  This  section thus interrogates the micro/meso relationship from 
the perspective of the digital practitioners and their interactions  with the meso-level of 
the arts  institutions and gatekeepers.  During the course of the interview process, it 
became apparent that these artists  are resolute about producing artistic works regardless 
of institutional acceptance, with many adopting the position, like one artist, wishing not 
to be named, who says  of her practice ‘I just do what I want to do and I don’t really care 
to be honest’.  For this artist, her feeling is that if the art world accepts her work that 
would be a bonus, but for her, the main motivation for the work is  that her work is 
socially engaged with a general audience.  ‘Obviously, if people like it that is  a definite 
bonus’, she revealed, ‘but if I was  making it for anybody I would be making it for the 
general public, rather than an art audience’.
Conor McGarrigle also expresses  an attitude of disengagement with the art institutions 
in Ireland.  He suggests that this was because ‘to go back to that place where you’re 
explaining to them why it is art, I guess  a lot of people aren’t interested in doing that 
any more, because if you go to Spain or America, they know what it is, they see where it 
fits  within the tradition.  They see where you are within a wider body of work’.  Thus, a 
‘path of least resistance’ for McGarrigle is to disengage with the institutions in Ireland. 
For artists  working with digital technologies, it does  appear to be a ‘path of least 
resistance’ to show their work at institutions abroad where the work is  more readily 
accepted within an artistic tradition (Futurism, Dadaism, Minimalism etc).  As 
McGarrigle observes, ‘the sense that I get from people, that people aren’t willing to go to 
that place again, to convince people that working with computers is  actually art and it’s 
not just messing about with computers’.  For him, like other artists  who have worked 
abroad, it is far more productive and rewarding to pursue other more relevant options 
than to struggle for acceptance in Ireland.
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However, adopting this  attitude is not unproblematic for artists.  For Ivan Twohig, there 
is a sense of conflict between producing independent work, and having a desire for that 
work to be rewarded within traditional channels.  Twohig contemplates how ‘I always 
have this dilemma of, are you looking to be doing something proactively for one, and do 
you want to be doing something that goes  beyond, to push the boundaries?’.  ‘But at the 
same time you want to be acknowledged’, he posits.  Whilst Twohig attests to the peer 
group of digital artists who would assess the work in its  context, he acknowledges  how 
‘there’s always this  ideal of being accepted into certain galleries or having your work 
shown in galleries  as  a mark of acceptance’.  Thus, whilst Twohig desires to create work 
that is  progressive, he also expresses a conflicted stance where ‘there’s  a reward system 
and you do need to feel - it’s  just human nature - to feel acceptance from your peers’. 
The tension for Twohig lies in the complex nexus  of gatekeepers.  He posits  that ‘the art 
community is  based on this intellectual top down’ which requires the artist to ask of 
their own work ‘do the curators accept it, do the theorists  who influence the curators 
accept it, and then do the galleries who show it?’.  For Twohig, ‘curators look to 
theorists, gallerists look to curators’.  An awareness  of this on the part of the artist leads 
them to question the purpose of the work.  As  he asks of himself ‘are you trying to do 
something that slots in?’.  Clearly, the stance of ‘slotting in’ is  in conflict to Twohig’s 
desire to push artistic boundaries, yet there is a reward for acquiescing to what 
traditional gallerists  and curators  desire, in the form of wider recognition of the artistic 
output110.
9.3.2 A Strategy of  Detachment
In the previous  section I analysed certain attitudes that digital artists  adopted in 
contextualising their work in the broader art world.  In this  section I now analyse some 
innovative strategies that digital artists  employ in the face of their perceived lack of 
representation.  I posit that a major strategy of digital artists is  to detach from the 
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110 However, Twohig did also suggest that for digital artists ‘the real peer acknowledgement now is blogs’. 
According to his experience ‘Blogs  are becoming the point of reference.  If you get blogged about your 
prototype [it] is a major thing for anybody’.  He suggested that to be blogged about is a major reward in 
itself, albeit ‘skewed’ because ‘it’s  maybe more to do with the safety of the forum or the social network that 
you’re accepted within’.  However, even this  reward system has its complications  in terms  of expected 
production output.  His critique of this  situation was that ‘you have to be seen to be producing all the 
time’.  For Twohig this  situation was  ‘another symptom to this networked society - that you need to keep 
up that online persona, or you fall off the radar or people will think you’ve just stopped making things or 
your work’s not good enough any more’.  Thus, whilst the peer review and peer acceptance of blogs had 
many benefits, nonetheless they created ‘all these kind of  built in pressures to being constantly viewed’.
broader art world, its  challenges of gatekeeping and its  reward systems, in favour of self-
motivated, self-started ventures  with a smaller peer group.  For example, Benjamin 
Gaulon and Ivan Twohig, as well as collaborating on artistic projects  such as Hard Drivin’ 
have also devised a strategy whereby they offer their artistic works for sale in an online 
store for artworks, akin to how art galleries and museums have their own stores. ‘So 
instead of going through a gallery where someone takes commission’ report the artists, 
‘we just said we’ll do it for ourselves’.  However, in a slight deference to the art world 
culture, they explain how the artists do not wish to ‘be selling stuff ’ on their artist 
portfolio website111, and so the ProtoNoir  website was conceived as a separate entity to 
their individual websites112.  However, there is a benefit to this strategy, because ‘once we 
had done that we could sell other people’s  works’.  On the website itself it is  also 
revealed how ‘ProtoNoir curates carefully the projects  and artists featured on the website’, 
in a gatekeeping role of its  own.  Thus, the strategy employed is  one of detachment 
from traditional channels of commerce within a gallery space, yet one of inclusion 
towards other, similarly minded artists.  
Maeve Connolly suggests that this  strategy of detachment was  ‘maybe a more naive 
Utopian idea’, in that the artists believe ‘that somehow they can create another, 
alternative structure or situation in which their work can be engaged with as  art’.  For 
Connolly, this alternative imagining of their work of art is  not to interrogate the 
museum ‘on its own grounds, through acquisitions or through archival instructions’. 
Rather the attempt is  to ‘try to establish some kind of imagined alternative, some other 
forum’ existing outside the remit of  the museum113.  
As we saw earlier, Conor McGarrigle’s ‘path of least resistance’ is  to detach from the 
gallery space in Ireland, observing that ‘one of the things  for myself is  that I don’t really 
pursue galleries  in Ireland all that much’.  For McGarrigle, the task of ‘breaking into’ 
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111 Twohig explained how the personal website of the artist is  now very important.  He revealed how ‘it’s 
gone from the idea of the artists sketchbook and the weight that they put on your sketchbook […] and 
that weight of how you lay out your ideas is  also the same now with how you approach your website’. 
Thus, in an art world where curators have certain expectations  around the design of the artists  website, 
the artist now needs to be mindful of their online identity.  Clearly, for Gaulon then, self-marketing on the 
personal ‘portfolio’ website was viewed as unacceptable, and a separate site was the option he chose for 
that aspect of  his work.
112 See www.protonoir.com 
113 I concur with this  assessment with respect to the attitudes and strategies that I encountered being 
adopted by the digital artists  I met with during my ethnography and interview process, and suggest that 
digital art in Ireland does adopt a ‘tone’ of detachment from the museum space, rather than challenging 
and interrogating it.
the gallery scene in Ireland seems like a significant undertaking.  ‘I probably should go 
and break down those walls  and approach’, admitted McGarrigle, ‘but for me I don’t 
have the time and it’s the effort’ of pursuing that relationship with museums  and 
galleries in Ireland when it is unproductive and costly for him emotionally114.  He 
suggests that he is not alone in this strategy, that ‘there are a lot of artists I know who 
work in similar ways because again, it’s too much of an effort’, or that the artists 
consider an approach to a major gallery with the intent of persuading them of the 
merits  of digital art ‘as an insurmountable thing’.  For McGarrigle like other artists, an 
alternate strategy that provides more recognition and reward is  to work abroad.  In the 
next section I analyse how that strategy circumvents  the perceived negativity towards 
digital art that the artists regard as part of  the zeitgeist in the Irish art world.
9.3.3 Proactively Looking Outward
As a response to institutional neglect, I have found that one strategy adopted by the 
digital artists  is  to detach from the mainstream art world in Ireland, to not critique the 
museum through acquisitions or documentation, but to grow alternative communities. 
Another strategy encountered is  that of proactively looking abroad for commissions, 
conferences and exhibitions.  I posit that this  strategy follows on from the perceived 
reluctance on the part of the art world to engage with digital art is one that is  prevalent 
in Ireland moreso than in other countries.  Many participants attest to positive 
experiences  abroad, with their work being received well and also known better abroad 
than in Ireland.  One curator of a digital art festival also attests  to this, noting how their 
festival is  ‘better known outside Ireland than it is actually in Ireland.  I have a huge 
international community that would be aware of it’.  Yet this  curator has had difficulty 
with recognition in Ireland in terms of  funding for the festival.
Perhaps the most prominent example of an artist who is based in Ireland, yet more well 
known and successful abroad is Conor McGarrigle.  As  we saw in the previous section, 
he suggests  that perhaps  digital artists should attempt to approach the large 
contemporary art galleries in Ireland to represent digital art.  However, for McGarrigle, 
this  is  an unproductive route, revealing how ‘it’s  probably something I should do, but the 
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114 From experiences of  the work not being well understood, to out and out rejection of  the work as art
path of least resistance for me is to exhibit overseas’.  He reveals  that in his  experience, 
‘there’s more support structures  in place’ abroad.  There are also more invites for work 
from countries in Europe, as well as offers  from the United States.  He reveals how ‘my 
work is known in Spain and the United States, exhibited all over really, and relatively 
little in Ireland’.  McGarrigle posits that this is  not an unusual situation for digital artists, 
and this  puts their foreign experiences at odds with their experiences  in Ireland.  ‘Most 
people working digitally have experiences where they go into spaces, people know what 
they’re doing, they fit in and see themselves in a tradition, a body of work, there’s  a 
discussion going on’ observes McGarrigle.  In his own experience, he has been funded 
by Spanish agencies  to present work and discuss the work at various  events.  He reports 
the experience as ‘incredible’ due to the support of the audience, and the familiarity of 
the art audience with his work.  He explains  how it was ‘an incredible amphitheatre, 
quite full and with an audience who actually knew the work’.  In contrast to his 
experience in Dublin at the time in which he was  ‘not getting any shows, not really 
getting anywhere’, in Spain the exhibition was  ‘full of people asking intelligent questions 
and with a good knowledge of  what you’ve done and what you’ve done before’.
During other ethnographic encounters I observed how many artists  were working, or 
attempting to work on an international level.  Jaki Irvine had spent a number of months 
in Mexico prior to our interview, in order to shoot footage for a film.  She has  since 
moved there permanently.  Jesse Jones, as I describe in the following chapter is, at the 
time of writing, in Los Angeles working on a new film project.  Ivan Twohig has 
exhibited in Norway and France.
9.3.4 Space as Solution
Whilst the last sections have posited a fairly austere picture on digital art in Ireland, I 
suggest that there are opportunities  to ameliorate this  perception of under 
representation.  Many of the artists  I spoke to express  a desire for more physical spaces 
where they could gather, collaborate and exhibit digital art.  A number of artists suggest 
spaces such as Rhizome or MediaLab Prado as  models for an Irish space where digital 
art could be more ‘mainstreamed’ as Cliona Harmey suggests.  Harmey also discusses 
how the current economic crisis has freed up physical spaces that are being repurposed 
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as  artistic spaces.  For Harmey this  represents  an opportunity for ‘very young graduates 
that are sort of  kids of  the Celtic Tiger’ to develop grass roots types of  collectives.
Ivan Twohig also speaks  of the need for physical spaces, suggesting that creativity does 
not work predictably, and that ‘you can’t impose that higher level of brainstorming and 
creativity’ in an artistic space ‘unless  the group is a tight group of people and they’re 
brainstorming’.  Thus, an artistic space for digital art would need to be quite fluid in 
how it organises itself.  For Twohig, a desired space would be ‘open to that type of 
creation, where people come together and meet’ as  opposed to some spaces where ‘it 
seems kind of trendy now to say this type of stuff, like be a hub of creativity and lots of 
brainstorming sessions’ that for Twohig are ineffectual and ‘very forced’.  The benefit to 
having an established space is  that when the space becomes ‘situated’ with a physical 
presence, facilities  and equipment, ‘people start to see it differently, you start 
maintaining an openness’.  Such a space, I believe would help to foreground digital art 
in Ireland and stands  as  a proactive, positive stance on the under-representation that has 
been outlined thus far.
For another participant, a specifically digital space ‘would be to have something like an 
institution like Eyebeam in New York, not so much Rhizome, but something that has 
facilities, workshop facilities, something like V2 maybe, where people could act as a 
focus  for the thing and it would provide practical facilities’.  Alongside these practical 
facilities  would be a space for the consideration of the ‘theoretical aspect’ and the 
‘residency aspect’ of digital art ‘where people come for residencies, meet locals, have the 
exchange and to become part of this  internationally’.  This  would be critical for the 
development of digital art in Ireland as it would extend the visibility of this  art sector 
internationally.  ‘We have to build local and then we can be part of a wider scene’ he 
suggests, where the collective expertise locally can be expanded through international 
networking and affiliations.  He suggests that if such a space were to become a focal 
point for digital art in Ireland, ‘then that is something that negotiates  with the other art 
institutions’ and is taken more seriously as an art form, and not just as ‘the Cinderella of 
Irish arts’.
Such findings lead me to suggest that the creation of a physical space modelled on 
centres  such as  V2 or Eyebeam in Ireland would foreground digital art in this country. 
Whilst the economic context may not be conducive towards  this, there are commercial 
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spaces unfinished, or nearing completion, which is  currently part of the public’s 
property portfolio.  Such spaces could be repurposed - in the spirit of digital art - 
towards  an arts  centre that foregrounds digital and electronic arts practices, theory and 
education.
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9.4  Why is Digital Art Undersupported? An Institutional Perspective
9.4.1 Introduction
In chapters  4 and 8 I outlined what I considered to be certain specificities of the digital 
aesthetic.  These included specific object characteristics  of digital art, such as  the 
interactive dimension to the work, complexities  surrounding where the digital artwork 
resides, and the technological complexity of digital art.  As outlined in chapter 4, certain 
digital artworks require a response from the spectator as  they employ high levels of 
interactivity.  The artworks also potentially only exist for a set amount of time that is 
linked to availability of digital technologies.  Sometimes the digital artwork exists in an 
ephemeral state such as computer code, in the case of net art.  I therefore suggest that 
the object characteristics recounted in the previous chapter, and in chapter 4 can raise 
issues  at an art institution level that potentially make it difficult for the art institution to 
mount or to collect a digital art piece.  It is these findings on representation at this  meso 
level that I now analyse.
9.4.2 Understanding Digital Art
In this section, I outline the broad mix and spread of opinions  on digital art that 
emerged from curators and arts workers  at an institutional level, ranging from an 
acknowledgement of a specific digital aesthetic, to a problematisation of working with 
digital artworks.  In relation to an aesthetic dimension, Carolyn Jones from the RUA 
Red arts  centre attests to the specific aesthetic of some digital art, whilst also 
problematising it in the context of more traditional art forms.  ‘I can look at a DaVinci 
in a book and go wow, that’s extraordinary‘ revealed Jones, ‘but if I see a circuit bending 
thing, that’s great but to be honest it just looks like some junk wired together’.  For Jones 
then, whilst digital art can concern itself with exposing the hidden dimension to 
technology, the aesthetic problem arising from that exposition of the inward workings 
and components  of technological objects  is that the aesthetic form and effect are such 
that traditional art audiences are not familiar with.
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Another challenge of the digital aesthetic, according to Jones, concerns  the unfamiliarity 
with the object characteristic previously posited which is the interactive nature of digital 
work, and how the work can not be fully appreciated and explored without the 
participatory dimension.  ‘I think that perhaps what the problem of some of this  work is 
that it’s very interactive’ posited Jones.  ‘You do have to actually be with it and 
experience it and participate in it or participate in the process of creating it to really 
understand it’.  Thus, the object characteristic of interactivity that I earlier suggested, in 
combination with a specifically digital aesthetic can lead to a poor understanding of 
digital art.
I also spoke to digital art curator who runs an electronic art festival in the South West of 
the country.  This  curator cites  digital art as situated within a broader ethos of 
collaboration, and for her, that is  what marks  digital art out from other art forms.  She 
explains how ‘the history of open source […] was a response to something’, and that 
response is also present in digital art.  For this participant, ‘I think that’s  what makes  it 
unique, about digital art, or even about open source software or open source hardware. 
It’s still that ethos of sharing and collaboration, and that’s what moves it forward as 
well’.  Thus, the ethos of open-source and collaboration that was  discussed in Chapter 8 
is here picked up at a curatorial level in this instance, and cited as  an example of a 
specificity of digital art that marks  it apart from other art forms.  For this participant, 
this  marks the digital and electronic practices as  an artistic medium in its  own right, but 
that in an institutional context the art is  not accepted as such, and therefore not valued. 
When asked as to why she thinks this might be the case, she suggests  that ‘I think it’s 
because they just don’t understand it as  a medium’.  Thus, for this  participant, 
understanding and acceptance of digital art, as a medium in its  own right, including the 
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collaborative and open source practices, is  necessary at an institutional level to expand 
the representation of  digital art in art institutions 115.
I support this  view by contrasting it with another viewpoint that I encountered in an 
interview with Tessa Giblin, curator at the Project Arts Centre in Dublin.  Giblin reveals 
that ‘my primary interest as a curator is  in contemporary art, and the medium that is 
used is  always a secondary consideration’.  Therefore, for Giblin, the concept or the idea 
behind the work is primary, and the medium through which that idea is executed is  of 
lesser importance.  Thus, the natural trajectory for Giblin in considering digital 
technologies is  as  tools, and not as a medium.  ‘What I’m most interested in with digital 
media at the moment is how this  can be used as  a transferral tool’ she explains about her 
relationship with digital media.  For Giblin, ‘the transition to digital format has reached 
a level that the loss of quality is not as  paramount as it was  before’.  Thus, the digital 
technologies can be employed as tools  for displaying, archiving and collecting visual 
work that otherwise would have been much more problematic to exhibit in the gallery 
due to unreliability, cost and obsolescence116.  However, for Giblin, digital technologies 
do not constitute an art medium within the canon of contemporary art where she has 
situated her interest.  I suggest that this viewpoint highlights the conceptual tensions at a 
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115 The foregrounding of open-source resources was also foregrounded in a different context by Carolyn 
Jones at RUA Red, who attested to the potential of  such tools in her work.  She explained:
“I love open source stuff.  I  use quite a lot of it, personally and in work, and I think it represents a lot of 
opportunity because it’s so changeable.   I think the joy of it is being able to play with it and change it, 
because you don’t just get it and it does  a function and it can do anything really for you, and I find it all 
kind of  exciting”
Her insight into the open-source ethos and community also had resonances in explaining the attraction of 
open-source resources for artists, noting that ‘people are really enthusiastic about actually making it work 
for you, because if they get to do that function or they write that script it opens up another element to that 
software which they may not have thought of ’.  Extending the conversation from open-source software to 
software and tools that facilitated her work at a curatorial level, Jones spoke to me about how freely-
available tools can facilitate collaboration and participation at a gallery level.  She explained how ‘most of 
us have laptops, most of us have cameras built in.  We’ve had a conversation the other day where we said 
“we can just Skype in the New York exhibition”.  We can task each other to do things on different days 
and we can come back and wave at each other on the camera, and it can be as simple as that’.
116  Giblin explained that the artists she is familiar with have been working historically on formats such as 
35mm and 16mm.  However, in her role as visual arts curator at the Project, she has  ‘completely decided 
not to work with artists using 35mm in the gallery any more, because of the expense’, and because the 
quality improvements  suggested above mean that the transferral to digital formats no longer represent 
such a huge compromise on visual quality.   She observed that there are many compromises in an 
exhibition installation and that this  compromise was one she was prepared to investigate. She did note a 
sadness in relation to a reluctance for galleries to adopt this  strategy, because of ‘some really great 
artworks that have been made’  and the fact that these films ‘are just being lost to the entire generations 
because no one can afford to do it any more, and the risk of breaking, and the vulnerability of the 
medium’.  Thus,  for Giblin, transferring such works to a digital format could allow these works to 
continue to be disseminated, and therefore, the digital media are of benefit to her, the artist and the 
gallery audience as tools.
meso level, revealing how the gap in understanding between the two levels  is evident 
from the perspective of  the meso level.
Emer McGarry, curator at The Model arts centre in Sligo, expresses a positive stance 
and an openness  to exhibiting digital art including practices beyond video art.  She 
stated that along the moving image, she would ‘also think of sound art or I might think 
of installation work that doesn’t necessarily have moving image or sound elements but 
that would employ technology in some way’.  However, she suggests  that technology 
‘should be just a means  to an end, rather than an end.  If it becomes an end in itself, it 
just becomes a gimmick in an artwork world’.  Thus  at the institutional level, a perceived 
fetishisation of technology within a digital art piece is  potentially read as  excessively 
techno-centric, gimmicky and trite.  
However some digital art practice aims to critique technology through exploring 
technology.  Thus, I suggest that what constitutes  a technological ‘gimmick’ in a digital 
artwork when viewed through a traditional art aesthetic is viewed differently through a 
critical aesthetic analysis of  digital art that takes account of  its specificities117.
Thus there are several considerations  to be aware of when examining the understanding 
of digital art at a meso level.  The contemporary art debates  surrounding the art 
‘medium’ appear to be uncritically transplanted to digital art.  This leads to an 
understanding of digital art as a fetishisation of technological means  where the aesthetic 
dimension of digital art is  not considered as  different to contemporary art aesthetics, as 
is  required of it - see section 5 of chapter 4.  This misunderstanding of the aesthetics of 
the digital medium thus lead to an impoverishment of representation at institutional 
level.  In the next section I recount issues  of collection and acquisition of digital works 
that also prove to be a barrier to representation of  digital art.
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117  This is not to say that when all digital art is  considered in this way, the misunderstandings it are 
reversed and somehow it is revealed in some true and profoundly revolutionary light.  I have also seen 
some bad digital art - at a presentation of various digital artists’ work in the Hello Operator gallery in 
Dublin, I was most disappointed by one artist from Holland who completely overplayed the intentionality 
on her part when revealing to the audience visual examples of computer code malfunctions,  or ‘glitches’. 
This artist also supported the validity of her artistic oeuvre by comparing her ‘glitch’ art to the uneasy, 
jarring aesthetic of the Daniel Libeskind designed Jewish Museum in Berlin.  My disappointment was  also 
due to having many years ago in the late 1990s  encountered ‘glitches’  in earlier versions  of software 
imaging programs.  I recalled how at the time of my discovery of these ‘glitches’, I wondered if this could 
be appropriated as art.  I decided that in all conscience I could not determine such glitches  as art, as they 
required no intentionality on my part,  nor did they posses any theoretical, ethical or revelatory dimension 
that could possibly add any contribution to the art canon, digital or otherwise.
9.4.3 Issues of  Collection and Acquisition
In chapter 4 I posited that object characteristics, where the art work resides, and 
technological complexity were all characteristics of digital art.  I now draw on the 
primary research to argue here that such characteristics  can be problematic in terms of 
collecting an artwork in an institutional context.  Emer McGarry suggests that despite 
the threat of the ‘gimmick’ in digital art, ‘ideally, we would love to be able to collect 
digital art and to enable artists, to give them a fellowship, and to commission more 
digital art’ at The Model gallery.  However, McGarry provides  an example of digital art 
that in the context of the more ‘traditional’ video art could even be problematic for a 
longer-term acquisition strategy for The Model.  
She explains  how ‘in terms of collecting it, we definitely have the added problem of, we 
would have to buy a synchronization machine’ in order to handle multichannel video 
that may be synchronised by motion or pressure sensors118.  Another aspect of the 
collection dilemma for galleries such as The Model concerns issues related technological 
obsolescence.  McGarry gives  an account of a digital artist that had exhibited in The 
Model, Nina Canell119.  She had been impressed by the work and had expressed a desire 
to collect it.  However, McGarry problematises storage and obsolescence regarding such 
works.  ‘Thinking about some particular works of art that would be lovely to have in our 
collection, say Ninas  work, where the technology becomes obsolete’, suggests McGarry, 
‘you’ve got a huge maintenance issues  with it then, and you would have to think about 
storing that work because it can be very bulky as well’.  Thus, issues of maintenance and 
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118 As an example of such a work that had been exhibited by The Model, McGarry spoke about a Jaki 
Irvine piece they exhibited.  McGarry explained how ‘all her work, it does employ a high level of 
technology, and again it has a sync unit and that was quite complex. I mean, all the disks  had to be 
programmed with the unit. So it was like a hard drive and the units told each disc when it needed to come 
on and off ’. However, this  heavy time investment in the technology was worth it for McGarry.  She 
revealed how ‘for Jackie’s [piece] it was really effective. It was very beautiful. We had loads  of screens  in 
one big gallery and it followed a birds path in flight. So he’d vanish for a little while and then come back, 
so it was lovely. So she is  a great example of how artists can use technology to create really strong, 
beautiful, very moving works’.
119 Canell is originally from Sweden, but moved to Dublin in 2005.  Her practice incorporates  sculptural 
elements, often with electronic components.  One review, in Circa magazine, 2008, described Canell as 
‘bright as a new pin’.   The review of her work Slight Heat of The Eyelid described how ‘most of Canell’s 
pieces have wire exiting from them and some form of electronics involved’.  Yet also observed by the 
reviewer was how Canell ‘liberates us  from the potentially baffling physics  with obscure but descriptive 
titles and reassuringly familiar objects’.  Source: http://www.recirca.com/reviews/2008/texts/
canell.shtml retrieved April 26th 2011.
of obsolescence of technology, along with the physical dimensions  of digital art work 
can be problematic for an art institution.
Carolyn Jones  also problematises the aesthetic of digital art in terms  of collecting and 
archiving.  Jones  advocates the use of documentation, also suggesting that technologies 
are now currently available to archivists to enable more thorough documentation of 
digital works.  Jones suggests  a solution to the problem of archival by suggesting that ‘it’s 
how we put that across in documents.  In some ways it’s  great because if you have video 
recordings, interviews, people seeing people actually interacting, which we have, […] I 
think it’s a better way for people to learn’.  Thus, whilst a digital artwork can be 
temporally ephemeral, the concomitant increase in digital archival tools  can enable a 
rich archive around the artwork to exist, textually and visually.
Thus, while the capital cost of the technological equipment may be absorbed in 
expenditure budgets  for a gallery, the ongoing cost of skilled labour for maintaining the 
equipment may also be prohibitive enough to prevent a gallery from investigating digital 
art not only for collections but for exhibitions.  I therefore suggest that even if a gallery 
does  not wish to collect a piece of digital art, the mere prospect of exhibiting a work can 
seem daunting, thus discouraging the gallery from investigating the exhibition of digital 
and electronic art120.
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120 This is  not to say that the problem of acquisition and collection is solely at the institutional level.  One 
participant revealed quite a shocking story whereby she discovered that a 9-channel work had been 
‘ripped’ by the institution for their use online.  In this  case, the institution had decided to take the issue of 
‘archival’ into their own hands by copying the work, illegally.  I suggest that example was one of the 
institution attempting to repurpose the digital work, perhaps due to issues of money, or as  Lovejoy pointed 
out, the form of representation has fundamentally shifted with digital, the artwork ‘residing’ on a DVD or 
hard disk until it is brought to representation.  Perhaps for this institution, the artwork was not ‘real’  whilst 
it was a DVD copy or in low-definition online.
9.5  Conclusion - an Opportunity for Representation
In this  chapter I have drawn on the primary research materials to examine aspects of 
issues  related to the relationship between the micro and meso levels of enquiry by 
providing accounts of the support and representation of digital art from both directions. 
The chapter finds  and argues that support of digital art practices can be problematised 
through (1) the lens  of contemporary art discourse and (2) a lens of postcoloniality in 
Irish art critique.  
The chapter also argues that certain attitudes on the part of digital artists in Ireland 
have led to a strategy of disengagement with the broader art world in Ireland.  I indicate 
how the artists proactively look abroad for reward and recognition in the perceived 
absence of such in Ireland, and how they also collaborate not only on artistic projects, 
but on strategic ones.  I outlined how artists  view the need for physical space as an 
important one, and noted that several artists  have looked to models of digital art spaces 
abroad for potential models of  how one could be implemented in Ireland.  
The chapter also analysed how at the meso level of the art institution, art curators can 
have material difficulty with exhibiting, collecting and archiving digital art, and that 
issues  of representation are due to the perceived complexities of digital works  in terms 
of technical support and maintenance of the works.  This  draws  on a theoretical 
perspective from chapter 4 which posited certain features or characteristics of  digital art.
To conclude, I suggest that a remedy to the perceived lack of support and representation 
may lie in the fallout from the Irish economic crisis itself.  With physical spaces 
becoming available, there are opportunities for digital artists  to form a collective that can 
model itself on international exemplars such as  V2, Rhizome, Eyebeam or MediaLab 
Prado.  With the combination of practical, theoretical and residency aspects of the 
institution, this space could become an internationally known resource for digital art, 
encouraging a discourse with the wider art world.
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Chapter 10: The Political Economy of  Art
10.1 Introduction: Political Engagement with the Arts in Ireland
10.1.1 Introduction: A History of  Foregrounding the Arts
This  chapter aims to analyse the macro-level political and economic discourses 
pertaining to both digital art and its broader situatedness within art and cultural 
discourses.  This is  in keeping with themes from chapters 3 and 4, where it was argued 
that art can not be considered as  outside both political and economic concerns.  Current 
discourses in Ireland have been making explicit calls to the arts  and cultural services  to 
act as a ‘rescue’ when political and economic measures, including massive bank bailouts, 
have failed to shore up confidence in the Irish financial and economic model.  For these 
and other reasons, I suggest that the current crisis in Ireland is  not merely economic, but 
social and cultural.  In this chapter I analyse how the arts  in Ireland have fared in the 
midst of this crisis; at once they are lauded as a saviour with the insight and inspiration 
to lead the way where our political institutions have failed, while also having to work 
against massive threats to funding.  
When the government budget was  announced in December 2009, both the Irish Film 
Board and Culture Ireland despite the recommendations of the McCarthy report.  The 
department of the arts was also spared, and surprisingly, the overall budget of the Arts 
Council, rumoured to be facing radical downsizing, was only cut by approximately 
5.6%121.  I suggest that this turn to culture has not happened without historical 
precedent.  Cultural studies discourses since 1980 have foregrounded and emphasised 
the role of  culture in social and economic development122.
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121  Source: National Campaign for the Arts, December 2009 http://www.ncfa.ie/index.php/blog/
comments/national-campaign-for-the-arts-response-to-budget-2010-press-release/ 
122 While this  ‘cultural turn’ has had the benefits  of widening the discourse in relation to the importance 
of culture - against a reductionist economistic model of culture - I  believe that the foregrounding of 
culture to the exclusion of where and how culture is politically and socially situated is equally reductionist 
and does not afford due consideration to the complexities of the production of culture within a complex 
civic and political society.  This is  in keeping with Frankfurt School theory, which as  we saw in chapter 3 
could not treat the production of culture as a realm apart from the society and the political zeitgeist in 
which it was being produced.
In addressing the current policy turn to the arts and cultural sector in Ireland, I note 
how this  ‘turn to culture’ is not without historical precedence in the Irish state.  1981 
saw the establishment of an Arts  Council-funded body called Aosdána, founded to 
reward excellence in the arts.  The reward for excellence is  not just a symbolic gesture 
invoked by the prestige of membership; those who are recognised by being admitted 
into Aosdána also receive an annual stipend, called the cnuas, which currently stands at 
€10,180123.  Membership of Aosdána is  limited to 250 artists across various disciplines, 
and is negotiated through a process of peer-review124  and election.  Within this  group of 
250 artists  is a subset of 7 members called saoi, whose title is bestowed by the president 
for an outstanding contribution to the arts.  Aosdána was established by the then prime-
minister of Ireland, Charles Haughey during a time of severe economic recession.  In a 
later interview, Haughey explained the difficulties in doing this, yet emphasised the 
importance of the arts, explaining that ‘the establishment of Aosdána was  a major 
innovation and a very significant element of my policy of enhancing the status  of 
creative people in our society.  It was intended to be their own independent academy, 
elected by themselves’ (Ryan, 2003: 83).
When asked whether establishing Aosdána fit in with the economic zeitgeist at the time, 
Haughey says  ‘Not really.  You must remember that in the 1980s, […] the country was 
in a very depressed state, with massive unemployment, high emigration, huge deficits, 
crushing borrowings, a generally pretty bleak outlook.  In these grim circumstances 
economic development had to take priority; the provision of jobs and sorting out the 
nation’s finances.  It was not very easy to find money for culture and the arts but we 
managed to lay the foundations for a brighter future’ (ibid.: 84).
Yet, Haughey did persist with his commitment to the arts.  Why?  As  Haughey 
explained, ‘in Ireland, we have had a sad history of our creative people going abroad 
either for economic reasons or from what they felt was  an unsympathetic or even hostile 
climate.  I felt that it was necessary to radically change all that.  I wished the modern 
Irish State to make a positive gesture to our creative people.  I wished it to say to them, 
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123 Source, Arts Council of  Ireland http://aosdana.artscouncil.ie/Cnuas.aspx
124 See Chapter 9 for a problematisation of  the peer-review system by Jaki Irvine.
in effect, “you are valued members of our community.  Your contribution is  of unique 
importance.  We wish you to stay and work here at home”’ (ibid.: 80).
Thus, I suggest that the current ‘turn to culture’ in Ireland has a precedent.  The 
‘cultural turn’ of the 1980s  facilitated a discourse around the foregrounding of art and 
culture.  Combined with the sympathy of the then prime-minister towards art, policies 
that supported the arts - even though they were introduced at a time of crisis  - had long-
term implications  for the artist in Ireland.  I suggest that this  prior foregrounding of the 
arts  set a precedent that had implications  for the events surrounding the role of the arts 
in the current crisis.
10.1.2 Contemporary Discourses on Art and Crisis
I now turn to present discourses  on art in Ireland at this time of crisis, in order to situate 
digital art within a broader macro-level discourse.  As I examine below, political 
institutions, broadcasting and print media, along with artists  themselves  have all been 
foregrounding the role of the arts  and culture during this  current crisis.  As  one national 
newspaper exhorted shortly after a government think-thank on reviving the economy, 
‘the arts cement our reputation abroad, are crucial to our smart economy, provide 
employment at home, fuel cultural tourism, and help form the nation’s  psyche – they are 
vital to our national recovery’ (Irish Times, September 23 2009).
This  foregrounding of the ‘arts-as-rescuer’ trope has also been prioritised on RTÉ, 
Ireland’s state broadcaster.  As  I examine later, RTÉ has  in recent times devoted 
significant time to coverage and debate on the arts and its role in rethinking ‘brand 
Ireland’.  This programming strategically occurred during the week of the Irish national 
holiday, and on a peak morning-time radio magazine entitled Morning Ireland.  A 
subsequent debate was held in April 2010 on RTÉ’s peak Drivetime evening radio show.
Political institutions have also been engaging with the role of arts, seemingly attesting to 
their importance in an ignoring of the advice of economist and Bord Snip Nua chairman, 
Colm McCarthy’s recommendations  on the abolition of several cultural institutions. 
One government response to the McCarthy report was to convene a myriad of Irish 
innovators for a forum on innovation, recovery, and ‘rebranding’ Ireland’s  image 
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abroad.  This  was not an isolated event - Irish government policy has shown that 
innovation is  considered to be important, with Forfás  (Ireland's national policy advisory 
body for enterprise and science) noting that ‘while enterprises and individuals  are the 
primary sources  of innovation, public policy can establish the right framework 
conditions for innovation to flourish’ (Department of Enterprise, Trade and 
Employment 2008: 2).  Whilst this sort of vague recommendation and commendation is 
something to be wary of, it does highlight that discourses around creativity, innovation, 
and the importance of fostering these traits  in the workforce are of some importance to 
the government.  
10.1.2.1 Global Irish Forum, Brand Ireland and Imagine Ireland
The current sense in Ireland that artists can contribute to improving the economic, 
social and cultural lot of the people therefore has a historical backdrop along with a 
contemporary foregrounding mapped to discourses around innovation and the ‘smart’ 
economy.  The policies  introduced in the 1980s, including Aosdána, and a tax 
exemption scheme for artists showed that there existed a political will to engage with the 
arts, even when economically challenging to do so.  The first department for the arts in 
was  established in Ireland at that time, further acknowledging the status  of the arts 
within the political zeitgeist.  So, turning to the current climate where Colm McCarthy 
recommended the undoing of so many of those long-term policies, I explore how the 
current government has been situating the role of  arts in the current moment of  crisis.
One answer to this lies  in the Global Irish Economic Forum, organised with major 
support from the department of Foreign Affairs  in September 2009.  This  forum 
encouraged members  of the Irish diaspora to contribute their thoughts  to a quasi ‘think-
tank’ on economic recovery.  The forum included prominent business professionals, but 
significantly, cultural producers  were also invited to take part, with one of the eleven 
working groups focused on ‘what role can Ireland’s  cultural and artistic capital play in 
developing our economy?’.
A major theme that emerged from the forum was  the ‘recognition of the importance of 
culture in promoting Ireland abroad and developing a unique brand for the country in 
new markets’.  The report continued by noting how ‘most participants  agreed that our 
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unique and strong cultural identity provides the Government and the private sector with 
a strong competitive advantage abroad’125.  Thus, the interplay of the arts  and the state 
was  foregrounded during these discussions.  To implement this foregrounding of the arts 
and culture as  a marker for national identity abroad, one initiative proposed was to 
‘establish world class centre or University for the performing arts and Irish culture 
housed in a landmark building in Ireland, to become a global centre for artistic and 
creative education, innovation and technology’.
The Forum also included a panel discussion on the topic of ‘Promoting Brand Ireland 
through our Global Cultural Profile’.  The report on this  panel observed that ‘speakers 
were united in agreement on the importance of arts  and culture, not merely for arts 
sake. It was  forcefully argued that this  asset should be harnessed as  a unique brand 
identifier, a significant employer and selling point for Ireland abroad’.  Once again, the 
infamous McCarthy report was also discussed, with one newspaper reporting how 
‘reference was made to “terrible consequences” resulting if the recommendations of the 
McCarthy Report in the cultural sphere were implemented’.  Another feature of the 
panel discussion was that of the conflating of the cultural and economic spheres, with 
the report disclosing that ‘participants  strongly argued that the arts are no longer a 
luxury or a charity, but are a hugely important part of the economy’.  There was also 
some dissent amongst the discussion group in relation to the question of Ireland being 
‘rebranded’ at all, the report stating that ‘a number of speakers questioned the view that 
Ireland should be ‘re-created’ as  a brand, which would by nature be inauthentic, and 
emphasised the importance of authenticity in delivering a positive tourist experience for 
people visiting’.
These discussions  culminated in March 2010 with the installation of a cultural 
ambassador for Ireland - the actor Gabriel Byrne - whose remit was  to represent Ireland 
abroad for cultural matters.    This was followed by a more ambitious  venture, entitled 
Imagine Ireland, a €4 million126  investment designed to foreground Irish arts  in 
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125 A similar theme featured in information society policy discourses from the 1990s, not only in Ireland 
but in other countries’ ‘information society’ strategies.
126 http://www.arts-sport-tourism.gov.ie/publications/release.asp?ID=101024 
America127.  I suggest that a contextualisation of the current discourses in the Irish 
political, media and artistic spheres through an analysis  based on the investigations of 
Benjamin and Adorno reveals weaknesses  in the discourses surrounding the ‘arts  as 
rescuer’ trope.  Whilst in many areas the apparent ‘turn to culture’ in crisis provided for 
a frank discussion of the ways in which Ireland could be economically improved, I 
suggest that in the context of Benjamin and Adorno’s critique of culture, to mobilise 
culture for the purposes  of economic gain is  problematic.  While Benjamin pointed to 
the potential of culture to liberate society, Adorno critiqued this romanticism, firmly 
providing the caveat that when the profit motive of cultural production was primary, it 
no longer fulfilled its highest goal of reifying the incongruencies of civic and political 
spheres.  For Adorno, if culture was  mobilised not to critique social inadequacies, but to 
be profitable, culture would become regressive and non-innovative.  Therefore, for the 
Irish government - whose industrial policies currently focus on fostering economic 
growth via inward investment and innovation - the use of culture in such a way 
potentially brings about a culture that merely conforms to capitalist ideology, thus 
annihilating innovative potential128, according to Adorno.
10.1.2.2 Media Engagement with Art and Crisis
From the 15th to the 19th of March 2010, Ireland’s  national broadcaster RTÉ featured 
in its  flagship morning radio news programme Morning Ireland, a series of interviews 
that explored the role of the arts  and culture in reviving Ireland’s economy during this 
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127  The program, launched on January 7th 2011 aimed to include over one thousand artists  and 
performers in 400 events in 40 states, and is currently ongoing at the time of writing.  On the Imagine 
Ireland website itself,  reference is given to its strategic origins in Farmleigh, noting that the venture 
‘followed on the Global Irish Economic Forum at Farmleigh, Dublin,  in September 2009, which placed a 
new strategic priority on culture as a unique long-term strength for Ireland, a vital door-opener for Irish 
business, and the most effective means of  strengthening links with the global Irish community’.
128 This  is not to say that I oppose state-sponsored arts.   A recent discussion by economist John O’Hagan 
at Trinity College Dublin suggested that there is  a conflict, not between ‘high’ and ‘low’ art, but between 
commercial arts and state arts.   He attested to the role of the arts as social innovator, its role of critique, 
and the economic spill-over of the arts into other areas of employment.   This  provided an argument in 
favour of state-sponsored arts in their role as  a test-bed for the commercial sector.   O’Hagan posited that 
the state must therefore play the lead role in encouraging the arts,  as  the state arts somewhat act as  a ‘loss 
leader’ but that they are a magnet for other industries.  However, I note that in their role of ‘test-bed’, the 
arts at this  incubatory stage need to have the freedom to not be entangled with the economic sphere, and 
according to the report on the Global Irish Economic Forum, this important distinction of the role of 
culture was overlooked.
time of crisis129.  The included cultural producers, some of whom also spoke at 
Farmleigh, voiced a unanimous opposition to what were perceived as short-cuts  on 
public spending in the McCarthy report.  They also mooted somewhat of a 
dissatisfaction with monetising culture in order to ‘rebrand’ Ireland for a profit motive. 
These series of radio interviews were significant in several ways.  First, they were 
broadcasted throughout the week of Ireland’s  national holiday, which was  a strategic 
move given that it was noted at the Forum that ‘of the three million people who 
regularly access the RTÉ website, 40% are based overseas’.  Second, RTÉ continues  to 
have the full interviews available, despite having a general policy of listening back for a 
week.  This availability encouraged those of the 40% of distant listeners  to listen to the 
discussions, even if they missed them during the typical week long availability period. 
Third, the interviews foregrounded the arts as  a way of ‘rebranding’ Ireland, and 
therefore took a position of investigating arts  and culture as an economic entity with the 
potential to drive economic renewal and growth.
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129  One interview focused on the economics  of encouraging the arts.  Finbarr Bradley, a heterodox 
economist, argued that human relationships are more important than technology, and that digital media 
can distribute the ‘stories’ and meaning that he believes Ireland is  good at.  He also suggested that public 
policy discourses around innovation and creativity are centred around words such as the ‘knowledge 
economy’ and the ‘smart economy’ and are centred around the technology, not the emotion.  Bradley 
however,  was of the opinion that this  should be the other way around for Ireland - to focus on our 
strength, which for him was the expression of emotion.  Bradley,  while an economist himself, was critical 
of the McCarthy report on public spending cuts in terms of the arts.   He suggested that the problem with 
such a report is that it is fundamentally flawed from a policy perspective to use the short term to do 
damage in the long term.  James Hickey, an expert in entertainment law suggested that Ireland needed to 
recognise the existing strength of the creative industries  and the arts.  Hickey cited a report from 
European Commission suggesting that creative industries are worth 2.6% of overall GDP.  In Ireland, 
Indecon did a study of the economic impact of the arts in Ireland that found that the arts  account for 
3.5% of GDP.  The report also found that between direct & indirect employment there are nearly 
100,000 people in Ireland working in the creative industries.  Hickey then called for policy that 
encourages  growth in that industry and that existing schemes to encourage the arts  be left in place. 
Hickey was critical of Colm McCarthy’s report that suggested removing the dept of arts, sport & tourism, 
the tax incentives for artists, or the film board  Fiach Mac Conghail, Artistic Director of the Abbey 
Theatre8, posited that Irish society is  currently ‘fractured’, but that the arts  can provide an enlightenment, 
through the dramatisations of events  on stage, that allows the audience to introspect on themselves, and 
their role in society.  While he admits that theatre can not offer a solution to the economic, cultural and 
societal woes currently in Ireland, it ‘can offer a roadmap or revelation’.  Colm Tóibín, an author, 
suggested that Ireland has recently suffered a blow to its image abroad due to the banking crisis,  and the 
sexual abuse scandals  in the church.  He posited that in terms  of improving this  image, the arts have been 
crucial.  Tóibín was also very critical of the McCarthy report,  asserting that institutions that were 
threatened in the report are strategically vital for the country, and need to be maintained.  He also 
suggested that within universities, the arts and humanities faculties  needed to be protected, as  they 
‘produce the sort of intellectual capital that is  very hard to measure in the same way as the engineering 
departments’.   He observed that positive policies in terms of the arts were put in place and that ‘to begin 
dismantling any of that would be extremely dangerous’.   Neil Jordan, a film-maker and producer and film 
maker, spoke in response to the discussion at the Global Irish Economic Forum of cultural ‘products’.   He 
found a difficulty with the idea of ‘monetising culture’ and using culture as a product.  When asked about 
continuing with institutions such as Aosdána, Jordan posited that such an institution provides a stable 
income for a practicing artist and should be retained, noting that ‘as every country has to have a hospital 
service, every country has to have cultural funding, doesn’t it?  Isn’t that one of the definitions of being a 
country?’.
I suggest that the Irish state broadcaster has been seen to be interrogating the role of 
arts  and culture in ‘rebranding’ Ireland.  However, if we once again turn to Benjamin 
and Adorno, we are drawn to the question of the manufacturing of an ‘affirmative’ 
culture.  If the state broadcaster sets an agenda of culture-as-economic-rescuer, there is 
the danger of that broadcaster setting an agenda whereby culture is  seen only for its 
economic potential, and not for the wider civic, social and even ethical insights  it can 
provide.  Again, Adorno provides  a caveat - it is  not a given that culture in the form of 
an autonomous art will provide these insights, but it does  in potential have this  ability, 
whereas  a culture based on profit or, for that matter, state direction, does  not.  Also, 
considering Benjamin’s  concept of aura in this  context, I suggest that as the national 
public service broadcaster, RTÉ may possess  both the sense of authenticity, of historical 
testimony and indeed the cultural objects themselves  that make the possibility of their 
agenda having an auratic component.  Therefore, to frame the interviews in Benjamin’s 
context, the state broadcaster can use this  aura - this sense of authenticity - to promote 
culture-as-economic-rescuer in such a way as  to preclude the more dialectic approach of 
culture-as-potential-to-inform-about-other-possibilities.  Thus, as predicted by Adorno, 
the relationship between civic society and culture becomes ‘petrified’ into that mode, 
and other discourses around culture are lost.
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10.2  The Role of  Art at a Time of  Crisis
10.2.1 Introduction
As outlined earlier, there has been a recent ‘turn to culture’ in Irish political discourse 
and practice, which has seen the arts  foregrounded as  economic ‘rescuer’ during 
Ireland’s financial crisis.  I here interrogate and problematise this trope of ‘arts  as 
rescuer’ somewhat more granularly in this section, by looking once more to artists’ 
opinions on what they consider to be their ‘role’ - if any - at this time.  As I analysed 
earlier in chapter 8, a cohort of digital artists  felt that their ‘role’ was  to critique 
technology’s role in society through the use, manipulation and undermining of 
technological means  and systems.  In this section, I analyse how I expanded the enquiry 
to ask digital artists and arts  workers where they see their role at the time of crisis, when 
arts have been foregrounded at a macro political-economic level.
10.2.2 Artist Perspectives
As analysed in chapter 3, the ‘role’ of the artist according to the Frankfurt School of 
critical theory is  a complex one, involving societal critique and interrogation, whilst also 
comprising a somewhat visionary role, where the potential meaning of society could be 
explored and envisioned.  We also saw how the Frankfurt School also distanced itself 
from a Marxist-Leninist interpretation of the role of art, which saw the only valid art as 
overtly political art.  Drawing from this  theoretical perspective, I aimed to draw from 
artists and arts workers a temporally situated account of the relevance of such 
discourses on art.  As  Frankfurt School theorists wrote at a time of great economic, 
social and political instability, I explore whether or how their observations had relevance 
to the current mode of instability, or if postmodern critique and globalised culture 
placed the discourse around ‘role’ in art as obsolete.
Gerard Byrne reveals  how he is not ‘phobic’ about discourses  of ‘role’ or ‘function’ in 
art, rather suggesting that ‘to work around those ideas of role and function might be a 
useful thing to do, when at the same time being very circumspect and very critical about 
any claims or conclusions within that field’.   As  an example, Byrne posits  a theoretical 
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position on the role of art which suggests  that all artworks  act as  a ‘model’ for other 
artworks.  He observes that this position is  in contrast to a more typical suggestion of the 
role of art as  a special, rarefied ‘encounter’ with a combination of knowledge and the 
sublime.  For Byrne, the current mode of capitalism has  brought about a ‘ubiquity about 
the means  by which the work is made’.   This situation makes  the means  through which 
the work has been made, unremarkable.  For Byrne however, this  brings about a zeitgeist 
in which his  work is ‘something to be read’ as  ‘something legible within a broader 
cultural syntax’, as opposed to a rarefied, auratic object130.   Byrne suggests that 
interrogating the role or function of art in this way can yield oblique, tangental and 
unfamiliar insights.  The discourse opened up is of a different ‘tradition’ in terms of the 
role or function of art, to that tradition that presumes that the art aspires to be unique 
and unprecedented experiential encounter.   In this way, Byrne attests to the ongoing 
intellectual validity of  interrogating the role of  art.
However, in the current crisis he finds  it ‘curious as  to why on the one hand [the 
McCarthy report on public spending] was  commissioned, and on the other hand, largely 
ignored’.   For Byrne, it is  ‘conspicuous from afar that the same government that 
commissioned this  McCarthy character to do this audit, then basically pretty much 
ignored all his recommendations’.   Byrne suggests  that ‘the real cynic would wonder if 
the report was commissioned precisely so that it could be ignored’.  
For Maeve Connolly, the social roles  of artistic practice are more ‘fluid’, instead 
Connolly positing that art has  ‘quite a communicative function’.  In Connolly’s  view, the 
practice of art can stand in a ‘counterpoint’ to Habermas’ theory of the continuity of 
rationality.  Whilst Connolly notes  that ‘a lot of artists  have really bought into the idea of 
the public sphere and the idea of constituting publics, and the potential that exists 
through art practice and engaging in that, or making it possible’, she suggests that this 
standpoint can be overly rational about the social function of art, which she found 
problematic.  For Connolly, the counterpoint is to interrogate the conditions of artistic 
production, the dependence on the economy, and changing labour practices, and to 
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130 Byrne described his  work as ‘primarily discursive’, and because of this, it acts  as  a type of model for 
other works. 
situate those interrogations with ‘the capacity to be social, but not just to be involved in 
this incredibly ruthless production of  the self  as a project’131.    
Regarding the current crisis in Ireland then, Connolly warns that the political turn to 
culture is ‘really dangerous in some ways’.  For Connolly, the danger exists  in the ring-
fencing of funds  away from the day-to-day needs  of artists and towards the production 
of a brand.  She posits that ‘if funding for example by organisations like Culture Ireland 
starts to become really heavily instrumentalised to communicate this message of “brand 
Ireland”, that’s  really at odds with the kind of resourcing artists need to operate in an 
international artworld’.  Thus, whilst turning the attention towards  exhibiting and 
showcasing existent cultural products abroad, the policy is  in danger of cutting off 
funding to emergent artists  and thus in a sense, cutting off the potential at source.  As 
Connolly observes, artists ‘cannot be too prominently marked by that kind of rhetoric 
without being disadvantaged’ when trying to establish themselves internationally.
However, whilst Byrne and Connolly engage with concepts  such as  the role of art and 
the potential of art, not all artists  are affirmative of the validity of discourses  of role or 
function.  Ciara McMahon explains how she becomes ‘really nervous’ around a 
discourse of ‘role’.  For McMahon, a discourse around the role of an artist ‘implies 
obligation’.  McMahon describes how she ‘would be very nervous about pejorative 
applications  of the word obligation and role’, as it potentially implies a loss of artistic 
autonomy.  McMahon elaborates on this point by explaining how she considers  the type 
of practice she engaged in as of her own free choice and free will.  Her motivation has 
‘come from medicine and the desire to interact with people’, which for her is not 
determined or determining, but a free choice to develop her practice in such a way. 
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131  Connolly suggested how interrogating this trope of ‘production of the self as a project’ in 
contemporary art reveals insights about deeper economic, monetary and capitalist modes  of production. 
She revealed how in working with young critics and curators, she saw their belief in needing to engage in 
a ‘period of hyper production, really a production of themselves  as a brand’.  She believed that the 
curators themselves believed ‘that they were operating and competing in this globalised economy as an 
independent curator’, and they also believed that they could work in such a hyper-productive mode ‘for a 
few years and then they get into an institution and well, then they could take a deep breath and relax’. 
However, partly due to the crisis, that trajectory was no longer likely, and this crisis  in curatorial ‘hyper-
practice’ then revealed a deeper role for artistic practice.  For Connolly, ‘what you end up is  having to stop 
and calm down a bit, and think how is  it possible for these interactions, these situations to have some kind 
of meaning or significance that isn't about propelling you to the next moment’.   Through a more 
Deleuzean theoretical influence, Connolly posited that this curatorial practice can be recalibrated away 
from the trope of becoming their own brand or self-as-project, through ‘understanding our [artistic] 
practice as a kind of offering a space or kind of moment in which it's  possible to think about these things, 
and to talk about them, and to question them’.  Thus,  artistic practice,  for Connolly, can provide a ‘gap’ in 
our contemporary world.
When asked about the potential role of the arts or the artist, McMahon stated ‘have I a 
duty to do it? No’.  For McMahon, the role of art is  not necessarily political.  ‘A 
beautiful aesthetic object or an ugly aesthetic object has as much a role as the type of 
work that I would do’ posits  McMahon.  She suggests how her life is ‘enriched’ by 
artistic objects  in her possession, objects  that ‘are aesthetically pleasing to me, they may 
not be to you, but to me, and that’s  a really important thing for me’.  Thus, for 
McMahon, the creation of aesthetic objects  is the important gesture ‘even if it’s 
connected politically with society, allegedly, or overtly’.  This gesture then becomes 
much bigger than a political one, as the aesthetic drive for her is  a universal.  ‘I think it’s 
a covertly embedded and really important part of being human, that we like beauty, that 
we like to be jarred by ugliness, we like that kind of  thing’ concludes McMahon. 
Another digital artist is also wary of the relationship between government sponsorship 
and artistic production.  In her view ‘I just think there is  a payoff, like somebody has to 
pay for stuff ’.  This  artist explains that there is, in her opinion, a trade-off between 
government grants  and autonomy.  With respect to the Brand Ireland concept then, she 
suggests that ‘if artists want to get something from the government, there is  always going 
to be a price’.  For this artist, the price is  that cultural products are potentially 
commercialised through the government endeavour to rebrand Ireland.  She is also 
wary of how the government situates culture, observing that ‘I don’t know if they do 
appreciate art, and if they do appreciate it, it’s just another marketing tool that they can 
use’.  Thus, for this artist, the relationship between artistic autonomy and state 
sponsorship with a particular agenda of  marketing and branding is problematic.
Therefore, whilst a discourse on the role of the artist at a time of crisis  can be 
problematic, I suggest that the insights from the practitioners  above show some 
consistency in terms of the potential of art to be transformative, to open up space, a gap 
in the current tropes of production and society, as argued of the potential of art in 
chapter 4.
10.2.3 The Place of  the Institution 
Moving on to examine how the arts institutions understand their place - or role - at the 
time of crisis, Tessa Giblin also warns  that the turn to culture in political discourse 
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through ‘brand Ireland’ is  problematic.  She suggests that whilst it could be seen as a 
positive gesture to have a ‘flagship’ type cultural enterprise to foreground the arts, ‘your 
flagship is also the thing you sink when it all goes  wrong’.  For Giblin, a better way of 
understanding the question of role, function or potential of art during this crisis  is to ask 
‘the fundamental question of why art?’.  Giblin suggests that at an individual level - for 
the practitioner themselves, the critic, the academic - the question should be 
contemplated.  She revealed how she practices a reflexivity around why she chooses  to 
work in the area of art, of all possible careers.  ‘The clearest thing I can say about it’ 
posits  Giblin ‘is  that it’s  the area in which I am most inspired to have an independent 
thought, something of my own that I came up with’132.  For Giblin then, a more 
fundamental question surrounding ‘brand Ireland’ is not if art should be marketed in 
such a way, but if art has the kind of potential to inspire independent, autonomous 
thought.  ‘And frankly I do’ concludes Giblin, adding how art, in its potential ‘teaches 
you to take responsibility for your own thought, and you own decision, and your own 
action’.
The result of this for Giblin is  that art can question ideologies, including those of 
authority itself.  She observes how ‘art can also provide a destabilisation of authority, 
and not just political’.  For Giblin, this  questioning of authority can extend to more 
subtle forms such as  ‘the authority of the aesthetic gaze’, or the authority of the artist’, 
or that of ‘who writes the narrative’.  Giblin posits that through that destabilisation of 
authority in the space of the gallery, the gallery audience maintains  an autonomy which 
can be practised in general forms.  ‘By destabilising that in the space of the gallery so 
that you don’t give over your spectators  autonomy to anyone, the curator, the artist, the 
actor onscreen, the material of the sculpture’, posits Giblin, ‘you don’t give over that 
autonomy.  I feel that you start to retain a little bit more autonomy in your everyday life 
as  well.  I mean the gallery world is not in everyday life, it’s  a special place that you enter 
into’.  Thus, for Giblin, the potential of art - the highest form of its role - involves 
questioning authority, including a political authority.  I therefore suggest that any ‘top-
down’ attempt to shape the arts  into a culture machine for branding a financially 
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132  Giblin explained how this  inspiration ‘might be well gazing at a film that I’m seeing for the third 
time,  that I’m being around but not totally concentrating on, it might be sitting in the corner of the 
gallery writing some notes  in my notebook having just seen a number of wonderful works intelligently put 
together’.  Giblin suggested that ‘ if you’re someone who values independent thought yourself, no matter 
how complex or simple, something that really sends a shiver down your spine and sets you on fire, that the 
sector that I’ve had it in - contemporary art’.
bankrupt country has very real and dangerous  pitfalls in the form of the propping up of 
political ideologies.
Other institutional representatives speak in a focused way about the role of their 
institution.  Alison Carey of the Science Gallery reveals how she would have ‘no qualms’ 
in positioning the Science Gallery as ‘provocateurs’ who ‘mean to put things  together 
and shake them up’.  This  provocation is not, for Carey, on the level of thought and 
critique only, but is  extended ‘to provoke action really’.  She reveals  how, in connecting 
art, science and technology, the gallery ‘want[s] to incite research, we want to incite 
discussion, but also we want to make things  happen’.  Carey reveals  how her role within 
that space is driven by a desire to ‘create some contexts  in which amazing things can 
happen, and if I can provide the right environment and the right tools  for something to 
happen...you can’t legislate for what this is going to be’.  An important part of this 
context for Carey is  that the work be brought to the public in an interactive and 
accessible way.  Therefore, through having a clear understanding of where the Science 
Gallery wants  to position itself, the gallery’s model of research and engagement has 
implications for policy, according to Carey.  ‘I mean, art is  research and it’s  research into 
a way of living and a way of doing things’, posits Carey, ‘and if you have a successful 
organisation that’s working in a creative way it’s  a huge area that you can look to for 
knowledge about how to do things in different industries’.  For Carey then, the policy to 
situate the arts  as  rescuer is ‘quite a romantic notion to be able to say that we’ll save 
ourselves through art’.  She suggests  that a more valuable focus at policy level is to 
investigate the way arts  institutions  are run as a business model.  Whilst she attests to 
‘audience respite’ as  a valid role for the arts, and how the idea of ‘providing something 
free like we are, that you can do that gives you an experience outside of what you’re 
facing I think is an important service to provide’, the most valuable offering by the arts 
to a broader policy level is ‘a model of adaptability’.  Carey notes how ‘the structure of 
our organisation is  highly tuned to be able to cope with any situation that is coming to 
us’.  Thus, for Carey, adapting the innovative, flexible and fluid business models of arts 
institutions serves as  a more valuable asset to draw on from the arts than the trope of 
cultural rescuer.
Emer McGarry suggests  that for her institution, there have been no direct challenges or 
changes to the role of The Model, apart from operating difficulties due to a decrease in 
funding across the board.  For McGarry, the broader threat to the arts  is the coupling of 
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arts  and tourism at a departmental level.  ‘I think there was a danger when it was culture 
and tourism together’ revealed McGarry ‘that there may be, I just want to word this 
carefully, there might be a tendency to make things not as challenging for the members 
of the public’.  For McGarry, a potential danger therefore previously existed through a 
drive at a departmental level to encourage work ‘that could be seen as attracting a lot of 
tourists, but wouldn’t necessarily be seen as  at the heart of what we want to do and 
where we see ourselves’.  Therefore, a drive towards branding Ireland through the arts, 
in order to encourage inward touristic visits  was potentially problematic for the future 
programming of  The Model.
Another account of potential problems in this  regard is  indicated by a participant who, 
whilst agreeing to be named in full, requests  that this section of their account remain 
anonymous.  This participant reveals how their institution had recently mounted an 
exhibition which proved very successful, as  it provided an excellent catalogue of the 
work of an artist, whilst also boosting the presence of the gallery and its environs.  This 
participant reveals  how with a success such as that exhibition ‘comes a question from 
members  of the public and from other stakeholders, “is this not what you should always 
be doing, it’s such a success, is perfect for [the institution in question]”’.  This participant 
reveals ‘a tendency to push us down this  road’ of commercialisation and strategic 
touristic programming which is  problematic for the institution, as  it is  not within their 
policy to foreground themselves  for popularity or touristic value.  This participant 
reveals how the pressure to mount similar exhibitions is  not just from within the 
institution but ‘laterally, from other stakeholders in [the locale in question], that they feel 
this  is  the role [the institution] should have’.  The participant reveals how it was 
suggested that ‘we should charge people to come in and access culture,’ rather than the 
institution’s  own desire to mount the exhibition in order to ‘raise critical questions’ 
about the artist’s practice and place in art history.  
Thus, the exhibition became a victim of its  own success insofar as it drew the kind of 
touristic attention to the institution at a time when the ‘brand Ireland’ trope was to the 
foreground of other interested parties.  I suggest that in this  instance there was a subtle 
‘top-down’ pressure applied to the institution to position itself for touristic reasons, and 
even to implement a policy of charging for entry to the space - a policy at odds with the 
institution’s  policy of making culture available to all through the absence of admission 
charges.  I suggest that whilst the pressure did not come directly from political interests 
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at a governmental level, it was nonetheless  applied to the institution ‘laterally’ from 
prominent local interests  who were influenced by the broader political attitudes  to the 
foregrounding of  the arts, and the harnessing of  culture for economic benefit.
Another participant active in the South West of Ireland suggests  that whilst the 
government was  ‘looking outside of Ireland to make those choices’ regarding which 
cultural entities to fund, ‘there is  a huge amount of arts activity that is  going 
unsupported’ at a local level.  Whilst this  participant could not attest to all local and 
grass  roots art ventures as worthy of funding, she nonetheless  suggests how ‘it’s  just a 
shame that they were ignoring what’s  going on on the fringes, because that is  the most 
interesting thing, and that is  actually where it is an act of practice’.  For this participant, 
these small arts  initiatives are highly motivated, engaged with fellow artists and local 
audiences alike, and were sites of creative and innovative practices.  It is thus  a ‘pity’ for 
this  participant that the funding bodies were not awarding support to these groups, or 
that the more traditional institutions are not ‘looking to collaborate with those people’, 
and are instead focusing their attention on showcasing Irish art abroad.
These institutional perspectives reveal complexities  around issues of role and function at 
this  time.  I suggest that the role of the art institution such as  the gallery, is  somewhat 
tied in with funding concerns, and it is difficult for the institutions not to be aware of 
potential pressures that can come from a departmental, policy level which may affect 
their funding.  Whilst I attempted in this section to keep the discussion of the level of 
‘role’, it was nonetheless difficult to decouple it from funding concerns.  In the next 
section, I turn my attention more overtly to issues of  the state funding bodies.
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10.3  Cultural Funding Bodies in Ireland 
10.3.1  Artists’ Perspectives on Funding Bodies
Just as  I posited a spectrum of practices and of representation in the previous chapters, I 
now suggest that there exists  a spectrum of funding in digital art.  The research 
uncovered a spectrum of success  rates for funding, and even a spectrum of attitudes 
towards  funding.  In the main, I found that video artists  experienced higher levels of 
funding than those artists  working through digital and electronic arts practices.  I also 
found that attitudes varied from artists who were positive about funding bodies, to artists 
who felt they could or would not approach the funding bodies for grants, as  they felt the 
bodies  would not understand the work, or that the work could not be contextualised in 
such a way as to enjoy a favourable response.  I also note that opinions  of two main 
funding bodies - the Arts Council and Culture Ireland - varied, with digital artists  in the 
main suggesting that the Arts  Council was not responsive to their work, whereas  Culture 
Ireland was more supportive of  these practices.
When I asked Jaki Irvine whether it may be difficult to secure funding in a work 
requiring technology (as  opposed to the traditionally funded forms of painting and 
sculpture), she responded with ‘no, in that respect the Arts  Council are very good’. 
Irvine, a member of Aosdána133, is  situated as a well-established artist however, with 
potential access to the cnuas stipend, along with a career history that has been rewarded 
and recognised at a state-level through her Aosdána membership.  Irvine’s practice as a 
video artist is also at the end of the spectrum where acceptance and recognition of the 
practice itself are at a high level.  I thus  propose that her perceived lack of any funding 
issues  is  markedly at that end of the spectrum where funding success, and regard for the 
funding bodies  is established.  This  is  not to say that Irvine was not critical of the Arts 
Council - whilst a member of the board of the Arts Council, Irvine discovered 
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133 See section 10.1.1
anomalies in the funding structure that placed visual artists  at a disadvantage to other 
types of  practitioners134.  
For Jesse Jones  too, her video projects have also been met with success at a funding level. 
She reveals how ‘I know there is a real push for us to go and work in the States’ from a 
strategic policy level, and how she would be travelling to the US in 2011 to mount a solo 
exhibition in Los Angeles, whilst also making a new video work.  She reveals  how this 
venture ‘has  been partly financed for the travel, by the Irish government under Culture 
Ireland’.  Jones  has also secured funding from the US for the production of the new 
work, in what she describes as  ‘this  Irish facilitation of us making work, or showing work 
in different countries’, whilst also acknowledging the ‘huge contributions from the 
countries we are going to as well’. 
Jones notes  that through the Culture Ireland funding, she has  retained a high level of 
artistic autonomy, noting that ‘there hasn’t been any restriction on what kind of work 
I’m making’.  She says of her experience with Culture Ireland ‘they don’t even watch 
what you are doing - they’re really quite standoffish’.  She also describes  how the focus 
of Culture Ireland is  to give an artist who is ‘going to make a capable show artistically’ 
international attention, thus  foregrounding Irish culture abroad in an organic way 
where the merits of the work itself are not judged.  I suggest that this  is  an important 
factor for digital artists (whose funding experiences I recount later in this  section) insofar 
as  the work does not have to rest within a context of traditional art discourses  where, as 
I posited earlier, a representational disadvantage occurs.  
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134 During Irvine’s membership of the board of the Arts Council,  she discovered that ‘visual artists  are 
more or less actively not allowed to make a living from state funding while on the board of the Arts 
Council’.  This prohibited Irvine from seeking state-funded grants, awards, or commissions in a publicly 
funded space in Ireland while sitting on the board.  Whilst she did receive a stipend of €4000 (before tax) 
per year, she revealed that ‘you can be asked to do 4 day weeks’, thus potentially taking the time of a 
visual artist from their practice.  Irvine ended her tenure on the board by resigning after two years, 
observing that as  the procedures  stand, a visual artist needs  to ‘be privately funded or independently 
wealthy’ in order to have the means to follow their tenure of the board through.  She also stressed how 
‘this only applies  to the visual arts or individual artists - if you’re part of a theatre company, a theatre 
company can be funded’ because it is  a company and not an individual.  This has led to a situation where 
visual artists  are not represented at board level, as the cost to the artist through a prohibition on applying 
for commissions, bursaries and awards is oftentimes  too much.  As Irvine noted ‘it means you don’t have 
many practitioners on the table’ at a level where Arts Council policy is  made.  When I observed how this 
led to a vicious circle for visual artists,  she agreed, observing that even if a visual artist agrees to sit on the 
board in some act of altruism, ‘if you’re sitting on a board agreeing that you don’t really need money, how 
on earth can you argue for other people?’.  Despite Irvine’s repeated attempts  to change this anomaly, 
‘they all voted and no, they wouldn’t change the standing order so I felt I had to leave on this account’.
Regarding the Arts Council, Jones suggests  that an upskilling of workers with respect to 
technology in art could be advantageous for digital and electronic arts.  She posits  how 
‘I think there could maybe be the potential to upskill, in terms  of how to understand this 
work at proposals  stage‘ within funding bodies.  For Jones, ‘in the Arts Council maybe 
people are not all that well versed on technology’, and thus, extra training could help 
remedy the skills shortage.  She suggests that if a work isn’t ‘immediately visual like 
sculpture or painting’ it can take the arts administrator time to understand the project. 
She suggests  that this, alongside the routines  of reviewing grant applications, puts  digital 
art at a disadvantage because ‘in the Arts Council possibly when a proposal comes to the 
table, it has to be read within five minutes - that’s the length of time that they have’. 
Thus, when a complex piece of digital or electronic art is  proposed, it takes the 
administrator ‘a little time to listen to, to view and see and get the texture of the work, 
and in a five-minute thing, they’re not going to get it’135.  Jones posits the difficulties  in 
translating a complex work of digital art to the Arts  Council, asking ‘how can you 
translate it to a proposal to the Arts  Council, to other human beings who don’t know 
anything about the type of technology you are proposing to use?’. ‘Because very few 
people do’, Jones observes.
Ciara McMahon also reports how she had secured Arts Council funding through their 
Create program, revealing how she feels  ‘really happy to be part of a society that 
chooses  to do that’.  However, even with this success, she problematises the artists’ 
relationship with funding bodies.  She explains  how the relationship ‘will always be 
problematic’.  ‘If somebody is  paying for something’ McMahon asks, ‘then how much 
control have they got over it?’.  McMahon then notes  how her type of practice is  often 
‘more than a little critical of the way our society and our interpersonal human relations 
work’, and for her, seeking funding is difficult when a critique to societal structures, in 
which funding bodies are embedded, is mounted through her practice.  Thus, concludes 
McMahon, ‘once there’s  money involved - I’m not saying it’s not possible to work it - but 
it’s a fraught relationship’136.
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135 Jones did observe the corollary to this situation for the arts worker in a somewhat tongue-in-cheek 
manner by noting that ‘if you open a brown envelope while you drink your really bad coffee and you see 
some paintings, you’re like, “grand, I get it”’,  thus increasing the chances of a traditional art piece 
securing funding.
136 A sentiment also noted by Jonah Brucker-Cohen who observed that ‘it is difficult for artists to live off 
of their art without getting funding through institutions of some kind. This relationship may be difficult 
depending on how the artist gets  the funding or if they don't get the funding and they have to compete 
with other artists for this  funding’.   Brucker-Cohen suggested also that ‘art organisations have to be sure 
that they are not biased in who they select to give funding to’.
The artists  above work mainly with video art, and while they problematise funding it is 
evident that all of these artists have been successful in funding applications.  Looking at 
artists working at the other end of the spectrum of digital technologies, Cliona Harmey 
suggests that funding for digital art is necessary, as to practice digital art requires  ‘a really 
specific sort of skill’.  Citing the example of programming skills, Harmey suggests ‘that’s 
where you do need the funding’.  She observes  how she herself is learning programming 
as  it is not feasible to hire a programmer to facilitate the work, but the time cost of this  is 
high, as upskilling in this regard is ‘like learning to speak’.  Harmey suggests that at a 
funding level, digital art ‘needs a certain type of support’.  Whereas, according to 
Harmey, some artists  can make work in a couple of weeks, for her ‘a lot of these things 
take longer, to process  in my head, and to actually realise’.  Attesting to the 
characteristic of collaboration analysed in chapter 8, Harmey also suggests that ‘it’s 
important that the Arts Council fund things that aren’t just about artists  working away 
on their own, that they’re more humanistic about people working’.  For Harmey such an 
initiative would ‘not necessarily [entail] having to collaborate’ as  an imperative to 
funding, but to foster a creative environment in which ‘there’s dialogue and engagement’ 
between artists and arts institutions.
Some digital artists are critical of the funding bodies, particularly the Arts Council.  One 
practitioner describes how she had once secured Arts Council travel and training 
funding to travel to the US.  Whilst she was very appreciative of this  funding, it is  the 
one and only time she had secured it.  She describes how in her broader experience ‘I 
have applied for bursaries  once or twice, but I didn’t really think that I fitted into what 
they wanted’, due to the nature of the practice.  The artist elaborates on this, noting that 
‘you do have to fit into certain criteria’ in order to be successful with funding 
applications.  As a digital artist, this practitioner does not feel that she fits in to the 
criteria that the Arts  Council requires.  ‘I think you would have to be a more important 
part of the art world’ she posits, suggesting that as  a digital artist, the Arts Council does 
not see her as part of the broader art world, but outside it.  She explains  that her 
perception of the Arts Council is  one highly situated in a fine art genre and that is 
‘something that definitely does  hold me back’ from seeking funding.  She explains how ‘I 
don’t know if I can use the right words or the right references that they want, or I think 
that they want’.  Thus, if the application process  for digital artists is couched in a fine art 
genre, which, as  discussed earlier is  problematic in its disregard for medium specificity, 
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then the applications of digital artists for funding may be judged unfavourably.  I suggest 
that this perpetuates  a cycle through the micro, meso and macro levels, whereby digital 
and electronic art remains  outside the discourse and the canon of the traditional or fine 
art world in Ireland.
Ivan Twohig also problematises  the funding bodies, again particularly the Arts Council, 
whilst revealing a more favourable attitude towards  Culture Ireland.  With respect to the 
Culture Ireland funding that he had received to take part in an exhibition, he recounts 
how ‘they gave us  some nice support, in a very clear agenda, and we did exactly what we 
said we would do’.  However, Twohig suggests  how other funding agencies  are ‘very 
entrenched in a very established application process’.  Like Jesse Jones and the other 
participant above, Twohig suggests that funding is dependent on how the application is 
judged at an administration level.  ‘I think it’s  more to do with how you apply’ he 
observed, adding that ‘I think they judge the application process’.  This is, for Twohig 
problematic, as he could not see a ‘quality control’ at this point, nor could he see ‘any 
judgement of art’.  Expressing his frustration at this, he reveals  ‘I see total crap being 
funded - I see people who I know for a fact don’t produce, who live on their funding 
from the Arts Council and don’t produce a lot of stuff ’.  Twohig calls for more 
transparency in the application process, whilst also suggesting that a more robust review 
process be established.  In his opinion:
“Well I just think it’s all about the application process.  It’s  not 
about the review process.  What happens to the person who 
receives fifty grand?  How are they reviewed?  You can fill out 
review forms but they go through the same process.  It’s still 
somebody at a desk dealing with this big lump of paper.  It’s 
probably being outsourced to an administrator”
Thus for Twohig, these problems he perceives  with the Arts Council bring about a 
reluctance to source funding for digital art pieces.  ‘Well I’ve never even tried to seek 
funding for a digital [piece], I don’t really get funding’ for digital art projects Twohig 
reports, while in contrast he had applied for and secured funding that was ‘very much in 
the remit of fine art’ through traditional sculptural works.  This situation is problematic 
in that indicates that Twohig in his background as fine art sculptor felt comfortable and 
confident that his work was  in the context of Arts  Council requirements, yet as a digital 
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artist, he was so assured that the Arts  Council would not value the digital work that he 
self-funded his digital projects.
Issues  of funding are also discussed by Conor McGarrigle, who explains  how he has 
been ‘very fortunate’ with securing funding from Culture Ireland.  In his account:
“Culture Ireland have funded me several times  to big events, 
things like that.  So I’ve always found that if I’ve something that 
I need to go to, Culture Ireland will generally fund me.  They’ve 
always  funded me actually.  So I’ve gone to Brazil, I’ve gone to 
America several times, so I’ve gone to lots  of big exhibition 
events, so I’ll normally go and do a talk and I’ll show some work. 
And they’ve been great”
He also expresses confidence in the Culture Ireland application process, attesting how 
‘it’s very straight forward - I understand with Culture Ireland where funding will come 
from’137.
In contrast to multiple positive experiences with Culture Ireland, McGarrigle strongly 
critiques  the Arts  Council, outlining how he formerly received one-off funding from the 
Arts Council for his  website, but that it was partly through their publications  grants, and 
also because a particular arts officer had an interest in digital media.  He reveals how he 
‘got funding then as long as  [arts  officer]138  was there, but it was a very personal thing’. 
According to McGarrigle’s experience, ‘[the arts officer] was very much always reaching 
out  … but since then, no, the Arts Council has  been quite shut down for me I found, to 
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137  Also, McGarrigle revealed how the work is judged in the Culture Ireland application process.  I 
suggest that this is  in apparent contrast to how the Arts Council evaluate applications. ‘They look at it and 
they’ll take it on its merits’  observed McGarrigle of Culture Ireland.  He recounted how he had been 
funded through Culture Ireland to take part in a prestigious festival of electronic art in Sao Paolo, Brazil. 
For McGarrigle this was a significant invitation as he considered Brazil to be ‘one of these really dynamic 
countries for digital media’, where this art form is in the mainstream.  He supplied Culture Ireland with a 
comprehensive outline of the work he was undertaken, who had invited him, attendance figures for the 
festival and a list of international bodies, including the British Council, who had funded artists  to 
participate.   ‘So I put it through’, McGarrigle recounted of his  application,  ‘and obviously they looked at 
it and considered it to be a high merit event.  People go to it from all over, they’re funded by the British 
Council, various other international funding bodies.  All over Europe and all over America, people have 
funded people to go to this, so obviously it has some merit, so they funded me’.
138 McGarrigle named the arts officer during our interview.  However, I did not feel it appropriate to 
name this person as they themselves  were not a participant and therefore could not consent to being 
named.
the point where I haven’t applied for a couple of years now.  It just seemed to be more of 
an effort than it’s worth’.  This stance is  not unlike the accounts revealed above.  For 
McGarrigle though, this stance emerges having made attempts  to meet with members  of 
the Arts  Council to foreground the role of digital art.  He reveals how the Arts Council 
‘doesn’t seem to be open at the moment’ to digital art.  He explains how ‘it’s a door I’ve 
tried to knock on before, I’ve actually gone and set up meetings, I was recommended 
people to talk to and literally I couldn’t get a meeting’.  This  clearly frustrating situation 
is one where McGarrigle not only cannot secure funding, but cannot access the 
gatekeepers in this funding body in order to discuss  funding.  After numerous 
unsuccessful attempts to arrange meetings, McGarrigle desisted, observing that when no 
response was ever forthcoming, ‘you get your message’.  This message, concludes 
McGarrigle, is not to seek funding from the Arts Council.  ‘The effort that I would 
spend putting in this application, would I not be better applying somewhere else?’ he 
concludes.
McGarrigle, like Twohig also problematises the large amounts of funding given to 
certain practitioners  without a review of output.  For McGarrigle, this  is  a ‘growing 
feeling’ amongst his peers  where ‘you end up in a position where you’re totally 
dependent on them and the work doesn’t get done if the Arts  Council doesn’t fund it’. 
He suggests  that this is  not ‘necessarily a healthy thing’, as  the artist potentially exists  as 
a client of the funding body.  He suggests how this stance may be problematic in the 
digital art field, as ‘the work gets done whatever - it’s  a very DIY ethos, and they just 
manage to hack it together somehow’.  Therefore, this ethos may be regarded by the 
Arts Council as  not requiring funding, and they take the stance that ‘all this  work is 
getting done, and you don’t need to fund them if  they’re going to do it anyway’.
This  section has  revealed issues pertaining to digital art and the funding bodies  in 
Ireland.  In the main, Culture Ireland received a favourable response to participants, 
whereas  positive accounts  for the Arts  Council were in the main, attested to only by 
video artists.  I therefore suggest that the ‘spectrum’ of use, support and acceptance of 
digital art practices holds  true at the macro level, where a greater degree of state 
funding and support at the macro level was experienced by those artists  working on the 
scale of the spectrum closest to the more ‘established’ practices  of video art.  In the next 
section, I reveal how some arts institutions regard the cultural funding bodies, 
foregrounding the relationship between the meso and macro levels of  enquiry.
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10.3.2  Institutional Perspective on Funding Bodies
Just as my evidence from interviews with artists reveals  insights about the macro state 
level funding bodies, I suggest that an enquiry at a meso-level can also reveal insights on 
the political economy of art.  In this  section I analyse some attitudes  at an arts 
institution level towards  the funding bodies - noting that these examples were from 
institutions engaging heavily with digital media.  I also focus on a case study of a digital 
art association, their experiences with the Arts  Council, and how their experiences  were 
discussed amongst digital artists.
Carolyn Jones  suggests that with respect to mounting a digital art exhibition, ‘I just don’t 
know how they would react to it’.  She reveals  how RUA apply for annual programme 
funding through the Arts Council, but they are never successful.  ‘We know we’re not 
going to get anything, but we put in anyway’ Jones  observes.  She reveals  how the 
organisation was (at the time of writing) planning a festival of digital art and that they 
were going to apply to the Arts Council for a small festivals grant.  Whilst not securing 
annual funding, she was a little more hopeful of securing funding for this  festival 
‘because it’s a robust programme and it’s  very much about participation and about 
audience and about getting people involved’.  However she suggests  that she is  unsure if 
they regard digital art ‘necessarily as being valid’ as  a participatory practice, despite the 
Arts Council being aware that the focus  of RUA’s programming was to be community-
oriented and participatory.  ‘We’ve talked to them about it and they’ve said well that’s  a 
good idea, but then everybody says that to your face’, Jones muses.
Another participant involved in a digital art festival outside Dublin is also critical of 
funding bodies in Ireland.  Whilst again, this person is  grateful that the festival had been 
funded, as far as she is aware ‘if you look at where the Arts  Council funding is going, I 
think I’m the only festival that they are funding that is  in any way related to digital art’. 
This  participant suggests that instead of funds being allocated to digital art, they are 
being allocated to the more traditional art forms such as  literature and music.  This 
reflects  the account of Carolyn Jones above, who suggests  hope at being funded for a 
digital art festival, yet had not secured funding previous  to date.  This  participant 
suggests that to remedy this  deficit, the Arts  Council ‘need to set a broader agenda for 
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Ireland and look at it as a whole’.  She also suggests that the smaller, artist-led initiatives 
would benefit greatly from funding, whilst contributing to their local communities.  She 
suggests that ‘there is an awful lot of grass roots  DIY practices  that are happening that 
they’re not funding, and they’re missing out on so much’ innovative, culture-setting 
practices.  Like some of the other practitioners, this participant draws attention to the 
fact that there does  not appear to be a review process  for funding.  She suggests that the 
Arts Council would benefit from reviewing the ‘effect on the community of this event 
happening’.  This participant could not see the benefit in rewarding one artist with 
funding if  the community would not be involved:
“So things like, I don’t see the point of awarding one artist to go 
off to the middle of south America for a month so they can go 
off and do some documentation on a project, and then have five 
people show up to the exhibition because it’s  such a narrow 
thing”
Thus, the participant is critical of repeated funding awarded to exhibitions that are not 
well-attended, do not include the audience, do not convene seminars  or talks, or do not 
invoke responses from attendees.
Whilst other participants  chose not to discuss  particular funding concerns, I suggest that 
the accounts above are consistent with the body of feedback from practitioners.  To 
further complement this  position, I now provide an account of a funding issue that 
unfolded for a digital arts group during the empirical research.
10.3.2.1 DATA - A Case Study in Digital Art Funding
The Dublin Art and Technology Association is a group, established in 2002 by Jonah 
Brucker-Cohen and Nicki Gogan.  Brucker-Cohen outlines  how he had moved to 
Dublin that year to work at the MediaLab Europe research centre (which closed in 
2005), and as an artist, was  interested in working with local digital artists  in Ireland.  He 
also had a desire to ‘start a community around this practice’.  Benjamin Gaulon took 
over the running of DATA in 2006, before recently handling the running of the 
association to Rachel O’Dwyer, a researcher at Trinity College Dublin.  With the 
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assistance from colleagues, Gaulon secured yearly funding for DATA from the Arts 
Council.  However, in 2010 the funding from the Arts Council was  withdrawn from 
DATA in a seemingly obscure move.  Gaulon reveals how the organisers  of DATA had 
to ask ‘the question of do we go on or not’ in light of this  funding cut.  The ethos  of 
DATA is  ‘that we invite people from abroad but also get local people, but knowing that 
the local scene in Ireland is  very small, you tend to always have the same people’.  Thus, 
the Arts  Council funding is vital for DATA to bring influential digital media artists from 
abroad, and the loss  of that funding potentially means that it was  not viable for DATA 
to run events, talks and workshops.  However, the director of the Science Gallery 
intervened, and replaced the funding that DATA had lost139.  DATA’s Arts Council 
funding was €4000 per year, and with that relatively small amount ‘managed to run nine 
events and six workshops’.
During the ethnography of arts institutions, practitioners  and events, I observed how 
DATA did indeed provide an engaging context for digital art in Ireland.  I attended 
several of their talks in various  locations  (before their funding was  replaced by the 
Science Gallery, DATA had no fixed venue) and also engaged in several workshops on e-
waste, hardware hacking and circuit bending140.  During the interview process several 
digital artists  cited DATA’s  predicament when discussing funding, even though this was 
not a specific route of enquiry on my part.  I include some of the accounts to 
foreground the perspectives gained from the ethnography which attested to the key role 
DATA played in the digital art sphere.
Accounts  describe the funding decision as ‘crazy’ and ‘strange’, with participants  both 
attesting to the high contribution of DATA in the digital art arena in Dublin and 
expressing bewilderment at the withdrawal of funding.  ‘To be honest the amount of 
work they actually do, […] their output is very prolific’ Harmey observes.  Considering 
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139 Conor McGarrigle described how DATA was only continuing due to funding by the Science Gallery. 
He gave the account as thus:
“Yeah it’s still going because it’s being funded by the Science Gallery.  They kicked in five grand of 
funding because Michael John [director of the Science Gallery] said “we can’t let this go, I’ll find you the 
money”.  It was just that response at being so appalled that this was being lost.  It was  such a great 
resource and such a lively thing, and completely run on volunteer effort and dovetailing with, and tying in 
quite well with NCAD, certainly who would generally bring someone over.  If at all possible we’ll get them 
a lecture up at NCAD.  So we can’t afford to pay them to speak but they can always get a guest lectureship 
in NCAD which will pay them.  So the universities have kicked in quite well with DATA”.
140 Analysed further in chapter 11
this  prolific output, Harmey asserts how she did not understand why the funding for 
DATA was withdrawn, and posits that the Arts Council should reinstate the funding. 
Conor McGarrigle compares the situation with the setting in other countries where 
‘you’ve got so many places in Spain and Germany - you’ve ZKM, Ars Electronica, loads 
of places  in the UK, and everywhere has these centres of digital art’ that are funded 
enough to become ‘conceptual centres’ that are ‘driving innovation in this area’.  In 
comparison then, Ireland has an impoverished digital art scene.  ‘We have DATA’ posits 
McGarrigle, ‘which lost its  Arts Council funding and it had what, five thousand euros to 
put on twelve events, bring international artists over’.
Thus, within the digital art sector, the role of DATA is understood and valued. 
However, despite accounts  attesting to the valuable, prolific and innovative 
programming, the Arts  Council has nonetheless  withdrawn the funding.  Accounts  stress 
how DATA ‘delivered’, and how ‘that’s  one thing the Arts Council was  meant to be 
focusing on - people who actually did deliver’.  Participants  also suggest that the funding 
given to DATA represents  good value for money for the Arts  Council, as DATA provided 
a resource for digital media where ‘you know you’ll get a big crowd, full houses, really 
lively debate, and active grassroots artists, technologists  […] bringing in people from all 
over the world.  The decision is  also described as ‘a waste’ by one institutional curator. 
This  participant also reveals how she is ‘really really shocked they lost their funding’, 
adding how the decision ‘says a lot’ about the Arts  Council, that despite reports  from 
DATA as  to their programming and events, funding was withdrawn.  ‘I don’t see what 
else they could really want to see back for their investment’ she concludes.
Ivan Twohig, whilst also expressing bemusement at the decision, suggests that the 
withdrawal of funding may have had a strategic intent, positing that ‘maybe they [the 
Arts Council] do it on purpose’.  He suggests  that for the Arts Council ‘it’s good to keep 
fine art fine art - to define it’, in a move that would serve to underline the conceptual 
tensions  between contemporary and new media art.  Twohig also suggests  that had 
digital art been foregrounded through funding support, there may have been 
repercussions within the art world.  ‘I’m sure there’d be a pretty big backlash if the Arts 
Council started giving fifty grand to net art based projects’, Twohig posits, concluding 
that ‘maybe it’s to do with the political understanding of  what art is’.
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I thus suggest that whilst the Arts Council fund many worthy projects, their decision to 
cut DATA’s funding completely has been detrimental to the digital art sector in Ireland. 
If it had not been for the goodwill from the Science Gallery, DATA would most likely 
have been discontinued.  I suggest that the neglect of the digital art sector by the Arts 
Council thus potentially poses a threat to the development of  that sector.
10.3.4  The Art Market
A discussion of state funding bodies  such as the Arts  Council is one key aspect of the 
political economy of art in Ireland.  Aside from state funding bodies, this  chapter would 
be incomplete without considering the larger political economy of art during the crisis. 
Newspaper headlines such as I'm an artist - can I take your order?141, How the bust painted artists 
into a corner142, Why shouldn't poets do the State some service?143  from a national broadsheet, to 
broader reports such as Recession threat to London's place in art world144, are indicative of the 
latest ‘turn to culture’ that has  emerged during the period of this  research.  Whilst such 
a discussion is  necessarily abridged here, I posit that a brief overview of how 
commercial art - or the art market - is  situated in Ireland, adds  another facet to the topic 
of  political economy of  art.
Jaki Irvine posits that ‘there isn’t a big enough private collective system’ in Ireland to 
allow artists to make work independently of state funding.  She explains  this further, 
observing how ‘there’s  a gap between people’s perception of public and private spaces’ 
because of a misguided perception in the Irish art world that the private galleries are 
‘not doing public work’.  However, Irvine notes how ‘everybody knows the private 
galleries are plugged into the public system - they have to be’, as the private art market is 
so small in Ireland.  Thus, even for a well-established artist such as  Irvine, her income is 
from a combination of state and private sources.  ‘Even if you’re working with a private 
gallery, you might get a bursary from the Arts  Council, you show your work either in a 
private gallery or in a public space or ultimately be asked on the basis  of your private 
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141 The Irish Times - Tue, Jan 18, 2011
142 The Irish Times - Sat, Sep 25, 2010
143 The Irish Times - Thu, Aug 12, 2010
144 The Times, March 14, 2009
gallery show to go public’ illustrates Irvine, ‘so the notion that it’s separate is silly’.  She 
compares the gallery situation in Ireland with that of the UK, explaining a drive there 
currently to ‘interweave’ the public and private sectors in art.  In contrast, Irvine posits 
how in Ireland ‘we have them locked off because we don’t have a decent private gallery 
market here’.  For Irvine this  is a mistake of perception here, as  the country is ‘too tiny’ 
to marginalise the private galleries.  
Likewise at an institutional level, Tessa Giblin also suggests that there is not a strong art 
market in Ireland.  However for Giblin, there is hope that the current economic crisis 
could foreground the arts  positively through new funding initiatives.  ‘Coming out of the 
crisis’, Giblin hopes  ‘it would be wonderful if a market for art appeared in Ireland’. 
Giblin elaborates on market funding for the arts, observing that ‘there’s very little 
philanthropy and there’s no contemporary art market’ in Ireland.  She notes that whilst 
‘Irish people are extremely generous’ in relation to charitable donations, cultural 
philanthropy is not well-established in Ireland.  She perceives a recent development in 
Ireland however, which she feels might ‘begin for the first time, this idea of philanthropy, 
cultural philanthropy in Ireland’.  This  development is  in funding mechanisms  known as 
micro-philanthropy, or crowdfunding, where small donations towards  cultural producers or 
institutions are sourced.  She cites the example of a recent Irish initiative called FundIt 
which encourages  micro-funding for cultural institutions and artists145.  Giblin posits 
how ‘whether that comes  from a slow mechanism where everyone’s feeling that we’re a 
little bit responsible’, cultural philanthropy is ‘extremely important for the support and 
growth of the significant artists’ in Ireland.  She explains that with this support, the artist 
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145 I recently observed how the Irish Museum of Modern Art reached 113% of their FundIt target of 
€4800 to invest in four paintings  for their collection.  Source: http://www.fundit.ie/project/buying-four-
drawings-by-bea-mcmahon
can reach an international art market, thus  foregrounding Irish culture abroad in an 
organic way.  ‘I think that’s what we have to gain the most from’, she posited146.
Based on such evidence, I suggest that the art market in Ireland is  in a complex position. 
From the brief survey above, the sense is  that whilst the private galleries are contributing 
to the cultural landscape of Ireland abroad, they also contribute domestically to 
encouraging artists  and arts audience to participate in production and appreciation of 
art.  However, the divide between public and private sponsorship is problematic in 
Ireland.  Whilst the state sponsor the arts through numerous initiatives, the private 
institutions also contribute to the support of artistic production.  Yet an air of 
ambivalence and suspicion surrounds  these supports.  Whilst the ‘commercialisation’ of 
art is, according to a Frankfurt School analysis problematic, the artist nonetheless  often 
requires  commercial representation for their oeuvre.  In this respect, the role of the 
private market is relatively under-developed and neglected in Ireland.  I suggest that in 
the extreme, this divide between public and private sponsorship for the arts potentially 
makes for an artistic sector reliant on the state.  Where this becomes  problematic then, is 
when state initiatives  such as  Imagine Ireland not only foreground existent cultural 
products, but attempt to encourage new productions with a particular commercial aim.
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146 In conjunction with these accounts, media investigations of the art market reveal similar positions.  In 
the aforementioned I'm an artist - can I take your order? article, the author observes how ‘in the art world, 
levels of recognition don’t equate to income’.  The author cites the case of the artist Alice Maher who is 
described as having ‘exhibited in the Royal Hibernian Academy and whose work is held in some of 
Ireland’s major public and private collections’.  Maher has also been recognised for her contribution to 
the arts by membership of Aosdána.  Quoted in this  article, Maher observed how  ‘you could have a huge 
reputation as an artist […] but you still mightn’t be making a living from your work’.  Maher continued, 
observing that  ‘some of Ireland’s  best-known artists are in that position’.  In the same article, Maher 
commended the stipend she receives  through Aosdána in the absence of market income.   She noted how 
‘in the good years,  when your income goes above a certain level, you don’t get the cnuas […] but it’s there 
to apply for if you need it in the hard times’.   For Maher, this  dearth of private income can mean that the 
state income from the cnuas can prevent her from having to claim social welfare.  Maher observed how this 
stipend means that ‘top level practitioners can keep contributing to the culture without having to sign on’.
In the aforementioned How the bust painted artists into a corner article, reports from a gallery level suggest that 
the private art market in Ireland is weak.  The author observed how in Ireland, ‘buying art is seen as  a 
pastime for the rich, an indulgence and a luxury at odds with the needs of communities’.  The attention in 
the article turned to corporate philanthropy for the arts, suggesting that in the 1970s and 1980s this 
funding source was  rich, as private corporations created their own art collections.  However, during this 
crisis, collections are now being sold off as corporations attempt to recoup financial losses.  The article 
quoted Barbara Lawson, the director of the Hugh Lane gallery, who suggested that this loss  of funding 
would be hugely detrimental to the cultural landscape in Ireland.  ‘If corporations erroneously believe 
that it’s  no longer their role to support the visual arts’ Lawson observed, ‘the downward spiral would be 
enormous – disproportionate, actually, to what they put in’.  The article continued with a discussion of 
how private galleries operate ‘at the point where money for art changes hands’, and is  thus a source of 
suspicion in the art world.  The author suggested how ‘the rest of the art world can be ambivalent about 
the role they play, yet they, as much as  the Arts  Council and the major institutions, form the backbone of 
the art world’.  Citing an account from Kevin Kavanagh (of the eponymous Kevin Kavanagh gallery), 
‘commercial galleries are important components of the arts infrastructure that artists  and audiences 
depend on’.  Yet as Jaki Irvine noted above,  this persistence of suspicion around the private galleries 
negatively affects their place in the contemporary Irish art market.
10.4  Conclusion
In this  chapter I have conducted an analysis of macro-level factors related to the 
political economy of art.  I indicate how both government and media interests have 
foregrounded the arts and cultural services as ‘economic rescuer’, whilst the chapter also 
problematised this ‘turn’.  From artist and institutional perspectives, I revealed how the 
discourse around ‘brand Ireland’ is subtly in the awareness of the art community.  The 
funding bodies themselves  have been analysed, finding that whilst Culture Ireland is 
positively (or neutrally) disposed to the genre of digital and electronic art, the Arts 
Council adopts a more oppositional stance, with artists and certain institutions and 
groups foregrounding digital art remaining unconvinced of their support for digital arts. 
In the analysis  of the RTÉ coverage of ‘brand Ireland’, some of the interviewees 
critiqued the reductionist economistic positioning of culture, again in sentiments that 
are simpatico with Frankfurt School discourses.  However, just as Adorno’s writings 
concur with this sense of the potential of ‘high’ art, Benjamin’s work is concerned with 
popular culture.  Therefore, for these artists there is a balancing act that they are faced 
with - to not compromise on the Adornoesque sense of potential of ‘high’ art, whilst 
also understanding, through Benjamin’s work, that the general populace is  more 
oriented towards to popular culture, state programming and the national broadcaster. 
Thus, it is a challenge to cultural producers in Ireland to not retreat into an art-for-arts-
sake stance that can justify ignoring its  imposed ‘role’ as ‘cultural rescuer’, but to strike 
the balance of producing cultural works with an integrity and an honesty that can 
expose and critique such tropes to relevant taste cultures, whilst avoiding the trap of 
culture-for-profit.
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Chapter 11: Research Findings and Conclusions
11.1 Introduction
This  research thesis  has explored, analysed and problematised the area of innovation in 
digital media cultural production in Ireland.  In this chapter, I discuss how the 
theoretical framework and the key questions  were addressed.  I move on to then outline 
possibilities for further study and examine the potentials along with the limitations of 
the research.
As previously flagged in chapter 10, when I began this research project the general 
‘structure of feeling’ amongst Irish citizens was that the aggressive economic growth of 
the country had hit a bumpy patch.  There was much talk of a ‘soft landing’ in the 
grossly over-heated property sector.  However, this  thesis evolved in parallel with a 
dramatic unravelling of those predictions regarding the economy that far exceeded the 
‘soft landing’ predictions.  The resulting crisis is marked by massive negative equity in 
the property sector, massive cuts in public expenditure and an ever-worsening crisis in 
the financial and banking sectors that ultimately required an EU-IMF bailout.  As this 
thesis is  concerned with issues of ‘situatedness’, this  unfolding economic crisis  shaped 
the research, not least because policy rhetorics  began to frame the arts as  an economic 
‘rescuer’.  Thus, whilst an early goal of the research was  always to consider themes  from 
three levels  of micro, meso and macro, the crisis acted as a punctum (to borrow from 
Barthes) of  commonality between the levels.
Thus, in this chapter I argue how applying a theoretical framework that prioritises 
situatedness, has provided a robust foundation through which to consider the key 
questions  posited in chapter 1.  Had the economy either stabilised or continued an 
upward trajectory, this  study would have yielded very different results - possibly pointing 
to an optimism regarding the digital media artistic sector, rather than problematisation 
of the prior ‘feel-good gulag’.  Opportunities  for digital artists  would possibly be 
enhanced by continued spending on the arts.  However, as the crisis unfolded, an 
opportunity was provided to assess this  sector at a time of upheaval, change and crisis.  I 
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suggest that consideration of the crisis has therefore yielded rich results, where prior 
knowledge and analysis of art, the culture ‘industry’ and the role of culture at a time of 
late-capitalist, postmodern expansion and contraction can be especially valued for their 
relevance.
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11.2 Theoretical Framework - A Reprise
As first outlined in chapter 1, the framework was  designed to provide a ‘depth’ model 
through which the complexities, tensions and interplays  in the cultural and artistic sector 
could be examined by conducting research in to one such sub-sector, that of digital art 
production in Ireland.  This  was done through consideration of the ‘I’, ‘We’ and ‘It’ 
dimensions of research, pertaining to the individual, the intersubjective and the 
interobjective connections in the digital media art world.  
The research thus aimed to track innovation, its  sites, its characteristics and its  threats by 
first considering how digital artists  innovate.  This  micro-level dimension was analysed 
through a combination of an ethnography of the digital art sector, along with in-depth 
interviews of a subset of artists working with digital media.  The meso level was also 
analysed using these means, as at this level an analysis  of the ‘intersubjective’ relations 
between individual actors  and gatekeepers was  key to understanding the relationship 
between the micro and meso levels.  The ‘voice’ of the meso level actors and their 
engagements  with the micro and macro levels  was  best revealed through the interview 
process.  Finally, as  posited in chapter 1, micro-level actors also engage with the macro 
level, as do meso-level gatekeepers.  Therefore, the macro level was analysed, partly 
through accounts of interactions between micro- and meso-level actors  with the macro 
level, and also through accounts of  media and policy positions.
I therefore suggest that the theoretical framework enabled an account of digital art 
production in Ireland from multiple vantage points.  That framework, along with the 
overarching theme of situatedness, allowed for consideration, inclusion and 
foregrounding of the massive economic changes that occurred between 2008 and 2011. 
In chapter 1, I mapped the ‘big three’ framework to that of the area of digital art in 
Ireland, to annotate the flexibility of the framework.  This flexibility has  allowed the 
research to also ‘flex’ as the economic crisis  hit.  Indeed the crisis  provided an example 
of how the framework can incorporate changes to the parameters of the research by 
being specific enough to require an account of the macro, whilst also being flexible 
enough to cope with the macro either during a time of stability or a time of crisis. 
Whilst the thesis outcomes would have been different had it taken place at a different 
time, nonetheless the framework would still have performed adequately.
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11.3 Key Questions Addressed
In chapter 1 I posited a set of key questions that unfolded from one major central 
question, namely, how do artists  innovate and interact with digital technologies to 
produce artistic works  in contemporary Ireland?  Chapter 1 suggested that this  key 
question raised sub-questions  in five areas  of analysis: (1) socio-cultural situatedness, (2) 
art, (3) technology, (4) innovation and (5) the political-economic.  I suggest that these five 
themes have been addressed through the research, and here outline how this  was 
achieved.
11.3.1 Situatedness
The first overarching theme of situatedness has been accounted for throughout the 
thesis and formed a backdrop for analysing how the micro, meso and macro levels  are 
not distinct spheres, but how they overlap.  The primary research revealed examples of 
this  situatedness.  In chapter 8, the primary research findings uncovered a ‘distinct’ 
digital aesthetic, where artists  were themselves self-situating as ‘digital’, the chapter also 
revealing that this  move was in contrast to the contemporary art ‘fashion’ to 
problematise media specificity (in what was another example of  a genre situating itself).
  
Chapter 9 problematised situatedness  in the context of gatekeeping, the primary 
research finding that the situatedness of an art curator potentially views the inclusion or 
foregrounding of digital art as  problematic in the context of their own career.  It found 
that their situatedness  within a contemporary art discourse that ‘frowned upon’ an 
engagement with media specificity meant that the curators were unlikely to foreground 
work that specified itself  by medium.  
In chapter 10, the theme of situatedness was analysed at the macro level, where a major 
finding revealed that the arts sector is itself situated within an economic and political 
zeitgeist that has been in massive flux.  This finding also revealed how economic 
situatedness  had ramifications back to the meso level in funding concerns  and even in 
one example, programming constraints.  The situatedness  was also tracked back to the 
micro level, where issues of  ‘role’ of  the individual artist were considered.  
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11.3.2 Art
The second theme centring on art has also been addressed both through an analysis  of 
key theoretical perspectives, and through accounts of art, the digital aesthetic and its 
characteristics  in chapter 8.  The primary research found that these specificities or 
‘features’ of digital art comprised (1) collaboration, (2) knowledge-sharing and (3) 
repurposing/reconfiguration.  Thus I propose that such primary research findings 
resonate well with, or advance and serve as  a complement to the characteristics posited 
in chapter 4.  In chapter 4 I outlined how digital art can be identified by three factors; 
(1) object characteristics, (2) where the artwork ‘resides’ and (3) technical complexity. 
The primary research as  analysed in chapter 8 complemented this analysis by adding 
descriptions of features of digital art such as practitioners regular use of collaboration, 
of influences from the open-source movement and how the repurposing of materials for 
unintended use through hardware ‘hacking’ also feature prominently in digital artworks.  
Digital art was  problematised in chapter 9, where gatekeepers’ accounts  of their 
concerns regarding the exhibition, acquisition and archival of digital art were 
foregrounded, along with a key finding that revealed a perception of under-
representation and lack of acceptance amongst digital artists  into the broader art sector 
in Ireland.  Chapter 9 also found that some characteristics  of the digital art work itself 
can cause issues of acceptance at an institutional level.  The primary research found that 
(1) context, categorisation and affiliation, (2) suspicion around where the artwork 
‘resides’, or for that matter whom or what has created the artwork and (3) that digital art 
can interrogate the traditional rose of the art institution, all emerged from the primary 
research as sources of  contention at the institutional level.
The key theme of art and its political dimension was also foregrounded in chapters  8 
and 10, where a key finding revealed that a ‘universal’ potential of art, regardless  of 
medium, is that of critique.  This key primary research finding potentially challenged 
the ‘spectrum’ hypothesis  presented in chapter 7, as the potential political motivation for 
making art was presented irrespective of where in the usage spectrum the practitioner 
fell.  
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The nexus of art and capitalism were also problematised in chapter 10.  In this chapter, 
a key finding revealed both historical and continuing discourses  in policy and the media 
that situate art as a ‘rescuer’ during a time of  a crisis.
11.3.3 Technology
The third theme of technology has  been addressed in this  research thesis  through 
interview accounts of participants  and through case studies and an ethnography. 
Chapter 7 introduced concepts of a ‘spectrum’ of use of technologies, and posited how 
some artists view ICTs  as  tools only, whilst other artists  argue that these technologies are 
also a medium, or even a ‘metamedium’.  This  primary finding was again picked up in 
chapter 8 where I explored artists’ views on technology.  The primary research found 
that whilst those artists who viewed technologies as  tools were doing so in an anti-
determinist stance, this  did not imply that artists who heavily employed technology were 
less concerned about determinism.  
The empirical research found that in our current ‘mode’ of technology use, ICTs are 
becoming so embedded and domesticated as  to make a critique of them through their use 
increasingly likely, a point verified by observing that a significant cohort of digital artists 
heavily use technology as a medium through which to mount such a critique.  This  was 
evidenced in the accounts  of artists  wishing to ‘push’ technology, to seek the ‘limits’ of 
ICTs and to ‘slow down’ the networked systems of  our current social mode.  
11.3.4 Innovation
The fourth theme of innovation was  discussed in terms of ‘sites’ of innovation in the 
digital art sector.  Chapter 8 provided a major primary finding that revealed how the 
three specificities  of digital art dovetailed with concepts of sectoral innovation.  Thus, a 
key finding on the subject of innovation revealed that the specific characteristics of 
digital art also functioned as  major sites  or enablers of innovation for the digital art 
sector.  
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The primary research in chapter 8 also showed how the collaborative ‘nature’ of digital 
art also allowed for innovation through those collaborative encounters, where knowledge 
transfer could occur.  It was also found that the characteristic of digital art which saw 
extensive use of open-source technologies  also functioned as a site of innovation. 
Through the use of open-source hardware and software, innovation was fostered by the 
knowledge acquisition facilities  afforded by these ICTs.  Online discussion forums, 
knowledgebases and ‘Wikis’ where code could be shared and collaboratively improved 
upon are all ways  in which this  innovation-supporting knowledge acquisition occurs  for 
digital artists.  
Chapter 8 also suggested that through the practice of repurposing of materials and 
software, as  is common in digital art, both incremental and radical innovations can 
occur.  It was  also suggested that much like an R&D function in traditionally understood 
paradigms of innovation, these collaborative, experimental practices  can provide sites  of, 
and foster innovation.
Chapter 9 found that a potential site of innovation was in the ‘proactivity’ of the digital 
artists who (1) looked to foreign sources of funding and/or enablement of their practice 
and (2) suggested that vacant urban spaces  could be employed as  cultural centres  for 
digital media.
Chapter 10 problematised the limits to artistic innovation through an analysis of two 
major funding bodies.  Key findings  from this  chapter revealed how a major source of 
funding from the Arts Council was effectively ‘closed off ’ to digital artists.  This  finding 
was  coupled with a finding that showed how Culture Ireland was  supportive of digital 
artists attempts to innovate, revealing problems  at the state level and artistic/cultural 
innovation.
11.3.5 Political Economy
The fifth theme dealing with the political-economic factors has also been addressed in 
the primary research, particularly in chapter 10.  The chapter charted the impacts of 
political and economic decisions  on culture.  A key finding from this chapter revealed 
how the arts  have been positioned as political ‘rescuer’ during this time of crisis.  This 
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highlights  the position of both the Frankfurt School and Pierre Bourdieu by the attempt 
to place economic value or capital on to the arts, in a move at odds  with Frankfurt School 
thought and in an elucidation of Bourdieu’s mechanisms of how art can be mobilised as 
a form of capital.  The theme of crisis was  therefore considered in terms of the impact 
of political and economic factors at the macro level on the arts.  Media engagement 
with the arts at this time was also analysed.  A key finding here showed that media 
organisations, just like commercial cultural producers are liable to have an ‘auratic’ 
quality.  
Chapter 9 also found that at the institutional level, some awareness of this  ‘arts  as 
rescuer’ dimension to political discourses was  evident.  Whilst the findings  did not show 
a direct interventionist stance on behalf of the state, one account revealed pressures 
from local political and economic interests  to make their programming more suitable to 
tourists.
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11.4 Contributions to the Field
I suggest that this research contributes  to the general fields  of innovation studies and 
related policy practices, particularly in terms of the role of collaborative and user-based 
innovation.  The findings revealed that the very practices  that digital artists  engage in, 
and those specific characteristics of digital art function as  sites of innovation.  Also, 
whilst the artist does have to function within a capitalist system, they serve as  a subset of 
innovators who may be motivated by non-commercial goals  and values.  Thus, this 
research, in foregrounding their practices and processes contributes a complement to 
traditional innovation studies  which in the main situate the innovation processes  within a 
market outcome for the innovation.  The research has  found that a significant role for 
collective rather than proprietary models of intellectual property exists within this  sector. 
I suggest that this  sends  a ‘flag’ to scholars of innovation that highlights how this trend is 
being utilised in an innovative way by this subset of  cultural producers.
This  research has  also revealed complexities regarding the relationship between 
technology and society, and contributed to the understanding of this  complex 
relationship.  A major finding from the primary research revealed that the relationship 
was  not an either/or one, but a complex spectrum of usages, practices and critiques of 
technology.  The research found that whilst ‘onlookers’ in the art world sometimes saw 
those artists who heavily employed technology as determined by it, a cohort of artists 
employed heavy technology use to critique technology.  
This  research also contributes to the field of art, both contemporary and digital art. 
The key primary research findings  revealed three aesthetic specificities  of digital art 
(collaboration, use of open-source and reconfiguration).  These specificities add to and 
complement the previously understood dimensions  of digital art which included (1) 
object characteristics, (2) where the artwork ‘resides’, and (3) technical complexity.  The 
research findings have also revealed a tension between the digital art ‘world’ and the 
contemporary art ‘world’, contributing a voice that straddles between the promises of 
Quaranta’s  ‘postmedium’ age, and the current divisions existing between the ‘new 
media’ and ‘contemporary art’ worlds.
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11.5 Limitations of  the Research
Whilst this research aimed from the outset to be as thorough and inclusive of issues and 
concerns in digital media artistic production at three levels  of research, nonetheless the 
research has its limitations.  The field of digital media is  so rapidly morphing as to be 
like a changing geographical landscape.  Where one technology can be in the moment 
on ‘solid ground’, it can be quickly superseded and ‘cut adrift’ by another innovation. 
However, this study was from the outset aware of this, and attempted to guard against 
that type of ‘neologising’ by steering away from a technological account of the 
‘differences’ or ‘newness’ of ICTs in digital media art, but by drawing on historical 
perspectives, continuities and long-term patterns of  use, appropriation and remediation.
The digital art sector in Ireland is a small one, and thus a limitation of the research was 
in the number of participants it was  feasible to include in this study.  Several participants 
initially declined to be interviewed.  One participant having initially agreed, 
subsequently declined.  This  participant’s ultimate response and reason for declining the 
interview also characterised the malaise of the country in the aftermath of the economic 
downturn, explaining that ‘I’m not sure I'd have a very positive view of digital art 
research at the moment, having to take time out to make ends meet…’ (personal 
communication with unnamed digital artist, January 13th 2011).  Another participant 
had agreed, but was living between Ireland and Germany and despite several arranged 
meetings, something always  ‘came up’ and she had to cancel, on one occasion about 15 
minutes before our meeting.  Other potential participants did not respond to my 
enquiries 147, leaving a relatively small pool of  participants.
Another limitation of the size of the sector itself lay in the ‘voices’ that emerged.  Had 
the sector been a larger one from which a more varied pool of artists  could be sampled, 
this  may have increased the likelihood of contrasting or dissenting voices.  Thus, whilst 
the thesis  identified strong specificities, sites  of innovation, attitudes to determinism, 
issues  of exhibition and collection, and political and economic constraints, perhaps  a 
broader sample could have enhanced the material.  
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147 My strategy when contacting potential participants  was always to leave a two to three week gap in 
between requests, and to make three attempts  to contact them.  Thus, when no response was  forthcoming, 
it was not due to having made only one attempt that may have been ‘forgotten’ or neglected.
However, an advantage of conducting a small-scale research project is  the depth of 
material encountered.  The nature of the study elicited subjective, lived experiences  on 
the subject matter that allowed for a problematisation of digital art in a way that may 
not have as efficiently been gleaned from say a large-scale, quantitative survey.  Also, the 
ethnographic work and practice as research dimension added complements  to the 
material, and provided a breadth of  material to complement the in-depth interviews. 
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11.6 Possibilities for Further Study
As this research thesis was conducted at a time of extreme economic flux, it was 
informed by the ‘structure of feeling’ of crisis, or change and paradigm shifts  not only in 
artistic production, but in capitalism itself.  Thus, as  the dust settles, it would be of 
benefit to chart and follow the participants over a longer time scale, after the ‘crisis’ has 
hit, and while the ramifications of it are yet to fully unfold.  However, this stresses  the 
point that any further study would also need to adopt a theoretical standpoint that 
places ‘situatedness’ even more to the fore.
The field of digital media is  in flux by virtue of the market-driven pace of change of 
ICTs, making any sustained study of the technologies problematic.  Thus, whilst certain 
open-source hardware and software has emerged as currently ‘hot’, a further study would 
require the researcher to straddle a position that involves a knowledge of these 
technologies, whilst also understanding that the fetishisation of these technologies carries 
the risk of a one-dimensional perspective on innovation in digital media.  I therefore 
suggest that whilst this research has strongly attested to the value and potential of 
technologies such as  the Arduino hardware and software, the Processing programming 
environment and the PureData interface, these technologies may be superseded in the 
short to medium term.  Thus, further research would require ethnographic and/or 
practice as  research components that could embed the researcher in the ‘current’ tools 
and means, so that they can converse in an in-depth way with their participants. 
However, the researcher must also be open to those tools being discarded in favour of 
ones  deemed more appropriate.  Thus, a fetishisation of the technologies of the day is 
not an appropriate research trajectory.
The field of innovation studies could be furthered by continuing research that priorities 
the innovation processes where the goals or outcomes  are not primarily market-driven. 
This  research has yielded insights that pertain to the non-commercial aspect of cultural 
production.  I suggest that further research along this  trajectory could yield further 
insights  on innovation practices and processes that complement existing studies of 
commercially-influenced innovations.
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Chapter 2 Addenda
A2.1 Case Study: Determined Dystopia, Determined Utopia - A Critique of 
Determinism
A2.1.1 Technological Dystopia: Neil Postman and Technopoly
Cultural critic Neil Postman presents a decidedly dystopian yet determinist critique of 
technology-centric society in his  1993 work Technopoly.  In this work, Postman sets out his 
explication of a technopoly as a society where ‘the primary, if not the only, goal of human 
labor and thought is efficiency, that technical calculation is  in all respects superior to 
human judgment ... and that the affairs of citizens are best guided and conducted by 
experts’ (Postman 1993: 51).  In a technopoly, Postman suggests that culture takes a 
subaltern place to technology, positing that ‘culture seeks its  authorisation in technology, 
finds  its satisfactions in technology, and takes its  orders from technology’ (ibid.: 71-72). 
Whilst this work serves a critique of bureaucracy, mindless  technological advancement 
and the organisation of US society, which Postman considers to be a technopoly, I 
critique it for its basis in a technological determinist stance.
The work posits a dystopian world where machines  are ‘intelligent’, they exist 
anthropomorphically as pseudo ‘brains’ and ‘thinking machines’.  Postman includes 
quotes from the ‘coiner’ of the phrase ‘artificial intelligence’ to suggest that ‘even 
machines as simple as thermostats  can be said to have beliefs’ (Postman 1993: 74). 
Postman, in his  own analysis of this  onslaught of the machine states that the computer 
‘subordinates  the claims of our nature, our biology, our emotions, our spirituality’ (ibid.). 
I suggest that Postman’s alarmist stance regarding technology is determinist insofar as he 
anthropomorphises the machine, elevating it to a status on par with that of human 
beings, the implication of which being that machines can possess  will, consciousness  and 
intent.  He suggests that human metaphors and machine metaphors  are now 
interchangeable, citing the use of the words  ‘programming’ and ‘deprogramming’ as 
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now referring to how humans work out thought processes.  He details  how discourses 
now attribute breaches  of security systems and malicious  computer code as  ‘viruses’ and 
‘worms’, noting how computers  are ‘infected’ with them.  Postman claims that this  is  not 
just anthropomorphism but a shift in perception in the human/machine dynamic.  His 
warning is that if computers can have a status  of being ‘sick’, they can also have the 
status  of being ‘well’.  ‘Well’ could also connote the state of being compos mentis and 
therefore in a position to make decisions.  
To elucidate this point, and a very dystopian view of the human/machine relationship, 
Postman cites  the controversial work of social psychologist Stanley Milgram148 
concerning obedience in an attempt to illustrate the dangers of deferring decisions to 
others.  For Postman however, those ‘others’ are, by implication, computers.  The 
Milgram experiment showed that between 65-70% of participants  took orders  from a 
supposed official to the extent that they inflicted electric shocks on others to the extent of 
severe harm or even death (the ‘official’ and the ‘victims’ were both actors  – in a sense 
the only true ‘victim’ was the subject of the experiment who had to deal with the 
knowledge of what they were capable of doing to another human being).  This work 
was  used to explain how killing within a military setting could be justified as ‘following 
orders’, potentially negating the perpetrators from any real responsibility.  For that 
reason alone the experiment is  still controversial to this day, whilst also deriving 
controversy from its  own reductionist, behaviourist ideologies  (Slater, 2005).  I suggest 
that Postman’s use of the findings however, by transposing the implications of the 
experiment to the context of computer technology, is  wholly determinist.  Postman 
posits  that the results of the Milgram experiment demonstrate that if ethical 
responsibility is relinquished, as in the Milgram experiment, ‘we have relinquished 
control, which in the case of the computer means that we may, without excessive 
remorse, pursue ill-advised or even inhuman goals because the computer can 
accomplish them or be imagined to accomplish them’ (Postman 1993: 78).
My critique of Postman’s work is its double-determinism.  Critics of the Milgram 
experiment have found it to be flawed.  Lauren Slater suggests that the experiment may 
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148 Stanley Milgram (1933 – 1984) was a social psychologist and assistant professor of psychology at Yale 
University.   Although probably best known for his experiments on obedience, he is also the originator of 
the ‘small world’ experiment, which preceded the ‘six degrees of separation’ hypothesis.  His work is the 
subject of many media representations, my personal favourite being Peter Gabriel’s track on his  album So, 
entitled We Do What We’re Told (Milgram’s 37).
not have been about obedience at all but about trust, and therefore is framed in a 
reductionist way. Other critics of the experiment have noted that the situation the 
subjects found themselves in was so far removed from real-life that one cannot possibly 
take the findings as being a reliable marker of human behaviour (Slater 2005).  Thus, to 
adopt this problematic experiment uncritically as  a warning against the pursual of 
technological advancement doubly-determines technology, through Postman himself 
and through the dystopian outcomes of the Milgram experiment.  According to 
Postman we are, to paraphrase the subtitle of Technopoly, surrendering our culture to 
technology.  However, I suggest that such dystopian views are alarmist and determinist, 
positioning technology as  inevitability progressing in sophistication until it takes over 
human decision-making and ethical judgment.  The irony in Postman’s  usage of the 
Milgram experiment is, despite its  flaws, it shows that the results  could be determined 
with any certainty.   If that were the case the experiment would have seen a 100% result 
of either those who obeyed orders.  Milgram has  provoked the field of behaviourist and 
experimental psychology to ask about that 35%, the significant number of objectors  to 
the experiment.  Thus, I suggest that were Postman to analyse the complex dynamics 
behind these numbers, a determinist pronouncement on technology and society would 
not be so certain, instead seeing within the experiment the complexity of the human 
and social psyche149.
A2.1.2 Technological Utopia in Castells’ Information Age
In contrast to the dystopian setting of Postman, there is  a champion of technological 
determinism who does not see our future reduced to such nihilistic ends, Manuel 
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149 Certainly Postman is  not alone in his dystopian-determinist stance on technology.  Jean Baudrillard, 
although working in the field of cultural theory, has  also unleashed what I consider to be a similarly 
determinist view of modern – or for him, postmodern society.  In his work Symbolic Exchange and Death, he 
charts  three eras of modern signification, the last stage being simulation.  According to Preston, 
Baudrillard’s  assertion is  that ‘culture no longer copies the real but produces it, postmodern culture is 
viewed as largely an effect of electronic technologies and networks’ (Preston 2001).  Again, I posit that this 
serves as a technologically deterministic stance, implying that meaning and reality have all but 
disappeared, instead having been replaced by meaningless  representations and simulations of technology. 
It all but shouts  ‘The Medium Is The Message’ – content is  unimportant, it is meaningless.  However, 
Baudrillard goes  one step further in his apocalyptic view that the loss  of the ‘real’ and the rise of the 
‘virtual’ that results is  an insidious enemy of contemporary society, stating that ‘it is in the Virtual that we 
have the ultimate predator and plunderer of reality, secreted by reality itself as a kind of self-destructive 
viral agent’  (Baudrillard 2005). Those aphorisms in Baudrillard’s disjointed, poetic style amount to a knife 
that threatens to bring about the culmination of Postman’s sword of Damocles regarding the increasingly 
complex role that technology plays in contemporary society – Postman’s sword at least hangs by a single 
hair, but add in Baudrillard and one is hurtled from the sphere of the potentiality of dystopia to 
depressing inevitability.
Castells.  It is  perhaps unfair to call him a technological determinist when he himself 
rejects this  label.  However, it is difficult not to label him as such upon reading the fifth 
chapter of volume one of his three-volume work The Information Age: Economy, Society and 
Culture (Castells 1999).  In this  chapter, Castells makes  determinist claims regarding 
media, outlining how television and radio have ‘overwhelmed’ textual communication. 
Castells  posits that society is  undergoing a seminal change (for the first time in 2700 
years) because of the convergence of different communication forms into an interactive 
network.  He describes this new world order as  a ‘Super-Text and a Meta-Language’, 
claiming that this order integrates text, sound, oral and visual communication whilst also 
suggesting a unity developing between machines, the two sides of the human brain and 
social contexts  (Castells 1999).  I suggest that these determinist statements pay a fitting 
homage to Carey’s beautifully articulated phenomenon of the ‘rhetoric of the 
technological sublime’ (Carey 2005).   
My critique of Castells is  in how he does  not elaborate on how this  unity might be 
possible, and merely expects  the reader to accept the inevitability and universality of its 
occurrence.  He declines  to make reference to the digital divide and unequal access to 
new technologies, rather claiming that despite all the ‘hype’ surrounding the 
‘Information Superhighway’, its  significance cannot be ignored as it - in grandiose 
determinist fashion - fundamentally changes the character of communication.  Castells 
suggests that communication decisively shapes culture, in an exercise in reductio ad 
absurdum that starts  with the premise that reality is linguistically structured.  Ergo, in 
Castells’ first reduction, our world languages constitute the media.  The media can thus 
be considered as  ‘metaphors’ due to their basis in language.  These ‘metaphors’ are in 
turn the building blocks  of the construction of culture.  Thus, in a reductionist swipe 
that no doubt McLuhan would be proud of, the medium is once again the message, with 
the power to construct culture.  
In effect Castells suggests  that because our cultures  are mediated and enacted through 
communication media, our cultures  are transformed by the new networked 
technological and media system.  I suggest that this is technological determinism at its 
most fundamental.  Whilst Castells  does  accede that at the time of writing, the 
technological system he outlined is  not fully developed, and whilst also acknowledging 
that it may not develop equally over geographical areas and even temporally, he 
nonetheless assures  the reader that its  development is  an inevitability, surmising that ‘it is 
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a certainty that it will develop and embrace at least the dominant activities  and the core 
segments  of the population in the whole planet’ (Castells 1999).  Castells  does not in this 
chapter give any time frame for this, or address how, for example, when a majority of 
the worlds population is  functionally illiterate, they will become technologically savvy 
enough to engage with this new world order in any meaningful way. 
These details evidently do not deter Castells, however.  He proceeds to lyrically espouse 
that this  technological system is in existence in embryonic form in telecommunications 
systems, in interaction on the internet, in ‘the imagination of people’150, government 
policy and ‘the drawing boards of corporate offices’.  He questions the ability to assess 
its potential impact on the world without resorting to ‘the excesses  of futurology’ which 
he apparently wishes to avoid.  However, Castells seems to have no problem with 
resorting to the excesses  of technological determinism.  This may not be surprising in 
the light of his reference to McLuhan’s  studies  of television as a form of mass 
communication that may be expanded upon for the information society.  
Thus from the dystopian futurology of Postman, Castells  stands a celebrant of new 
technology, and its potentials to homogenise and bring equality to society151.  However, 
as  my critiques have outlined, both stances  comprise determinist approaches to the 
relationship between technology and society.  Whether utopian or dystopian, the 
accounts place technology at the foreground of societal change, with an inevitability 
around technological advancement for either the universal good, or universal detriment 
of society.  I have alluded to the simplistic stance that both authors  adopt, critiquing 
Postman for the dystopian inevitability of the machine’s progress  towards ethical 
decision-making, and critiquing Castells for uncritically describing the universal and 
inevitable progress of the information age and the debordering and equality he suggests 
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150 In my opinion also in the imagination of people is the existence of aliens, armageddon, time travel, a 
12,000 year old world and fairies, this statement revealing Castells’ utopian and vague sentiments about 
his network society.
151  With due respect to Castells, I have reflected on this championing of the information age and 
contemplated that I myself may be practising a reductionism in my critique. Upon reading Castells’ 
chapter in Mackay and Sullivan (Mackay, O’Sullivan and Open University 1999), my opinion of Castells 
softened somewhat.  In that chapter, entitled An Introduction to the Information Age, Castells  outlines his 
theories of sociology in the post Cold war, postmodern, post Communist age.  Whilst this is just an 
introduction, Castells  details  compelling observations of social polarisation and exclusion, proposing the 
acknowledgement of a ‘fourth world’  of those excluded from the information society, noting that these 
people could equally reside in rural Asia or in the Bronx.  Thus, despite the difficulty I have with his 
position on the information society in his main three-volume work, the subsequent analysis of social 
division pertaining to technology use is noteworthy.
it will usher in.  
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A2.2 Aramis
Aramis: Or A Love of Technology is  Bruno Latour’s sociotechnical study that charts the 
failure of a Parisian personal transit system named Aramis.  Aramis  was a personal 
rapid transit (PRT) system whose research and development spanned from 1970 until its 
eventual abandonment in 1987.  In its conception, it was meant to function somewhat 
as  a hybrid between a car and a train.  It was to have the flexibility and convenience of a 
car, in the form of a point-to-point transport system.  It was  also designed to link up 
with other cars to form trains, so that urban congestion and pollution would be lessened 
in Paris.  
Latour’s account of Aramis  is a postmortem of the mechanisms  of the failure of the 
transit system in which a fictional professor of sociology and his  engineering assistant 
assemble facts  pertaining to the failure of the system, in the hope of reaching a 
consensus on who ‘killed’ Aramis. The work is in the unusual form of a hybrid between 
a sociological analysis, a novel and a fact file that cites data and interviews from some of 
the key players  in the Aramis project. Latour explains that in his work he has  ‘sought to 
show technicians that they cannot even conceive of a technological object without 
taking into account the mass of human beings  with all their passions  and politics and 
pitiful calculations, and that by becoming good sociologists and good humanists they can 
become better engineers and better-informed decisionmakers [sic] ’ (Latour 2004: viii). 
He wishes  to show the humanists that machines  are worthy of their respect, and show 
the technologists that the artifacts they create are not possible without human influence. 
He posits the view that far from our culture being subsumed by machines, a converging 
of the human/machine dynamic could enrich our culture.  By including technology 
alongside text, Latour maintains that our culture could ‘take on added density’ (ibid.). 
At the end of the work, the professor comes to the conclusion that there was no ‘crime’, 
that Aramis  was not ‘killed’ by one fatal flaw, be it design or financial or planning.  It was 
more that there was an inherent fragility to the project on many different levels; political, 
financial, interpersonal, planning, engineering and design.  The conclusions that the 
professor draws are that despite the multiple fragilities that existed in the project, the 
people of the project believed in Aramis, and this  was  ultimately its reason for failure. 
To put it in Latour’s succinct language ‘You believed in the autonomy of 
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technology’ (ibid.: 292).   
Clearly this  work is another swipe at the technological determinists, but it is also an 
example of how the social shaping model falls  short of explaining the complex 
relationship between human society and technology.  The technology affected the 
humans and their decisions  were informed by the changes in the project over time. 
Thus, there was not one clear path of evolution of the project, either from a 
technologically deterministic view or from a social shaping one.  It was much more like a 
symbiotic organism – the work showed how as governments changed, the direction of 
the project changed, but the love of  the project over time also kept it alive.
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A2.3 The Psychology of  Innovation
In the process of researching into theories of innovation, what has repeatedly struck me 
is the notion of some hidden variable, or chance quirk that can either scupper an 
innovation's success  or ensure it.  Rogers  referred to the unpredictability factor in 
innovation, he also mentioned that perception of newness  is  more important than 
objective newness.  The aforementioned Forfás  report uses words such as ‘creativity’, 
‘ingenuity’, (p.1) ‘imagination’, (p.33) when referring to their goals and successes  in 
encouraging innovation in Ireland.  This  points  to a need to look at what is behind those 
words, what is behind the unpredictability, what is  this creativity, ingenuity and 
imagination that leads to innovation?
I am aware that this  topic could comprise a paper in itself, and not being a qualified 
psychologist do not consider myself an expert in matter of the human psyche.  However, 
I have attempted to pursue some study into the human nature of innovation, and have 
found some research from the field of clinical neuropsychology that could provide a 
jumping-off  point for further consideration.
Tanja Sophie Schweizer152  has  investigated the psychological and neurocognitive aspects 
of innovation and postulated a neurocognitive model for innovation, creativity and 
novelty-seeking (Schweizer 2006).  In this  article, Schweizer considers the role of 
novelty-seeking behaviour in a work environment, behaviour which she deems 
significant particularly in companies  engaged in innovation and creativity.  She reveals 
that from a neuropsychological perspective, individuals  with high levels  of novelty-
seeking behaviour have certain personality traits  that ‘also require specific work 
conditions’ (Schweizer 2006: 164).  What is interesting about this  postulation is that 
Schweizer not only considers the psychological consequences  for the individual who has 
these personality traits, but she also considers the economic consequences for the 
companies who employ these individuals.  This  work is therefore valuable for offering an 
insight and potentially a management resource for the creative and cultural industries, 
who seek to employ and retain innovative, creative individuals in order to grow their 
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152 Tanja Sophie Schweizer is an assistant professor of clinical neuropsychology at Vrije Universiteit 
Amsterdam.  Her research interests include investigations into creative cognition, stress vs relaxation on brain 
functioning and the effects of meditation on generative processes.  Like Daniel Levitin, who I referred to in my 
previous paper in terms of music cognition, Schweizer uses research from fMRI imaging to investigate the 
creative functions of  the brain (Vrije Universiteit  2008).
business.  
Although it is possibly outside the remit of this study, I find it interesting to note that 
Schweizer explains that novelty-seeking behaviour is  linked to the levels of a 
neurotransmitter in the brain, called dopamine, and that certain genes have now been 
identified that control the levels  of dopamine in the brain.  These genes have even been 
called the ‘novelty-seeking genes’ (ibid.: 165).  Other studies have found that a high level 
of novelty-seeking is also linked to what are described as  attention deficit behaviours  and 
addictive behaviours.  What Schweizer then observes is  important for any study of 
innovation in my opinion, namely that such personality traits have important knock-on 
effects  for social interaction, including interactions  in the work environment.  She 
suggests that while the individual with these traits  need their own support, support also 
needs to be given in terms  of management in the work environment in order to bring 
out the best of the novelty-seeking traits  in the form of creativity and innovation.  Given 
that Schweizer has  already stressed the economic significance of managing novelty-
seeking behaviour, this  explanation further elucidates the importance of understanding 
these psychological processes.
She then further explains  the psychological complexities  of creativity, explaining that 
creativity involves certain ways of looking at and solving problems, and that creativity 
emerges from many different types of brain functions.  In explaining the innovative 
process, Schweizer notes that ‘in order to find something new, focused attention is 
necessary, but also the defocusing of attention: creative thinking involves  intuitive leaps, 
which are facilitated by states  of unfocused relaxation’ (ibid.: 165).  She also explains 
that the ability to have ‘many things  on your mind at the same time’ is  linked with 
creativity as it may encourage lateral thinking, and seeing something from different 
points of view.  Again, Schweizer stresses  the importance of understanding these 
processes and calls for further research to be undertaken so that individuals  with high 
levels of creativity can be understood and supported by structures within companies, 
such as management and human resources.  
When Schweizer proceeds to describe some of the personality traits of creative 
individuals it helps to further understand the importance of her call for enhanced 
interdisciplinary research between psychology and human resource management.  She 
notes that creative individuals possess traits  such as ‘judgmental autonomy, self-
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confidence, risk-taking, non-conformity, independence and a critical attitude towards 
norms’ (ibid.: 165).  Having worked in two Fortune-500 companies whose human-
resource rhetoric spoke of encouraging creativity and lateral thinking, I may permit 
myself to observe with some credibility that personality traits  associated with creativity 
are most definitely not welcome in such environments, where underneath the rhetoric, 
obedience, conformity and structure are paramount.  
Schweizer in her article also mentions other personality traits of creative individuals 
including curiosity, the openness  to new experiences, and seeking out new experiences. 
Two specific characteristics are defined as  experience seeking (ES) and boredom susceptibility 
(BS), and if one considers  the implications  of these personality traits  for individuals 
involved in the innovative process they become quite significant.  ES is described as ‘the 
seeking of novel sensations and experiences through the mind and senses, as  in arousing 
music, art, and travel, and through social nonconformity, as  in association with groups 
on the fringes of conventional society (e.g. artists)’ (ibid.: 166).  BS ‘represents an 
intolerance for repetitive experience of any kind, including routine work, and boring 
people’ (ibid).  This shows that for individuals  involved in innovation, a creative and 
stimulating environment is necessary for both their psychological well-being and for 
their performance at work.  
Critically, what Schweizer also notes is that this openness to new experience ‘has  been 
found to be related to trait creativity (McCrae, 1987), creative personality (Feist, 1999), 
creative achievement (King, Walker & Broyles, 1996) and cultural innovation’ (ibid). 
Thus, this part of Schweizers article reveals the personality traits  of innovative 
individuals and calls for a need to understand how these individuals’ talents and traits 
can be better managed in a work environment so that they encourage the innovation 
process.
The next part of the article is valuable for the understanding of the innovation process 
in terms of the social reception of innovations.  Schweizer in this section posits  that an 
innovation ‘is not “something new”, but more appropriately referred to as “something 
that is judged as new”, thus  a label resulting from a social comparison and judgment 
process’.  This insight is very valuable as it furthers  Rogers’ postulation in his definition 
of innovation as being something that is  perceived as being new.  What Schweizer clarifies 
is  that just as a product can be perceived as  being new, it can also be re-judged socially 
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as  no longer being new.  Schweizer then seeks to understand the neurocognitive 
processes that play a role in this judgement of an innovation.  I believe this  is important 
for researchers engaged in innovation studies, as  an adequate knowledge of the 
processes involved in judging a product as innovative could help encourage innovation, 
just as understanding how innovative individuals  create can also support the innovation 
process.
Schweizer notes that an individual or firm can be involved in production but the 
products  may not be innovative or really new.  This view is  complimented by the Garcia 
and Calantone report which notes  that ‘many firms  have taken an innovation strategy of 
imitating and improving upon existing products  or technologies ... often viewed by their 
competitors  as  great imitators and not highly innovative’ (Garcia, Rosanna and Roger 
Calantone 2002: 117).  Thus, Schweizer suggests that a model of creativity and novelty-
seeking could help frame the individual personality traits, the behaviours that result, and 
also the sociological processes that all synthesise to produce an innovation.  She created 
a model that elucidates  this, and refers to this  model as  the Novelty Generation Model. 
She outlines it thus:
Figure A1: The Novelty Generation Model (Schweizer 2006: 168)
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This  model explains  the neurocognitive and social functions  involved in the innovation 
process.  I believe that this  model is valuable for providing a holistic understanding of 
what innovation actually is for the individual, the workplace and the social arbiters and 
adopters of products and services. It provides an understand on what feeds  in to 
innovation – the four-fold areas  of individual traits, individual behaviour, motivation 
and the social influences.
In this model, it can be seen that Schweizer frames the areas of novelty-seeking and 
creativity as  being qualities  that lead to innovative performance.  The model also 
explains what within the individual feeds  into supporting both creativity and novelty-
seeking.  Through this clear elucidation of the processes, one can see that personality 
traits alone will not necessarily translate into creativity.  There are needs  for motivation, 
expression and achievement, all of which I believe could be fostered in a working 
environment that shows consideration towards encouraging innovative behaviour.  The 
social needs are also expressed in this model – showing, as Rogers mooted, how external 
factors contribute to innovative performance. 
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A2.4 Garcia and Calantone’s Typology of  Innovations
Garcia and Calantone (2002) posit that in defining innovation typologies, the existing 
literature on innovation can be lacking in an understanding of which perspective 
‘newness’ is measured.  Thus, an innovation could be perceived as new by the firm 
involved in creating the innovation, but not the world, the adopting group, the industry, 
the market or the consumer.  The authors  posit that this confusion has hindered 
innovation research, as the research cannot be compared between disciplines.  
However, the authors  note one consistent feature in the definition of innovativeness  - 
‘discontinuity in marketing and/or technological factors’ (ibid.: 112).  Therefore, on the 
macro level, innovativeness  is the capacity of an innovation to cause a paradigm shift in 
the market or technology structure in an industry.  On the micro level, innovativeness 
could shape internal processes in marketing, strategy etc.  The authors note that product 
innovativeness does not equate to innovativeness  in a firm - a highly innovative product 
could be introduced into an non-innovative firm.  They give the example of Microsoft, 
who, the authors suggest is  not a very innovative company, but they imitate and improve 
upon existing technologies.
The authors suggest that through the lenses of different typologies  or categorisations, 
the same terminologies  can be used for different types of innovations, and vice versa - a 
similar innovation could be classified in different typologies.  Citing the example of the 
typewriter, in one study, the typewriter was classed as a ‘radical’ innovation as  it brought 
about discontinuity in industry.  However, another typology classed the typewriter as an 
‘incremental’ improvement on an existing innovation.  This was similar in the case of 
accounts of the Canon laser photocopier.  This  digital technology was termed in one 
study as ‘radical’, as it moved from analogue to digital and was  capable of being 
networked.  However, another study noted that the radical technology of the digital was 
embedded in an existing technology, so therefore was incremental.  Thus, the 
inconsistencies of what constitutes ‘newness’ prohibit a holistic way of measuring the 
degrees of  newness.
The authors thus posit that recent literature has  classed innovations as  either radical or 
incremental in a simplistic manner, suggesting that radical innovations are rare, only 
accounting for about 10% of innovations.  However, the authors  suggest that two 
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categories  are not adequate to define types  of innovations, and believe that a third 
category is  necessary.  They refer to this category as the ‘really new’ (ibid.: 120).  They 
also suggest that a boolean logic could help to categorise the innovations on a macro/
micro and marketing/technology perspective.  They describe how this typology results 
in eight possible types of innovation based on five categories and a boolean logic of 
whether marketing and/or technology discontinuity are present.  
I suggest that this framework provides  a clarity around the description of the types of 
innovation.  It provides a subtlety by having a five-level description of innovation types, 
whilst also providing a systematic way of categorising an innovation.  This framework 
clarifies for interdisciplinary research, the parameters operating within discourses of 
innovation, and allows for innovation processes to be decoupled from market concerns. 
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A2.5 National, Regional and Sectoral Innovation 
The categorisation of innovation systems  into a national system is  just one of the 
systems within the systems of innovation framework153.  The concepts  of national, 
regional and sectoral innovation represent subsets and complementarites  of the broader 
systems of innovation approach.  For example, according to Johnson (in Edquist 1997: 
36), studying sectoral innovation can be useful to gain a more in-depth study within a 
national or international context of  the systems of  innovation framework.
The national systems of innovation framework provides  a strong underpinning of the 
large-scale processes at work.  However, firms do not only interact with institutions and 
organisations in a nation, there are more complex relationships involved, including 
relationships between firms in a similar industry (sectoral) and geographical relationships 
between firms  (clusters).  The regional system of innovation is also considered to be a 
subset of the national system, Edquist citing Silicone Valley as an example of such a 
system (Edquist 1997: 11).  However, in Ireland, regional innovation is  considered to be 
important in terms of government policy, Forfás noting in a section entitled ‘Regional 
Innovation’ that ‘The National Spatial Strategy identified nine Gateways with the 
potential to drive balanced regional development; and to support distinctive and 
innovative projects in Gateway areas, the Government established a €300 million 
Gateway Innovation Fund, as  part of the National Development Plan 
2007-2013’ (Department of  Enterprise, Trade and Employment 2008: 18).
The weakness  inherent in just trying to categorise firms by a national system of 
innovation is that the system can be too broad.  For example, many industries now 
transcend geographical and national boundaries, and therefore analysing them using the 
national systems of innovation approach falls short.  As Nelson and Rosenberg note, ‘the 
system of institutions  supporting technical innovation in one field, say pharmaceuticals, 
may have very little overlap with the system of institutions supporting innovations  in 
another field, say aircraft’ (Nelson and Rosenberg, 1993: 5 in Edquist, 1997: 11).  This 
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153 There is  also a regional approach to studying innovation and industrial development, the example 
Edquist cites as Saxenians 1994 treatise.  There emerged in the 1990s  two major works on national 
systems  of innovation, one by Lundvall in 1992,  the other by Nelson in 1993. Edquist positions the works 
as  ‘complimentary’,  describing how Nelson’s  book stresses empirical research on the subject, detailing case 
studies  of national systems of innovation in fifteen countries,  whereas the thematic approach of Lundvall 
serves as a theoretical complement to the work of Nelson.   Also conducting research through a national 
framework is  Modiste, who in 1992 conducted a study using the national systems of innovation approach 
which included European countries such as Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Switzerland, Austria & Ireland.
supports  their call, amongst others, for considering a system of innovation that takes 
into account the fields of  endeavour of  the firms being considered.
The difference between national and sectoral systems of innovation is that borders  are 
not delineated in the sectoral system154  as it focuses  on types of industry.  For example, 
the automotive industry may manufacture components in one country yet market the 
completed product in a different country.  In such an example, the national system of 
innovation approach would not adequately explain the complexities international 
linkages occurring in the industry.  Various attempts have been made to categorise 
sectoral systems.  An early one by Pavitt and Patel notes that the industrial sectors ‘can 
be grouped into three broad “technological families”, mechanical, electrical, and 
chemical’ (Patel and Pavitt, 1991: 45 in Edquist 116).  An earlier study by Pavitt 
attempted a taxonomy of sectors, categorising them into scale intensive, science based, 
specialised suppliers, and supplier dominated or traditional (Pavitt, 1994 in Edquist 116). 
Through an analysis of these taxonomies, Paulo Guerrieri and Andrew Tylecote 
attempted a taxonomy of their own, which delineated sectors  according to the following: 
mechanical and electrical, electronics, chemicals, ‘effects’, ‘volumes’ and biochemicals. 
Whilst this research is  formidable, especially to someone studying innovation from the 
humanities, it does provide a jumping-off point for considering innovation in terms of 
the ‘type’ of industry being considered.  Whilst the research that Pavitt, Patel, Guerrieri 
and Tylecote centres  on the industrial industries, potential exists  to analyse the media 
and cultural industries  through the sectoral systems  of innovation approach, more so 
than national or regional approaches.
324
154 It could also be noted that regions could act like sectors in certain circumstances.  Again, Silicon 
Valley serves as an example of this.  However, regions still have the implication of borders being involved, 
whereas sectors do not.
A2.6 EU Report on Clusters
An EU report has studied the concept of clusters  of innovation.  The organisation who 
carried out the study, PRO INNO Europe, ‘aims to become the focal point for 
innovation policy analysis, learning and development in Europe, with the view to 
learning from the best and contributing to the development of new and better 
innovation policies  in Europe’ (European Commission 2008).  The reports  that they 
produce are called innobarometers, and their 2006 report focused on clusters (European 
Commission 2006).
The 2006 report studied innovation in 25 EU member states, along with four countries 
applying for membership, and three non-EU states (Norway, Switzerland and Iceland. 
The report states that it considers clusters to be ‘prominent vehicles of increased 
innovation and competitiveness, where – due to the concentration of similar and 
complementary businesses – key factors  of development can be produced more 
economically and competition is above the average’ (European Commission 2006: 3). 
The report was revealing in terms of its analysis of awareness of the concepts  of 
clusters, understanding of what clusters are and the distribution of clusters in the EU. 
The study, in what I observe to be possibly precipitated by an understanding of the 
national systems of innovation framework, also analysed the role of the public 
institutions and organisations in clusters.  
The report found that there is generally a high level of awareness  of the concept of 
clusters  in the older EU member states.  However, awareness amongst the four 
candidate states drops, and is  lower again for the ten new member states.    The 
European Free Trade Association countries also score quite highly on awareness, but not 
as highly as the established EU member states, as depicted thus:
Figure A2: awareness of  the concept of  clusters
325
The study proceeds to then analyse the percentage of companies  operating in a cluster 
environment.  This shows a great variance throughout the EU, with the UK and Ireland 
having the highest level of operations in the cluster environment.  Again, using a 
national systems of innovation framework to explain this could prove very effective.  For 
example, in Irelands  case we can see how public policy is  helping to promote innovation. 
Again, the Forfás innovation report notes that ‘While enterprises and individuals are the 
primary sources  of innovation, public policy can establish the right framework 
conditions for innovation to flourish’ (Department of Enterprise, Trade and 
Employment 2008: 2).  In Irelands case, the EU Innobarometer report shows that 
approximately 64% of companies  operate in a cluster environment.  The standings are 
displayed graphically as follows:
Figure A3: percentage of  firms operating in a cluster environment
Some of the other findings  that have implications for innovation in member countries, 
in particular Ireland, are also posited:
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*  The survey found that innovative companies  operating in a cluster are more 
innovative than other companies
*  Companies in clusters are more than twice as likely to outsource R&D to universities, 
other firms or public labs
*  Most managers in cluster companies consider the role of government to be very 
important in supporting the cluster
*  Ireland has a particularly high level of financial support for clusters  at a government 
level
*  In Ireland, the company departments that benefit most from the company operating 
in a cluster are sales, marketing and R&D
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A2.7 Understanding the Nature of  Diffusion: Rogers’ Case Studies
Rogers  uses the case study of scurvy in the British navy (Rogers  1966: 7) to show how 
even obviously beneficial innovations can be diffused very slowly.  In this  study, Rogers 
charts  the time frame between the first known experiment on scurvy in 1601, showing 
the benefits  of lemon juice in controlling scurvy, and the eventual adoption of citrus 
fruits as part of sailors  diets in 1795.  Rogers  points out that the navy adopted 
technological innovations more rapidly at the same time, so it was  not the case that the 
navy were slow to adopt innovations generally.  Rogers  cannot fully account for why the 
navy were so slow to adopt scurvy prevention measures, but he did point out that one of 
the major experimenters was not a naval medicine expert.  Perhaps the perceived lack of 
authority could have led to skepticism of the experiment's findings?  The point from this 
example is that just because an innovation is  beneficial, tested experimentally, cost-
effective and easy to implement, it does not necessarily follow through that the 
innovation will be adopted.  This  study shows that the psychological dimensions of 
perception could have been a factor – the perceptions  of the navy that a main 
contributor to this innovation was not an expert in naval medicine.
In the second of Rogers  case studies  on diffusions, he uses  the well-cited example of the 
Dvorak typewriter keyboard.  Rogers details  the design of QWERTY keyboard, noting 
that the layout of the keys was to prevent the old, mechanical typewriter from jamming. 
This  was  achieved by arranging the keys  in such a manner that there was a very small 
probability of adjacent keys appearing together in type.  However, by 1900 there was 
frustration at the layout because the typewriter technology had improved, leading to less 
of the insidious jamming.  This  frustration was also due to the increase in touch-typing 
skills amongst typists, leading to an ability to type faster.  The QWERTY layout thus 
hindered the typist.  Around 1932 Professor August Dvorak of Washington University 
designed a typewriter layout that would afford more efficiency to the user.  The new 
Dvorak layout meant that the amount of work done by each finger was in proportion to 
its strength and dexterity.  This  had huge advantages  to speed and accuracy for typists 
and was clearly a well-thought out, scientifically-based, empirically researched 
innovation.  Yet the QWERTY layout is still almost exclusively in use.   Rogers  posits  an 
explanation for this, citing vested interests among typewriter/keyboard manufacturers to 
not change the layout.  Rogers also blames users themselves.
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These studies show that diffusion of innovations is  a complex concept in itself.  It is 
subject to the quirks  and idiosyncracies of human behaviour and perception.  An 
innovation might ‘tick all the boxes’ in terms of function, efficiency and cost, but the 
uncertainty and unpredictability that Rogers highlighted earlier in his  work are certainly 
at play in the diffusion process.
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Chapter 3 Addenda
A3.1 The Six Facets of  the Production Nexus
Technology
The first facet of the production nexus is identified as technology.  The authors  claim 
that ‘technology provides  the tools with which people and institutions augment their 
abilities  to communicate, and changes  in communication technology profoundly 
destabilize and create new opportunities  in art and culture’ (Peterson and Anand 2004: 
314).  The authors cite several examples  that enforce this view, starting with the 
technology of the printing press, which evidently precipitated the evolution in western 
society from the medieval to a Renaissance era.  The authors then cite several studies 
relating to the composer Ludwig van Beethoven and the development of the pianoforte. 
One study claims  that ‘the structure of a vast amount of orchestral music owes its shape 
to the mind set of the piano’ (Goodall 2000: 175 cited in Peterson and Anand 2004: 
314).  This  claim, referring to the structure of orchestral music, is linked to Beethoven’s 
emergence as a composer, with the authors  citing a 1995 study by DeNora in which it is 
claimed that ‘were it not for the advent of this  technology, Beethoven would have 
remained a provincial musician on the streets  of Vienna, and the world would not have 
his magnificent body of work’ (Peterson and Anand 2004: 314).  In keeping with the 
musical theme, the authors then draw on more research, all claiming that improvements 
in recording and transmission of sound ‘radically altered music in the twentieth 
century’ (ibid.).  
However, this particular viewpoint of technology is somewhat problematic in that it is 
quite determinist.  From a social shaping of technology perspective, technology alone 
cannot be responsible for the emergence of a new social era, nor can it alone be 
responsible for the emergence of a genius such as Beethoven.  There are many 
contingent factors involved in the successful adoption of a new technology, many of 
them social, political and cultural.  However, within the six facets of the production 
nexus, the impact of these factors, particularly the social factors is diminished and lost 
once technology is over-emphasised.
330
Law and Regulation
The second facet in the production nexus is  identified as  law and regulation.  The 
authors note that ‘law and regulation create the groundrules that shape how creative 
fields  develop’ (ibid. 315).  They illustrate this by using the example of Griswold’s 1981 
study of copyright law in the nineteenth century.  Griswold noted that the main themes 
evident in successful American novels at this  time centred around man and his  striving 
endeavours to master the wilds  of nature, whereas English novels centred around more 
domestic concerns.  This  difference was put down to differences in culture, but Griswold 
found another explanation - that of copyright.  She found that English novels could be 
sold copyright-free in the US, giving English works (although clearly not the authors 
themselves) the advantage.  In response to this, the American authors  needed to increase 
the saleability of their work by writing more specialised works  with themes  such as  man 
versus nature.  Significantly, she notes that once the copyright laws changed in 1909, the 
amount of domestic type novels  being produced by American writers  increased. 
Therefore, the supposedly cultural difference between England and America regarding 
taste in novels was in part falsely exaggerated due to copyright law and regulation.
Related to this  is the issue of censorship.  The authors  explain that ‘since the earliest 
days of printing, when the right to publish books  was controlled by the Crown, 
regulation and censorship of the culture industries have shaped what could be 
produced’ (ibid.).  This  has had an effect on the modern culture industry, the authors 
noting that ‘restriction on multiple ownership of newspapers  and of TV and radio 
stations has  fostered competition and diversity in the United States, and deregulation 
has had serious consequences’ (ibid.).  They observe a change in ownership of radio 
stations over time, in what could be described as a diachronic application of the 
perspective.  According to a 2004 study by Lee, the largest radio company in the US in 
1989 owned 20 radio stations, whereas by 2002, the corresponding largest company 
owned 1225 stations  (Lee 2004 cited in Peterson and Anand 2004: 315).  The knock-on 
effect of this  is  that the decisions as to what music made it to air were made by fewer 
individuals, with the result that ‘in 2002 just about half as many songs  were aired often 
enough to become popular as indicated by the pop music charts’ (ibid.).  This is 
significant in terms  of the quality of material being disseminated by the culture industry. 
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However, at this point, quality of content is not discussed in relation to such industrial 
developments. 
Industry Structure
Peterson and Anand next observe how industry structure can be a significant part of the 
production nexus.  Citing DiMaggio and Powell’s  1991 work, they note how ‘industrial 
fields  (Bourdieu 1993) tend to coalesce around new technologies, evolving legal 
arrangements, and newly conceptualized markets, a process identified as 
“institutionalization”’ (ibid.: 315).  According to the authors, this  process  of 
institutionalisation can be seen in many areas of cultural production including fine arts, 
commercial music, country music, photography and the film industry (ibid.).  Another 
aspect to this is  ‘reinstitutionalisation’, in which established organisations restructure 
according to the same three factors involved in institutionalisation.  
Specific to the cultural industries, the authors observe how these industries  can be 
structured in three ways (ibid.: 316), with a large amount of small businesses  and diverse 
offerings, a small amount of large companies offering little diversity or a hybrid, where 
oligarchical companies  are divided into areas  that produce content for strategically 
targeted markets and also products that are targeted at more specialised markets. 
Within this  hybrid, the authors note that ‘the former produce the most lucrative 
products  and the latter produce the most innovative’ (ibid.).  To elucidate this, the 
authors use the example of commercial music, again applying the production 
perspective in a diachronic way.  They note how ‘in the late 1940s, a few large firms 
dominated the field and bland homogenous  music predominated. In the 1954-1968 
period, many small record companies  prospered, and the music became highly diverse 
and innovative, but by the late 1980s, the oligarchic firms were able to dominate by 
buying or building niche market divisions and making diverse music that generally was 
not innovative’ (ibid.).  While this could be perceived as  a mild critique of the lack of 
innovation that results  form such culture industries, it by not means  critiques  the culture 
industries in terms of the regression of listening that Adorno attributed to the culture 
industry decades previously.
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Organisational Structure
According to the authors, there are three types of organisations in the culture industry. 
The first type identified is  a bureaucratic type of organisation, consisting of distinct roles 
and an organised hierarchical system of authority.  This  type of organisation is  suited to 
gaining access to markets and distribution channels.  The second type is  an 
entrepreneurial organisation where there is  not as distinct a division in roles nor in 
authority.  This  type tends to be more innovative, allowing for less  structure and more 
creativity.  The third type is  somewhat of a composite between the two, it being a large 
organisation that adopts the bureaucratic organisational structure, but which also 
leverages for a creative and entrepreneurial spirit through employing services on a short 
term, contractual basis.  
To elucidate this, the authors cite several synchronic studies, including a 2002 one by 
Thornton on the publishing industry.  She found that once the ‘multidivisional’ 
organisational structure was adopted in the industry, standardisation became a key 
factor in such organisations (Thornton 2002 cited in Peterson and Anand 2004: 316). 
This  was applicable not only to the publishing industry where ‘routines are designed to 
sort the unfamiliar into the familiar at every step of the decision chain’ (ibid.) but also 
applied to the music industry where ‘music label executives, for example, seek to tailor 
the sound of  new bands in the mold of  accepted genres’ (ibid.).
Occupational Careers
As the authors explain, ‘culture is produced through sustained collective activity, so each 
cultural field develops a career system’ (ibid.: 317).  For example, in the field of writing, 
Bourdieu and Anheier see the career system ‘as both vertically stratified as  “elite” and 
“peripheral” and horizontally differentiated as “literary” or “light” works’ (ibid.).  In 
order to distinguish between these literary or light works, a system of cultural 
gatekeeping is  necessary.  The individuals  involved in the gatekeeping ‘selectively favor a 
subset of producers over others, thereby magnifying distortions in age, gender, and other 
demographic characteristics’ (ibid.).  The authors  cite a 1976 study by Crane in which 
she considers reward systems in art, science and religion, and investigates how variations 
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in such reward systems either foster or inhibit innovation.  This study will also be 
considered later in this paper.
Market
The final facet in the production nexus is the market.  As the authors note, ‘markets are 
constructed by producers to render the wel ter of consumer tas tes 
comprehensible’ (ibid.).  They also explain that ‘markets  result from the actions of 
cliques  of producers  who interact with and observe each others’ attempts  to satisfy 
consumer tastes’ (ibid.).  This can bring about a continual reshaping of markets, for 
example the once titled ‘hillbilly’ music became reconceptualised as ‘country’ music in 
the 1950s (ibid.).  As the authors  observe in relation to this reconceptualisation, ‘once 
consumer tastes are reified as a market, those in the field tailor their actions to create 
cultural goods like those that are currently most popular as represented by the accepted 
measurement tools’ (ibid.), for example the Billboard music charts.  If, for example, the 
Billboard charts  are recompiled to show a different emphasis  on musical genres, that 
could have the knock-on effect of changing the way in which genres  are viewed by the 
market, ‘consequently changing the allocation of  resources to them’ (ibid.).
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A3.2 Six Facets of  Production Nexus Mapped to Hesmondhalgh
Technology
As we saw previously, Peterson and Anand’s  document implies that technology itself was 
responsible for the exposition of Beethoven’s  genius, and that it precipitated the 
transformation from medieval to Renaissance society.  This  stance is widely known as 
technological determinism.  In considering the role technology, Hesmondhalgh warns 
against any sort of reductionism, while also acknowledging that technology can have 
effects.  He explains  that he would rather use the term reductionism to determinism 
because ‘the problem is not that technology is given a determining role but this 
de te r min ing ro l e i s  overemphas i s ed , thus reduc ing complex i t y to 
simplicity’ (Hesmondhalgh 2007: 80).  He later cautions  that ‘we need to be particularly 
cautious  in addressing technology as  a causal factor, for technologies are themselves the 
effects  of choices, decisions, contingencies and coincidences in the realms of economics, 
politics  and culture.  Therefore, in the context of a complex production nexus, 
technology can be assigned a significant role, but favouring such a stance should not be 
at the expense of considering other factors.  In this regard, the production of culture 
perspective provides a framework to highlight the role of technology, yet frame that role 
within a complex nexus.
Law and Regulation
Hesmondhalgh addresses  issues  of law and regulation through analysing the 
implications of copyright in the cultural industries.  He explains  that copyright is  one 
aspect of a tripartite nexus  that also includes  patents  and trademarks (ibid.: 149).  That 
tripartite nexus  is  termed intellectual property.  He explains  how copyright could be 
understood as a form of protection for the creators, and also an incentive to create. 
However, he also notes how copyright ‘is  better understood as  an attempt to regulate 
one of the distinctive problems facing the cultural industries, which is  that cultural 
commodities often tend to act like public goods, in that the act of consuming them does 
not diminish their value’ (ibid.: 150).  This regulation of such goods  in the form of 
limiting the copying of them has the effect of ‘making cultural goods  scarcer than they 
might otherwise be’ (ibid.).  
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In the light of Peterson and Anand’s work, this  observation is valid.  As they noted, in 
changing copyright law, the type of themes present in nineteenth century US novels 
changed once the law ensured equanimity between American and English writers. 
Industry structure
Peterson and Anand distinguished three types of structure in the cultural industries. 
They noted the presence of small firms, something also acknowledged by 
Hesmondhalgh.  He explains reasons for the small firms  being still operational in what 
could be considered a hostile oligarchical environment, noting a growth of 
‘independent-friendly’ industries through the emergence of new technologies (ibid.: 
174).  He also considers the cultural producers  in the wider sociological context, 
observing that ‘there has been increasing emphasis  since the 1970s on the value of 
“going it alone”, working separately from large bureaucratic organisations’ (ibid.). 
Third, Hesmondhalgh cites  the availability of venture capital.  Fourth, he notes that 
‘dominant vertically integrated companies  have seen some disintegration’ (ibid.: 175), 
thus allowing scope for smaller independent companies to provide services.  Lastly, he 
cites  an increasing interest in marketing as  being an area that small independent firms 
can benefit from in terms of interest from other companies who value the creative work 
involved in an enhanced marketing strategy.
On the large, corporate scale, which Peterson and Anand termed ‘vertically integrated’ 
and ‘oligarchal’, Hesmondhalgh echoes this, citing two features  at this  scale; 
conglomeration and vertical integration (ibid.: 164).  He defines  a conglomerate as  ‘a 
corporation that consists  of a group of businesses dealing in different products  or 
services’ (ibid.: 310).  He explains  the impact of such oligarchical firms, noting that 
‘conglomeration clearly entails an increase in the scope and power of individual cultural 
industry corporations, in that the same corporation can have stakes  in many different 
forms of  communication’ (ibid.: 167).
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Organisational Structure
In a similar analysis to his  broad one of the industry, Hesmondhalgh evaluates the 
organisational structures  within the cultural industries.  He notes  that since the 1960s, 
there has  been a tendency towards conglomeration (ibid.: 68), which would in some 
cases approximate to the first type of structure defined by Peterson and Anand, in which 
the large bureaucratic firm offers a clear division of labour and a hierarchical authority 
system.  In line with Peterson and Anand’s  typology, Hesmondhalgh also notes  that the 
smaller, more entrepreneurial firms also explains how the ‘complex professional’ period 
from about the 1950s  also allowed for these firms to exist.  He notes how ‘as small 
companies proliferated, more and more importance was attached to them as sites  of 
creative independence, which reflects anxieties about the negative effects  of big, 
bureaucratic organisations on cultural production’ (ibid.: 59).
Occupational Careers
In terms  of occupational careers, Hesmondhalgh provides  what could be considered to 
be a complement to Peterson and Anand’s  work, detailing what Bill Ryan termed a 
‘project team’ (ibid.: 64).  According to Hesmondhalgh, the team consists firstly of 
‘primary creative personnel such as musicians, screenwriters and directors, magazine 
journalists, and authors’ (ibid.).  These fall in to the category of what Hesmondhalgh 
describes  as  ‘symbol creators’ and are involved in generating creative ideas.  Next in the 
team are the technical workers, highly skilled individuals  who perform specific tasks, such as 
sound engineering, camera operation and typesetters.  Whilst these individuals  are also 
involved in the process of creativity, they do not usually generate creative ideas 
themselves, and are thus  akin to artisans rather than artists.  Third in the team are 
creative managers who ‘act as brokers or mediators  between, on the one hand, the interests 
of owners and executives, who have to be primarily interested in profit (or, at the very 
least, prestige), and those of creative personnel, who will want to achieve success  and/or 
build their reputation by producing original, innovative and/or accomplished works. 
Such individuals  include A&R teams  in the music industry, producers  and editors.  Next 
in the team are the marketing personnel whose aim it is  ‘to match the work of primary 
creative personnel to audiences’ (ibid.: 65).  The final members in a project team are the 
owners and executives who direct the organisation, are responsible for staff contracts  but 
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who do not have significant creative input, and the unskilled and semi-skilled labour who 
may work in the packaging and distribution of  the cultural product.
Market
The questions of the cultural market, its  concentration and its  relationship with the 
consumer are complex.  Hesmondhalgh attempts to address some of these questions 
throughout his 2007 work.  As  we saw previously, Peterson and Anand considered 
markets  to be constructed by cliques of producers.  Issues of quality and standards arise 
from this, along with issues of diversity.  However, Hesmondhalgh cautions  against 
inferring from studies  attesting to increasing market concentration, stating that ‘even in 
the rare cases  where decreasing diversity is  clear, it is  very difficult to show that 
concentration causes homogenisation’ (ibid.: 76).
On the other hand, Hesmondhalgh asks  ‘how can we possibly speak of a lack of 
diversity?’ when shops are ‘awash with products and nearly everyone in the developed 
world can receive more radio and television stations than ever before’ (ibid.).  However, 
as  Hesmondhalgh notes ‘one political economy writer (Mosco 1995: 258) has  responded 
to this  criticism by making a distinction between multiplicity - the sheer number of 
voices  - and diversity - whether or not these voices are actually saying anything different 
from each other’ (ibid.).  Hirsch also echoed this in terms  of television and newspaper 
media, positing that ‘as the level of concentration increases across  these media, an 
interesting empirical and researchable question will be whether the diversity of what 
becomes available is diminished’ (Hirsch 2000: 357).
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A3.3 Bourdieu’s Methodology
Perhaps because of a rigorous  engagement with the combined intellectual practices of 
theory and empirical research, Bourdieu contributed a powerful sense of introspection 
and reflexivity to his work.  This has been significant in the field of social research, with 
Bourdieu positing that sociologists themselves are socially situated and therefore there 
can be ‘no such thing as  “disinterested” academic work’ (Jenkins  2002: xi).  The 
significance of this, according to Jenkins, is  that ‘epistemological questions about the 
nature of adequate sociological knowledge and the conditions under which it is  possible 
are central to his  project’ (ibid.: 10).  Jenkins elaborates  this  further by analysing 
Bourdieu’s epistemology and philosophy, observing that ‘rather than attempting to 
pronounce on “the big questions” - “the meaning of life” - Bourdieu is  more interested 
in how those questions become possible and the manner in which that meaning is 
practically accomplished as a social phenomenon’ (ibid.:16). 
A further dichotomy that Bourdieu explored was  that of the individual and society. 
Jenkins posits that Bourdieu was influenced by two dichotomous movements in the form 
of existentialism, epitomised by Sartre, and structuralism, epitomised by Lévi-Strauss 
(ibid.: 18).  Jenkins claims  that within that exploration ‘lie the roots  of Bourdieu's 
attempt to overcome the “absurd opposition between individual and society”, the 
opposition between subjectivism and objectivism’ (ibid.).   According to Jenkins, 
Bourdieu considered that opposition to be ‘the key and the ultimate dualistic category 
which structures  and organises  social science and, at the need of the day, the root of 
social science's inadequacies’ (ibid.).  Garnham and Williams also attest to in Bourdieu’s 
exploration of the opposing discourses of Subjectivism and Objectivism.  They assert 
that ‘while Subjectivism cannot recognize the social determinants in human action’, the 
Objectivists fail ‘to recognize in the idealization of the structure and its logic an 
expression of their failure to recognize the social conditions of their own practice by 
failing to recognize the socially and historically specific conditions  determining all 
human practice’ (Garnham & Williams  in Collins  1986: 119).  Thus, Bourdieu reveals  a 
necessary step in order to resolve these dichotomies, which is that any sociological 
investigation must consider the historical dimension to the issue ‘by specifying the social 
conditions  under which the structure will be reproduced or conversely will be more or 
less rapidly transformed’ (ibid.).  However, Bourdieu also provides a caveat to this, 
because he recognises that there is  an arrow of time, and that human action takes place 
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in a unidirectional way, thereby adding a sense of unpredictability into sociological 
matters.  Thus  humans, acting in society, perform actions in a way that is  guided by an 
uncertainty as  to the outcome of those actions.  This  leads to a sense of potential 
opposition, because their actions  can be interfered with by other actors, which in turn 
leads to the issue of unpredictability for the sociologist.  Bourdieu suggests  that a way to 
investigate this ‘is to specify the mechanism by which unbeknownst in principle to the 
actors  (for if they knew they would alter their strategy to take account of this  knowledge) 
these strategies  of improvization are objectively co-ordinated’ (ibid.).  Bourdieu terms 
this  regulating mechanism the habitus, which will be analysed later, along with his  field 
theory and his research on capital.
Thus, it is evident that Bourdieu wished to not only explore the inadequacies of social 
science, but to attempt a redress of these inadequacies  by example.  In his 2003 Huxley 
Memorial lecture, he detailed some of these inadequacies, positing that ‘I have little 
sympathy with what Clifford Geertz calls, after Roland Barthes, “the diary disease”, an 
explosion of narcissism sometimes verging on exhibitionism, which came in the wake of, 
and in reaction to, long years  of positivist repression’ (Bourdieu 2003: 282).  For 
Bourdieu therefore, the reaction to positivism in the social sciences was  in a problematic 
form of reflexivity that promoted extreme subjectivity and a narcissism that lacked a 
relative objectivity that empirical research could offer the discipline.  However, he 
explored some possibilities for the field of social science research, positing that ‘one does 
not have to choose between participant observation, a necessarily fictitious  immersion in 
a foreign milieu, and the objectivism of the “gaze from afar” of an observer who 
remains as remote from himself  as from his object’ (ibid.).  
The alternative that Bourdieu considered as a viable alternative was one he termed 
‘participant objectivation’, which he explained as ‘the objectivation of the subject of 
objectivation, of the analysing subject - in short, of the researcher herself ’ (ibid.).  As 
Jenkins describes this process, it is  ‘the objectification of the relationship that the 
researcher as  subject - in this case Bourdieu himself - has to the field in which he or she 
participates, but which is  also the object of the research’ (Jenkins 2002: xvi).  This raises 
consciousness  of how the researcher themselves is  situated within their field, within class 
structures, within the educational sphere and their relation to various forms of  capital.  
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While this is a challenging epistemology to adhere to, Bourdieu believed that the 
practice of reflexive sociology ‘possesses the unique potential to objectify intellectual 
production and, in the process, to objectify itself ’ (ibid.: xvii).   Therefore, the 
contribution to academic discourse is significant, as  it provides the academic field of 
sociology with a discernment of both the subjects  that it is engaged with, and with a 
reflexivity that allows it to self-critique as a discipline.  It allows  for a scientific form of 
sociology, grounded in empirical research and objectivity whilst also adhering to the 
valuable contributions of subjective reasoning and introspection.  As Karakayali notes, 
‘it is  this “double gesture” - break with objectivism but not science and epistemology - 
which gives Bourdieu’s reflexive sociology its distinctive characteristics’ (Karakayali 
2004: 355). 
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A3.4 Pierre Bourdieu: The Social and the Cultural
A3.4.1 Bourdieu and Cultural Studies
Bourdieu’s writings  have been greeted with mixed reactions within cultural studies 155, 
with an initial review of his  work Distinction by Garnham and Williams  welcoming the 
work, whilst also offering critiques  of it.  They observe the relative lack of adoption of 
Bourdieu’s work into Anglo-Saxon cultural studies literature, noting that ‘neglect of this 
aspect of Bourdieu’s work [on the history and sociology of culture] is not only damaging 
in its own right within cultural studies, but this fragmentary and partial absorption of 
what is a rich and unified body of theory and related empirical work … can lead to a 
danger of seriously misreading the theory’ (Garnham & Williams in Collins 1986: 116). 
Garnham and Williams as two prominent cultural theorists, aimed to provide an 
overview of Bourdieu’s work on culture, and also investigate how Bourdieu’s work could 
contribute to traditional cultural studies discourses. 
Garnham and Williams posit that the discipline of cultural studies has developed in two 
stages, both of which, they observe, can be explained by Bourdieu’s  theory of cultural 
production (ibid.).  The authors  identify these two stages of development as ‘cultural 
Marxism’ and ‘theoreticist Marxism’.  They explain that the first stage was  ‘in 
opposition to both the subjectivism of Leavisite literary criticism and to that empirical, 
ahistorical sociology of mass-communication and popular culture’ (ibid.).  The second 
stage ‘directed consideration of the problem of ideology away from economic and class 
determinants’ (ibid.).  They note that this  second stage privileged the text itself as  the 
site for the theoreticist’s  ‘relatively autonomous signifying practice’, but that this 
development has been disputed, amidst calls for a need to value empirical research and 
consideration of  ‘economic and class determinants’ (ibid: 117).
The authors explain that Bourdieu’s  work assists  in synthesising these two stages, 
observing that Bourdieu ‘develops a theory of ideology based upon both concrete 
historical research and upon the use of the classical techniques  of empirical sociology 
such as  the statistical analysis of survey data’ (ibid.).  In addition to this, Bourdieu at 
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155 Hesmondhalgh 2006
once also critiques  theoreticism ‘by specifying with accompanying empirical evidence 
the historical roots  and economic and class  determinants of the relative autonomy of 
intellectual practice’ (ibid.).  Thus, Bourdieu in his practice attempts to harmonise a 
seemingly dichotomous tension between theory, (which Garnham and Williams  have 
identified as being problematic for its  subjectivity) with an intellectual practice that is 
grounded in empiricism and backed up by empirical evidence from quantitative 
research techniques.  In the case of Distinction, Bourdieu posits  that there is  a twofold 
interest in appropriating a particular ideology, the interest of the ‘specialists’ who are 
‘competing for the monopoly of the competences in question’ but also the interest of the 
‘non-specialists’ (Bourdieu, 1977 in Garnham 1986).  Bourdieu refers to this twofold 
interest as  ‘doubly determined’.  The result of this, according to the authors  is  a work 
that is ‘a frontal assault upon all essentialist theories  of cultural appropriation (taste) and 
cultural production (creativity)’ (ibid.).  Thus, it places cultural production within a 
complex political, economic and social nexus, refuting the essentialist notion of absolute 
taste or absolute autonomous creativity, along with a challenge to the notion that 
cultural elites  are removed from the shaping forces of economics and politics.  This  in 
turn challenges the prescriptiveness  of an ‘absolute’ culture, instead positing that these 
notions of absolute cultural values are ideologies ‘that the intelligentsia has constructed 
in defence of its material and symbolic interests as the “dominated fraction of the 
dominant class”’ (ibid.).
The authors  then proceed to analyse what they consider to be a fundamental issue with 
historical materialism, which is that of reproduction (ibid.).  They consider this  issue to 
exist at two levels, the material and symbolic, with society being organised as to 
perpetuate the current material conditions (which they term ‘the problem of the mode 
of production’), but also how society is  symbolically organised in such a way as  to 
prevent conflict about this structure (which they term ‘the problem of the mode of 
domination’), thus legitimising the existing status quo.  They posit that this problem is 
addressed by Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice, and that Bourdieu addresses the second 
problem of the mode of domination with an analysis of ‘the exercise of symbolic 
power’, whilst also investigating the material, economic aspect, thus  interrogating the 
first problem of the mode of production.  They also note that Bourdieu’s  work, being in 
the form of a critique, has  broader implications for intellectual work and advise against 
appropriating his  work just for a particular sub-discipline such as cultural studies.  They 
posit that Bourdieu’s analysis ‘lies  at the very heart of his wider general theory ... 
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because it provides the very conditions of its own potential scientificity’ (ibid.: 118). 
They elucidate this by explaining the ramifications for an intellectual practice, positing 
that ‘Bourdieu sees  sociology as  by definition the science of the social conditions 
determining human practices and thus the sociology of symbolic power is  the science of 
the social conditions  determining intellectual practice’ (ibid.).  However, these conditions 
are culturally, politically and historically situated.  Thus, a critique of these conditions 
can bring about a progression from ideology to practice, and in doing so, ‘the 
historically defined limits of available truth’ can be revealed.  They note that this 
movement is  also inherently political ‘because it is  the misrecognition of these conditions 
and limits  that is  the condition for the exercise of symbolic power to reinforce the 
tendency to reproduce the existing structure of  class relations’ (ibid.).
A3.4.2 Annotating the Social Space
Bourdieu annotated his  complex field theory in his work The Rules of Art (Bourdieu 1996: 
124).  This annotation is  reproduced below.  Hesmondhalgh explains that ‘Bourdieu sees 
the field of power as characterized by high levels of economic capital and low levels  of 
cultural capital (indicated by CE+ and CC– at the top right of the figure). The field of 
cultural production, meanwhile, is constituted by low levels  of economic capital and 
high levels of cultural capital (indicated by CE– and CC+ at the top left of the 
diagram)’ (Hesmondhalgh 2006: 214).  However, there are specific forms  of symbolic 
capital also shaping this field, annotated by CSs+ and CSs-, with the top left of the 
figure showing a high degree of symbolic, specific capital towards  the ‘consecrated 
avant-garde’ area, and a much lower degree of symbolic, specific capital in the areas of 
avant-garde, bohemia, vaudeville, serial and journalism.
Within this  field of cultural production are two sub-fields, those of small-scale 
production and large-scale production.  What distinguishes these two fields are levels of 
capital and autonomy.  According to Bourdieu’s  annotation, the small-scale production 
field is  characterised by high levels of autonomy (AUTON+), high levels  of symbolic, 
specific capital (CSs+) but low levels  of economic capital (CE-).  This  area includes  ‘art 
for art’s sake’.  In the field of large-scale production however, there is  a low level of 
autonomy (AUTON-), high levels  of economic capital (CE+) and low levels of symbolic, 
specific capital (CSs-).
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appears in The Rules of Art (Figure 1, from Bourdieu, 1996/1992: 124). As
this shows, Bourdieu sees the field of power as characterized by high levels
of economic capital and low levels of cultural capital (indicated by CE+
and CC– at the top right of the figure). The field of cultural production,
meanwhile, is constituted by low levels of economic capital and high levels
FIGURE 1
The field of cultural production in the field of power and in social space
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figure A4: the social space (Bourdieu 1996, reproduced in Hesmondhalgh 2006)
A3.4.3 Cultural Consumption
Bourdieu considers  that the ‘consumption’ of cultural goods  is just one aspect of the 
field of cultural production.  While he acknowledges that class-based distribution of 
access to cultural goods is important, the underlying class  distinctions are also of great 
significance.  Bourdieu therefore wishes not only to highlight the question of access to 
cultural goods, but to explore ‘in terms of the legitimation function of cultural practice 
the ways  in which these objective class distinctions are internalized within the habitus as 
differing dispositions, differing attitudes towards  culture and differing abilities to utilize 
cultural practices’ (Garnham & Williams in Collins 1986: 124).  Therefore, Bourdieu is 
concerned with how class fractions, through their habitus, either adopt or reject cultural 
goods, and in doing so contribute unwittingly to maintaining the existing class relations.
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Garnham and Williams posit that ‘the cultural field serves  as  a marker and thus  a 
reinforcer of class relations’ (ibid.).  As Bourdieu himself posits  ‘that is  why art and 
cultural consumption are predisposed, consciously and deliberately or note, to fulfil a 
social function of legitimating social differences’ (Bourdieu 1993: 7).   Garnham and 
Williams elaborate on this by describing Bourdieu’s  exploration of cultural production 
in the form of art.  They posit that there are two reasons that the cultural field acts as 
both marker and reinforcer of class relations, firstly because cultural production and 
specifically art, has  a rejection of use-value and therefore is  marked itself by difference, 
and secondly because art has been only possible historically in the realm of the 
bourgeoisie who could afford to devote time to pursuits that were not overtly connected 
to an appropriation of economic capital.  For Bourdieu, a work of art historically was 
characterised by ‘its  difference from and distance from everyday material reality and 
indeed its superiority to it, together with its  matching ideology, namely the post-Kantian 
aesthetics  of “pure” form and “disinterestedness”’ (Garnham & Williams  in Collins 
1986: 124).  Therefore, an appropriation of a work of art involved the ability to distance 
oneself from the class struggle of the accumulation of economic capital, but it also 
required knowledge of the codes  of art and the skills  of decoding and competencies  of 
reception and production that are acquired through the habitus.
Bourdieu therefore posits  that ‘distinct patterns  of cultural consumption are associated 
with these different modes of acquisition of cultural competence’ (ibid.).  He posits  that 
those groups that appropriate their cultural competencies  through schooling go through 
insecurities that may make them more likely to conform and not question the cultural 
hierarchy that they have learned.  Jenkins remarks  on this that in this area of uncertainty 
the key to the game is  “cultural goodwill” and what is  at stake is  their knowledge of 
Culture rather than their acknowledgement of it’ (Jenkins 2002: 144).  On the other hand, 
he posits, ‘the children of the bourgeoisie can express  the assurance of their natural 
taste in a contempt for such hierarchies and by legitimizing new forms  of cultural 
practice such as cinema and jazz’ (Garnham & Williams in Collins 1986: 125).
Bourdieu also posits  that the control of cultural capital and its subsequent conversion to 
economic capital is class-based because of access  to free time.  For Bourdieu, this  means 
economic access  to education can be very much mitigated by class fraction.  This  in turn 
links  educational level with the hierarchy of cultural appropriation.  However, Bourdieu 
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posits  that in the case of art, ‘it has  been characteristic of the development of cultural 
practice in the narrowly artistic sense to maximize the complexity of coding’ (ibid.), 
which in turn requires  a significant amount of free time in order to successfully decode 
and appropriate the cultural product.  Thus, because of the different amounts  of free 
consumption time between classes, the class distinctions are reinforced and also 
legitimised ‘by labelling those excluded from the cultural discourse as  stupid, philistine, 
etc’ (ibid.).
However, consumption time is not just a factor in this.  Bourdieu considers that what 
class  fractions do with their consumption times is governed by the beliefs  appropriated in 
the habitus.  Therefore, the choice that is  made by an individual as  to how to spend their 
consumption time is  mitigated by what they have appropriated in the habitus as being a 
‘valuable’ way to spend their time.  For Bourdieu, ‘the specific competence (in classical 
music or jazz, theatre or film etc.) depends  on the chances which the different markets, 
domestic, scholastic or occupational, together offer for accumulating, applying and 
exploiting it, i.e., the degree to which they encourage acquisition of this  competence by 
promising or guaranteeing it profits which will reinforce it and induce new 
investments‘ (Bourdieu 1993: 86).  Thus, Bourdieu posits, that the decisions that the 
agent makes as  to how to spend their consumption time ‘will depend upon the cultural 
and economic endowments with which he or she enters  the social field, the fields 
objectively and realistically open for investment given the position of class origin from 
which he or she starts, and the relative weight of various fields’ (Garnham & Williams in 
Collins  1986: 125).  Thus, agents entering a field with large amounts of both cultural 
and economic capital will fare better than those agents at a deficit of one or both of 
those forms of capital.  Bourdieu considers the dominant class to consist of agents with 
large amounts of both capitals.  The dominated class consists  of those agents who 
possess little amounts of  both forms of  capital.  
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Chapter 4 Addenda
A4.1 Modernity and the separation of  ‘economy’ and ‘culture’ 
The emergence and meaning of the category of ‘culture’ can only be understood in the 
historical context of this ‘Great Transformation’ of modernity, as  characterised by 
Polanyi (1994).  For, this  transformation involved much more than the deepening 
divisions of labour which classical theorists, notably Adam Smith, viewed as  key to the 
growing ‘Wealth of Nations’.  It involved the structural separation of activities and 
spheres that were previously interwoven.  In Polanyi’s account, a key element of this 
transformation is  centred round the separation of the economic from the social and 
cultural systems.  Polanyi’s  analysis  emphasises that, prior to the eighteenth century,  ‘the 
economic system was absorbed in the social system’.  For him, regulation and markets 
had grown up together and the self-regulating market was unknown before this time. 
Thus for Polanyi, the emergence of the very idea of self-regulation represented ‘a 
complete reversal of the trend of  development’.  In this  particular great transformation, 
nothing must be allowed to inhibit the formation of markets.  The only legitimate 
policies  now become those which help to ensure the self-regulation of the market, not 
least by creating conditions  which make the market the only organizing power in the 
economic sphere.    
Such features of the ‘economic’ and its characteristics  had profound implications for 
those of ‘culture’.  Firstly, the great transformation saw a separation of the three 
faculties  of practical reason, judgement and theoretical reason, as first identified by 
Kant.  By the end of the eighteenth century, these ‘spheres of knowledge’, appeared to 
be differentiated from one another institutionally as  the ‘spheres  of science, morality, 
and art’.  Secondly, the culture domain acquired a specific social role distinct from its 
prior religious associations and ritual roles. Its remit shifted to the aesthetic, 
transcendent and ‘sublime’ and it began to increasingly embrace secular characteristics 
and concerns.  Thirdly, the culture realm embraced a new social and political role in 
relation to the construction of the early modern cultural ‘public sphere’. This  cultural 
dimension of the public sphere addressed the quest for new modes  of expression and 
exchange of ideas  inaugurated by other aspects  of modernity’s ‘great transformation’, 
not least its new modes of subjectivity, self-consciousness and its  ‘self-referentiality of a 
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knowing subject’ (Habermas, 2001: 133).   Fourthly, the shift from patronage to the 
market became an increasingly important sponsor of certain forms of cultural 
production. 
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A4.2 The Neo-Liberal Turn
The neo-liberal framework suggests that the ‘content neutral’ invisible hand of the 
market ensures diversity of cultural artefacts, and freedom of choice for the consumer. 
Private ownership in a capitalist market framework provides  the consumer with the best 
choice of media ‘products’.  In contrast to this, critical cultural theory suggests that 
commodified cultural ‘products’ determine the meanings  and content of the media, that 
private ownership of media entities predisposes the content to be in line with capitalist 
ideology and that media organisations  function as sites  of profit.  Thus, in terms  of 
ownership of media, neo-liberal ideology sees large media corporations  as  driven 
towards  market share and thus will offer a diverse range of cultural products in order to 
maximise market share across a spectrum of audiences.  However, the suggestion from 
critical cultural theory is  that such a distribution of a few large media organisations 
promotes  a concentrated ideological and political power amongst the small pool of 
corporate elites.  The nature of cultural artefacts emanating from such organisations 
therefore, is commodified for profit.
In terms of the role of the state, neo-liberal theory is  generally in favour of self-
regulation of organisations, it backs away from state regulation, sees  state-ownership of 
media corporations as antagonistic to media and individual freedom, ignores 
inequalities of economic power or takes them as  legitimate, and defines  social agents in 
individual and consumer terms  with little attention to social or cultural collectivities. 
Critical cultural theory posits that the funding of state media organisations - with the 
important caveat that they are independent of direct political control - can provide an 
important public service function.  This  view also posits  that state subsidies or grants for 
small media and cultural organisations can promote a diversity of expression, and 
importantly that intervention at a state level can help to counter the power of economic 
elites, thus furthering diversity of  cultural expression. 
In relation to advertising, neo-liberal ideology sees  the role of advertising as one that can 
reduce the cost of media access for consumers, and that sponsorship can be defined as 
‘commercial free speech’.  In contrast to this, critical cultural discourse posits that 
advertising media play an indirect but important role in the process of capitalist 
commodity production.  Thus, the role of advertising shifts  from informing audiences to 
producing consumers.  In terms of the effects  of advertising, we also see a difference 
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between neo-liberal theory and critical cultural discourse.  For neo-liberal ideology, 
advertising informs  consumers about products, while encouraging consumers  to buy 
without compelling the ‘rational’ audience to purchase.  Opposing this, critical cultural 
theory posits  that the effects of advertising can reshape the parameters, forms and 
content of public communication, and that advertising has  strategic ideological and 
social impacts on audiences beyond the promotion of  specific products.
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A4.3 Fredric Jameson
A4.3.1 Jameson on Adorno
In his  book Late Marxism, Fredric Jameson provides detailed readings of some of 
Adorno’s seminal works  while foregrounding the ahistorical trends and ‘poststructural 
gossip’ of recent cultural turn thought (Jameson 2007: 3).  He posits an account of 
Adorno’s work as an alternative to these trends, citing the richness  of Adorno’s  thought 
which combined the cultural with the social, economic and political domains.  While 
Jameson admits  to distancing himself from Adorno in the 1970s, he later came to see 
how Adorno’s  prophecies  about a ‘total system’ became complete at this  time.  Jameson 
posits  that Adorno might in fact be ‘the analyst of our own period, which he did not live 
to see, and in which late capitalism has all but succeeded in eliminating the final 
loopholes  of nautre and the Unconscious, of subversion and the aesthetic, of individual 
and collective praxis alike ....’ (ibid: 5).  
Jameson also highlights Adorno’s academic praxis, in that it brought American 
empirical research back to German sociological thought, but also brought the dialectic 
into empiricism (ibid).  For Jameson, this is a significant contribution, suggesting that we 
can now appreciate the form of praxis that Adorno brought.  He explains how in his 
opinion, Anglo-American influences have been hostile to dialectic thought.  In fact, he 
posits  that so powerful is  Adorno’s  praxis  that the dialectic is a ‘methodological 
timebomb’ in the social sciences (ibid: 8).  
Significantly for this  research however, is  Jameson’s critique of Adorno’s Marxism 
(Jameson 2007: 9).  Jameson considers that Adorno’s significant contribution is  in the 
area of the economic system, or the mode of production.  Jameson stresses  Adorno’s 
‘unique emphasis  on the presence of late capitalism as a totality within the very forms  of 
our concepts or of the works of art themselves’.  Jameson, as we saw previously, 
considers  that ‘no other Marxist theoretician has ever staged this relationship between 
the universal and the particular, the system and the detail, with this kind of single-
minded yet wide-ranging attention’.  For Jameson, ‘Marxism, like other cultural 
phenomena, varies according to its socieoeconomic context’.  Thus, the continuing 
special relevance of Adorno’s  Marxism is in that combination of the previously 
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separated dimensions  of art, politics  and economics  - one which we have seen the 
cultural turn thesis ignore.
A4.3.2 Jameson on Postmodernism
Jameson suggests that postmodernist theories are not just cultural, comparing 
perspectives  from postmodernism to those that eulogise a new type of society, most 
notably the ‘post-industrial’ society of Daniel Bell, along with the ‘information’ 
society156.  Importantly, Jameson’s  critique of these theories posits that in eulogising the 
postmodern world order, these theories wish to show how their processes are beyond 
economic influences, and how they have transcended the economic laws of capitalism. 
As Jameson observes ‘such theories have the obvious ideological mission of 
demonstrating, to their own relief, that the new social formation in question no longer 
obeys  the laws of classical capitalism, namely the primacy of industrial production and 
the omnipresence of  class struggle’ (Jameson 1984: 55).
However, for Jameson (acknowledging Ernest Mandel’s  influence on him - Mandel 
having posited that the ‘new’ postmodern society represents the purest form of 
capitalism to date), there is a symbiosis between postmodernism and capitalism, and 
postmodernism can not be considered without considering multinational capitalism.  For 
Jameson, ‘every position on postmodernism in culture - whether apologia or 
stigmatization - is  also at one and the same time, and necessarily, an implicitly or 
explicitly political stance on the nature of  multinational capitalism today’ (ibid.).
the deconstruction of  expression
For Jameson, meaning is  constructed in a work of art by giving consideration to the 
context in which the work is  produced.  In the absence of a context, a work of art is 
reduced to ‘decoration’ (ibid.: 58).  This  is because a work of art is a response to a 
situation.  Jameson takes  the example of a Van Gogh painting, Peasant Shoes  as an 
example, suggesting that when taken contextually, the shoes  point to a difficult life of 
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156  I suggest that along with these theories which eulogise the new, we could include the rhetoric of 
government policy in Ireland around the ‘knowledge’ society and the ‘smart economy’.
manual labour and poverty.  Van Gogh’s technique is also considered by Jameson - he 
considers the work to be ‘a Utopian gesutre’ due to the artists choice of  vibrant colours.
Jameson also considers the Heideggeran interpretation of the work, which is that ‘the 
work of art emerges  within the gap between Earth and World’, or for Jameson ‘the 
meaningless materiality of the body and nature and the meaning-endowment of history 
and of the social’ (ibid.: 59).  This  means that in the gesture of painting the peasant 
shoes, Van Gogh is  recreating the lived context of the shoes, which is  a gesture towards 
reconnecting them with the earth.
These readings - a Utopian gesture and a reconnection with the earth - are, for Jameson 
hermeneutical, in that ‘the work in its  inert, objectal form, is  taken as  a clue or a 
symptom for some vaster reality which replaces it as  its ultimate truth’ (ibid.: 59).  To 
contrast with this, Jameson next asks  the reader to consider Andy Warhol’s  work 
Diamond Dust Shoes, by which Jameson is  less  enthused.  He observes  the postmodern 
characteristic of meaninglessness  in the work, stating that the work ‘evidently no longer 
speaks  to us  with any of the immediacy of Van Gogh’s footgear: indeed, I am tempted 
to say that it does  not really speak to us at all’ (ibid.).  He observes  how the viewer has 
nowhere to go with this  painting - the shoes are devoid of context, they are fetishised, 
dead objects, as plausable to have been painted in the context of Auschwitz or a dance 
hall.  
For Jameson, the result of this  is  that there is ‘no way to complete the hermeneutic 
gesture, and to restore to these oddments that whole larger lived context’ of the 
collection of shoes.  In relation to other work by Warhol such as the infamous 
Campbell’s  soup prints, Jameson notes  that Warhol’s  work locates  itself within the 
discourse of commodification that is characteristic of late capitalism.  For Jameson, 
these works therefore should be inherently political, and if they are not, this raises  the 
question of  the potential of  political art in the period of  late capitalism.
Jameson considers the Van Gogh work to be characteristic of the high modernist 
movement, and the Warhol painting as characteristic of the postmodernist movement. 
Through the examples  of these paintings, Jameson construes that a feature of 
postmodernism is  a depthlessness  and a superficiality of representation (ibid.: 60).  He 
considers  photographic technology to play a role in the postmodern aesthetic, 
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attributing the ‘deathly quality’ and ‘x-ray elegance’ of the Warhol image to 
photographic techniques.  He observes how the shoes appear as  ‘debased and 
contaminated in advance by their assimilation to glossy advertising images’ (ibid.), and 
that the coloured surface of the image ‘has been stripped away to reveal the deathly 
black-and-white substratum of the photographic negative which subtends them’ (ibid.). 
He considers this to be ‘the inversion of  Van Gogh’s Utopian gesture’.
This  leads Jameson to posit that a feature of postmodernism is  ‘the waning of 
affect’ (ibid.: 61).  In stripping away the context for the shoes - in removing the 
situatedness  of them, unlike Van Gogh, Warhol is  forcing a removal of subjectivity, of 
narrative and therefore a removal of emotional engagement with the work.  He 
elucidates this point, again by means of a comparison with another work from the high-
modernist era, The Scream by Edward Munch.  Jameson considers  The Scream to be ‘a 
canonical expression of the great modernist thematics of alienation, anomie, solitude 
and social fragmentation and isolation’, epitomising what he refers to as ‘the age of 
anxiety’ (ibid.).  Implicit in that reading is that there is a subject who does  the expressing 
of those anxiety-laden emotions.  There is  a subject-object relationship in which the 
subject can feel isolation and alienation.  However, in postmodern theory there has  been 
a ‘criticizing and discrediting this  very hermeneutic model of the inside and the outside 
and of stigmatizing such models as  ideological and metaphysical’ (ibid.).  He considers 
such hermeneutic models  (including other models such as  essence/appearance, latent/
manifest, authenticity/inauthenticity) to be ‘depth models’ of analysis.  However, for 
Jameson, a characteristic of postmodern thought is the rejection of these models.  He 
considers that ‘depth is replaced by surface, or by multiple surfaces’ (ibid.: 62).
Further considering The Scream, Jameson posits  that the painting represents  an 
inexpressible ‘atrocious solitude and anxiety’ and does so by deconstructing its  own 
aesthetic - it is an expression of a sonorous  gesture, executed in a medium (the visual) 
that cannot convey that gesture (sound).  Even the figure in the painting is  trapped in 
this  silent world - he has no ears.  However, for Jameson, such expressions of terrible 
alienation and anxiety are no longer appropriate in postmodern expression.  He posits 
that ‘the notorious burn-out and self-destruction cases of the ending 1960s’ such as 
Marilyn Monroe or Edie Sedgewick have little to do with the modernist expressions  of 
either Freudian hysteria and neurosis, or Munch’s  expressions of isolation and 
alienation.  According to Jameson, ‘this  shift in the dynamics of cultural pathology can 
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be characterized as  one in which the alienation of the subject is  displaced by the 
fragmentation of  the subject’ (ibid.: 63).
This  is somewhat equivalent to discourse around the ‘death’ of the subject - it is  a 
decentering of subjectivity, along with subjective expression and subjective 
characteristics  of style.  As Jameson notes, if we are unique subjects  as  in Munch’s 
painting, we have the pathologies  and burdens of that subjectivity.  Postmodernist 
thought removes this  difficulty by bringing about the death of subjectivity, of ego. 
However, Jameson notes that this  difficulty is  replaced by a new one, which for him is 
‘the end for example of style, in the sense of the unique and the personal, the end of the 
distinctive individual brushstroke’ (ibid.: 64).  There is  also an end to emotions, given 
that there is  no subject present to experience or express them.  Thus, in postmodern 
expression, feelings ‘are now free-floating and impersonal’ (ibid.).  For Jameson, the 
postmodern is also characterised as  being concerned with spatial issues, as  opposed to 
the modernist concern with temporal ones.  Thus, ‘our daily life, our psychic experience, 
our cultural languages, are today dominated by categories of space rather than by 
categories of  times, as in the preceding period of  high modernism proper’ (ibid.).
the postmodern and the past 
Jameson next turns to the artistic devices of pastiche and parody, with a deference 
shown to Adorno’s  critique of Stravinsky’s use of pastiche in his  essay On the Fetish 
Character in Music and the Regression of Listening.  For Jameson, parody was  a 
modernist trope, a ‘systematic mimicry of their deliberate eccentricities’ (ibid.:65:. 
Parody contained the sense of intent in its mimicry.  As we have seen however, for 
Jameson postmodern expression became more about quantity than quality, the depth 
was  removed from expression, and fragmentation of meaning occurred.  In this 
situation, there is no sense of normativity amongst the plurality of voices, and for 
Jameson this is linked with multinational capitalism.  He notes  that ‘faceless  masters 
continue to inflect the economic strategies which constrain our existences  but no longer 
need to impose their speech’ (ibid.).  As a result, there is  no place for parody.  What 
replaces  it is pastiche, which unlike parody ‘is  a neutral practice of such mimicry, 
without any of parody’s  ulterior motives, amputated of the satiric impulse, devoid of 
laughter and of any conviction that alongside the abnormal tongue you have 
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momentarily borrowed, some healthy linguistic normality still exists’ (ibid.).  The 
conclusion that Jameson comes  to is  that in the effacement of the satirical, subversive 
motives ‘pastiche is thus blank parody’ (ibid.).
Jameson notes  that with this  development, along with the diminution of subjectivity, 
cultural producers  in the era of postmodernism ‘have nowhere to turn but to the past: 
the imitation of dead styles’ (ibid.).  Thus, postmodernism can be characterised by the 
loss  of a pithy parody, to be replaced by a bland, unoriginal pastiche of those - possibly 
modernist - cultural producers who have gone before.  This turn towards  the past leads, 
according to Jameson, to a kind of nostalgia in postmodern culture.  He claims that the 
postmodern ‘addiction to the photographic image is  itself a tangible symptom of an 
omnipresent, omnivorous and well-nigh libidinal historicism’ (ibid.: 66).  
the breakdown of  the signifying chain
Jameson equates the ahistoricism and spatial categorisation that are characteristic of 
postmodernism to a crisis  in temporality.  With the privileging of the current 
‘moment’ (albeit with its  underbelly of nostalgia) and the privileging of space, concerns 
of time, of temporality, become problematic.  For Jameson, if the subject becomes  lost 
in the ‘moment’ of postmodern thought, he or she can not constitute a sense of the past, 
present or future and essentially, subjectivity becomes fragmented (ibid.: 71).  Jameson 
expresses his  concerns for the production of culture in postmodern society in light of 
this  fragmentation, positing that ‘it becomes difficult enough to see how the cultural 
productions of such a subject could result in anything but “heaps of fragments” and in a 
practice of  the randomly heterogeneous and fragmentary and the aleatory’ (ibid.).
Jameson then turns to Lacan’s  account of schizophrenia to elucidate his concerns.  For 
Lacan, schizophrenia involves  ‘a breakdown in the signifying chain’, where the subject 
temporarily loses the ability to attach meaning to the events that they are experiencing 
from moment to moment.  Thus, the subject experiences an overwhelming amount of 
information that they cannot process whilst their schizophrenic episode is in progress. 
As Jameson observes, ‘the schizophrenic is reduced to an experience of pure material 
Signifiers, or in other words of a series  of pure and unrelated presents  in time’ (ibid.: 
72).
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Connecting this back to Jameson’s hypothesis of a crisis in temporality that 
postmodernism has  wrought, this  experience of such an intense present is overwhelming 
for the subject.  The subject can not locate itself temporally, and is thus  assuaged by the 
excesses of stimuli of the present.  For Jameson, this breakdown of temporality 
‘suddenly releases this present of time from all activities and the intentionalities that 
might focus it and make it a space of praxis’ (ibid.: 73).  This  annihilates any possibility 
for transformation through a temporal process  and leads  to a sense of intensity, because 
all the subject has is the experience of a momentary present.  Thus, ‘that present 
suddenly engulfs the subject with undescribable vividness, a materiality of perception 
properly overwhelming, which effectively dramatizes the power of the material - or 
better still the literal - Signifier in isolation’ (ibid.).
Jameson critiques a work of postmodern poetry, China, by Bob Perelman.  He observes 
that when the style of writing which he terms  ‘schizophrenic disjunction’ (ibid.: 74) 
becomes  normalised into cultural production, the work ‘ceases to entertain a necessary 
relationship to the morbid content we associate with terms like schizophrenia’ and 
instead becomes a vehicle for the intensity of experience that characterised the 
postmodern ‘moment’.  As we previously saw, this  intensity displaced and abstracted the 
more subjective emotions of anxiety, alienation and isolation that were characteristic of 
modernist works.
However, Jameson also attests  to the potential in postmodern works such as those by 
Nam June Paik to articulate a tension in the notion of differences, (ibid.: 75) and thus 
help to investigate relationship in a more profound way - through negotiating those 
tensions.  In viewing such postmodernist works with what Jameson terms ‘the older 
aesthetic’, the viewer can construct a certain meaning amongst the random elements of 
the work.  However, for the ‘postmodern viewer’, this is problematic as  they attempt to 
absorb all of the random stimuli at once.  For Jameson, ‘the vivid perception of radical 
difference is  in and of itself a new mode of grasping what used to be called 
relationship’ (ibid.: 76).
the hysterical sublime 
At this  juncture in the essay, Jameson proceeds to describe the ‘intensities’ of feeling - 
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those immediacies that he suggested in the previous  section - that he believes  are 
characteristic of the postmodern turn.  For Jameson, the foregrounding of space in 
postmodern thought has led to an incompatibility with concepts  of the body, calling the 
cultural turn of postmodernism ‘anti-anthropomorphic’ (ibid.: 76).  With this 
abstraction of the body comes a fetishisation of the body, seen in such works  as  those of 
the sculptor Duane Hanson whose life-like fibreglass figures  are for Jameson a 
‘simulacrum’.  For Jameson, the experience of encountering such a realistic 
representation of a human being causes the viewer to observe the other museum-goers 
in a similar light - as a representation or illusion.
The point of including this example is  that it causes Jameson to ask ‘is  this now a 
terrifying or an exhilarating experience? (ibid.: 77).  He suggests that to try and 
comprehend the intensities of the postmodern experience, we adopt the concept of 
‘camp’ from Susan Sontag, and marry it with the Kantian notion of the sublime, in a 
hybrid that Jameson terms  the ‘hysterical sublime’.  For Kant, the sublime involved 
considering a power or force so awesome and otherworldly that it defied representation. 
What resulted was  that ‘the object of the sublime is now not only a matter of sheer 
power and of the physical incommensurability of the human organism with Nature, but 
also of the limits of figuration and the incapacity of the human mind to give 
representation to such enormous forces’ (ibid.).
However, Jameson believes  that postmodern thought has  attempted to ‘eclipse’ this 
disproportionality of the human and Nature by the ‘eclipse’ of nature itself.  For 
Jameson, nature is annihilated by the commodification and industrialisation of late 
capitalism.  Here, Jameson provides an exegesis  of the nexus between technology, 
postmodern thought and late capitalism.  He does not wish to be determinist in his 
approach to technology, rather positing the Marxist stance that technology is  as a result 
of capital, not a prefiguration of it.  He also follows Ernest Mandel’s  schema of 
capitalism in which he posited that there have been three periods  of technological 
development under capitalism - steam, combustion and electronic and nuclear (ibid.: 
78).  These periods correlate with three stages of capitalism - market capitalism, 
monopoly capitalism, and multinational capital.  Therefore, for Jameson, our current 
age is the third machine age, which brings  about issues of aesthetic representation 
specific to that age.  For example, in the previous era of capitalism, which Jameson 
equates with high modernism, the cultural producers of the time - Marinetti, Le 
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Corbusier, Picabia and Duchamp - represented their machine aesthetic in Utopian 
ways, with an excitement about the machine and its potential.
For Jameson, the machines of that day allowed for representation - turbines, 
smokestacks, grain elevators, pipes, conveyor belts and trains are all included here as 
examples  for the materiality (and representability) of that machine age.  However, 
Jameson asks us  to reflect on the materiality of the tools  of our postmodern machine 
age, which for him is  represented by the computer.  Aesthetically, the computer has  no 
(or little) visual interest, and it serves only to house the inner components of the 
machine.  For Jameson ‘such machines  are indeed machines  of reproduction rather than 
of production’ (ibid.: 79).  He posits  that they do not demand representation by a 
cultural producer as the machines  of the previous  modernist machine age did.  He 
believes that there is  accordingly, an aesthetic shift away from thematially representing 
the age, towards articulating the process of reproduction - which for Jameson is  the 
function of the computer and television.  This change in emphasis towards articulating 
reproduction also encourages the simulacrum.
However, Jameson does  not believe that technology is  today’s equivalent of Kantian 
sublime Nature - something to be ‘othered’, something outside our grasp.  He feels that 
it would be deterministic to attribute this  ‘hysterical sublime’ to technology itself. 
Rather, Jameson posits that our aesthetic relationship with technology is  representative 
of our relationhsip with multinational capitalism.  He observes  that ‘our faulty 
representations of some immense communicational and computer network are 
themselves but a distorted figuration of something even deeper, namely the whole world 
system of present-day multinational capitalism’ (ibid.: 79).  He does not believe that our 
fascination with technology is  because the technology itself is so interesting, but that in 
coming to terms  with technology, we can come to terms with the enormity of the 
penetration of  capitalism into hitherto untouched areas of  our lives.
post-modernism and the city 
This  part of the essay is somewhat like a case study in the spatial features of postmodern 
architecture.  Jameson uses  the Bonaventura Hotel in Los Angeles  as an example.  He 
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reminds  us  of the populist stance that postmodernism was a reaction against modernist 
elitism.  Therefore a structure such as the Bonaventura hotel should stand as a populist 
example of this.  However, Jameson notes that far from being populist in design 
(notwithstanding the fact that it is a ‘popular’ hotel), the hotel is  designed in such a way 
as  to minimise the presence of any of the entrances, making it difficult for a potential 
guest to determine how they should enter the premises.  One of the entrances  leaves 
guests  on the sixth floor, while another leaves  them on the second.  For Jameson, this is 
read as the desire on the architect’s  part to construe the building as  a city in itself - a 
world that is  self-sufficient and hardly in need of entrances at all.  Even the reflective 
exterior glass ‘skin’ of the hotel suggests  to Jameson that it ‘repels  the city outside’ by 
reflecting back the city to the city, making the hotel almost invisible (ibid.: 82).
Jameson then critiques the use of elevators and escalators in the building, comparing 
them to a modernist notion of those technologies  as a feature in themselves for moving 
people from place to place.  However, not only do the elevators in the hotel ‘replace’ 
movement, but they are positioned in such a way as to ‘designate themselves as new 
reflexive signs  and emblems of movement proper’ (ibid.).  The hotel does not allow for 
the choice to walk of  ones own volition.
The lobby of the hotel itself is confusing - it is  situated between the four towers of the 
hotel and until directional signs were added, its  uniformity made orientating oneself 
within it extremely difficult, Jameson terming the sense of the lobby ‘milling 
confusion’ (ibid.: 83).  Relating back to the critique of movement in the hotel, Jameson 
also notes that the confusion is  ‘like the vengeance this space takes  on those who still 
seek to walk through it’ (ibid.).  Thus, Jameson concludes, the postmodern aesthetic with 
its preoccupation with space has succeeded in annihilating any sense in which the 
human being can bodily orientate themselves.  For Jameson, this ‘postmodern 
hyperspace’ has ‘finally succeeded in transcending the capacities  of the individual 
human body to locate itself, to organize its immediate surroundings perceptually, and 
cognitively to map its position in a mappable external world’ (ibid.).  He suggests  that 
this is symbolic of  our inability to map the network of  multinational capitalism.
the abolition of  critical distance
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Jameson next proceeds to critique the postmodern ethic, which he sees as  that of 
complacently following the aesthetic that it has wrought.  Jameson observes how ‘the 
logic of the simulacrum’ does  not only repeat the logic of late capitalism, but ‘reinforces 
and intensifies  it’ (ibid.: 85).  He also observes  that for those with political concerns, the 
current ‘image addiction’ with its  nostalgia for the past, is hostile to the formulation of 
any sense of  a collective or coherent vision for the future.
For Jameson, it is  an ineffectual exercise to moralise on either the hubris or the nemesis 
of the postmodern turn.  Rather, he looks  to Marx, who urged his readers to consider 
the positive and negative at once, in the exercise of a dialectical thought process.  In 
today’s world that means for Jameson being able to consider the malevolent features  of 
capitalism along with its potential for liberation that no other production system has 
offered.
In terms  of cultural production, this means for Jameson that ‘the subject demands that 
we make at least some effort to think the cultur (ibid.: 86).  He suggests that we need to 
identify some ‘moment of truth’ amongst what he considers to be the more apparent 
‘moments of  falsehood’ in the cultural productions of  the postmodern turn (ibid.).  
Jameson next queries the role of culture in postmodern times.  He attests to the ‘semi-
autonomy’ of culture which historically was able to make a political stand and act as a 
mirror to the broader culture.  However, he questions if this semi-autonomy has  been 
undermined by postmodern culture.  He suggests  that this has happened by means of ‘a 
prodigious  expansion of culture throughout the social realm, to the point at which 
everything in our social life - from economic value and state power to practices and to 
the very structure of the psyche itself - can be said to have become “cultural” in some 
original and as yet untheorized sense’ (ibid.: 87).
This  leads  Jameson to observe that our presuppositions  regarding culture in its radical, 
transformative, political form had the characteristic of what he terms ‘critical distance’. 
For Jameson this  critical distance enables  the cultural producer to critique the norms of 
society, it enables  ‘the possibility of the positioning of the cultural act outside the 
massive Being of capital, which then serves as an Archimedean point from which to 
assault this  last’ (ibid.: 86).  Jameson posits  that postmodern culture does not allow for 
this  ‘critical distance’ to exist - our space is  structured in such a way as to overwhelm the 
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physical body, and thus renders us ‘incapable of  distantiation’.  
A4.3.3 Jameson on Cultural Production
Whilst critiquing the postmodern perspective, Jameson also proposes a model of cultural 
production that he suggests  can incorporate the issues of postmodernism.  He observes 
how in the time of high modernism, leftists allowed themselves to be ‘unduly 
intimidated’ by bourgeois disapproval of what Jameson considers  to be ‘one of the age-
old functions  of art’ - namely the pedagogical and the didactic’ (ibid.: 89).  Jameson 
therefore proposes a cultural model that underscores this function, whilst acknowledging 
that the cultural model has to consider how postmodern thought has changed our 
notions of spatiality and temporality.  Thus, he posits that the aesthetic of the new 
cultural model will be an aesthetic of ‘cognitive mapping’ (ibid.).  This is  in light of the 
‘alienated city’ which ‘is  above all a space in which people are unable to map (in their 
minds) either their own positions or the urban totality in which they find 
themselves’ (ibid.).  The solution to this  sense of an urban alienation for Jameson is a 
rebordering of personal space within the urban space, a ‘practical reconquest of a sense 
of place’.  On a practical, cultural level, this involves producing works that represent a 
cognitive mapping for the postmodern subject in which the subject can re-orientate 
itself, or in Jameson’s words  ‘the construction or reconstruction of an articulated 
ensemble which can be retained in memory and which the individual subject can map 
and remap along the moments of  mobile, alternative trajectories’ (ibid.).
I do not believe that Jameson is talking literally about producing works that are akin to 
maps.  Given his  exploration of the nexus of postmodernism and multinational 
capitalism, I believe that the ‘cognitive’ mapping he refers  to is  a symbolic gesture by the 
cultural producer that will once again reclaim subjectivity, identity and individuality 
back from the abstraction and fragmentation that it underwent through postmodernism. 
As Jameson elucidates, the new aesthetic of the cognitive map is ‘called upon [...] in the 
narrower framework of daily life in the physical city: to enable a situational 
representation on the part of the individual subject to that vaster and properly 
unrepresentable totality which is the ensemble of the city’s structure as a whole’ (ibid.: 
90).  Given that for Jameson, the postmodern city - along with its  impermeable 
structures  and the technology, networks and communications channels that also pervade 
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the postmodern urban space - is symbolically equivalent to multinational capitalism, the 
call for cultural producers to represent this space is  far more profound than a mere 
mapping of that physical space.  It calls upon the cultural producer to map the networks 
of multinational capitalism, in order to aid the subject reorientate itself within that 
system.
In conclusion then, Jameson leaves us with this presupposition, a challenge to political 
artists that their works ‘will have to hold to the truth of postmodernism, that is, to say, to 
its fundamental object - the world space of multinational capital - at the same time at 
which it achieves a breakthrough to some as  yet unimaginable new mode of 
representing this last, in which we may again begin to grasp our positioning as 
individual and collective subjects  and regain a capacity to act and struggle which is  at 
present neutralized by our spatial as well as  our social confusion’ (ibid.: 92).  Thus, the 
political artist gesturing in the face of postmodernism ‘will have as its vocation the 
invention and projection of a global cognitive mapping, on a social as well as  a spatial 
scale’ (ibid.).
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A4.4 Object and Concept: The Continued Relevance of Frankfurt School 
Thought
Whilst the work of the Frankfurt School has been marginalised in cultural turn and 
postmodern debates, a number of authors  have foregrounded the continuing relevance 
of the School’s  work. As  we have seen, Fredric Jameson has strongly attested to the work 
of Theodor Adorno.  Slater and Tonkiss (2001) also provide a sympathetic reading of 
Adorno, observing that ‘in many respects, the most developed and most influential 
attempt to use the concept of reification to extrapolate from a theory of market relations 
to a characterization of modern consciousness and culture is to be found in the work of 
Theodor Adorno’ (Slater and Tonkiss, 2001: 162).  They explain how one of the 
keystones of Adorno’s thinking - that of ‘negative dialectics’, is  a methodology whereby 
the real object is  confronted with its  concept.  Thus, in Adorno’s case, his  political and 
aesthetic philosophy was to illuminate ‘the formal freedoms of the capitalist market with 
the concepts or promises of freedom implicit within it, to confront what the object is 
with what it “would  itself  like to be” ….’(ibid.: 163).
Where the application of dialectical thought is of significance for us, is  in how it reveals 
the shortcomings  of theories  of culture that are based on postmodern, neo-liberal or 
‘cultural turn’ thought.  As Slater and Tonkiss  observe, ‘the tragedy of the dialectics  of 
enlightenment is  that the same process  of subsumption that demythified nature through 
rationality and empirical observation also reduced it to a meaningless  object of 
domination, replacing all questions  of substantive value with pure manipulation’ (Slater 
Tonkiss, 2001: 164).  We can map this observation about ‘enlightenment’ and ‘nature’ 
on to those broader concepts  of art and culture.  Through Adorno’s device of dialectical 
reasoning, it  becomes clear that when nature/enlightenment is subsumed under a profit 
motive, art and culture become just another facet in the production nexus, their 
substantive or potential transformative value becoming meaningless.  As  Slater and 
Tonkiss observe, ‘the market is  recognized by Adorno as  a particular instance of this 
process  of domination, but also a privileged mechanism for accomplishing it’ (Slater and 
Tonkiss, 2001: 164).  Thus, in this  privileged market economy, the motivation and the 
means for subsuming ‘enlightenment’ is  total, with catastrophic results  for autonomous, 
critical culture.
According to Slater and Tonkiss, for Adorno, ‘a great period of autonomous & critical 
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art was  possible during the bourgeois era, precisely because the artist’s ability to support 
him- or herself through sales allowed a mediated relationship to audiences  that 
contrasted with direct dependence on Church, state or patrons’ (Slater and Tonkiss: 
166).  As  we saw from our overview of Adorno’s work on the culture industry, the threat 
to that autonomy came through the monetisation of culture, where culture was 
produced primarily for exchange value.  According to Slater and Tonkiss, Adorno 
considers  that ‘the appearance of the culture industry represents  a fundamental 
qualitative shift from liberal bourgeois  society into the era of monopoly 
capitalism ...’ (Slater and Tonkiss, 2001: 164).  For Adorno, this incursion of the profit 
motive into culture did not separate out ‘high’ and ‘low’ culture, as  has  been commented 
of his  work.  As Slater and Tonkiss observe, ‘nor did Adorno’s principles  permit him ‘to 
take one side or the other of the great divide between autonomous  an consumerist 
culture’, but rather that ‘the division itself is  the truth; of market capitalism 
(Horkheimer and Adorno, 1979: 6), cited in (Slater and Tonkiss, 2001: 166).   For 
Adorno, neither autonomous nor high art could be simply appreciated in an elitist 
manner or  taken as  the last refuge of truth or beauty.  Indeed,  high art and industrial 
produced consumer art ‘bear the stigmata of capitalism, both contain elements  of 
change.  Both are torn  halves of an integral freedom, to which however, they do not 
add  up’  (Adorno, cited in Bloch et al, 1980: 123; quoted in Slater and Tonkiss, 2001: 
166).
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Chapter 6 Addenda
A6.1 Quantum Physics and qualitative research
As physicist Brian Greene explains, ‘for more than half a century [...] physicists have 
been quietly aware of a dark cloud looming on a distant horizon’ (Greene 2003: 3).  He 
explains the problem as this.  On one hand stands Einstein’s  theory of general relativity 
‘which provides a theoretical framework for understanding the universe on the largest of 
scales: stars, galaxies, clusters  of galaxies, and beyond to the immense expanse of the 
universe itself ’ (ibid.).  On the other hand stands another behemoth of modern science - 
quantum mechanics, which ‘provides a theoretical framework for understanding the 
universe on the smallest of scales: molecules, atoms, and all the way down to subatomic 
particles like electrons and quarks’ (ibid.).
Both these theories  are testaments  to the centuries of positivist research carried out in 
the natural sciences, from the discovery of the orbits of the planets, to understanding 
that the earth is a sphere and not a disc, how we are all kept from hurtling off the planet 
into space, thanks to gravity, to radiation, x-rays  and lasers.  Thanks  to the positivist 
research methodology employed and accepted by the natural sciences, ‘physicists have 
experimentally confirmed to almost unimaginable accuracy virtually all predictions 
made by each of  these theories’ (ibid.).
However, the dark cloud the Greene introduces is this: ‘as they are currently formulated, 
general relativity and quantum mechanics cannot both be right’ (ibid.: 3).  This has left 
physicists groping for alternatives in an attempt to resolve the incompatibilities  of the 
two theories.  Some of the searches have started to lead physicists into a decidedly more 
‘human’ field of research - that of consciousness.  As  part of their experiments which 
have unearthed all of these inconsistencies, physicists have also discovered what Einstein 
referred to as  ‘spooky action at a distance’ (Rosenblum and Kuttner: 9).  This  ‘spooky 
action’ pertains to light - sometimes  it appears  in scientific experiments to behave like a 
wave, and sometimes it appears like tiny particles.  This is  known as  wave-particle 
duality.  The ‘spooky’ part of the duality however, is  that its appearance as a particle or 
a wave is  brought about by observation.  That is to say, light appears to know if it is  being 
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observed as a particle or a wave and it acts  accordingly.  This is  where the positivist 
paradigm breaks down.  It appears that conscious observation affects what can be 
known about light.  As  Rosenblum and Kuttner explain, ‘quantum theory tells  us that 
an observation of one object can instantaneously influence the behaviour of another 
greatly distant object - even if no physical force connects the two’ (Rosenblum and Kuttner: 12). 
Moreover, they note that ‘quantum theory also tells  us  that observing an object to be 
someplace causes it to be there’ (ibid.).
The issue that Rosenblum and Kuttner have with the physics community is  that due to 
their positivist scientific paradigm, much of the community does  not want to engage in a 
discussion of consciousness.  As  the authors explain, ‘classical physics, with its 
mechanical picture of the world, has  been taken to deny almost all metaphysics. 
Quantum physics  denies that denial: It hints at the existence of something beyond what 
we usually consider physics’ (Rosenblum and Kuttner: 154).  They call for physicists  to 
accept the consciousness problem, even though it may lead them to a position more 
aligned with a philosophical or metaphysical explanation to reality, warning that if 
physicists do not engage with the problem and demystify it, there is the danger of 
quantum theory being used by new-age mystics to ‘prove’ their world view.  In the 
authors’ view, ‘the antidote for sensationalistic, misleading treatments of the implications 
of quantum mechanics  would be for the physics discipline to be more open to some 
discussion of  the quantum enigma’ (ibid.: 155).
Roger Penrose, the eminent Oxford physicist and mathematician also calls  for a new 
look at science, observing that ‘a scientific world-view which does not profoundly come 
to terms  with the problem of conscious  minds can have no serious pretensions  of 
completeness.  Consciousness is  part of our universe, so any physical theory which 
makes no proper place for it falls  fundamentally short of providing a genuine description 
of  the world’ (Penrose 2004: 8).
Thus, if the scientific community is calling for an enhanced understanding of the world, 
and if that understanding is  enhanced, for Penrose, ‘our philosophical outlook can 
hardly be other than profoundly altered’ (ibid.: 8).
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A6.2 Kvale’s 7 stage interview process applied to current research
1. The interviews  were thematised by referring to the key questions  and drawing on 
them for the broad interview themes.  This  meant that the research questions could 
be turned into interview questions, ensuring that the themes of the key questions 
followed through to the empirical phase of the research.  I formulated a set of 
questions, thus ‘scripting’ the interview, taking into account Kvale’s  concepts of 
‘thematic’ and ‘dynamic’ questions, where thematic questions further the production 
of knowledge that is  pertinent to the research, whilst the dynamic ones engage the 
interviewee and keep the interview going in a lively way (Kvale, 2007)157.  
2. The interviews  were next designed to ‘flow’ through the subject themes identified in 
step one, scheduled according to the overall project timeline and tested through two 
pilot interviews.  This  stage also included the selection of the participants, the initial 
communication with them which involved identifying myself as a researcher and, 
based on Gillham’s work (Gillham, 2000: 12-14) on research interviewing, I 
considered the ethical dimensions  to interviewing, including the purposes  of the 
research and how the participant’s  personal data would be handled.  I also designed a 
participants  guide which aimed to answer preliminary questions that the participant 
may have about the research, the interview itself and the data.  A consent form was 
also designed158.
3. Having scheduled the dates, times, and locations of the interviews  themselves, the 
participants  were then interviewed.  During the research design phase it was 
decided that the first preference for location of the interview would rest with the 
participant, whilst also offering them a choice to meet within the university.  Again, 
drawing on Kvale, where ‘the first minutes of an interview are decisive’ (Kvale, 2007: 
55), the interviews were commenced with a ‘briefing’, where ‘the interviewer defines 
the situation for the subject, briefly tells  about the purpose of the interview the use of 
a tape recorder, and so on, and asks if the subject has any questions before starting 
the interview’ (ibid.).  This also provided the opportunity to ask if the participants 
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157 The themed areas and how they mapped to interview questions are annotated in appendix B
158 See appendices C and D for these documents
guide had answered the relevant questions, and opened up the themes of the research 
in a comfortable way.  Whilst the interview had been scripted thematically, the 
interviews themselves were conducted in a semi-structured format, which allowed for 
some variation on themes, and the running order of the questions, as participants 
may change themes  during the interview and enforcing a schedule would potentially 
distract them, thus  affecting the knowledge production.  I also phrased the interview 
questions  in part by drawing on personal experience or observations, as  according to 
King and Horrocks, ‘you can think about your own personal experience of the 
research area, both first-hand experience and stories and anecdotes  told by people 
you know’ in order to add empathy and rapport during the interview process  (King & 
Horrocks, 2009: 35).  As Kvale has  also suggested, a ‘debriefing’ took place once the 
interview had concluded (Kvale, 2007).  This was  done to avoid feelings of 
‘emptiness’ on the part of the participant, as ‘the subject has given much information 
about his  or her life and may not have received anything in return’ (ibid.).  Thus, an 
opportunity was  given at the end of each interview for the participant to speak further 
on any topics outside of those discussed, and to provide comments on their 
experience of the interview.  All interviews were recorded with a digital voice 
recorder, the model159  chosen for its  discreet size, as to not draw attention to its 
presence during the interview.
4. As each interview took place, they were transcribed.  Initially this was  done by 
listening back to the interviews and typing what was heard, but due to existing nerve 
damage to my left hand, the transcription process was then carried out using speech 
recognition software, which proved accurate (once trained to know my voice and to 
learn digital media related vocabulary) and faster than traditional typing.
5. The interviews  were then physically printed out so that they could be analysed. 
The analysis  phase consisted of revisiting the key questions, the themes of the 
interviews and ascertaining the participants response to the questions.  As  Kvale 
observes, ‘no standard method exists, no via regia, to arrive at essential meanings  and 
deeper implications  of what is said in an interview’.  Thus, in broad terms the 
interviews were ‘coded’ for meaning as opposed to a linguistic analysis of the content. 
This  was  done using a physical markup, where themes  were colour coded, to allow for 
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159  A Sony ICD-UX200S, which transferred MP3s directly to iTunes software, allowing for easy 
digitization, archival and playback of  the material
easy recognition of  commonalities across the annotated documents.
6. The interview findings  were then drafted into an initial framework of themes, where 
their validity, pertinence and objectivity could be verified.  For Kvale, objectivity 
does  not just consist of the dispassionate observer, but can exist as ‘intersubjective 
consensus, as  adequacy to the object and as  the object’s  ability to object’ (Kvale, 2007: 
120).  At this stage then, the interview data was  checked for areas of intersubjective 
consensus, where knowledge about a particular question was co-constructed between 
interviewer and participant, thus lending a ‘voice’ of the interview to emerge.  The 
data was also checked to include the presence of the participant as  they themselves 
theorised and abstracted concepts  to arrive at their ‘objective’ opinion on the matter 
at hand.  
Finally, the data was checked to ensure the inclusion of those participants  who chose 
to object to certain questions, subject areas, interview themes or even the interview 
process itself.  
An example of this  occurred early into the process, where I had initially proposed 
that short articles based on the interviews would be published online, with prior 
review by the participant.  Having reached stage 5 with one early interview, I duly set 
to work at writing the article that would be destined for one of my two websites 
designed for this research project.  When I sent the draft article to the artist on whose 
interview the article was based, I received not an approval, but a critique of the 
article.  The participant suggested that ‘the difference between speaking and the 
recounting of this in writing’ was problematic for her, down to matter ‘as  basic as 
deciding to use my first name, rather than surname throughout’ for the online article. 
For this participant, the framing of the article for online use, with its  adoption of a 
more familiar tone through the use of the first name meant that ‘what was said sits 
within a quite a loaded / unequivocal frame and has turned our conversation into 
something unintentionally lopsided or oddly emphatic’.  
This  critique brought to a head a point on which I had been struggling with in terms 
of the methodology.   On the one hand, the research thesis is situated within a 
discourse of ‘innovation’, and thus the online portal was  an attempt to innovate, as  a 
371
complement the traditional written thesis.  My attempts  to balance the traditional 
research with a sensitivity to online content needing its own tone, were aimed at 
making the research material readable and conversational.  However, this participants 
critique revealed that reconfiguring research material for an online space framed the 
material in a more problematic way, revealing how material designed for academic 
purposes  is  not easily ported to other channels.  The participant had no difficulty with 
the written material being used for the research thesis, and gave full consent to be 
named in the research project, but was nonetheless  uncomfortable with the material 
being ported to an online space.
7. Whilst the difficulties encountered as described above changed my initial 
methodological approach as to how the data could be reported, nonetheless  the 
material had to be processed into a readable format designed for a relevant audience. 
Again, drawing on Kvale (2007), the data from the interviews  was  written in such a 
way as to bring forth the extensive information given in the interview, which the 
interviewer had full access to, but which is  not known to the reader.  This included 
contextualising quotes so that the reader was  aware of what prompted the answer, to 
the layout of the quotes themselves, as both inline to keep the tone readable, and for 
longer quotes, as block quotes.
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Appendix B: Subject Areas as Interview Questions
Interview questions for gatekeepers in institutions
 
Research 
Question
Interview questions
How arts 
institutions 
interact with 
ICTS
Technology 
as art
Tell me a little about what you do.
When you think of  ‘digital media’ and ‘technology’, do you think 
these have any special meaning to you in relation to the artistic 
work that you show in the gallery?
Would you say you choose to show digital media art a lot in your 
gallery?
Why?
Could you name some examples that really stand out for you?
Technological 
determinism 
vs social 
shaping
Gatekeeping - 
showing 
digital art
Gatekeeping - 
investing in 
digital art
I have been reading a lot about technology.  Some scholars believe 
that technology influences us without being influenced itself  and 
we just passively use the technology without much say in it.  Other 
scholars disagree and say that while technology does this up to a 
point, the users can also shape the technology by finding 
unexpected ways of  using it. 
Thinking about some of  that digital media art that you’ve spoken 
about, what would you have to say about these ideas about 
technology?
Some galleries can be reluctant to invest in digital media art - there 
is a perception of  having to have technical skills to use it, or there 
are worries about obsolescence.  What do you think about these 
issues?
Are there other perceptions about digital art, say from gallery 
audiences or from decision makers such as yourself ?
Do you think it can stop galleries from showing digital media art?
In your opinion, are there any other issues around investing in, and 
showing digital art?
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Research 
Question
Interview questions
Innovation 
and creativity 
as viewed by 
gatekeepers
Creative 
process
Technology 
as process
Asking you about ‘how an artist might shape the technology’ leads 
me to ask you about artists and innovation.  What to you is being 
innovative, being creative for an artist looking to gain entry for 
their work into your gallery?
What place has technology in that process?
I’ve been reading about the creative process - what makes a person 
creative.  There are lots of  ideas about this, from brain chemicals, 
to personality traits and personality complexity.  Then on the other 
hand, it can be unfashionable to think of  a creative person as being 
in any way special.  
Thinking about the artists that you see, and how creativity is 
viewed, what do you think?
Artists and 
society
Role of  the 
artist
Function of  
art
Moving on to look at artists in the community - the artist has to live 
within a society.  I would like to explore this with you a little.  
Where do you see the place of  artists in the wider community?  
 Do they have a set ‘role’?  
(I’d also like to say that we will be looking at the artist in relation to 
the state and politics a little later, so in thinking about these 
questions, could you try to not worry about the political dimension 
for now).
And looking at this in reverse - how do you think the wider society 
sees artists?  Do you think those views are accurate?
Artists and 
arts 
institutions - 
structure and 
reward 
systems
Much of  the artists’ world involves dealing with arts institutions 
like yours, for funding, exhibitions, promotion abroad etc.  
Have you any personal experiences or observations you would like 
to relate about that relationship between your institution and 
artists?
And have you any comments or thoughts about that chain of  
interaction between yourself  and those artists as a structured 
relationship?
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Research 
Question
Interview questions
Art, state 
funding and 
culture 
industry
Many times, the funding for the arts comes from the state.  Other 
times it comes from private and commercial interests.  
How do you feel about state funding?
And how do you feel about the commercial interests?  
Theodor Adorno talked about his difficulties with the ‘culture 
industry’, that is, culture being produced for profit.  Yet the arts 
institutions need funding to do their work.  Is this relationship a 
difficult one for arts institutions?
How do you believe the arts should be funded?
How do you believe artists should be supported?
Art, Ireland 
and crisis
Having talked about the arts institutions and their interactions the 
artistic community, and further along to the state, I’d like to pull 
this all together to ask you about art at this moment in time, in 
Ireland.
There has been a lot of  attention on the arts as a kind of  saviour in 
this crisis - do you have an opinion on that?
What is the role of  your institution, if  any, in this situation?
Vision What would you like to see happening the arts in Ireland?
What would you not like to see happening?
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Appendix C: Sample Participant Guide
Sample Guide for Artists:
This  guide will give you a little more detail about the interview process and structure, 
the topics  I would like to talk about, and about the ethical considerations  of data 
collection and privacy.  Please feel free to contact me if there is  anything you would like 
further clarification about.
The interview:
I would like to conduct the interview in a semi-structured format.  This means that 
while I have some broad topics (detailed below) that I would like to talk about with you, 
we have the flexibility to also branch out from these topics  if our conversation takes such 
a turn.  Perhaps during our conversation some further questions may arise from what is 
being talked about, including questions  you might have for me.  You may also wish to 
discuss  some topics  that have not been specifically mentioned in the interview schedule, 
but that you feel are important to discuss.  So the interview, while having a general 
structure, also allows for our conversation to be fluid and dynamic.
It is  my hope that in offering this format for our interview, it will allow you to feel 
comfortable that your opinions can be fully expressed, while also giving us some focus as 
to the subjects we will be exploring.
Location and duration:
While I do have access  to private meeting rooms in Dublin City University, and can 
offer this as an interview location, this may not be convenient for you.  I would therefore 
like to give you the choice of where you would like the interview to be conducted, so 
that it is most comfortable and time-efficient for you.
While the interview is  semi-structured and will allow for topics  to branch out, I would 
intend to take up no more than 60 to 90 minutes of  your time.
Outline of  topics:
How artists interact with technology
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Innovation and creativity in art
Interacting with the wider community and society as an artist
Interacting with arts institutions
Art and culture as an industry
Being an artist in Ireland - how the arts  are viewed politically, through policy and in the 
current ‘crisis’
Data collection, privacy and anonymity:
I would like you to feel as  comfortable as possible about speaking to me, so I would like 
to tell you how I am going to treat the data that I collect from you during the interview 
process.  
So that I can give you my full attention during the interview, and I can be as accurate as 
possible about what we speak about when I write up my research findings, I would like 
to record our conversation.  This  recording will be transcribed by myself.  The only 
other person that may have access to it is  my PhD supervisor, and only for analysis of 
the subject matter that we discussed.  
The recording will be digitally stored on my password-protected computer in an office 
requiring swipe-card access.  It will be deleted 12 months after my research project has 
been completed.
You are kind enough to agree to participate in this  interview - I wish to respect that by 
stating that this is  voluntary on your part.  You can decline to answer any question, and 
you can withdraw from the interview at any point during it.
Your personal privacy is also important.  I have identified some varying degrees of 
anonymity that you may be comfortable with.  Some people may feel comfortable about 
speaking more freely if they have a prior assurance that their identity is  to be kept 
private.  Others are of the understanding that some identification can help add 
authenticity and a richness to the research report.  Other people prefer to be credited for 
the time and valuable information they have contributed to the research, and would not 
wish their voice to be denied by the imposition of anonymity by the part of the 
researcher.  I therefore offer you a choice of the level of anonymity you would be most 
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comfortable with.  Please indicate to me which you would prefer when you sign the 
consent form:
Full anonymity: you prefer your identity not to be revealed in my final thesis
Partial anonymity: you are referred to by your first name, and the initial of your 
surname, e.g. ‘David P’
Full credit: you prefer to be credited with your full name
Online content:
Given that my research is on the topic of digital media, I am hoping to develop an 
online component to my work.  I envisage that this  online resource could include some 
blog type posts that give an overview of some of the topics  that we discussed.  If you 
would be willing to have a short article based our interview written by me for the web, 
please indicate this on the consent form.  Before publication I will send the article to you 
for your approval and nothing will be published in an online format without your 
consent.  At any time before publication you can withdraw your consent and I will not 
publish the content online.
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Appendix D: Consent Form
Sample Consent Form for Gatekeepers
I would like to give my consent to be interviewed by Trish Morgan, PhD researcher 
(digital media), School of  Communications, Dublin City University.
I understand that this  interview is part of Trish’s ISSP funded research project, titled 
Innovation in Digital Media Artistic Production in Ireland.  I agree to it being conducted, 
recorded, transcribed, archived and destroyed as detailed in the participant’s guide.
I agree that I can choose the level of anonymity as detailed in the participants  guide, 
and I declare this by checking one of  the boxes below.
Signed:  _______________________________________
Date:  _________________________________________
Preference for anonymity:
Full anonymity                         Partial anonymity          
Partial personal anonymity   Full credit                         
Consent for online content (with prior review by you)
Yes              
No              
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